Imperfect Knowledge, Inflation Expectations, and Monetary Policy

Imperfect Knowledge, Inflation Expectations, and Monetary Policy Athanasios Orphanides Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and (cid:3) John C. Williams Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco May 2002 Abstract This paper investigates the role that imperfect knowledge about the structure of the economy plays in the formation of expectations, macroeconomic dynamics, and the e(cid:14)cient formulation of monetary policy. Economic agents rely on an adaptive learning technology to form expectations and continuously update their beliefs regarding the dynamic structure of the economy based on incoming data. The process of perpetual learning introduces an additional layer of dynamic interactions between monetary policy and economic outcomes. We (cid:12)ndthat policies that would bee(cid:14)cient underrational expectations can performpoorly when knowledge is imperfect. In particular, policies that fail to maintain tight control over inflation are prone to episodes in which the public’s expectations of inflation become uncoupled from the policy objective and stagflation results, in a pattern similar to that experienced in the United States during the 1970s. More generally, we show that policy shouldrespondmoreaggressively toinflation underimperfectknowledgethanunderperfect knowledge. Keywords: Inflation targeting, policy rules, rational expectations, learning, inflation persistence. JEL Classi(cid:12)cation System: E52 Correspondence: Orphanides: FederalReserveBoard,Washington,D.C.20551,Tel.: (202)452-2654, e-mail: Athanasios.Orphanides@frb.gov. Williams: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 101 Market Street, San Francisco, CA 94105,Tel.: (415) 974-2240,e-mail: John.C.Williams@sf.frb.org. (cid:3) We would like to thank Roger Craine, George Evans, Judith Go(cid:11), Stan Fischer, Mark Gertler, JohnLeahy,BillPoole,TomSargent,LarsSvensson,andparticipantsatmeetingsoftheEconometric Society, the Society of ComputationalEconomics,the University of Cyprus, the FederalReserve BanksofSanFranciscoandRichmond,andtheNBERUniversitiesResearchConferenceonMacroeconomicPolicyinaDynamicUncertainEconomyforusefulcommentsanddiscussions. Theopinions expressedare those of the authors and do not necessarilyreflect views of the Boardof Governorsof the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.

1 Introduction Rational expectations provides an elegant and powerful framework that has come to dominate thinking about the dynamic structure of the economy and econometric policy evaluation over the past 30 years. This success has spurred further examination into the strong information assumptions implicit in many applications. Thomas Sargent (1993) concludes that \rational expectations models impute much more knowledge to the agents within the model ... than is possessed by an econometrician, who faces estimation and inference prob- 1 lems that the agents in the model have somehow solved" (p. 3, emphasis in original). Researchers have proposed re(cid:12)nements to rational expectations that respect the principle that agents use information e(cid:14)ciently in forming expectations, but nonetheless recognize thelimitstoandcosts ofinformation-processingandcognitive constraintsthatinfluencethe expectations-formation process (Sargent 1999, Evans and Honkapohja 2001, Sims 2001). In this study, we allow for a form of imperfect knowledge in which economic agents rely on an adaptive learning technology to form expectations. This form of learning represents a relatively modest deviation from rational expectations that nests it as a limiting case. We show that the resulting process of perpetual learning introduces an additional layer of interaction between monetary policy and economic outcomes that has important implications for macroeconomic dynamics and the e(cid:14)cient formulation of monetary policy. Our work builds on the extensive literature relating rational expectations with learning and the adaptive formation of expectations (Bray 1982, Bray and Savin 1984, Marcet and Sargent 1989, Woodford 1990, Bullard and Mitra 2001). A key (cid:12)nding in this literature is that under certain conditions an economy with learning converges to the rational expectations equilibrium (Townsend 1978, Bray 1982, 1983, Blume and Easley 1987). However, 1Missing from such models, as Benjamin Friedman (1979) points out, \is a clear outline of the way in which economic agents derive the knowledge which they then use to formulate expectations." To be sure, this does not reflect a criticism of the traditional use of the concept of \rationality" as reflecting the optimal use of information in the formation of expectations, taking into account an agent’s objectives and resource constraints. The di(cid:14)culty is that in Muth’s (1961) original formulation, rational expectations are not optimizing in that sense. Thus, the issue is not that the \rational expectations" concept reflects too muchrationality butratherthat it imposes too little rationality in theexpectations formation process. For example,asSims(2001)hasrecentlypointedout,optimalinformationprocessingsubjecttoa(cid:12)nitecognitive capacitymayresultinfundamentallydi(cid:11)erentprocessesfortheformationofexpectationsthanthoseimplied by rational expectations. To acknowledge this terminological tension, Simon (1978) suggested that a less misleading term for Muth’s concept would be\model consistent" expectations (p. 2). 1

until agents have accumulated su(cid:14)cient knowledge about the economy, economic outcomes during the transition depend on the adaptive learning process (Lucas 1986). Moreover, in a changing economic environment, agents are constantly learning and their beliefs converge not to a (cid:12)xed rational expectations equilibrium, but to an ergodic distribution around it (Sargent 1999, Evans and Honkapohja 2001). In this paper, we investigate the macroeco- 2 nomic implications of such a process of perpetual learning. Asalaboratoryforourexperiment,weemployasimplelinearmodeloftheU.S.economy withcharacteristics similar tomoreelaboratemodelsfrequentlyusedtostudyoptimalmonetary policy. We assume that economic agents know the correct structure of the economy and form expectations accordingly. But, rather than endowing them with complete knowledge of the parameters of these functions|as would be required by imposing the rational expectationsassumption|wepositthateconomicagentsrelyon(cid:12)nitememoryleastsquares estimation to update these parameter estimates. This setting conveniently nests rational expectations as the limiting case corresponding to in(cid:12)nite memory least squares estimation and allows varying degrees of imperfection in expectations formation to be characterized by variation in a single model parameter. We (cid:12)nd that even marginal deviations from rational expectations in the direction of imperfect knowledge can have economically important e(cid:11)ects on the stochastic behavior of our economy and policy evaluation. An interesting feature of the model is that the interaction of learning and control creates rich nonlinear dynamics that can potentially explain both the shifting parameter structure of linear reduced form characterizations of the economy and the appearance of shifting policy objectives or inflation targets. For example, sequences of policy errors or inflationary shocks, such as experienced during the 1970s, couldgiverisetostagflationaryepisodesthatdonotariseunderrationalexpectations with perfect knowledge. 2Ourworkalso drawsonsomeotherstrandsoftheliteraturerelating tolearning, estimation, andpolicy design. One such strand has examined the formation of inflation expectations when the policymaker’s objective may be unknown or uncertain, for example during a transition following a shift in policy regime (Taylor 1975, Bom(cid:12)m et al, 1997, Erceg and Levin, 2001, Kozicki and Tinsley, 2001, Tetlow and von zur Muehlen, 2001). Another strand has considered how policymaker uncertainty about the structure of the economy influences policy choices and economic dynamics (Sargent, 1999, Balvers and Cosimano 1994, Wieland 1998, andothers). Finally, ourwork relates to explorations of alternativeapproaches for modeling aggregate inflation expectations, such as Ball (2000), Mankiw and Reis (2001) and Carroll (2001). 2

Indeed, the critical role of the formation of inflation expectations for understanding the success and failures of monetary policy is a dimension of policy that has often been cited by policymakers over the past two decades but has received much less attention in formal econometricpolicyevaluations. Animportantexampleisthecontrastbetweenthestubborn persistence of inflation expectations during the 1970s when policy placed relatively greater attention on countercyclical concerns and the much improved stability in both inflation and inflation expectations following the renewed emphasis on price stability in 1979. In explaining the rationale for this shift in emphasis in 1979, Federal Reserve Chairman Volcker highlighted the importance of learning in shaping the inflation expectations formation 3 process: It is not necessary to recite all the details of the long series of events that have culminatedintheseriousinflationaryenvironmentthatwearenowexperiencing. Anentiregeneration ofyoungadultshasgrown upsincethemid-1960’s knowing only inflation, indeed an inflation that has seemed to accelerate inexorably. In the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that many citizens have begun to wonder whether it is realistic to anticipate a return to general price stability, and have begun to change their behavior accordingly. Inflation feeds in part on itself, so part of the job of returning to a more stable and more productive economy must be to break the grip of inflationary expectations. (Statement before the J.E.C., October 17, 1979.) Thishistoricalepisodeisaclear exampleofinflationexpectations becominguncoupledfrom the intended policy objective and illustrates the point that the design of monetary policy must account for the influence of policy on expectations. We (cid:12)nd that policies designed to be e(cid:14)cient under rational expectations can be quite ine(cid:14)cient when knowledge is imperfect; in particular, the e(cid:14)cient response to inflation is more aggressive than would be optimal with perfect knowledge. This deterioration in performance is particularly severe when policymakers put a high weight on stabilizing real economic activity relative to price stability. We show that economic performance can be improved signi(cid:12)cantly by placing greater emphasis on controlling inflation and inflation 3Indeed,wewouldarguethattheshiftinemphasistowardsgreaterfocusoninflationwasitselfinfluenced by the recognition of the importance of facilitating the formation of stable inflation expectations|which had been insu(cid:14)ciently appreciated earlier during the 1970s. See Orphanides (2001) for a more detailed description ofthepolicy discussion atthetimeandthenatureoftheimprovementinmonetarypolicysince 1979. SeealsoChristianoandGust(2000)andSargent(1999)foralternativeexplanationsoftheinflationary episode of the1960s and 1970s. 3

expectations. We (cid:12)nd that policies emphasizing tight inflation control can facilitate learning and provide better guidance for the formation of inflation expectations. Such policies mitigate the negative influence of imperfect knowledge on economic stabilization and yield superior macroeconomic performance. Thus, our (cid:12)ndings provide analytical support for monetary policyframeworks that emphasize theprimacyof price stability as an operational policy objective, for example the inflation targeting approach as discussed by Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and as adopted by several central banks over the past decade or so. 2 The Model Economy We consider a stylized model that gives rise to a nontrivial inflation-output variability tradeo(cid:11) and in which a simple one-parameter policy rule represents optimal monetary pol- 4 icy under rational expectations. In this section, we describe the model speci(cid:12)cation for inflation and output and the central bank’s optimization problem; in the next two sections, we take up the formation of expectations by private agents. Inflationisdeterminedbyamodi(cid:12)edLucassupplyfunctionthatallowsforsomeintrinsic inflation persistence, (cid:25) t+1 = (cid:30)(cid:25) t e +1 +(1−(cid:30))(cid:25) t+(cid:11)y t+1+e t+1 ; e(cid:24) iid(0;(cid:27) e 2 ); (1) where (cid:25) denotes the inflation rate, (cid:25)e is the private agents’ expected inflation rate based on time t information, y is the output gap, (cid:30) 2 (0;1), (cid:11) > 0, and e is a serially uncorrelated innovation. As discussed by Clark et al (1999), Lengwiler and Orphanides (forthcoming), and others, this speci(cid:12)cation incorporates an important role for inflation expectations for determining inflation outcomes while also allowing for some inflation persistence that is 5 necessary for the model to yield a nontrivial inflation-output gap variability tradeo(cid:11). The output gap (the percent deviation of real output from potential output) is determined by the real rate gap (the di(cid:11)erence between the short-term real interest rate and the 4Since its introduction by Taylor (1979), the practice of analyzing monetary policy rules using such an inflation-output variability tradeo(cid:11) has been adopted in a large numberof academic and policy studies. 5We have also examined the \New-Keynesian" variant of the Phillips curvestudied by Gali and Gertler (2000) andothers,which also allows forsome intrinsicinflationinertia. Aswereport insection 6,ourmain (cid:12)ndingsare not sensitive to this alternative. 4

equilibrium real interest rate), y t+1 = −(cid:24)(r t −r(cid:3) )+u t+1 ; u(cid:24) iid(0;(cid:27) u 2 ): (2) wherer is theshort-term real interest rate, r(cid:3) is theequilibriumreal rate, and uis a serially uncorrelated innovation. Note that a monetary policy action at period t a(cid:11)ects output in the following period, reflecting the lag in the monetary transmission mechanism. The central bank’s objective is to design a policy rule that minimizes the loss, denoted by L, equal to the weighted average of the asymptotic variances of the output gap and of deviations of inflation from the target rate, L =(1−!)Var(y)+!Var((cid:25)−(cid:25)(cid:3) ); (3) where Var(z) denotes the unconditional variance of variable z, and ! 2 (0;1] is the relative weight on inflation stabilization. The central bank sets its instrument, the short-term (ex ante) real interest rate r t, after private agents set their expectations for inflation in period t + 1, (cid:25)e , but before time t+1 t + 1 innovations are observed. We assume that the central bank has perfect knowledge regarding the structural parameters of the model, (cid:11);(cid:30);(cid:24), and r(cid:3) . With this assumption, we can reformulate the policy instrument in terms of the choice at time t of the intended level of output gap in period t+1, x t = −(cid:24)(r t −r(cid:3) ). 6 Hence, the realization of the output gap in period t+1 equals the intended output gap plus the control error, u t+1, y t+1 = x t+u t+1 : (4) This completes the description of the structure of the model economy, with the exception of the expectations formation process that we examine in detail below. 3 The Perfect Knowledge Benchmark We begin by considering the \textbook" case of rational expectations with perfect knowledge in which private agents know the structure of the economy and the central bank’s 6Notethathereweabstractfromtheimportantcomplicationsassociatedwiththereal-timemeasurement oftheoutputgapandandtheequilibriumrealinterestrateforformulatingthepolicyrule. SeeOrphanides (1998) and Laubach and Williams (2001) for analyses of these issues. 5

policy. In this case, expectations are rational in that they are consistent with the true data generating process of the economy (the model). In the following section, we use the resulting equilibrium solution as a \perfect knowledge" benchmark against which we compare outcomes under imperfect knowledge, in which case agents do not know the structural parameters of the model, but instead must form expectations based on estimated forecasting models. Under the assumption of perfect knowledge, the evolution of the economy and optimal monetary policy can all be expressed in terms of two variables, the current inflation rate and its target level. These variables determine the formation of expectations and the policy choice, which, together with serially uncorrelated shocks, determine output and inflation in period t+1. Speci(cid:12)cally, we can write the monetary policy rule in terms of the inflation gap, x t = −(cid:18)((cid:25) t −(cid:25)(cid:3) ); (5) where (cid:18) > 0 measures the responsiveness of the real rate gap to the inflation gap. Given this monetary policy rule, inflation expectations are given by: (cid:11)(cid:18) 1−(cid:30)−(cid:11)(cid:18) (cid:25) t e +1 = 1−(cid:30) (cid:25)(cid:3) + 1−(cid:30) (cid:25) t : (6) Inflation expectations depend on the current level of inflation, the inflation target, and the parameter (cid:18) measuring the central bank’s responsiveness to the inflation gap. Substituting this expression for expected inflation into equation (1) yields the rational expectations solution for inflation for a given monetary policy, (cid:11)(cid:18) (cid:11)(cid:18) (cid:25) t+1 = 1−(cid:30) (cid:25)(cid:3) +(1− 1−(cid:30) )(cid:25) t+e t+1 +(cid:11)u t+1 : (7) Onenoteworthyfeatureofthissolutionisthatthe(cid:12)rst-orderautocorrelation oftheinflation rate, given by 1 − (cid:11)(cid:18) , is decreasing in (cid:18) and is invariant to the value of (cid:25)(cid:3) . Note that 1−(cid:30) the rational expectations solution can also be written in terms of the \inflation expectation gap"|thedi(cid:11)erencebetweeninflationexpectationsforperiodt+1fromtheinflationtarget, (cid:25)e −(cid:25)(cid:3) , t+1 t 1−(cid:30)−(cid:11)(cid:18) (cid:25) t e +1 −(cid:25) t (cid:3) = 1−(cid:30) ((cid:25) t −(cid:25)(cid:3) ): (8) Equations (5) and (6) close the perfect knowledge benchmark model. 6

3.1 Optimal Monetary Policy under Perfect Knowledge For the economy with perfect knowledge, the optimal monetary policy, (cid:18)P , can be obtained 7 in closed form and is given by: 0 s 1 (cid:18) (cid:19) ! (cid:11) (cid:11) 2 4 (1−!) (cid:18)P = @− + + A for 0 < ! < 1: (9) 2 (1−!) 1−(cid:30) 1−(cid:30) ! Inthelimit, when! equals unity(thatis, whenthepolicymaker isnotatall concernedwith output stability), the policymaker sets the real interest rate so that inflation is expected to return to its target in the next period. The optimal policy in the case ! = 1 is given by: (cid:18)P = 1−(cid:30) , and the irreducible variance of inflation, owing to unpredictable output and (cid:11) inflation innovations, equals (cid:27)2 + (cid:11)2(cid:27)2 . More generally, the optimal value of (cid:18) depends e u positively on the ratio 1−(cid:30) , and the parameters (cid:11) and (cid:30) enter only in terms of this ratio. (cid:11) In particular, the optimal policy response is larger the greater the degree of intrinsic inertia in inflation, measured by 1−(cid:30). The greater the central bank’s weight on inflation stabilization, the greater is the responsivenesstotheinflation gap, andthesmaller the(cid:12)rst-orderautocorrelation ininflation. Di(cid:11)erentiating equation (9) shows that the policy responsiveness to the inflation gap is increasing in !, the weight the central bank places on inflation stabilization. As a result, the autocorrelation of inflation is decreasing in !, with a limiting value approachingunity when ! approaches zero, and zero when ! equals one. That is, if the central bank cares only about output stabilization, the inflation rate becomes a random walk, while if the central bankcaresonlyaboutinflationstabilization, theinflation ratedisplaysnoserialcorrelation. And, as noted, this model yields a nontrivial monotonic tradeo(cid:11) between the variability of inflation and the output gap for all values of ! 2 (0;1]. These results are illustrated in Figure 1. The top panel of the (cid:12)gure shows the variability tradeo(cid:11) described by optimal policies for values of ! between zero and one. The lower panel plots the optimal values of (cid:18) against !. 7SeeClark,Goodhart,andHuang(1999)andOrphanidesandWieland(2000)forexamplesofthemethod of solving for the optimal policy. Note that owing to the linear-quadratic structure of the model, the distributions of the innovations do not influence the equilibrium determination of the expectations and policy functions. 7

4 Imperfect Knowledge As the perfect knowledge solution shows, private inflation forecasts depend on knowledge of the structural model parameters and policymaker preferences. In addition, these parameters influence the expectations formation function nonlinearly. We now relax the assumption that private agents have perfect knowledge of all structural parameters and the policymaker’s preferences. Instead, we posit that agents must somehow infer the information necessary for forming expectations by observing historical data, in essence acting like econometricians whoknow thecorrect speci(cid:12)cation of the economy butare uncertain about the parameters of the model. In particular, we assume that private agents update the coe(cid:14)cients of their model for forecasting inflation using least squares learning with (cid:12)nite memory. We focus on least squares learning because of its desirable convergence properties, straightforward implemen- 8 tation, and close correspondence to what real-world forecasters actually do. Estimation with (cid:12)nite memory reflects agents’ concern for changes in the structural parameters of the economy. To focus our attention on the role of imperfections in the expectations formation process itself, however, we deliberately abstract from the introduction of the actual uncertainty in the structure of the economy which would justify such concerns in equilibrium. We follow Sargent (1999) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) by modeling (cid:12)nite memory or \perpetual learning" by assuming agents use a constant gain in their recursive least squares formula that places greater weight on more recent observations. This algorithm is equivalent to applying weighted least squares where the weights decline geometrically with the distance in time between the observation being weighted and the most recent observation. This approach is closely related to the use of (cid:12)xed sample lengths or rolling- 8This method of adaptivelearning isclosely related tooptimal (cid:12)ltering wherethestructuralparameters areassumedtofollowrandomwalks. Ofcourse,ifprivateagentsknowthecompletestructureofthemodel| including the laws of motion for inflation, output, and the unobserved states and the distributions of the innovations to these processes|then with this knowledge they could compute e(cid:14)cient inflation forecasts that could outperform those based on recursive least squares. However, uncertainty regarding the precise structure of the time-variation in the model parameters is likely to reduce the real e(cid:14)ciency gains from a method optimized to a particular model speci(cid:12)cation relative to a simple method such as least-squares learning. Further, once we begin to ponder how economic agents could realistically model and account for such uncertainty precisely, we quickly recognize thesigni(cid:12)cance of respecting (or the absurdityof ignoring) thecognitive and computational limits of economic agents. 8

window regressions to estimate a forecasting model (Friedman 1979). In terms of the mean \age" of the data used, a rolling-regression window of length l is equivalent to a constant gain (cid:20) of 2=l. The advantage of the constant gain least squares algorithm over rolling regressions is that the evolution of the former system is fully described by a small set of variables, while the latter requires one to keep track of a large number of variables. 4.1 Least Squares Learning with Finite Memory Underperfectknowledge,thepredictablecomponentofnextperiod’sinflationrateisalinear function of the inflation target and the current inflation rate, where the coe(cid:14)cients on the two variables are functions of the policy parameter (cid:18) and the other structural parameters of the model, as shown in equation (6). In addition, the optimal value of (cid:18) is itself a nonlinear function of the central bank’s weight on inflation stabilization and the other model structural parameters. Given this simple structure, the least squares regression of inflation on a constant and lagged inflation, (cid:25) i = c 0;t+c 1;t (cid:25) i−1+v i ; (10) yields consistent estimates of the coe(cid:14)cients describing the law of motion for inflation (Marcet and Sargent (1988) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001)). Agents then use these 9 results to form their inflation expectations. To (cid:12)x notation, let X i and c i be the 2(cid:2)1 vectors, X i = (1;(cid:25) i−1) 0 and c i = (c 0;i ;c 1;i) 0 . Using data through period t, the least squares regression parameters for equation (10) can be written in recursive form: c t = c t−1 +(cid:20) t R t −1X t((cid:25) t −X t 0c t−1); (11) R t = R t−1+(cid:20) t(X t X t 0−R t−1) (12) where (cid:20) t is the gain. With least squares learning with in(cid:12)nite memory, (cid:20) t = 1=t, so as t increases, (cid:20) t converges to zero. As a result, as the data accumulate this mechanism 9Note that here we assume that agents employ a reduced form of the expectations formation function thatiscorrectly speci(cid:12)edunderrationalexpectations. Instead,agentsmaybeuncertainofthecorrect form and estimate a more general speci(cid:12)cation, for example, a linear regression with additional lags of inflation which nests (10). In section 6, we also discuss results from such an example. 9

converges to the correct expectations functions and the economy converges to the perfect knowledge benchmark solution. As noted above, to formalize perpetual learning|as would be required in the presence of structural change|we replace the decreasing gain in the in(cid:12)nite memory recursion with a small constant gain, (cid:20)> 0. 10 With imperfect knowledge, expectations are based on the perceived law of motion of the inflation process, governed by the perpetual learning algorithm described above. The model under imperfect knowledge consists of the structural equation for inflation (1), the output gap equation (2), the monetary policy rule (5), and the one-step-ahead forecast for inflation, given by (cid:25) t e +1 = c 0;t+c 1;t (cid:25) t ; (13) where c 0;t and c 1;t are updated according to equations (11) and (12). Weemphasizethatinthelimitofperfectknowledge(thatis,as(cid:20)! 0),theexpectations function above converges to rational expectations and the stochastic coe(cid:14)cients for the intercept and slope collapse to: (cid:11)(cid:18)(cid:25)(cid:3) cP = ; 0 1−(cid:30) 1−(cid:30)−(cid:11)(cid:18) cP = : 1 1−(cid:30) Thus, this modeling approach accommodates the Lucas critique in the sense that expectations formation is endogenous and adjusts to changes in policy or structure (as reflected here by changes in the parameters (cid:18), (cid:25)(cid:3) , (cid:11), and (cid:30)). In essence, our model is one of \noisy rationalexpectations." Asweshowbelow,althoughexpectations areimperfectlyrationalin that agents need to estimate the reduced form equations they employ to form expectations, they are nearly rational in that the forecasts are close to being e(cid:14)cient. 5 Perpetual Learning in Action We use model simulations to illustrate how learning a(cid:11)ects the dynamics of inflation expectations, inflation, and output in the model economy. First, we examine the behavior of 10In terms of forecasting performance, the \optimal" choice of (cid:20) depends on therelative variances of the transitory and permanent shocks, similar to the relationship between the Kalman gain and the signal-tonoise ratio in the case of the Kalman (cid:12)lter. Here, we do not explicitly attempt to calibrate (cid:20) in this way, but instead examine thee(cid:11)ects for a range of values of (cid:20). 10

the estimated coe(cid:14)cients of the inflation forecast equation and evaluate the performance of inflation forecasts. We then consider the dynamic response of the economy to shocks similar to those experienced during the 1970s in the United States. Speci(cid:12)cally, we compare the outcomes under perfect knowledge and imperfect knowledge with least squares learning that correspond to three alternative monetary policy rules to illustrate the additional layer of dynamic interactions introduced by the imperfections in the formation of inflation expectations. In calibrating the model for the simulations, each period corresponds to about half a year. We consider values of (cid:20) of .025, .05, and .1, which roughly correspond to using 40, 20, or 10 years of data, respectively, in the context of rolling regressions. We consider two valuesfor(cid:30),theparameterthatmeasurestheinfluenceofinflationexpectationsoninflation. As a baseline case, we set (cid:30) to 0.75, which implies a signi(cid:12)cant role for intrinsic inflation inertia, consistent with the contracting models of Buiter and Jewitt (1981) and Fuhrer and 11 Moore (1995) and estimates by Brayton et al (1997). In the alternative speci(cid:12)cation, we allow for a greater role for expectations and correspondingly down-weight inflation inertia by setting (cid:30) = :9, consistent with estimates by Gali and Gertler (2000) and others. To ease comparisons between the two values of (cid:30), we set (cid:11) so that the optimal policy under perfect knowledge is identical in the two cases. Speci(cid:12)cally, for (cid:30) = :75, we set (cid:11) = :25, and for (cid:30)= :9, we set (cid:11) = :1. In all cases, we assume (cid:27) e = (cid:27) u = 1. The three alternative policies we consider correspond to the values of (cid:18), f0:1;0:6;1:0g. These values represent the optimal policies under perfect knowledge for policymakers with preferences with a relative weight on inflation, !, 0.01, 0.5, and 1, respectively. Hence, (cid:18) = 0:1 corresponds to an \inflation dove" policymaker who is primarily concerned about outputstabilization, (cid:18) = 0:6 correspondstoapolicymaker with \balanced preferences"who weighs inflation and output stabilization equally, and (cid:18) = 1 corresponds to an \inflation hawk" policymaker who cares exclusively about inflation. 11Other estimates suggest an even smaller role for expectations relative to intrinsic inertia; see Fuhrer (1997), Roberts (2001), and Rudd and Whelan (2001). 11

5.1 The Performance of Least-Squares Inflation Forecasts Even absent shocks to the structure of the economy, the process of least squares learning generates time variation in the formation of inflation expectations and thereby in the processes of inflation and output. The magnitude of this time variation is increasing in (cid:20)| which is equivalent to using shorter samples (and thus less information from the historical data) in rolling regressions. Table 1 reports summary statistics of the estimates of agents’ inflation forecasting model based on stochastic simulations of the baseline model economy with (cid:30) = :75. As seen in the table, the unconditional standard deviations of the estimates increase with (cid:20). This dependence of the variation in the estimates on the rate of learning is portrayed in Figure 2, which shows the steady-state distributions of the estimates of c 0 and c 1 underlying Table 1. For comparison, the vertical lines in each panel indicate the values of c 0 and c 1 in the corresponding perfect knowledge benchmark. Table 1: Least Squares Learning (cid:20) 0 (PK) .025 .05 .10 (cid:18) = 0:1 Mean c 0 .00 .02 .01 -.01 SD c 0 { .37 .68 1.40 Mean c 1 .90 .86 .83 .79 SD c 1 { .11 .17 .25 Median c 1 .90 .89 .88 .87 (cid:18) = 0:6 Mean c 0 .00 .01 .01 .00 SD c 0 { .25 .38 .59 Mean c 1 .40 .37 .35 .31 SD c 1 { .20 .27 .37 Median c 1 .40 .39 .38 .36 (cid:18) = 1:0 Mean c 0 .00 .01 .01 .01 SD c 0 { .24 .35 .52 Mean c 1 .00 -.02 -.03 -.06 SD c 1 { .21 .29 .39 Median c 1 .00 -.02 -.03 -.06 12

The median values of the coe(cid:14)cient estimates are nearly identical to the values implied by the perfect knowledge benchmark; however, the mean estimates of c 1 are biased downward slightly. There is nearly no contemporaneous correlation between estimates of c 0 and c 1. Each of these estimates, however, is highly serially correlated, with (cid:12)rst-order autocorrelations just below unity. This serial correlation falls only slightly as (cid:20) increases. Note that a more aggressive policy response to inflation reduces the variation in the estimated intercept, c 0, but increases the magnitude of fluctuations in the coe(cid:14)cient on the lagged inflation rate, c 1. In the case of (cid:18) = 1, the distribution of estimates of c 1 is nearly symmetrical around zero. For (cid:18) = 0:1 and 0:6, the distribution of estimates of c 1 is skewed to the left, reflecting the accumulation of mass around unity, but the absence of much mass above 1.1. Table 2: Forecasting Performance: Mean-squared Error (cid:30)= :75;(cid:11) = :25 (cid:30)= :9;(cid:11) = :1 Forecast method (cid:20) : .025 .05 .10 .025 .05 .10 Perfect knowledge 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.01 1.01 1.01 (cid:18) = 0:1 LS ((cid:12)nite memory) 1.04 1.05 1.08 1.03 1.18 2.12 LS (in(cid:12)nite memory) 1.05 1.06 1.12 1.05 1.70 6.21 Long-lag Phillips curve 1.05 1.06 1.08 1.07 1.08 1.13 (cid:18) = 0:6 LS ((cid:12)nite memory) 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.01 1.01 1.04 LS (in(cid:12)nite memory) 1.06 1.09 1.14 1.10 1.19 1.43 Long-lag Phillips curve 1.05 1.06 1.10 1.06 1.12 1.29 (cid:18) = 1:0 LS ((cid:12)nite memory) 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.01 1.01 1.02 LS (in(cid:12)nite memory) 1.06 1.10 1.18 1.11 1.27 1.85 Long-lag Phillips curve 1.05 1.07 1.10 1.07 1.14 1.34 Finite-memory least squares forecasts perform very well in this model economy. As shown in Table 2, the mean-squared error of agents’ one-step-ahead inflation forecasts is only slightly above the theoretical minimum given in the (cid:12)rst line of the table (labeled 12 \Perfect knowledge"). Only when both inflation displays very little intrinsic inertia and 12This isconsistent with earlier (cid:12)ndingsregarding least squaresestimation. AndersonandTaylor(1976), 13

the policymaker places very little weight on inflation stabilization does the performance of (cid:12)nite-memory least squares forecasts break down. Not surprisingly, given that we do not include any shocks to the structure of the economy, agents’ forecasting performance deteriorates somewhat as (cid:20) increases. Nonetheless, (cid:12)nite-memory least squares estimates perform better than those with in(cid:12)nite memory (based on the full sample), and the difference in performance is more pronounced the greater the role of inflation expectations in determining inflation. In an economy where inflation is in part determined by the forecasts of other agents who use (cid:12)nite-memory least squares, it is better to follow suit rather than to use estimates that would have better forecast properties under perfect knowledge (Evans and Ramey 2001). Withimperfectknowledge, theprivateagents abilitytoforecastinflationdependsonthe monetarypolicyinplace, withforecasterrorsonaverage smaller whenpolicyrespondsmore aggressively to inflation. This e(cid:11)ect is more pronounced the greater the role of inflation expectations in determining inflation. The marginal bene(cid:12)t to tighter inflation control on agents’ forecasting ability is greatest when the policymaker places relatively little weight on inflation stabilization. In this case, inflation is highly serially correlated, and the estimates of c 1 are frequently in the vicinity of unity. Evidently, the ability to forecast inflation deteriorates when inflation is nearly a random walk. As seen by comparing the cases of (cid:18) of 0.6 and 1.0, the marginal bene(cid:12)t of tight inflation control disappears once the (cid:12)rst-order autocorrelation of inflation is well below one. Finally, even though only one lag of inflation appears in the equations for inflation and inflation expectations, it is possible to improve on in(cid:12)nite-memory least squares forecasts by includingadditional lags of inflation in the estimated forecasting equation. This result is similar to that found in empirical studies of inflation, where relatively long lags of inflation help predict inflation (Staiger, Stock, and Watson 1997, Stock and Watson 1999, Brayton, Roberts, andWilliams 1999). Evidently, inan economy whereagents useadaptive learning, multi-period lags of inflation are a reasonable proxy for inflation expectations. This result may also help explain the (cid:12)ndingthat survey-based inflation expectations do not appear to for example, emphasize that least squares forecasts can be accurate even when consistent estimates of individual parameter estimates are much harderto obtain. 14

be \rational" using standard tests (Roberts 1997, 1998). With adaptive learning, inflation forecast errors are correlated with data in the agents’ information set; the standard test for forecast e(cid:14)ciency applies only to stable economic environments in which agents’ estimates of the forecast model have converged to the true values. 5.2 Least Squares Learning and Inflation Persistence Thetimevariationininflationexpectationsresultingfromperpetuallearninginducesgreater serial correlation in inflation. As shown in Table 3, the (cid:12)rst-order unconditional autocorrelation ofinflation increases with(cid:20). The(cid:12)rstcolumnshows theautocorrelations for inflation under perfect knowledge ((cid:20) = 0); note that these (cid:12)gures are identical across the two speci- (cid:12)cations of (cid:30) and (cid:11). In the case of the \inflation dove" policymaker ((cid:18) = 0:1), the existence of learning raises the (cid:12)rst-order autocorrelation from 0.9 to very nearly unity. For the policymaker with moderate preferences ((cid:18) = 0:6), increasing (cid:20) from 0 to 0.1 causes the autocorrelation of inflation to rise from 0.4 to 0.66 when (cid:30)= :75, or to 0.93 when (cid:30)= :9. Table 3: Inflation Persistence: First-order Autocorrelation (cid:30)= :75;(cid:11) = :25 (cid:30) = :9;(cid:11) = :1 (cid:18) (cid:20): 0 .025 .05 .10 .025 .05 .10 0.1 .90 .97 .98 .99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.6 .40 .48 .55 .66 .62 .79 .93 1.0 .00 .03 .06 .12 .09 .18 .28 Thus, in a model with a relatively small amount of intrinsic inflation persistence, the autocorrelation of inflation can be very high, even with a monetary policy that places signi(cid:12)cant weight on inflation stabilization. Even for the \inflation hawk" policymaker whose policy under perfect knowledge results in no serial persistence in inflation, the perpetual learning generates a signi(cid:12)cant amount of positive serial correlation in inflation. As we discuss below, the rise in inflation persistence associated with perpetual learning in turn a(cid:11)ects the optimal design of monetary policy. 15

5.3 The Economy Following Inflationary Shocks Next, weconsider thedynamicresponseof themodelto asequenceof unanticipated shocks, similar in spirit to those that arose in the 1970s. The responses of inflation expectations and inflation do not depend on the \source" of the shocks, that is, on whether we assume the shocks are due to policy errors or to other disturbances. Note that under least squares learning, the model responses depend nonlinearly on the initial values of the states c and R. In the following, we report the average response from 1000 simulations, each of which starts from initial conditions drawn from the relevant steady-state distribution. The shock is 2 percentage points in period one and it declines in magnitude from periods two through eight. In period nine and beyond there is no shock. For these experiments we assume the baseline values for (cid:30) and (cid:11), and set (cid:20) = 0.05. With perfect knowledge, the series of inflationary shocks causes a temporary rise in inflation and a decline in the output gap, as shown by the dashed lines in Figure 3. The speedat which inflation is broughtbackto target dependson themonetarypolicy response, with the more aggressive policy yielding a relatively sharp but short decline in output and a rapid return of inflation to target. With the inflation hawk or moderate policymaker, the peakincreaseininflationisnomorethan2-1/2percentagepointsandinflationreturnstoits target within 10 periods. With the inflation dove policymaker, the modest policy response avoids the sharp decline in output, but inflation is allowed to rise to a level about 4-1/2 percentage points above target, and the return to target is more gradual, with inflation still remaining one percentage point above target after 20 periods. Imperfect knowledge with learning ampli(cid:12)es and prolongs the response of inflation and output to the shocks, especially when the central bank places signi(cid:12)cant weight on output stabilization. The solid lines in the (cid:12)gure show the responses of inflation and output under imperfect knowledge for the three policy rules. The inflation hawk’s aggressive response to inflation e(cid:11)ectively keeps inflation from drifting away from target and the responses of inflationandoutputdi(cid:11)eronlymodestlyfromthoseunderperfectknowledge. Inthecase of balanced preferences, the magnitude of the peak responses of inflation and the output gap is a bit larger than under perfect knowledge, but the persistence of these gaps is markedly 16

higher. The outcomes under the inflation dove, however, are dramatically di(cid:11)erent. The inflation dove attempts to (cid:12)nesse a gradual reduction in inflation without incurring a large decline in output but the timid response to rising inflation causes the perceived process for inflation to become uncoupled from the policymaker’s objectives. Stagflation results, with the inflation rate stuck over 8 percentage points above target while output remains well below potential. The striking di(cid:11)erences in the responses to the shocks under imperfect knowledge are a product of he interaction between learning, the policy rule, and inflation expectations. The solid lines in Figure 4 show the responses of the public’s estimates of the intercept and the slopeparameter of theinflation forecasting equation underimperfectknowledge. Under the inflation hawk policymaker, inflation expectations are well anchored to thepolicy objective. The serially correlated inflationary shocks cause some increase in both estimates, but the implied increase in the inflation target peaks at only 0.3 percentage point (not shown in the (cid:12)gure). Even for the moderate policymaker who accommodates some of the inflationary shock for a time, the perceived inflation target rises by just one-half percentage point. In contrast, under the inflation dove policymaker, the estimated persistence of inflation, already very high owing to the policymaker’s desire to minimize output fluctuations while respondingto inflation shocks, rises steadily, approaching unity. With inflation temporarily perceived to be a near-random walk with positive drift, agents expect inflation to continue to rise. The policymaker’s attempts to constrain inflation are too weak to counteract this adverse expectations process, and the public’s perception of the inflation target rises by 5 percentage points. Despite the best of intents, the gradual disinflation prescription that would be optimal with perfect knowledge yields stagflation|the simultaneous occurrence of persistently high inflation and low output. Interestingly, the inflation dove simulation appears to capture some key characteristics of the United States economy at the end of the 1970s, and it accords well with Chairman Volcker’s assessment of the economic situation at the time: Moreover, inflationary expectations are now deeply embedded in public attitudes, as reflected in the practices and policies of individuals and economic institutions. After years of false starts in the e(cid:11)ort against inflation, there is widespread skepticism about the prospects for success. Overcoming this legacy 17

of doubt is a critical challenge that must be met in shaping{and in carrying out{all our policies. Changing both expectations and actual price performance will be di(cid:14)cult. But it is essential if our economic future is to be secure. (Statement before the Committee on the Budget, March 27, 1981) Incontrasttothisdismalexperience,themodelsimulationssuggestthattheriseininflation| and the corresponding costs of disinflation|would have been much smaller if policy had responded more aggressively to the inflationary developments of the 1970s. Although this was apparently not recognized at the time, Chairman Volcker’s analysis suggests that the stagflationary experience of the 1970s played a role in the subsequent recognition of the value of continued vigilance against inflation in anchoring inflation expectations. 6 Imperfect Knowledge and Monetary Policy 6.1 Naive Application of the Rational Expectations Policy Wenowturntothedesignofe(cid:14)cientmonetarypolicyunderimperfectknowledge. Westart by considering the experiment in which the policymaker sets policy under the assumption that private agents have perfect knowledge when, in fact, they have only imperfect knowledge and base their expectations on the perpetual learning mechanism described above. That is, policy follows (5) with the response parameter, (cid:18), computed using (9). Figure 5 compares the variability pseudo-frontier corresponding to this equilibrium to the frontier from the perfect knowledge benchmark. The top panel shows the outcomes in terms of inflation and output gap variability with the baseline parameterization, (cid:30) = 0:75. The bottom panel shows the results of the same experiment with the more forward-looking speci(cid:12)cation for inflation, (cid:30) = 0:9. In both cases, the imperfect knowledge equilibrium shown is computed with (cid:20) = 0:05. With imperfect knowledge, the perpetual learning mechanism introduces random errors in expectations formation, that is, deviations of expectations from the values that would correspond to the same realization of inflation and the same policy rule. These errors are costly for stabilization and are responsible for the deterioration of performance shown in Figure 5. 18

This deterioration in performance is especially pronounced for the policymaker who places relatively low weight on inflation stabilization. As seen in the simulations of the inflationary shocks reported above, for such policies the time variation in the estimated autocorrelation of inflation in the vicinity of unity associated with learning can be especially costly. Furthermore, the deterioration in performance relative to the case of perfect knowledge benchmarkis larger thegreater the role of expectations in determininginflation. With the higher value for (cid:30), if a policymaker’s preference for inflation stabilization is too low, the resulting outcomes under imperfect knowledge are strictly dominated by the outcomes corresponding to the naive policy equilibrium for higher values of !. 6.2 E(cid:14)cient Simple Rule Next we examine imperfect knowledge equilibria when the policymaker is aware of the imperfection in expectations formation and adjustspolicyaccordingly. Toallow for astraightforward comparison with the perfect knowledge benchmark, we concentrate on the e(cid:14)cient choice of the responsiveness of policy to inflation, (cid:18)S , in the simple linear rule: x t = −(cid:18)S ((cid:25) t −(cid:25)(cid:3) ); 13 which has the same form as the optimal rule under the perfect knowledge benchmark. The e(cid:14)cient policy response with imperfect knowledge is to be more vigilant against inflation deviations from the policymaker’s target relative to the optimal response under perfect knowledge. Figure 6 shows the e(cid:14)cient choices for (cid:18) under imperfect knowledge for the two model parameterizations; the optimal policy under perfect knowledge|which is the same for the two parameterizations considered|is shown again for comparison. The increase in the e(cid:14)cient value of (cid:18) is especially pronounced when the policymaker places relatively little weight on inflation stabilization, that is, when inflation would exhibit high serial correlation under perfect knowledge. Under imperfect knowledge, it is e(cid:14)cient for a policymaker to bias the response to inflation upward relative to that implied by perfect knowledge. This e(cid:11)ect is especially pronounced with the more forward-looking inflation 13We note that this is only the restricted optimal rule within the family of rules that are optimal under rational expectations. With imperfect knowledge, thefully optimal policy would bea nonlinear function of all thestates of thesystem, including theelements of c and R. 19

process. Indeed, in the parameterization with (cid:30) = :9, it is never e(cid:14)cient to set (cid:18) below 0.6, the value that one would choose under balanced preferences (! = 0:5) under perfect knowledge. Acknowledging imperfect knowledge can signi(cid:12)cantly improve stabilization performance relativetooutcomesobtainedwhenthepolicymakernaivelyadoptspoliciesthataree(cid:14)cient under perfect knowledge. Figure 7 compares the loss to the policymaker with perfect and imperfect knowledge for di(cid:11)erent preferences !. The top panel shows the outcomes for the baseline parameterization, (cid:30) = :75;(cid:11) = :25; the bottom panel reports the outcomes for the alternative parameterization of inflation, (cid:30) = :9;(cid:11) = :1. The payo(cid:11) to reoptimizing (cid:18) is largest for policymakers who place a large weight on output stabilization, with the gain huge in the case of (cid:30) = :9. In contrast, the bene(cid:12)ts from reoptimization are trivial for policymakers who are primarily concerned with inflation stabilization regardless of (cid:30). The key (cid:12)nding that the public’s imperfect knowledge on the part of the public raises the e(cid:14)cient policy response to inflation is not unique to the model considered here and carries over to models with alternative speci(cid:12)cations. In particular, we (cid:12)nd the same result when the equation for inflation is replaced with the \New Keynesian" variant studied by Gali and Gertler (2000) and others. Moreover, we (cid:12)nd that qualitatively similar results obtain if agents include additional lags of inflation in their forecasting models. 6.3 Dissecting the Bene(cid:12)ts of Vigilance Inordertogaininsightintotheinteraction ofimperfectionsintheformationofexpectations and e(cid:14)cient policy, we consider a simple example where the parameters of the inflation forecast model vary according to an exogenous stochastic process. Fromequation(6)recallthatexpectationformationisdrivenbythestochasticcoe(cid:14)cient expectations function: (cid:25) t e +1 = c 0;t+c 1;t (cid:25) t : (14) For thepresentpurposes,letc 0;t andc 1;t varyrelative totheirperfectknowledgebenchmark values; i.e., c 0;t = cP 0 +v 0;t and c 1;t = cP 1 +v 1;t ; where v 0;t and v 1;t are independent zero mean normal distributions with variances (cid:27)2 and (cid:27)2 . 0 1 20

Substituting expectations into the Phillips curve and rearranging terms, results in the following reduced form characterization of the dynamics of inflation in terms of the control variable x: (cid:11) (cid:25) t+1 = (1+(cid:30)v 1;t)(cid:25) t+ 1−(cid:30) x t+(cid:11)u t+1 +e t+1 +(cid:30)v 0;t : (15) In this case, the optimal policy with stochastic coe(cid:14)cients has the same linear structure as the optimal policy with (cid:12)xed coe(cid:14)cients and perfect knowledge, and the optimal policy response is monotonically increasing in the variance (cid:27)2 . 14 1 Although informative, the simple case examined above ignores the important e(cid:11)ect of the serial correlation in v 0 and v 1 that obtains under imperfect knowledge. The e(cid:14)cient choice of (cid:18) cannotbewritten in closed formin the case of serially correlated processes forv 0 and v 1, but a set of stochastic simulations is informative. Consider the e(cid:14)cient choice of (cid:18) for our benchmark economy with balanced preferences, ! = 0:5. Under perfect knowledge, the optimal choice of (cid:18) is approximately 0.6. Instead, simulations assuming an exogenous autoregressive process for either c 0 or c 1 with a variance and autocorrelation matching our economy with imperfect knowledge suggest an e(cid:14)cient choice of (cid:18) approximately equal to 0.7|regardless of whether the variation is due to c 0 or to c 1. For comparison, with the endogenous variation in the parameters in the economy with learning the e(cid:14)cient choice of (cid:18) is 0.75. As noted earlier, for a (cid:12)xed policy choice of policy responsiveness in the policy rule, (cid:18), the uncertainty in the process of expectations formation with imperfect knowledge raises the persistence of the inflation process relative to the perfect knowledge case. This can be seen by comparing the solid and dashed lines in the two panels of Figure 8 which plot the persistence of inflation when policy follows the RE-optimal rule and agents have perfect 14SeeTurnovsky(1977)andCraine(1979)forearlyapplicationsofthewell-knownoptimalcontrolresults for this case. Forour model, speci(cid:12)cally, the optimal response can be written as: (cid:11)(1−(cid:30))s (cid:18)= ; (1−(cid:30))(1−!)+(cid:11)2s where s is thepositive root of thequadratic equation: 0=!(1−!)(1−(cid:30)) 2 +(!(cid:11)2 +(1−!)(1−(cid:30)) 2(cid:30)2(cid:27) 1 2 )s+((cid:30)2(cid:27) 1 2−1)(cid:11)2s2: While the optimal policy response to inflation deviations from target, (cid:18), is independent of (cid:27) 0 2, the variance of the v 0;t di(cid:11)erentiation reveals that it is increasing in (cid:27) 1 2, the variance of v 1;t. As (cid:27) 1 2 !0, of course, this solution collapses to theoptimal policy with perfect knowledge. 21

and imperfect knowledge, respectively. This increase in inflation persistence complicates stabilization e(cid:11)orts as it raises, on average, the output costs associated with restoring price stability when inflation deviates from its target. The key bene(cid:12)t of adopting greater vigilance against inflation deviations from the policymaker’s target in the presence of imperfect knowledge comes from reducing this excess serial persistence of inflation. More aggressive policies reduce the persistence of inflation, thusfacilitatingitscontrol. Theresultinge(cid:14)cientchoiceofreductionininflationpersistence is reflected by the dash-dot lines in Figure 8. 7 Conclusion In this paper,we examine the e(cid:11)ects of a relatively modestdeviation from rational expectationsresultingfromperpetuallearningonthepartofeconomicagentswithimperfectknowledge. The presence of imperfections in the formation of expectations makes the monetary policy problem considerably more di(cid:14)cult than would appear under rational expectations. Using a simple linear model, we show that although inflation expectations are nearly e(cid:14)cient, imperfect knowledge raises the persistence of inflation and distorts the policymaker’s tradeo(cid:11)betweeninflationandoutputstabilization. Asaresult,policiesthatappeare(cid:14)cient under rational expectations can result in economic outcomes signi(cid:12)cantly worse than would be expected by analysis based on the assumption of perfect knowledge. The costs of failing to account for the presence of imperfect knowledge are particularly pronounced for policymakers who place relatively greater value on stabilizing output: A strategy emphasizing tight inflation control can yield superior economic performance, in terms of both inflation and output stability, than policies that appear e(cid:14)cient under rational expectations. More generally, policies emphasizing tight inflation control reduce the persistence of inflation and the incidence of large deviations of expectations from the policy objective, thereby mitigating the influence of imperfect knowledge on the economy. In addition, tighter control of inflationmakes theeconomylesspronetocostlystagflationary episodes. Theseresultshighlight the value of continued vigilance against inflation in anchoring inflation expectations and fostering macroeconomic stability. 22

References Anderson,T.W.andJohnB.Taylor (1976), \SomeExperimentalResults on theStatistical PropertiesofLeastSquaresEstimates inControlProblems," Econometrica, 44(6), 1289- 1302, November. Ball, Laurence (2000), \Near-Rationality and Inflation in Two Monetary Regimes," NBER Working Paper 7988, October. Balvers, Ronald J. and Thomas F. Cosimano (1994), \Inflation Variability and Gradualist Monetary Policy," The Review of Economic Studies 61(4), 721-738, October. Bernanke, Ben S. and Frederic S. Mishkin (1997), \Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?" Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(2), 97-116. Blume, Lawrence E. and David Easley (1982), \Learning to be Rational," Journal of Economic Theory, 26, 340-351. Bom(cid:12)m, Antulio, Robert Tetlow, Peter von zur Muehlen, John Williams (1997), \Expectations, Learning and the Costs of Disinflation: Experiments Using the FRB/US Model," Topics in Monetary Policy Modeling, 5, Bank for International Settlements. Bray, Margaret M. (1982), \Learning, Estimation, and the Stability of Rational Expectations," Journal of Economic Theory, 26, 318-339. Bray, Margaret M. (1983), \Convergence to Rational Expectations Equilibrium,"in Roman Frydman and Edmund S. Phelps, eds., Individual Forecasting and Aggregate Outcomes, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Bray, Margaret M. and Nathan E. Savin (1984), \Rational Expectations Equilibria, Learning, and Model Speci(cid:12)cation," Econometrica, 54(5), 1129-1160, September. Brayton, Flint, Eileen Mauskopf, David Reifschneider, Peter Tinsley, and John Williams (1997), \The Role of Expectations in the FRB/US Macroeconomic Model," Federal Reserve Bulletin, 227{245, April. Brayton, Flint, John M. Roberts and John C. Williams (1999). \What’s Happened to the Phillips Curve?" Finance and Economics Discussion Series, 1999-49, Federal Reserve Board, September. Buiter, Willem H. and Ian Jewitt (1981), \Staggered Wage Setting with Real Wage Relativities: Variations on a Theme by Taylor," The Manchester School, 49, 211{228. Bullard, James, B. and Kaushik Mitra (2001), \Learning About Monetary Policy Rules," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper 2000-001E, December. Carroll,ChristopherD.(2001),\TheEpidemiologyofMacroeconomicExpectations,"NBER Working Paper 8695, December. ChristianoLawrenceJ.andChristopherGust(2000), \TheExpectationsTrapHypothesis," in Money, Monetary Policy and Transmission Mechanisms, Bank of Canada. Clark, Peter, Charles Goodhart H. and Huang, (1999) \Optimal Monetary Policy Rules in a Rational Expectations Model of the Phillips Curve," Journal of Monetary Economics, 43, 497-520. 23

Craine, Roger (1979), \Optimal Monetary Policy with Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 1, 59-83. Erceg Christopher J. and Andrew T. Levin (2001) \Imperfect Credibility and Inflation Persistence," FinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries,2001-45, FederalReserveBoard, October. Evans, George and Seppo Honkapohja (2001), Learning and Expectations in Macroeconomics, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Evans, George and Garey Ramey (2001), \Adaptive Expectations, Underparameterization and the Lucas Critique," University of Oregon, mimeo, May. Friedman, Benjamin M. (1979), \Optimal Expectations and the Extreme Information Assumptions of ‘Rational Expectations’ Macromodels," Journal of Monetary Economics, 5, 23-41. Fuhrer,Je(cid:11)reyC.(1997), \The(Un)ImportanceofForward-looking Behavior inPriceSpeci(cid:12)cations," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 45, 338{350. Fuhrer, Je(cid:11)rey C. and George R. Moore (1995) \Inflation Persistence" Quarterly Journal of Economics 110(1), 127-59. Gali, Jordi and Mark Gertler (2000), \Inflation Dynamics: A Structural Economic Analysis," Journal of Monetary Economics, 44, 195{222. Kozicki, Sharon and Peter A. Tinsley (2001), \What Do You Expect? Imperfect Policy Credibility and Tests of the Expectations Hypothesis," Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Working Paper 01-02, April. Laubach, Thomas and John C. Williams (2001), \Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2001-56, Federal Reserve Board, November. Lengwiler, Yvan and Athanasios Orphanides (forthcoming), \Optimal Discretion," Scandinavian Journal of Economics. Lucas, Robert E., Jr. (1986), \Adaptive Behavior and Economic Theory," Journal of Business, 59, S401-S426. Mankiw, N. Gregory and Ricardo Reis (2001), \Sticky Information Versus Sticky Prices: A Proposal to Replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve," NBER Working Paper 8290, May. Marcet, Albert and Thomas Sargent (1988), \The Fate of Systems with ‘Adaptive’ Expectations," American Economic Review 78(2), 168{171, May. Marcet, AlbertandThomasSargent(1989), \Convergence ofLeastSquaresLearningMechanisms in Self Referential Linear Stochastic Models," Journal of Economic Theory, 48, 337-368. Muth,JohnF.(1961), \RationalExpectationsandtheTheoryofPriceMovements," Econometrica, 29, 315{335, July. Orphanides, Athanasios (1998), \Monetary Policy Evaluation with Noisy Information," Finance and Economics Discussion Series, 1998-50, Federal Reserve Board, October. 24

Orphanides, Athanasios (2001), \Monetary Policy Rules, Macroeconomic Stability and Inflation: A View from the Trenches," Finance and Economics Discussion Series, 2001-62, Federal Reserve Board, December. Orphanides, Athanasios and Volker Wieland (2000), \Inflation Zone Targeting," European Economic Review, 44, 1351-1387. Roberts, John M. (1997), \Is Inflation Sticky?" Journal of Monetary Economics, 39, 173{ 196. Roberts,JohnM.(1998),\InflationExpectationsandtheTransmissionofMonetaryPolicy," Finance and Economics Discussion Series, 1998-43, Federal Reserve Board, November. Roberts, John M. (2001), \How Well Does the New Keynesian Sticky-Price Model Fit the Data?" Finance and Economics Discussion Series, 2001-13, Federal Reserve Board, February. Rudd, Jeremy and Karl Whelan (2001), \New Tests of the New-Keynesian Phillips Curve" Finance and Economics Discussion Series, 2001-30, Federal Reserve Board, July. Sargent, Thomas J. (1993), Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Sargent, Thomas J. (1999), The Conquest of American Inflation, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Simon, Herbert A. (1978), \Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought," American Economic Review, 1{16, May. Sims, Christopher (2001), \Implications of Rational Inattention," Princeton University, mimeo. Staiger, Douglas, JamesH.Stock,andMarkW.Watson (1997), \HowPreciseareEstimates of the Natural Rate of Unemployment?" in: Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, ed. by Christina D. Romer and David H. Romer, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Stock, JamesH.andMarkW. Watson (1999), \Forecasting Inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, 44, 293-335. Taylor, John B. (1975), \Monetary Policy during a Transition to Rational Expectations," Journal of Political Economy, 83(5), 1009-1022, October. Taylor, John B. (1979), \Estimation and Control of a Macroeconomic Model with Rational Expectations," Econometrica, 47(5), 1267-86. Tetlow, Robert J. and Peter von zur Muehlen (2001), \Simplicity versus Optimality: The Choice of Monetary Policy Rules when Agents Must Learn," Journal of Economic Dynamics And Control 25(1-2), 245-279, January. Townsend, Robert M. (1978), \Market Anticipations, Rational Expectations, and Bayesian Analysis," International Economic Review, 19, 481-494. Turnovsky,Stephen(1977), Macroeconomic Analysis and Stabilization Policies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 25

Wieland, Volker (1998), \Monetary Policy and Uncertainty about the Natural Unemployment Rate," Finance and Economics Discussion Series, 98-22, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May. Woodford, Michael (1990), \Learning to Believe in Sunspots," Econometrica, 58(2), 277- 307, March. 26

Figure 1 E(cid:14)cient Policy Frontier with Perfect Knowledge s p 22..00 phi = .75 11..88 phi = .9 11..66 11..44 11..22 11..00 11..00 11..11 11..22 11..33 11..44 11..55 s y Optimal Policy Response to Inflation Q 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 w Notes: Thetoppanelshowsthee(cid:14)cientpolicyfrontiercorrespondingtooptimalpoliciesfor di(cid:11)erent values of the relative preference for inflation stabilization !, for the two speci(cid:12)ed parameterizations of (cid:11) and (cid:30). The bottom panel shows the optimal response to inflation corresponding to the alternative weights !, which are identical for the two parameterizations. 27

Figure 2 Estimated Expectations Function Parameters ((cid:30) = :75;(cid:11) = :25) Intercept Slope Inflation Hawk: (cid:18) = 1 222...000 222...000 K=.025 K = .05 K = .10 111...555 111...555 111...000 111...000 000...555 000...555 000...000 000...000 ---111...666 ---111...444 ---111...222 ---111...000 ---000...888 ---000...666 ---000...444 ---000...222 000...000 000...222 000...444 000...666 000...888 111...000 111...222 111...444 111...666 ---000...888 ---000...666 ---000...444 ---000...222 000...000 000...222 000...444 000...666 000...888 111...000 111...222 pppoooiiinnntttsss[[[111]]] pppoooiiinnntttsss[[[111]]] Balanced Preferences: (cid:18) = :6 222...000 222...000 111...555 111...555 111...000 111...000 000...555 000...555 000...000 000...000 ---111...666 ---111...444 ---111...222 ---111...000 ---000...888 ---000...666 ---000...444 ---000...222 000...000 000...222 000...444 000...666 000...888 111...000 111...222 111...444 111...666 ---000...888 ---000...666 ---000...444 ---000...222 000...000 000...222 000...444 000...666 000...888 111...000 111...222 pppoooiiinnntttsss[[[111]]] pppoooiiinnntttsss[[[111]]] Inflation Dove: (cid:18) = :1 222...000 555 444 111...555 333 111...000 222 000...555 111 000...000 000 ---111...666 ---111...444 ---111...222 ---111...000 ---000...888 ---000...666 ---000...444 ---000...222 000...000 000...222 000...444 000...666 000...888 111...000 111...222 111...444 111...666 ---000...888 ---000...666 ---000...444 ---000...222 000...000 000...222 000...444 000...666 000...888 111...000 111...222 pppoooiiinnntttsss[[[111]]] pppoooiiinnntttsss[[[111]]] 28

Figure 3 Evolution of Economy Following Inflation Shocks ((cid:30) = :75;(cid:11) = :25) Inflation Output Inflation Hawk: (cid:18) = 1 10 0.0 Imperfect Knowledge Perfect Knowledge 8 -0.5 6 -1.0 4 -1.5 2 -2.0 0 5 10 15 20 5 10 15 20 Balanced Preferences: (cid:18) = :6 10 0.0 8 -0.5 6 -1.0 4 -1.5 2 -2.0 0 5 10 15 20 5 10 15 20 Inflation Dove: (cid:18) = :1 10 0.00 8 -0.25 6 -0.50 4 -0.75 2 0 -1.00 5 10 15 20 5 10 15 20 29

Figure 4 Estimated Intercept Following Inflation Shocks ((cid:30) = :75;(cid:11) = :25) 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 Theta = 1.0 Theta = 0.6 Theta = 0.1 0.0 5 10 15 20 Estimated Slope Following Inflation Shocks 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 5 10 15 20 30

Figure 5 Outcomes with RE-policy, ((cid:30) = :75;(cid:11) = :25) s p 33..00 RE (Perfect Knowledge) Naive (Imperfect Knowledge) 22..55 22..00 11..55 11..00 11..0000 11..2255 11..5500 11..7755 s y Outcomes with RE-policy ((cid:30) = :9;(cid:11) = :1) s p 33..00 22..55 22..00 11..55 11..00 11..0000 11..2255 11..5500 11..7755 s y Notes: Each panel shows the e(cid:14)cient frontier with perfect knowledge and corresponding outcomes when the RE-optimal policies are adopted while, in fact, knowledge is imperfect. The square, triangle, and diamond correspond to preference weights ! = f0:25;0:5;0:75g, respectively. 31

Figure 6 E(cid:14)cient Policy Response to Inflation Q 111...222 111...000 000...888 000...666 000...444 Perfect knowledge (K = 0) 000...222 Efficient simple rule (phi = .75, K = .05) Efficient simple rule (phi = .90, K = .05) 000...000 000...000 000...111 000...222 000...333 000...444 000...555 000...666 000...777 000...888 000...999 111...000 w Notes: The solid line shows the optimal value of (cid:18) under perfect knowledge for alternative values of the relative preference for inflation stabilization !. The dashed and dasheddotted lines show the e(cid:14)cient one-parameter policy under imperfect knowledge for the two parameterizations of the model. 32

Figure 7 Policymaker Loss ((cid:30) = :75;(cid:11) = :25) L 111...888 111...666 111...444 111...222 RE (Perfect Knowledge) Naive Policy (Imperfect Knowledge) Efficient Policy (Imperfect Knowledge) 111...000 000...000 000...111 000...222 000...333 000...444 000...555 000...666 000...777 000...888 000...999 111...000 w Policymaker Loss ((cid:30) = :9;(cid:11) = :1) L 111111 999 777 555 333 111 000...000 000...111 000...222 000...333 000...444 000...555 000...666 000...777 000...888 000...999 111...000 Notes: The two panels show the loss corresponding to alternative values of the relative preference for inflation stabilization ! for di(cid:11)erent assumptions regarding knowledge and di(cid:11)erent model parameterizations. The solid line shows the case of perfect knowledge. The dashed line shows the outcomes assuming the policymaker chooses (cid:18) assuming perfect knowledgewhenknowledgeisinfactimperfect. Thedashed-dottedlineshowstheoutcomes for the e(cid:14)cient one-parameter policy under imperfect knowledge. 33

Figure 8 Inflation Persistence ((cid:30) = :75;(cid:11) = :25) r 111...000 RE Policy (Perfect Knowledge) Naive Policy (Imperfect Knowledge) 000...888 Efficient Policy (Imperfect Knowledge) 000...666 000...444 000...222 000...000 000...000 000...111 000...222 000...333 000...444 000...555 000...666 000...777 000...888 000...999 111...000 w Inflation Persistence ((cid:30) = :9;(cid:11) = :1) r 111...000 000...888 000...666 000...444 000...222 000...000 000...000 000...111 000...222 000...333 000...444 000...555 000...666 000...777 000...888 000...999 111...000 w Notes: The(cid:12)gureshowsthepopulation(cid:12)rst-orderautocorrelationofinflationcorresponding to policies based on alternative inflation stabilization weights !. For each value of !, the solid line shows the inflation persistence in the benchmark case of rational expectations with perfect knowledge. The dashed line shows the corresponding persistence when policy follows the RE-optimal solution but knowledge is imperfect. The dash-dot line shows the persistence associated with the e(cid:14)cient one-parameter rule with imperfect knowledge. 34