A New Look at the Effects of the Interest Rate Ceiling in Arkansas

Finance and Economics Discussion Series Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C. ISSN 1936-2854 (Print) ISSN 2767-3898 (Online) A New Look at the Effects of the Interest Rate Ceiling in Arkansas Gregory Elliehausen, Simona M. Hannon, Thomas W. Miller, Jr. 2021-045 Please cite this paper as: Elliehausen, Gregory, Simona M. Hannon, and Thomas W. Miller, Jr. (2023). “A New Look at the Effects of the Interest Rate Ceiling in Arkansas,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2021-045r1. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2021.045r1. NOTE: Staff working papers in the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDS) are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The analysis and conclusions set forth are those of the authors and do not indicate concurrence by other members of the research staff or the Board of Governors. References in publications to the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (other than acknowledgement) should be cleared with the author(s) to protect the tentative character of these papers.

A New Look at the Effects of the Interest Rate Ceiling in Arkansas* GregoryElliehausen‡ SimonaM.Hannon§ ThomasW.Miller,Jr.¶ Retired FederalReserveBoard MississippiStateUniversity March31,2023 Abstract Arkansas has been a popular place to study the effects of rate ceilings because of its exceptionallylowinterestrateceiling. ThispaperexaminestheeffectsoftheArkansasrateceiling oncreditusebynonprimeconsumersinArkansas,whoareespeciallyvulnerabletocreditrationingbecauseofthelowceiling. Wecomparethelevelandcompositionofconsumerdebt of nonprime consumers in Arkansas with that of prime Arkansas consumers and also nonprimeconsumersintheneighboringstates.WefindthatnonprimeconsumersinArkansasare lesslikelytohaveconsumerdebtand,conditionalonhavingdebt,haveslightlylowerlevels ofconsumerdebtthanprimeArkansasconsumersandnonprimeconsumersinneighboring states. TypesofcreditusedbynonprimeconsumersinArkansastendtodifferfromthoseof thecomparisongroups. Notableismuchloweruseofconsumerfinanceloans,traditionally animportantsourceofcreditforhigherriskconsumers. Thisfindingsuggestsrate-basedrationingofriskyconsumers.Alsonotableisloweruseofbankcreditdespitefederalpreemption oftherateceilingforbanks.Thisresultisconsistentwithbanks’traditionalavoidanceofrisky lending. Keywords:ConsumerCredit,AccesstoCredit,InterestRateCap,FinancialRegulation. JELclassification:D14,G2 *WethankHannahCase,JessicaFlagg,andLucasNatheforsuperbresearchassistance,MarkCarlson,JohnDriscoll, ThomasA.Durkin,HarryP.Huizinga,GengLi,DamjanPfajfar,andR.BurakUrasforhelpfulcommentsandsuggestions. TheviewsinthispaperarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflectthoseoftheBoardofGovernorsofthe FederalReserveSystemoritsstaff. ‡ApreviousversionofthispaperwascirculatedwhileGregoryElliehausenwasaPrincipalEconomistattheBoard ofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem.Email:gregory.elliehausen@gmail.com. §Address:BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem,20thStreetandConstitutionAveNW,Washington,DC 20551,USAEmail:simona.m.hannon@frb.gov. ¶Address:DepartmentofFinanceandEconomics,P.O.Box9580,MississippiStateUniversity,MississippiState,MS 39762,USAEmail:TWM75@msstate.edu.

1. Introduction Atleastpartoftherationaleforinterestratelimitsisaconcernthatlenderswilltakeadvantageof necessitousborrowers.Therehavebeencallsbypolicymakerstoconsiderinterestrateceilingsfor consumersbesetnohigherthan36percent. Whenrateceilingsaresetatlowlevelsthatmakelendingunprofitable,however,creditbecomes unavailable, especiallyforriskierconsumers. Unavailabilityofcreditmightresultinlowerlevels ofhouseholdinvestmentorfinancialdifficultiesarisingfromshortfallsofincomeorunexpected expenses.1 Substitutingotherkindsofcreditfortheonesinshortsupplymightbecostlyinterms oftheinterestrateorsacrificesincurrentconsumptionduetoshortertermstomaturity. ThispaperexaminestheeffectsoftherateceilingonriskynonprimeconsumersinArkansas, thestatewitha17percentrateceiling.Arkansashasbeenapopularplacetostudytheeffectsofrate ceilingsbecauseofitslonghistoryofalowconstitutionallyimposedrateceiling. Nonprimeconsumersaremostlikelytobeaffected. Previousstudiesfromthe1960sand1970sfoundthatstrict applicationoftheceilingresultedinfewerdirectlenders,tightercreditstandards,andlargerloan sizesrelativetoneighboringstates, whichhadlessrestrictiverateceilings. Arkansasconsumers, however,usedmoreretailcredit,inwhichhigherproductpricescouldcompensateforriskbearing. Overall, previousstudiesfoundthatArkansasconsumersdidnothavemuchlowerlevelsof debtthanconsumersinneighboringstates(Lynch,1968,BladesJr. andLynch,1976,Petersonand Falls,1981).2 Currently consumer finance companies, traditionally a source of credit for nonprime consumers, do not have offices in Arkansas because, being subject to the usury ceiling, they cannot profitablylendtoriskyconsumers.Morerecentbroadpreemptionforbankcreditpotentiallyprovidesconsumersborrowingopportunitiesthatallowconsumerstoescaperestrictiveeffectsofthe lowArkansasrateceiling,butbankshistoricallyhaveavoidedriskier,nonprimeborrowers. Retailersmightassignsomefinancechargestoproductprices,butindoingso,retailerscouldloseprime credit consumers as well as cash-paying customers. Whether risky consumers in Arkansas have beenabletofindsufficientamountsofcreditfromexemptsourcesisnotknown. ResultsofouranalysissuggestthatnonprimeconsumersinArkansaswererationed. ComparingnonprimeconsumersinArkansaswithprimeArkansasconsumersandnonprimeconsumers inneighboringstates,wefindthatnonprimeconsumersinArkansaswerelesslikelytohaveconsumerdebtand,conditionalonhavingsuchdebt,haveloweramountsofdebtthanprimeArkansas consumers. Moreover,nonprimeconsumersinArkansaswerealsolesslikelythannonprimeconsumersinneighboringstatestohaveconsumerdebtandowedlessconsumerdebt. NonprimeconsumersinArkansastendedtousedifferentcreditsourcesthanprimeArkansas consumers or risky consumers in neighboring states. Because the 17 percent Arkansas rate ceil- 1SeeDurkinetal.(2014)chapters3and8fordiscussionofcredit’sroleinfinancinghouseholdinvestmentandprovidingliquiditytobridgetemporaryshortfallsinfunds. 2SeeDurkin,Elliehausen,Staten,andZywicki(2014)forasummaryofthesestudies’findings.ForadditionaldiscussionofrelatedstudiesnotlimitedtoArkansas,seeNationalCommissiononConsumerFinance(1972). 1

ing is very restrictive, consumer finance companies do not have offices in Arkansas. Nonprime consumers in Arkansas were less likely to have consumer finance debt and have lower levels of suchdebtthannonprimeconsumersinneighboringstates. Banks’exemptionfromtheArkansas rateceilingapparentlyhasnotstimulatedmuchbanklendingtoriskyconsumers.NonprimeconsumersinArkansashadlessbankcardcredit,bankpersonalloans,andbankautocreditthanprime consumersinArkansasandnonprimeconsumersinneighboringstates. Nonprimeconsumersin ArkansasusedmorefinancecompanyautoandretailcreditthanprimeArkansasconsumersand nonprimeconsumersinneighboringstates. Finally,nonprimeconsumersinArkansasweremore likely to owe debt and had greater balances in Arkansas counties bordering other states than in theinteriorcountiesofArkansas. Thisresultisespeciallysignificantforconsumerfinancecredit, which is a major source of small, riskier cash loans to nonprime consumers but is not generally availableinArkansas. Ourfindingssuggest, however, thatsomeArkansasconsumerslivingnear thestatebordermightcrossstatelinestoobtaincreditfromoutofstatefinancecompanies. Theremainderofthispaperproceedsasfollows. Webeginwithareviewofcurrentlegislation andahistoryofusurylawinArkansasinSection2. Wereviewpreviouseconomicstudiesofusury limitsinArkansasinSection3.InSection4weprovidedetailsonourresearchdesignanddataused inthisstudy,whileinSection5wediscussourempiricalanalysisandresults.Section6concludes. 2. AHistoryofUsuryLawinArkansas Arkansas’s rate ceiling is notable not only because it is low but also because it is established by the state’s constitution. Strict interpretation of the constitutional interest rate ceiling by the Arkansas SupremeCourthampered effortsto allow exceptionstothe ceilingtofacilitate lending toriskyconsumers. Federalpreemptionofstaterateceilingsprovidesanexceptionforbanks,but non-banklendersremainsubjecttoArkansas’slowrateceiling. 2.1. CurrentRegulationofInterestRatesinArkansas InNovemberof2011,ArkansasvotersapprovedanamendmenttotheArkansasConstitution thatincreasedthemaximumrateofinterestthatcanbechargedonloansorcontractsto17percent(Ark. Const. Amendment89,§3). Federalregulationsallowout-of-statenationalandFDICinsuredbankstochargeratespermittedbytheirhomestate. Whileactualandpotentialentryby out-of-statebanksmeansthatratesonbanklendingarenolongerlimitedbyArkansas’srateceiling,interestrateschargedbynon-banksarestillconstrainedbyArkansaslaw. Notably,autodeal- 2

ers,retailers,creditunions,andfinancecompaniesarestillsubjecttoArkansas’sinterestratelaws.3 Thelegislativeenvironment,however,wasnotalwaysthisclearlydefined. Inthenextsection,we reviewkeyaspectsofpastinterestrateregulationinthestate. 2.2. PastRegulationofInterestRatesinArkansas In1836,theArkansaslegislaturepassedalawlimitingtherateofinterestthatcouldbecharged. Thelawspecifiedamaximuminterestrateofsix,seven,oreightpercentperannum,dependingon thetermtomaturity.4 The1836limithadlittleeffectbecauseitcontainednopenaltiesforinterest ratesthatexceededtheceiling. FollowingtheCivilWar,anewconstitutionin1867prohibitedanylawfromlimitingtheinterest rate.Theintentofthisprovisionwastoattractcapitalforreconstruction.5 Restorationofvotingrightstoex-confederatesledtoachangeofgovernmentandanewconstitution in 1874. The 1874 constitution limited the interest rate to 10 percent. The penalty for violationswasforfeitureofinterestandprincipal. Theconstitutiondidnot,however,definewhat chargesareinterestandwhatchargesarenot;nordiditspecifyhowtocalculatetheinterestrate. These omissions made the interest rate limit vulnerable to evasion. For the next 75 years, the Arkansas Supreme Court tempered the restrictive effect of the limit with permissive interpretations. Thecourtallowedatime-pricedifferentialandconsideredcertainservicechargesasancillarychargesratherthanfinancecharges,forexample.6 In1951,theArkansaslegislaturepassedtheArkansasInstallmentLoanLaw,whichcodified75 years of court decisions and provided a maximum fee schedule that depended on the principal amountoftheloancontract.Byrelatingthemaximumfeetoloanamount,thelawrecognizedthat manyofthecostsofinstallmentlendingarefixed,makingsmallerloansrelativelymorecostlyper dollartoproducethanlargerloans.7 Aboutayearafterthe1951law,theArkansasSupremeCourt,inaseriesofdecisions,reversed earlypermissivedecisionsonevasionsandvoidedexceptionsinthe1951law. In1953,thelegisla- 3Creditunionscompetewithbankstomakeloanstolowerriskconsumers(Feinberg,2001,Feinberg,2003,FeinbergandAtaur-Rahman,2006). Federalcreditunionsaresubjecttoan18percentrateceiling,whichmakeslendingto riskierconsumersunprofitable(NationalCreditUnionAdministration,2021).Theceilingappliestonearlyallconsumer lendingbyfederalcreditunions. Thefinancecompanycategoryincludesnonbanklenders,commonlyreferredtoas FinTechlenders,thatseektoapplytechnologytoimprovethelendingprocess.FinTechlenderscanmakeloanswithinterestratesinexcessofastate’susuryrateceiling,buttheseloanswouldbemadeinpartnershipwithoutofstatebanks, withthebankbeingtheoriginatoroftheloan. FinTechlendersseekingtomakeloansontheirownareconstrainedby therateceilingsinlow-ratestateslikeArkansas. 4Thelowerceilingswerefortermslessthan4months(6percent)and4to8months(7percent).SeeGalchus,Martin, andVibhakar(1989). 5Thisconsiderationwascommoninsouthernstatesatthattime.Settinghigherrateceilingsthanotherjurisdictions toattractcapitalwasanestablishedpracticeinEnglishcoloniesinAmericaandlaterinwesternstatesoftheUS.See HomerandSylla(1996). 6Underthetime-pricelegaldoctrinemerchantsmayofferacashpriceandahigher"time"price. Courtsheldthat thedifferencebetweenthecashpriceandthetimepricewasnotinterestandwasthereforenotsubjecttousurylaws. TheleadingUScaseinvolvingthetime-pricedoctrineisHoggv.Ruffner,66US(1Black)115(1861). 7Fordiscussionofthecoststructureofinstallmentlending,seeDurkinetal.(2014),chapter5. 3

turerepealedsectionsoftheArkansasinstallmentLoanLawthatthecourthadnotalreadydeclared nullandvoid. Economictheorypredicts,andempiricalevidenceshows,thatlowinterestrateceilingsration higherriskborrowersoutofthemarket(NationalCommissiononConsumerFinance,1972).Naturally,Arkansas’s10percentrateceilingwasnoexception.Asinflationacceleratedinthelate1960s, rising interest rates made lending at 10 percent increasingly unprofitable in Arkansas. Loanable funds continued to be available in other states that allowed higher interest rates, but credit became unavailable to all but the most creditworthy borrowers in Arkansas (Galchus, Martin, and Vibhakar,1989).8 2.3. EffortstoRelaxRestrictiveRateRegulation The deterioration in lending conditions in the state provided a stimulus in 1973 for the Proposed Amendment 57 to the Arkansas Constitution. The proposed amendment retained the 10 percent rate ceiling but gave the legislature the authority to change the rate ceiling if it deemed thateconomicconditionswarrantedrelief. Thus, whiletheproposedamendmentwouldnotremovethe10percentinterestratelimitfromtheconstitution,itwouldhaveplacedtherateceiling in the hands of the state legislature. Proposed Amendment 57 was on the ballot and was overwhelminglyrejectedinthegeneralelectiononNovember5,1974.Widespreaddistrustofthestate legislatureandtheprospectoftemporaryfederalpreemptionapparentlycontributedtothedemise ofAmendment57. Lowerinterestratesin1975and1976providedsomerelieffromtherestrictive effectoftherateceiling. By mid-1977 interest rates began to climb and continued rising to record levels in the early 1980s.Asaresultoftheensuingrestrictionofcreditfromtherateceiling,in1982,Arkansasadopted Amendment60toitsConstitution(Ark.Const.Art.19,§13)in1982.Amendment60providedthat the“maximumlawfulrateofinterestonanycontractenteredinto". . . shallnotexceed5percent perannumabovetheFederalReserveDiscountRateatthetimeofthecontract"withamaximum of17percentperannumforconsumerloansandcreditsales.” LanguageinAmendment60wasambiguous,however. Inparticular,theamendmentdidnot specifywhethertheceilingof5percentperannumabovethediscountratefor“anycontract”included consumer loans, and the law separately provided for a 17 percent ceiling for consumer loans.Thelegislativehistoryindicatedthatthe17percentceilingwasintendedforconsumerloans andthe5percentoverthediscountratewasintendedforother(business)loans. Shortlyafterthe amendment was passed, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision and ruled that the language of the amendment was such that the rate ceiling for consumer loans was the lower of5percentoverthediscountrateor17percent,whichmadetherateceilingforconsumer 8Also,Arkansasretailersraisedpricestocoverhighercreditcosts.Onestudyfoundthatretailpricesformajorapplianceswere4percentto7percenthigherinLittleRock(whichislocatedintheinteriorofthestate)thanincomparable citiesoutsidethestate. Arkansas: AUsuryLawDriesupLoanFunds,BusinessWeek,September29,1973,pp. 73-74 (citedinGalchus,Martin,andVibhakar,1989). 4

loansmorerestrictivethanthelegislatureintended.9 AtthetimeoftheSupremeCourt’sruling,the discountratewas8.50percent,whichmadetherateceilingforconsumercredit13.5percent,not 17percentasthelegislatureintended. FollowingtheArkansasSupremeCourtdecision,adownwardtrendinthediscountratecaused theArkansasrateceilingtobecomeincreasinglyrestrictive.BetweenSeptember1984andSeptember 1986, a decline in the discount rate from 9.00 percent to 5.5 percent reduced the rate ceilingfrom14.00percentto10.50percent. TheensuingflowofloanablefundsoutofArkansasand reemergence of credit rationing again provoked pressure for replacing Amendment 60 (Galchus andVibhakar,2003). InMarch1989,thelegislaturepassedanewconstitutionalamendmenttoreplaceAmendment 60. Thenewamendment,Amendment2,providedforamaximuminterestrateof17percentfor consumerloansandamaximuminterestrateof5percentovertheaverageauctionrateofone-year USTreasurybillsforbusinessandagriculturalloansof$250,000orless.Loansover$250,000would havenoceiling.Amendment2waspresentedtovotersforapprovalintheNovember1990general election,butvotersoverwhelminglyrejectedAmendment2,astheyhadtheproposedamendment in1974. 2.4. InterstateBankingandFederalPreemption Theadventofinterstatebankinggaverisetothequestionwhetherthelawsofthehomestate orhoststatedeterminepermissibleinterestratesforout-of-statebanks. TheUSSupremeCourt hadruledinthe1978MarquettedecisionthattheNationalBankActauthorizesanationalbank"to chargeonanyloan"interestattherateallowedbythelawsofthestate"wherethebankislocated.” Thecourtalsomaintainedthatabankislocatedinthestateinwhichitischartered(thatis, the statenamedinitsorganizationcertificate). Thisrulingmeantthatout-of-statebankscouldlend instatesattheratespermissibleintheirhomestate. TheOfficeoftheComptrolleroftheCurrency(OCC)providedinterpretationstorelevantlaw. Interpreting section 85 of the National Bank Act, in 1988, the OCC advised national banks that theycouldchargearatepermittedbythestateinwhichthebankislocated. TheOCCruledthata nationalbankislocatedinthehomestateofitsmainoffice.10 Therefore,thelawsofthatstateapply tothebank’sloanrates. TheFederalDepositInsuranceCorporation’sinterpretationofsection27 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, provided the same guidance for state banks as the OCC’s guidancefornationalbanks. Thisguidanceallowedinterstatebankstoexportinterestratespermittedbythehomeinwhich abankislocatedtoout-of-statebranches. Thus,out-of-statebankscouldcircumventArkansas’s usurylawbyconfiguringtheloanprocessinsuchawayastoensurethattheirhomestateinterestrateswouldalwaysapplytoloansmadeinArkansas. Recognizingthethreatfromout-of-state 9Bishopv.LinkwayStores,Inc„280Ark.At106,655S.W.2d426(1983). 10MarquetteNat.BankofMinneapolisv.FirstofOmahaServiceCorp.,439U.S.299. 5

banksexportinghomestateratestotheirArkansasbranches,Arkansasbankersandstatelegislators urgedthestate’scongressionaldelegationtosupportfederallegislationallowingArkansasbanksto charge the same rates as their out-of-state competitors. Section 731 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act(1999),directedspecificallytoArkansas’susurylaw,addressedthisthreat. Itspecifiedthatthe highestrateinastateisthegreaterofthemaximumrateallowedbythehomestateofanybranch locatedinthestate,ortherateestablishedbythestate. InallowingArkansasbankstochargethe sameinterestratesastheirout-of-statecompetitors,section731leveledtheplayingfieldbetween Arkansasbanksandlocalbranchesofout-of-statebanks.11 2.5. Historical Perspective on the Share of Consumer Credit Subject to the Arkansas InterestRateCeiling Inthissubsection,weexamine,fromahistoricalperspective,theinterestrateceilinginArkansas anditseffectontheshareofcreditthatisnotexemptfromtheceiling(Figure1). First,wecontrastthehistoricallevelsoftheinterestrateceilingwiththediscountrate,thatwas usedforaperiodintheceilinglevelcalculation.Duringthemorerecentperiod,startingwith1950, theinterestrateceilinginArkansasfellunderthreecategories.Between1950and1982,theceiling wasfixedat10percent. Forthesubsequentperiod, theceilingwastiedtothediscountrateand wasthelowerbetween5plusthediscountrateand17percent. Startingwith2011,theceilingwas onceagainfixed,butthistimeat17percent(Figure1a).Asthespreadbetweentheceilingandthe discountratevaried,likelysodidtheshareofloansheldbylenderssubjecttotherateceiling. Second, examiningthemostrecentchangeinthisspreadcausedbythe2011increaseinthe interestrateceilingfrom5percentabovethediscountrateto17percent(Figure1b),wedocument thattheshareofcreditheldbylenderssubjecttothestate’sinterestrateceilinginconsumercredit, showninred,indeedriseswhenlendersareabletochargeahigherprice.12 Asnotedintheprevious section, up until 2011, the interest rate ceiling in Arkansas ranged between 5 percent above the discountrateto17percent,asalthoughmostofconsumerloanshadtobeissuedunderthefirst condition, there were circumstances that allowed an interest rate of up to 17 percent. In 2011, however,theinterestrateceilingwasfixedat17percent. Asresult,after2011,wenotethediscrete jumpintheshareofconsumerloanssubjecttotheinterestrateceilingintotal, suggestingthere issubstitutionbetweenconsumercreditissuedbylenderssubjecttotheinterestrateceilingand thoseexempted. 11Districtandcircuitcourtdecisionsupheldtheconstitutionalityofsection731(Johnsonv.BankofBentonville2000 and2001). 12Consumercreditdebtsubjecttothestate’sinterestrateceilingconsistsofconsumerfinancedebt,retailcredit,and autoloansissuedbyfinancecompanies. 6

3. PreviousEconomicStudiesofInterestRateLimitsinArkansas The1957ArkansasSupremeCourtdecisionaffirmingthatallformsofcreditinthestatewere subjecttotheconstitutional10percentinterestratelimitregardlessofanyactionsthestatelegislaturemighttake(Sloanv. Sears,228Arkansas464,308S.W.,2d8021957)motivatedseveralstudies oftheeconomiceffectsofthelaw. These studies provided evidence that sellers do respond to limitations to the price of credit byraisingproductprices. Forinstance,Lynch(1968)comparedappliancepricesinArkansasand otherstates. Atthattime,mostofthelargerhouseholdappliancesweretypicallypurchasedusing closed-end credit. Lynch found that prices on comparable appliances were several percentage pointshigherinArkansasthanincitiesinsurroundingstates.13 InbordercitiessuchasTexarkana ontheArkansas-Texasborder,Arkansasretailstoresreportedfacingaggressivepricecompetition fromTexasretailers. CashpurchasersfromtheArkansassidefrequentlycrossedthestatelineinto Texastopurchaseappliancesinordertoavoidsubsidizingbelow-marketinterestratesforcredit purchasersinArkansasthroughhigherpricesforgoods. Lynch (1968) also found relatively few direct lenders offering consumer credit in Arkansas. Thosehedidfindconcentratedmainlyonautomobilelending, whichbecauseofthelargerloan sizeandthepresenceofcollateralwasmoreprofitablethanothertypesofconsumerlendinginthe controlledenvironment.Evenso,lowloanlossesontheautomobilecreditsuggestedthathigh-risk borrowersinArkansaswererationed. InsubsequentresearchfocusingonTexarkanaandFortSmith,ontheborderrespectivelywith TexasandOklahoma,BladesJr. andLynch(1976)examinedthelocationchoicesofretailstoresin the first sixteen years following the strict application of the 10 percent ceiling in Arkansas. They found that the numbers of credit-oriented retail institutions, such as automobile dealers, furnitureandappliancedealers,anddepartmentstores,declinedontheArkansassideoftheborderat TexarkanaandincreasedontheTexasside. Thischangeincludedboththeformationofnewretail storesandtherelocationofexistingstoresfromArkansasintoTexas. InFortSmith,ontheborder withOklahomabutentirelyinArkansas,initiallytherehadbeenlittlecommercialdevelopmenton theOklahomaside,butthischangedinthe1960swiththeopeningofmanynewretailestablishmentsthere. Bytheearly1970s,FortSmithretailoutletsreportedfacingsubstantialnewcompetitionfrom retailersinOklahoma,whichpreviouslyhadnotbeenaconcern. BladesJr. andLynch(1976)also foundthatArkansasretailstoresfinancingcustomersalesappliedhighercreditstandards,required largerdownpayments, andofferedshorterlendingtermsthanTexasretailers. Arkansasretailers 13Bothretailstoresanddirectlenderscouldalsoincreasethepriceofproductsancillarytothecreditcomponent ofthesale,includingrepaircontractsandothercloselyrelatedproducts. ComparinglendingpracticesinLittleRock, Arkansas,toChampaign-Urbana,Illinois,whichhadlessrestrictivelendinglawsthanArkansas,theIllinoisLawForum BoardofStudentEditors(1968)foundthatlendersinArkansasweremuchmoreaggressiveabouteffortstosellcredit insurancetoborrowersandthatcreditinsurancepricesweresubstantiallyhigherinArkansaseventhoughthecovered riskswerenohigher. ThisfindingsuggeststhatlendersinArkansasmarkedupcreditinsurancepricesatthattimeto offsetbelow-marketinterestrates. 7

almostuniversallychargedceilingratesonpurchasestheyfinanced. TexasandOklahomaretailerschargedrateshigherthantheArkansasceilingbutgenerallylowerthantheTexasorOklahoma ceiling. Nationalretailchains,however,chargedratesincompliancewithcustomers’stateofresidency.TexasretaildealersfinancedagreaterproportionoftheirsalesthanArkansasretailersinthe yearsfollowingstrictapplicationofthe10percentceilinginArkansas.Greatercreditavailabilityin Texascertainlycontributedtothisoutcome,althoughtheremayalsohavebeenothercontributing factors,includingpotentiallymorefavorablenon-pricecredittermsinTexas.BladesJr.andLynch (1976)alsoreportedthatArkansasretaildealersperceivedareductioninthenumberoffinancial institutionswillingtobuytheirinstallmentsalescontracts. ReducedcompetitionamongtheremainingfinancialinstitutionsontheArkansassideoftheborderresultedintheretailersreceiving lessfavorabletermsforsalesfinancing.14 PetersonandFalls(1981)comparedborrowersinTexarkanawithborrowersinthreelocalmarketsinotherstateswithlessrestrictiverateceilings. Theyfoundthatdespiterestrictionsonconsumer credit from local sources, Texarkana borrowers did not owe less consumer debt overall.15 Their sources of credit merely differed. Arkansas borrowers obtained substantially larger shares ofcreditthroughretailersthantheconsumersinothermarkets,presumablypayinghigherprices forthegoodsintheprocess. Theyalsoobtainedmorecreditfromout-of-statesources. Whether ArkansasconsumersnotlivinginTexarkanaandwithlessconvenientaccesstoout-of-stateretail creditwereabletoobtainsimilarlevelsofdebtisnotknown. ThatmanyArkansasconsumerslivingneartheborderchoseTexasretailerssuggeststhatthe10percentArkansasrateceilingdidnot benefittheseconsumers. The2011amendmenttotheArkansasconstitutionestablisheda17percentinterestrateceiling.Therevisedrateceiling,however,remainsrestrictivecomparedtomostotherstates.16 Among thesourcesofcreditthatarenotexemptfromtheArkansasrateceilingareconsumerfinancecompanies. Consumer finance companies lend small amounts on an installment basis, generally to higher risk consumers. No consumer finance companies operate in Arkansas. States bordering Arkansasarenotseverelyrestrictive,andconsumerfinancecompaniesoperateinallsixstatesthat borderArkansas(LukongoandMillerJr.,2022).17 14Financialinstitutionseliminatedthedealerspread,paidlittleornointerestondealerreserves,andpurchasedpaper onlywithfullrecourse(whichrequiresthedealertoabsorbcreditlosses).SeealsoPetersonandFalls(1981). 15SeealsoPeterson(1983). 16Modellegislationestablishingtheconsumerfinanceindustryrecommendeda42percentrateceiling,alongwith therecommendationthat"thisrateshouldbereconsideredafterareasonableperiodofexperiencewithit".Thewriters ofthemodellegislationbelievedthata42percentratewouldattractsufficientcapitaltotheindustrytoprovidethe bulkofnecessitousloanswithoutcausingmuchhardship.Theywereawarethatverysmallloanswouldrequirehigher ratestobeprofitable. Fordiscussion,seeRobinsonandNugent(1935). DataanalyzedbytheNationalCommissionon ConsumerFinance(1972)(chapter7)indicatethatsmallloansareunprofitableat17percent. Recentdata(Chenand Elliehausen,2020)showthatsmallloansarestillunprofitableat17percent. 17StatesborderingArkansasareOklahoma,Texas,Louisiana,Mississippi,Tennessee,andMissouri. 8

Lukongo and Miller Jr. (2022) compared consumer finance company borrowing by Arkansas residents with that of residents of bordering states.18 They found that Arkansas residents had 90.4 installment loans per 10,000 population. Residents in the counties of the six states borderingArkansas(hereafter,bordercounties)had524.5loansper10,000population. WithinArkansas,LukongoandMillerJr.(2022)foundthatnearlyallloanstoArkansasresidents weretoresidentslivingincountiesontheperimeterofthestate(perimetercounties).Residentsof perimetercountieshad195.0loansper10,000population. Insharpcontrast,residentsofinterior countiesinArkansashad5.5loansper10,000population.Despitehaving55percentofthepopulation,interiorcountiesaccountedforjust3percentofloans. Figure2(fromLukongoandMillerJr., 2022)clearlyshowsthedifferencesininstallmentloanusebetweenborderandinteriorcounties.19 BecausenoconsumerfinancecompaniesoperatedinArkansas, residentsinbordercounties crossedstatelinestoobtainloansfromconsumerfinancecompanies.Arkansasresidentsinborder counties had many more loans than residents in the interior counties of Arkansas, but Lukongo and Miller Jr. (2018) showed that the distance to an out-of-state lender generally deterred these residentsfromtravelingtoseekloansfromconsumerfinancecompanies. They analyzed in detail whether proximity to out-of-state lenders influences the rate of installment loan usage. The authors applied spatial economics techniques across two groups, or regimes,ofcounties. Oneregimewasthe45interiorArkansascounties. Theotherregimewasthe 30perimetercountiesandthe85countiesincountiesinstatesthatborderArkansas.Testsrejected the hypothesis that differences were random and supported the alternative that loan usage was geographicallyclustered.Thatis,onespatialprocessisatworkinthelow-loanuseregimeconsistingoftheinteriorcountiesofArkansas,andanotherspatialprocessisatworkinthehigh-loanuse regime. TheLukongoandMillerJr.(2018)resultsareconsistentwiththenotionthatconsumers willtravelupto45milestoborrowfromaninstallmentloanlender.20 MelzerandSchroeder(2017)studiedtheeffectofrateceilingsontheavailabilityofautocredit andthetypeoflenderusingmatcheddataonautoregistrations,creditbureaurecords,andauto value estimates between January 2011 and August 2013. Their analysis focused particularly on dealer financing of auto purchases of subprime borrowers (credit score below 650) in Arkansas and neighboring states. They found that a binding rate ceiling has little effect on who receives 18LukongoandMillerJr.(2022)obtainedloan-leveldataoncharacteristicsofloansoriginatedbyconsumerfinance companiesbelongingtotheAmericanFinancialServicesAssociation(AFSA).Thesecompaniesheld5.2millionsmall installmentcashloansasofDecember13,2013(thedateforthedataanalyzedbyLukongoandMillerJr.(2022)). 19LowfrequenciesofinstallmentloansinArkansasperimetercountiesborderingMississippicanbeattributedbya lackofbridgesovertheMississippiRiver,andlowfrequenciesofloansinperimetercountiesborderingMissouricanbe attributedtolakes,parks,andforestsalongtheMissouriborder. 20LukongoandMillerJr.(2018)specifiedseparatespatialautoregressionmodelstopredictthenumberofloansper 10,000populationfortheinteriorcountiesofArkansasandforthe30perimetercountiesinArkansasplusthe85non- Arkansascounties.Explanatoryvariablesweresocioeconomiccharacteristicsofcountypopulationsandaccessibilityof out-of-statelenders. Accessibilityofout-of-statelenderswasbasedonfindingsfromstudiesofcommutingtolerance thresholdsthatfindthemaximumtolerablecommutingtimetobeabout45minutes,whichtranslatesintoabouta40 to50-milecommutingdistance.Overall,coefficientsinmodelswiththe40and45-mileaccessibilityindicatorvariables jointlyweresignificantlydifferentforthetworegimes.Inaddition,the40and45-mileaccessibilityindicatorcoefficients individuallyweresignificantlydifferentforthetworegimes. 9

creditbutasubstantialeffectonwhoprovidescreditandtermsofcredittotherecipients. Dealers financegreatersharesoftotalautofinancingswhenrateceilingsarebinding(36percentofhigher riskconsumers)thaninstateswithahighornolimit(23percentofhigherriskconsumers). They price the credit risk through the markup on the product sale rather than the interest rate. This behaviorproducesalowerinterestratetocomplywiththerateceiling,butthelargermarkupon thesaleoftheautoresultsinahigherloanamountrelativetotheactualvalueofthevehicle.Direct lendersdonothavethisadvantage. 4. ResearchDesignandData Consumer finance loans have historically been an important source of credit for higher risk borrowersandremainsotoday. Existingresearchindicatesthatrateceilingshaverestrictedavailabilityofsuchloansforhigherriskconsumersinmanystates(NationalCommissiononConsumer Finance,1972,chapter7; Durkinetal.,2014,chapter11,ConsumerFinancialProtectionBureau, 2021, Bolen, Elliehausen, andMillerJr.,2022). Thelowertheceilingrateis, thefewerhigherrisk consumersareabletoqualifyfortheloans.Accordingly,Arkansas’slowinterestceilingwouldbeexpectedtoresultingreaterrationingofnonprimeconsumersinArkansasthaninneighboringstates withtheirlessrestrictiverateceilingsforconsumerfinanceloans. PrimeconsumersinArkansas mightnotfacerationing,andtheirlowerriskwouldenablethemtoqualifyforlessexpensiveforms ofcreditthanconsumerfinanceloans. Primeconsumersinneighboringstatesalsomightqualify forlessexpensiveformsofcreditandnotneedtorelyonconsumerfinanceloans. WhethernonprimeconsumersinArkansasareabletoobtainsufficientorlessexpensivetypes ofcreditisnotclear.BankcreditislargelyexemptfromtheArkansasinterestrateceiling,butbanks havehistoricallyavoidedriskier,nonprimeborrowers.21 Asmentioned,retailersmightassignsome financechargestoproductprices,butindoingsoretailerscouldloseprimeconsumersaswellas cashcustomers. 4.1. ResearchDesign Weemployaquasi-experimentaldesigncomparingdatafromcreditbureaufilesontheamounts ofconsumerfinancedebtandamountsofpossiblesubstitutesforconsumerfinancedebtinArkansas andneighboringstates. Possiblesubstitutesincluderetailcredit,bankcardcredit,closed-enddepository institution loans, and auto credit. Auto credit is further broken down into credit from financecompaniesandfrombanks. Consumerfinancecreditconsistsprimarilyofpersonalloansfromfinancecompanies. Bank card credit consists of balances on revolving credit held by depository institutions. Retail credit 21Creditcardshavetoagreatextentreplacedclosed-endfinancingforfurniture,appliances,andmanyotherhouseholddurables. Thefinancialcrisisandregulationrestrictingcardissuersriskmanagementpracticesofcreditcardissuers(2008-2009)havemadeobtainingcreditcardsmoredifficultforconsumerswithlessthanprimecreditscores (ElliehausenandHannon,2018). 10

consists of credit originated and held by retailers to finance customers’ purchases. Depository institutionpersonalloansconsistofclosed-end,non-autocreditheldbybanksandcreditunions. Financecompanyandbankautocreditincludessalesfinanceanddirectloansusedtofinancethe purchaseofmotorvehiclesheldbyfinancecompaniesandbanks,respectively.22 WecomparetheamountofeachtypeofdebtheldbynonprimeconsumersinArkansaswith thatheldbythreegroups:(1)primeconsumersinArkansas;(2)nonprimeconsumersinneighboringstates;and(3)primeconsumersinneighboringstates. Weclassifyconsumerswithcreditbureauscoresoflessthan680asnonprimeandconsumerswithcreditbureauscoresof680orgreater as prime. Neighboring states are Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Tennessee, Missouri, and Mississippi. Survey evidence shows that finance companies operating in these states have large loan volumesandoffersmallloanstoriskierconsumers. Becausesmallloansarenotprofitableunless interestratesarerelativelyhigh(ChenandElliehausen,2020),theirprevalenceintheneighboring statesindicatesthattheneighboringstateshavelessrestrictiverateceilingsthanArkansas.23 Credit use is influenced by life-cycle stage and income. As consumers establish households andtheirfamiliesgrow,theyoftenneedtousecredittofinanceacquisitionofconsumerdurable assets. Inlateryears,adultchildrenleavethehousehold;andhouseholds,nolongermakinglarge additionstotheirstockofhouseholddurables,uselesscredit.Weaccountforlife-cycleinfluences withindicatorvariablesforconsumers’age(young,twomiddleagegroups,andolderconsumers). Studies have found that credit use is greatest in middle income groups, and lowest in lower incomegroups,butincomeisnotcollectedincreditbureaufiles.Weuseannualpercapitapersonal incomeforthecountyinwhichtheconsumerresides.24 Toaccountforstabilityofincomeweincludetheannualunemploymentrateinthecountyinwhichtheconsumerresides.Thesevariables reflectbroadinfluencesfromconsumers’economicenvironmentondebtholding. 4.2. Data DataarefromtheFederalReserveBankofNewYork’squarterlyConsumerCreditPanel(CCP), a database on consumers’ credit use and payment performance drawn from Equifax credit bureaurecords. Thesampleisrepresentativeofthepopulationofcreditusersineachquarter.25 The dataset contains individual-level data on virtually every debt owed by each consumer. The variablesincludetypeofcredit,typeoflender,originationdate,accountbalance,scheduledmonthly payments,delinquency,andadverseeventsassociatedwithcreditaccounts.Variablesalsoinclude yearofbirthandcreditbureauscore. Otherindividualcharacteristicsarenotcontainedincredit bureaufiles,andthereforearenotavailablefortheCCP. 22SeeDurkinetal.(2014)(chapter1)formoredetaileddescriptionsoftheseinstitutionandcredittypes. 23SeeDurkin,Elliehausen,andHwang(2016). 24PersonalincomeisfromtheBureauofEconomicAnalysis.UnemploymentisfromtheBureauofLaborStatistics. 25Thesamplingprocedureensuresthatthesameindividualsremaininthesampleineachquarterandallowsfor entryandexitintothesample,sothatthesampleisrepresentativeofthetargetpopulationineachquarter. SeeLee andderKlaauw(2010)foradescriptionofthedesignandcontentoftheCCP.Seealsohttps://www.newyorkfed.org/ medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/pdf/data_dictionary_HHDC.pdf 11

Weuseaonepercentsamplefromthetotalavailablefivepercentsample,coveringtheperiod between2012Q1and2018Q4.26 Attheendofthefourthquarterof2018,theCCPtotaledapproximately231millionindividualswithcreditscores,holdingabout$108billioninconsumerfinance loans across 79 million accounts owned by 56 million individuals. Nonprime consumers, those withEquifaxRiskScoreslowerthan680,had41percentofconsumerfinanceaccounts,butowed 57percentofconsumerfinancebalances. 5. EmpiricalAnalysis ToidentifypossibleeffectsoftheinterestrateceilinginArkansas,wefirstlookatthedistributionofdebtacrossdifferentdebtcategoriesfornonprimeandprimeconsumersinArkansasand in neighboring states. We then use a multivariate model to examine individual-level debt holding for each type of debt accounting for credit risk category and the influence of life-cycle stage andincomeonconsumerborrowing. Finally,weinvestigatetheextenttowhichproximitytoout of state consumer finance loans affects Arkansas consumers’ holdings of different types of debt, againaccountingforcreditriskcategory,life-cyclestage,andincome. 5.1. Incidenceandamountofconsumerdebt,Arkansasandneighboringstates UsingourCCPsample,wecalculatedtheincidenceandtheaverageamountofdebtofborrowersforthelastthreeyearsinoursample(2016, 2017, and2018)acrossdebtandcreditriskcategories. Nonprimeconsumerswerelesslikelytoowedebtthanprimeconsumers,butconditional onhavingdebt,nonprimeconsumershadconsiderableamountsofdebt(Table1).NonprimeconsumersinArkansashadalowerincidenceofdebt(6.72percentlower)thannonprimeconsumers in neighboring states, but a higher average amount of debt ($14,809 and $13,650, respectively), perhapsbecauseriskyconsumersexperiencedgreatercreditrationinginArkansasthaninneighboringstates. ThecompositionofconsumerdebtofnonprimeconsumersinArkansasdifferedfromthatof nonprimeconsumersinneighboringstates. NotableisamuchlowerincidenceofnonprimeconsumerfinanceloansinArkansas(46.07percentlowerthanthatofnonprimeconsumersinneighboringstates). However,forthoseconsumershavingconsumerfinancedebt,theaverageamount ofconsumerfinancedebtofnonprimeconsumersinArkansaswasnotmuchdifferentfromthat ofnonprimeconsumersinneighboringstates.NonprimeconsumersinArkansasalsohadalower incidenceofdepositoryinstitutionpersonalloans(despitepreemptionofbanks,themajorholders ofsuchloans,fromtheusuryceiling).ThosenonprimeconsumersinArkansaswhohaddepository institutionpersonalloanshavesignificantlylargerpersonalloanbalancesthannonprimedepositoryinstitutionpersonalloanusersinneighboringstates.27 26Westartouranalysisin2012,aftersubstantialrecoveryfromtheeffectsoftheGlobalFinancialCrisis. 27PossiblybecausebanksandcreditunionswerewillingtolendtonearprimeArkansasconsumers. 12

NonprimeconsumersinArkansasweremorelikelythannonprimeconsumersinneighboring statestohaveretailandfinancecompanyautocredit. TheincidenceofcreditcarddebtfornonprimeconsumersinArkansaswasnotmuchdifferentfromthatofnonprimeconsumersneighboringstates,butnonprimeconsumersinArkansashadlowerbankcardbalances. LukongoandMillerJr.(2022)foundaconsumerfinance“creditdesert”existingintheinterior ofArkansasshowninthefirstmap(Figure2).Arkansascountiesadjacenttooneoftheneighboring states, whichhavemorepermissiverateceilingsthanArkansas, tendtohavegreaternumbersof consumerfinanceloansthaninteriorcounties. Weusethefull5percentCCPsampleavailableto usforthethirdquarterof2013(matchingtheperiodusedbyLukongoandMillerJr.,2022)toinvestigatethegeographicalconcentrationoftheconsumerfinancedebtreflectedinoursample. The secondmap(Figure3)comparesconsumerfinancelendingtononprimeconsumersinArkansas andneighboringstates. Themapshowsindeedquiteclearlyfarfewerconsumerfinanceaccounts per10,000nonprimeindividualsinArkansasthaninneighboringstates. The third map (Figure 4) provides greater detail on geographic distribution of consumer finance loans to nonprime consumers in Arkansas. Like the finance company data analyzed by LukongoandMillerJr.(2022),nonprimeconsumerfinanceloansinArkansastendtobeconcentrated mostly around the state borders in the CCP data. This observation can be explained by relativelylowtransactioncostsforresidentsofthebordercountiesdriveoutofstatetoobtainconsumerfinanceloans. Fewer subprime consumer finance loans are found in border areas to the east and north of Arkansasthaninareastothewestandsouth. TheMississippiRiverisanaturalbarriertocrossing statelinesintheeast. InMissouri,tothenorth,numerousparks,forests,andlakeslimitpopulationdensity. Withlimitedpopulationdensity,financecompaniesopenfewerofficesinanareato achievescaleeconomiesinoperations. Lessgeographicconcentrationraisesconsumers’transactioncostsofcrossingstatelinestoobtaincredit. These findings suggest that Arkansas’s interest rate ceiling impeded consumer finance companylendingtohigherriskconsumers. ItappearsthatnonprimeconsumersinArkansaslargely appear to have substituted other types of credit for consumer finance credit. In addition, nonprime consumers in Arkansas living near the border of less restrictive neighboring states might haveaugmentedtheirconsumerdebtbycrossingstatelinestoborrowfromoutofstatelenders. Thenextsubsectionexploresthesepossibilitiesfurtherconsideringlife-cycleandlocaleconomic environmentinfluencesonconsumerborrowing. 5.2. RegressionscomparingconsumerlendinginArkansasandneighboringstates,by typeofcredit Our multivariate model estimates the mean difference in credit use between nonprime consumersinArkansasandconsumersineachotherstate/creditriskcategory(Arkansasprime,Louisiana nonprime,Louisianaprime,Missourinonprime,andsoforth). Weaccountforeffectsofincome 13

andageandincludefixedeffectsfortime.Asmentionedinthebeginningofthissection,consumer creditusegenerallyincreaseswithincomeanddecreaseswithage,reflectingtheabilitytoservice debtandlife-cycleconsiderations(Durkinetal.,2014,chapters2and3). Incomeandunemploymentreflectbroadinfluencesonconsumers’immediateeconomiccircumstances. Theregressionmodelis DEBT =a +Σa ·(STATExRISK) +b ·INC +b ·INC2 +b ·UNEMP it 0 1i it 1 jt 2 jt 3 jt +b 4 ·AGE<25it +b 5 ·AGE 25−39it +b 6 ·AGE≥55it +Σd t Q t +ε ijt , (1) DEBT istheamountofeachtypeofdebtowedbyanindividualconsumeriattimet. STAit TExRISK is an indicator variable for the consumer’s state of residence and nonprime/prime risk category. Consumers’ageisobtainedfromthecreditbureaudatabaseandcodedinindicatorvalues AGE<25 , AGE 25–39 , AGE 40−54 , and AGE≥55 , with ages between 40 and 54 being omitted for estimation.Q isafixedeffectfortime. t Otherthanageandlocation,creditbureaufilesdonotcontainnon-creditrelatedinformation onconsumers. Incomeisincludedwithaquadraticterm(INC and INC2,respectively)toallow for nonlinearity. The INC and INC2 variables are per capita personal income from Bureau of EconomicAnalysisforthecountyinwhichtheconsumerresides.UNEMP istheunemployment ratefromBureauofLaborStatisticsforthecountyinwhichtheindividuallives.Variabledefinitions anddescriptivestatisticsarepresentedinTable2. Weestimateregressionsforconsumerfinance,bankcard,retail,financecompanyauto,bank auto,depositoryinstitutionpersonalloans,andtotalconsumercredit. Notallconsumersuseall types of credit. Because the credit use data are censored from below, we use a Tobit model for estimation. Coefficientswerestatisticallysignificant. Agevariablesreflectinglife-cycleconsiderationswerestatisticallysignificant. Theyindicatedthatmuchyoungerandolderindividualswere lesslikelytohavedebtthanmiddle-ageindividuals.Theestimatedrelationshipbetweendebtand incomewasnonlinear.Coefficientsforunemploymentweresignificantandgenerallynegative. Tables3through13presentTobit(seeTobin,1958)estimationresultsbytypeofcredit.Thefirst columnineachtablecontainsestimatedTobitcoefficients.Thesecond,third,andfourthcolumns contain the McDonald and Moffitt (1980) decomposition of marginal effects — that is, effects of explanatoryvariablesontheunconditionalexpectedvalue(Y*),theexpectedvalueconditionalon being uncensored (that is, having a positive balance), and the probability of being uncensored, respectively.28 Theriskcategory/stateindicatorvariablesmeasurecreditbalancesrelativetononprimeconsumersinArkansas. 28Keytoourresultsinterpretationarethelattertwocolumnsthatshow,righttoleft,theprobabilityofbeinguncensored,whichistheprobabilityofhavingpositivebalancesandtheexpecteddebtamountconditionalonhavingpositive balances. 14

5.2.1. ConsumerFinanceLoans ResultspresentedinTable3showthatinArkansas,primeconsumerswerelesslikelytobeuncensured(thatis,havepositivebalances)thannonprimeconsumersforconsumerfinancecredit (-4.27percent). Conditionalonhavingconsumerfinancecredit, primeconsumershadlessconsumerfinancedebtthannonprimeconsumersinArkansas(-$220).Thatprimeconsumershadless consumerfinancecreditthannonprimeconsumersislikelyduetoavailabilityoflessexpensivealternatives to consumer finance credit for prime consumers. Arkansas’s low interest rate ceiling preventedconsumerfinancecompaniesfromchargingratesthatwouldmakeconsumerfinance loanstoriskiernonprimeconsumersprofitable.Banks,whichwerepreemptedfromtheusuryceiling,historicallyhaveavoidedlendingtohigh-riskconsumers.Lessriskyprimeconsumersseeking apersonalloanmightfindabankpersonalloanavailableatalowerpricethanaconsumerfinance loan. Primeconsumersinneighboringstatessimilarlywerelesslikelytohavepositivebalancesand conditionalonhavingdebthadlowerbalancesthannonprimeconsumersinArkansas. Forexample,primeconsumersinMissouriwere5.24percentlesslikelytohaveconsumerfinancecreditand had$276lessconsumerfinancedebtthannonprimeconsumersinArkansas.Again,availabilityof lessexpensivealternativestoconsumerfinanceloansisconsistentwiththisfinding. Incontrast,nonprimeconsumersinneighboringstatesweremorelikelytohavepositivebalancesthannonprimeconsumersinArkansas,andwhentheyhadconsumerfinancecredit,nonprimeconsumersinneighboringstateshadhigherconsumerfinanceloanbalances.InOklahoma, for example, a 17.3 percent greater incidence and $749 greater balances than in Arkansas. The smallloanlawsinneighboringstatesallhadhigherrateceilingsforconsumerfinanceloansthan theArkansasusuryceiling. Higherrateceilingsallowedforlendingtoriskierconsumersinthese states. These findings point to credit rationing of nonprime consumers in Arkansas, which was greaterthananyrationingofnonprimeconsumersinneighboringstates. 5.2.2. BankCreditCardDebt Onceanicheproductheldprimarilybyhighincomeconsumers,bankcreditcardholdinghas become widespread among households. Over time, bank credit cards also became available to higherriskconsumers,thoughrecentregulationshavemadebankcreditcardcreditmoredifficult forriskyconsumerstoobtain.29 Largecreditcardissuerslocateinstateswithhighornorateceilings, which allows them to charge their home state rates to out of state consumers. Thus, bank credit card issuers can offer credit to Arkansas consumers unconstrained by the Arkansas usury ceiling. 29TheCreditCardResponsibilityandDisclosureAct(2009)restrictedcardissuers’abilitytoraisetheinterestrate onanaccountwhenconsumers’behaviorontheaccountsuggeststhatcreditriskhasincreased(risk-basedpenalty pricing),limitedtheamountoffeeschargedforlatepaymentsorchargesexceedingthecreditlimit,andrestrictedthe allowedamountofinitialandperiodicfees(whichwerecommonlyusedtoreduceavailablecreditoncreditcardprogramsmarketedtosubprimeconsumers).SeeCannerandElliehausen(2013)andElliehausenandHannon(2018). 15

Despitebankcreditcardissuers’abilitytochargeratesgreaterthantheusuryceiling,nonprime consumers’ borrowing in Arkansas lagged behind that of nonprime consumers in three of its six neighboringstatesinbankcreditcarddebt(Table4).NonprimeconsumersinMissouriandTexas aremorelikelytohavecreditcardbalancesand,conditionalonhavingdebt,havegreaterbalances than nonprime consumers in Arkansas. Differences for Tennessee are small and not statistically significant. Nonprime consumers in Louisiana were 3.58 percent less likely to have bank credit card balances and have smaller balances ($292 smaller) than nonprime consumers in Arkansas when they owed bank credit card debt. On balance, these findings do not support a hypothesis that nonprime consumers in Arkansas offset reduced availability of consumer finance credit by usingmorebankcreditcarddebt. NonprimeconsumersinArkansasdonotappeartohaveoffset reducedconsumerfinancedebtavailabilitywithbankcardborrowing. 5.2.3. RetailCredit Whenasellerprovidesboththeproductandcredit,asellercanoffsetashortfallinthefinance charge(perhapsduetoaninterestrateceiling)byincreasingtheproductprice. Thisactionisnot unlimited,becausethisactionbythesellerriskslosingconsumerswhodonotneedtorelyonthe sellerforfinancing. PrimeconsumersinArkansasandinneighboringstateswerelesslikelytouseretailcreditand had lower amounts of retail credit than nonprime consumers in Arkansas (Table 5). Nonprime consumersinneighboringstatesalsousedlessretailcreditandhadloweramountsofretaildebt thannonprimeconsumersinArkansas.Forexample,nonprimeconsumersinLouisianawere5.53 percent less likely to use retail credit and conditional on having such debt, their balances were $135lower. DifferencesforTexasaresmallandnotstatisticallysignificant. Withtheexceptionof Louisiana, thedifferenceintheamountofretailcreditconditionalonusingsuchcreditbetween nonprimeconsumersinArkansasandeachoftheneighboringstateswassmall–$100orless.The findingthatnonprimeconsumersinArkansasdidnotrelymoreheavilyonretailcreditthannonprimeconsumersinneighboringstatessuggeststhatthey,forthemostpart,didnotuseretailcredit tomakeupforanyshortfallinthedemandforconsumerfinancecredit. 5.2.4. DepositoryInstitutionPersonalLoans Banksaccountformostofthepersonalloansfromdepositoryinstitutions(banks,savingsinstitutions,andcreditunions). Asdiscussedabove,bankloansarepreemptedfromArkansas’susury ceiling. PreemptiondoesnotappeartohaveresultedingreateruseofpersonalloansfromdepositoryinstitutionsinArkansas, however. ResultspresentedinTable6showthatprimeconsumers inArkansasweremorelikelytohavepersonalloansfromdepositoryinstitutionsthannonprime consumersinArkansas,butthedifferencewassmall(3.12percentgreater).Conditionalonhaving depository institution personal loans, prime consumers had larger balances ($1,339) than nonprimeconsumersinArkansas. 16

Theincidenceofdepositoryinstitutionpersonalloansamongnonprimeconsumerswasslightly greater than in Arkansas. Conditional on using depository institution personal loans, loan balancesfornonprimeconsumersinneighboringstateswerenotablylargerthantheloanbalances of nonprime consumers in Arkansas. Prime consumers in neighboring states were also slightly morelikelytousedepositoryinstitutionpersonalloans,andwhentheyhaddepositoryinstitution personalloans,hadlargerbalancesthannonprimeconsumersinArkansas. 5.2.5. AutoCredit Looking at aggregate amounts, auto debt owed by prime consumers in Arkansas was higher than that of nonprime consumers (Table 7). Further analysis shows that prime consumers in Arkansaswerelesslikelytohaveautocreditfromafinancecompanyandmorelikelytohaveauto creditfromabankthannonprimeconsumersinArkansas(Tables8and9).Conditionalonhaving financecompanycredit,primeconsumershadloweramountsofsuchdebt($912lower)thannonprimeconsumersinArkansas. Incontrast,conditionalonhavingautocreditfromabank,prime ArkansasconsumershadlargerautodebtthannonprimeconsumersinArkansas($2,179larger). With the exception of nonprime borrowers in Louisiana and Texas, nonprime consumers in Arkansasreliedmoreheavilyonfinancecompanycreditthannonprimeconsumersinneighboring states.NonprimeconsumersinArkansasweregenerallymorelikelytohavefinancecompanyauto debtandwhentheyhadautodebt,owedlargeramountsofsuchdebtthannonprimeconsumers inneighboringstates.30 Theprevalenceofdealerfinancingofautopurchases,eitherthroughindirectcreditorbuyhere payheredealershelpsexplainhowhigherriskconsumersinArkansasobtainautocreditdespite thefactthattheseloansaresubjecttothestateusuryceiling.31 Previousresearch,includingMelzer andSchroeder(2017),indicatesthatdealerscanpricecreditriskthroughthemarkupontheproductsaleratherthanthroughtheinterest.Asmentionedpreviously,bankshavehistoricallyavoided high-risklending.Furthermore,MelzerandSchroeder(2017)notedthatbankspurchasinginstallmentsalescontractsoriginatedbylocaldealerstendtofollowthelendinglawsapplicabletothe dealer’sstateratherthanthelawsofthebank’shomestate.Thispracticediscouragesbanklending tohigherriskconsumersinArkansas. ThegreaterrelianceofnonprimeconsumersinArkansasonfinancecompaniesforautocredit isconsistentwithMelzerandSchroeder(2017)’sfindingthatabindingrateceilinghasasignificant effectonthesourceofcredit. Inaddition,alargeramountoffinancecompanyautocreditmight reflectdealerscharginghigherpriceswhenfinancinghigherriskconsumers’autopurchases. 30TheexceptionswerelowerincidenceofbankautodebtfornonprimeconsumersinMississippiandgreaterincidenceoffinancecompanyautodebtfornonprimeconsumersinTexas. 31Somebuyherepayheredealersholdinstallmentsalescontractsinanaffiliatedfinancecompany(seeWhann,Keith E.,2007). 17

5.2.6. TotalConsumerDebt Overalltypesofcredit,theincidenceandamountofconsumercreditforbothnonprimeand primeconsumersinneighboringstatesweregenerallygreaterthanthatforconsumersinArkansas (Table10). PrimeconsumersinArkansasweremorelikelytohaveconsumercreditbalancesthan nonprimeconsumersinArkansas,andwhentheydid,debtamountsweresubstantiallygreater.In moststatesamountsofdebtweremarkedlygreater. Nonprime consumers in Arkansas had more consumer finance and retail credit than prime consumersinArkansas.NonprimeconsumersinArkansashadmorefinancecompanyautocredit, whichmaybeattributedtoretailersanddealers’abilitytopricecreditriskthroughproductprices ratherthaninterestrates.DespitepreemptionoftheArkansasrateceiling,nonprimeconsumersin ArkansashadlessbankcreditthanprimeArkansasconsumers,apossibleconsequenceofbanks’ longstandingavoidanceofhigh-risklending. 5.3. RegressionscomparingnonprimeconsumerlendinginArkansasborderandinteriorcounties,bytypeofcredit Next,weexaminedifferencesinnonprimeconsumerlendingwithinArkansasbetweencounties in proximity to the state border and counties in the interior of the state. Proximity to the Arkansas’borderisdefinedasbeingeitherdirectlyadjacenttothestateborderorbeinginacounty nexttoanadjacentcounty.Thesecountiesaredesignatedasbordercounties. WeestimateTobitregressionmodelssimilartotheonesusedabove,replacingthestate/credit riskcategoryindicatorvariableswithanindicatorvariableforbordercounties. DEBT it =b 0 +b 1 ·INC jt +b 2 ·INC2 jt +b 3 ·UNEMP jt +b 4 ·AGE<25it +b 5 ·AGE 25−39it +b 6 ·AGE≥55it +d 1 ·BORDER it +Σd t Q t +ε ijt , (2) DEBT istheamountofeachtypeofdebtowedbyanindividualconsumeriattimet. BORit DER isanindicatorvariablethatequalsoneiftheconsumerlivesinabordercountyandzerootherwise.Othervariablesareasdefinedearlier.Consumers’ageiscodedinindicatorvaluesAGE<25 , AGE 25–39 , AGE 40−54 ,and AGE≥55 (withagesbetween40and54beingomittedforestimation). As beforeINCandINC2areincomevariables,UNEMPistheunemployment,andQ isafixedeffect t fortime. Asdiscussedabove, Arkansasconsumerslivinginbordercountiestotheeastandnorthface impediments to crossing state lines to obtain credit. The Mississippi River to the east is a natural barrier, and the low population density to the north limits the number of offices that can be operatedprofitability.Consideringevidencefromstudiesofcommutingtolerancethresholds,that 18

ArkansascountiesontheborderofMissouriandMississippiareproximateisarguable.32 WethereforeexcludeconsumerslivingincountiesboardingMissouriandMississippifromouranalysis.33 The estimated regressions are statistically significant. Again, we present the McDonald and Moffitt(1980)decompositions. Overall,nonprimeconsumerslivinginbordercountiesweremore likelyasconsumersininteriorcountiestooweconsumerdebt(Table11). Foreachtypeofcredit, the proportion of nonprime consumers having positive balances was greater in border counties than in interior counties. Conditional dollar amounts of each type of consumer debt were also higherinbordercountiesthanininteriorcounties. Thegreatestdifferenceinincidenceofdebtisforconsumerfinanceloans, whicharesubject to Arkansas’ 17 percent usury ceiling. The proportion of consumer finance loans was 11.5 percent greater for nonprime consumers in border counties. The additional amount of consumer financedebtofnonprimeconsumersinbordercountieswasrelativelymoderate($557),however (Table12).Depositoryinstitutionpersonalloanswere5.07percentmorefrequentinArkansasbordercountiesthaninteriorcounties, buttheadditionaldollaramountofsuchpersonalloandebt ($1,456)wasmuchgreaterthantheadditionalamountofconsumerfinancedebt(Table13). Both consumerfinanceloansanddepositoryinstitutionpersonalloansareunsecuredclosed-endcash loans. Historically,higherriskconsumersusedconsumerfinanceloans,andlessriskyconsumers usedbankpersonalloans(JusterandShay,1964). Thisrisksegmentationinunsecuredcashlendinglikelystillexists. Therelativelylargeresponseofnonprimeconsumersinbordercountieswith proximateaccesstoconsumerfinanceloans,butsmallamountsofsuchcreditisconsistentwith higherriskconsumersinbordercountiescrossingstatelinestoobtainconsumerfinanceloansin stateswithlessrestrictiverateceilings. 6. Conclusion Interestrateceilingshavealonghistory. Economictheorypredicts,andempiricalevidencesuggests,thatarateceilingresultsincreditrationingwhentheceilingisbelowthemarketequilibrium price. Arkansas is notable for its low constitutional interest rate ceiling. Previous studies from the1960sand1970sfoundthatstrictapplicationoftheceilingresultedinalowernumberofdirectlenders,tightercreditstandards,andlargerloansizesandloanamountsrelativetoneighboringstates,whichhadlessrestrictiverateceilings. Arkansasconsumers,however,usedmoreretail credit,buthadaboutthesamelevelsofdebtthanconsumersinneighboringstates.Also,Arkansas consumerslivingnearstateborderscrossedstatelinestoobtaincredit. Since that time, Arkansas relaxed its interest rate ceiling, and widespread preemptions have beengrantedforbankcredit. 32Studiesofcommutingtolerancethresholdssuggestthatmaximumtolerablecommutingtimesareabout45minutes,whichisabout40to50miles.Fordiscussion,seeLukongoandMillerJr.(2018). 33IncludingconsumersinallbordercountiesandallexceptbordercountiesexceptthosealongtheMississippiRiver producessomewhatlowereffectsbutdoesnotleadtodifferentconclusionsfromtheonespresentedhere. 19

We find that nonprime consumers in Arkansas appear to be rationed. They are less likely to haveconsumerdebtandconditionalonhavingsuchdebt,haveloweramountsofdebtthanprime Arkansas consumers. Nonprime consumers in Arkansas are also less likely than nonprime consumersinneighboringstatestohaveconsumerdebtandowelessconsumerdebt. ThetypesofcreditusedbynonprimeconsumersinArkansasdifferfromthoseusedbynonprimeconsumersinneighboringstates.Generally,nonprimeconsumersinneighboringstatesuse more consumer finance company credit than nonprime consumers in Arkansas. This finding is a consequence of rationing in Arkansas due to finance companies being subject to the low-rate ceilinginArkansas. Nonprimeconsumersinneighboringstatesusedmoredepositoryinstitution personalloansandbankautocreditthannonprimeconsumersinArkansas.BankpreemptionapparentlyhasnotincreasedcreditavailabilityfornonprimeconsumersinArkansas.NonprimeconsumersinArkansasusedmoreretailandfinancecompanyautocreditthannonprimeconsumers inneighboringstates. Retailersandautodealersoriginatingsalesfinancecreditmaycompensate for credit risk with higher product prices and thereby avoid violating the Arkansas interest rate ceiling. Finally, nonprimeconsumersinArkansasweremorelikelytohavedebtandhadgreaterbalancesinbordercountiesthanininteriorcounties.Thisresultisespeciallysignificantforconsumer financecredit,whichisamajorsourceofsmall,riskiercashloanstosubprimeconsumers. 20

References BladesJr.,H.B.andG.C.Lynch(1976).Creditpoliciesandstorelocationsinarkansasbordercities: Merchantreactionstoa10percentfinancechargeceiling,monographno.2. WestLafayette,IN: PurdueUniversity,KrannertGraduateSchoolofManagement. Bolen, B., G. Elliehausen, and T. W. Miller Jr. (2022). Effects of illinois’s 36% interest rate cap on small-dollar credit availability and financial well-being. Mississippi State University, working paper. Canner,G.B.andG.Elliehausen(2013).Consumers’experienceswithcreditcards.FederalReserve Bulletin(99),1–36. Chen, L. and G. Elliehausen (2020, August). The cost structure of consumer finance companies anditsimplicationsforinterestrates: Evidencefromthefederalreserveboard’s2015surveyof financecompanies. FEDSNotes.Washington:BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem. ConsumerFinancialProtectionBureau(2021, January). Taskforceonfederalconsumerfinancial lawreport. Technicalreport. Durkin,T.A.,G.Elliehausen,andM.Hwang(2016). Rateceilingsandthedistributionofsmalldollarloansfromconsumerfinancecompanies:resultsofanewsurveyofsmalldollarcashlenders. Mimeo. Durkin,T.A.,G.Elliehausen,M.E.Staten,andT.J.Zywicki(2014). ConsumerCreditandtheAmericanEconomy. Number9780195169928inOUPCatalogue.OxfordUniversityPress. Elliehausen, G. and S. M. Hannon (2018). The credit card act and consumer finance company lending. JournalofFinancialIntermediation34,109–119. AssessingBankingRegulationDuring theObamaEra. Feinberg,R.M.(2001). Thecompetitiveroleofcreditunionsinsmalllocalfinancialservicesmarkets. TheReviewofEconomicsandStatistics83(3),560–563. Feinberg,R.M.(2003). Thedeterminantsofbankratesinlocalconsumerlendingmarkets: Comparingmarketandinstitution-levelresults. SouthernEconomicJournal70(1),144–156. Feinberg, R. M. and A. Ataur-Rahman (2006, Fall). Are Credit Unions Just Small Banks? Determinants of Loan Rates in Local Consumer Lending Markets. Eastern Economic Journal 32(4), 647–659. Galchus,K.E.,C.G.Martin,andA.P.Vibhakar(1989).Ahistoryofusurylawinarkansas:1836-1990. UniversityofArkansasatLittleRockLawReview12,695–737. 21

Galchus,K.E.andA.P.Vibhakar(2003).Acontinuinghistoryofusurylawinarkansas:Ontheverge ofextinction. UniversityofArkansasatLittleRockLawReview25,819–34. Homer, S. and R. Sylla (1996). A history of interest rates. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. IllinoisLawForumBoardofStudentEditors(1968). Anempiricalstudyofthearkansasusurylaw: Withfriendslikethat.... Technicalreport. Juster,F.T.andR.P.Shay(1964). ConsumerSensitivitytoFinanceRates. InConsumerSensitivity toFinanceRates: AnEmpiricalandAnalyticalInvestigation,NBERChapters,pp.6–46.National BureauofEconomicResearch,Inc. Lee,D.andW.V.derKlaauw(2010). AnintroductiontotheFRBNYConsumerCreditPanel. Staff Reports479,FederalReserveBankofNewYork. Lukongo, O. E. B. and T. W. Miller Jr. (2018). Evaluating the spatial consequence of interest rate ceilingusingaspatialregimechangeapproach. TheAmericanEconomist63,166–86. Lukongo,O.E.B.andT.W.MillerJr.(2022). Measuringtheconsequencesofabindinginterestrate caponsmall-dollarinstallmentloans. JournalofFinancialResearch,forthcoming. Lynch,G.C.(1968).Consumercreditattenpercentsimple:Thearkansascase.UniversityofIllinois LawForum,592–618. McDonald,J.andR.Moffitt(1980). Theusesoftobitanalysis. TheReviewofEconomicsandStatistics62(2),318–21. Melzer,B.andA.Schroeder(2017).Loancontractinginthepresenceofusurylimits:Evidencefrom automobilelending.ConsumerFinancialProtectionBureauOfficeofResearchWorkingPaperNo. 2017-02. NationalCommissiononConsumerFinance(1972). Consumercreditintheunitedstates. Technicalreport. NationalCreditUnionAdministration(2021,January). Loanrateceilingforfederalcreditunions unchangedat18percentuntilseptember2021. Technicalreport. Peterson, R. L. (1983). Usury laws and consumer credit: A note. The Journal of Finance 38(4), 1299–1304. Peterson, R. L. and G. A. Falls (1981). Impact of a ten percent usury ceiling : empirical evidence / RichardL.PetersonandGregoryA.Falls. CreditResearchCenter, KrannertGraduateSchoolof Management,PurdueUniversityWestLafayette,Ind. 22

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Figure1.HistoricalViewofTheInterestRateCeilinginArkansasandtheShareofConsumerCredit SubjecttotheRateCeiling Percent 18 Discount Rate 16 Ceiling 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 (a) ArkansasInterestRateCeilingTimeline Percent Percent 18 38 Price Differential (left axis) 16 37 Share (right axis) 14 36 12 35 10 34 8 33 6 32 4 2 31 0 30 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018 (b) PriceandShareofConsumerCreditSubjecttotheInterestRateCeiling Note:Figurea)plotstheevolutionoftherateceilinginArkansas(inred)shownrelativetothediscountrate (inblack).Infigureb),inthegreyarea(leftaxis),weshowthepricedifferential,thedifferencebetweenthe interestrateceilingandthediscountrate.Upuntil2011,theinterestrateceilingwasthelowerof5percent abovethediscountrateand17percent.After2011,theinterestrateceilingwasfixedat17percent.Thered line(rightaxis)representstheshareoftheconsumercreditthatissubjecttotheinterestrateceiling.Figure b)highlightsthatthisshareincreasedoncetherateceilingand,implicitly,thepricedifferentialthatcanbe chargedincreased. Source: FREDforthediscountrateandauthors’calculationsbasedontheFederalReserveBankofNew York/EquifaxConsumerCreditPanelfortheshare. 24

Figure2. PersonalLoansinArkansasandBorderCounties. LukongoandMillerJr.(2022)founda consumerfinance"creditdesert"existingintheinteriorofArkansas. 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0 1 − 20 21 − 100 101 − 1000 1001 − 2000 > 2000 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Note: Numberoftraditionalinstallmentloansper10,000population,Arkansasandbordercounties,September 2013.Source:AmericanFinancialServicesAssociation(AFSA). 25

Figure3.PersonalLoansHeldbySubprimeBorrowersinArkansasandBorderCounties 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0 − 2,273 2,273 − 3,683 3,683 − 4,593 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4,593 − 5,342 5,342 − 6,061 6,061 − 6,856 6,856 − 7,854 7,854 − 9,193 9,193 − 15,000 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Note:Numberofconsumerfinancetradesper10,000individualswithcreditscores,Arkansasandbordercounties, 2013Q3.Source:FederalReserveBankofNewYorkConsumerCreditPanel/Equifax. 26

Figure4.PersonalLoansHeldbySubprimeBorrowersinArkansasandBorderCounties–Detailed View 0 − 1,000 1,000 − 1,750 1,750 − 2,000 2,000 − 2,500 2,500 − 4,000 4,000 − 5,000 5,000 − 6,000 Note:Numberofconsumerfinancetradesper10,000individualswithcreditscores,Arkansasandbordercounties, 2013Q3.Source:FederalReserveBankofNewYorkConsumerCreditPanel/Equifax. 27

Table1: ProportionofConsumersHavingConsumerDebtandAverageAmountofDebtforConsumersOwingDebt:ArkansasandNeighboringStates Arkansas NeighborStates Proportionofconsumers Nonprime Prime Nonprime Prime Memo havingconsumerdebt Typeofdebt Totaldebt 0.707 0.789 0.758 0.768 -6.72 Bankcarddebt 0.437 0.640 0.436 0.639 0.14 Consumerfinance 0.163 0.104 0.303 0.116 -46.07 Retail 0.301 0.264 0.263 0.258 14.49 Financecompanyauto 0.325 0.228 0.294 0.171 10.61 Bankauto 0.153 0.229 0.157 0.217 -2.67 Depositoryinstitutionpersonal 0.096 0.113 0.110 0.099 -12.13 Averagebalanceofconsumers havingconsumerdebt(dollars) Typeofdebt Totaldebt 14,809 14,697 13,650 14,737 8.49 Bankcarddebt 4,658 5,117 4,970 5,196 -6.28 Consumerfinance 2,956 3,607 2,944 2,717 0.42 Retail 1,813 1,247 1,943 1,151 -6.70 Financecompanyauto 13,716 13,024 12,743 13,585 7.64 Bankauto 13,364 13,672 14,623 15,683 -8.61 Depositoryinstitutionpersonal 9,395 13,426 6,471 16,196 45.20 Note: The Memo represents the nonprime percentage difference calculated following the formula: Percentage difference=100*(Arkansas-Neighbor)/Neighbor.Source:FederalReserveBankofNewYork/EquifaxConsumerCredit Panel. 28

Table2:SummaryStatisticsandVariableDescriptions Description Mean Standard Deviation Dependentvariables Total Totaldebt 10,422 19,235 Card Totalbankcarddebt 2,837 7,183 Consumerfinance Totalconsumerfinanceaccountdebt 500 1,860 Retail Totalretailcreditdebt 385 1,358 Auto Totalautoloandebt 5,610 11,651 Autofinance Totalautoloandebtissuedbyfinancecompanies 2,927 8,334 Autobank Totalautoloandebtissuedbybanks 2,683 8,069 Depositoryinstitutionpersonal Totalbankandcreditunionpersonalloandebt 1,089 9,924 Explanatoryvariables NonprimeborrowersinArkansas Indicatorvariable(omitted) 0.0228 0.149 PrimeborrowersinArkansas Indicatorvariable 0.0292 0.168 NonprimeborrowersinLouisiana Indicatorvariable 0.0436 0.204 PrimeborrowersinLouisiana Indicatorvariable 0.0441 0.205 NonprimeborrowersinMissouri Indicatorvariable 0.0454 0.208 PrimeborrowersinMissouri Indicatorvariable 0.0707 0.256 NonprimeborrowersinMississippi Indicatorvariable 0.0301 0.171 PrimeborrowersinMississippi Indicatorvariable 0.0265 0.161 NonprimeborrowersinOklahoma Indicatorvariable 0.0331 0.179 PrimeborrowersinOklahoma Indicatorvariable 0.0401 0.196 NonprimeborrowersinTennessee Indicatorvariable 0.0607 0.239 PrimeborrowersinTennessee Indicatorvariable 0.0747 0.263 NonprimeborrowersinTexas Indicatorvariable 0.226 0.418 PrimeborrowersinTexas Indicatorvariable 0.253 0.435 Border Indicatorvariable 0.0989 0.299 INC Income(logarithm) 10.7 0.238 INC2 Incomesquared 114 5.09 AGE<25 Agelessthan25years,indicatorvariable 0.0683 0.252 AGE25−39 Age25to39years,indicatorvariable 0.264 0.441 AGE40−54 Age40to54years,indicatorvariable(omitted) 0.27 0.444 AGE≥55 Age55yearsorolder,indicatorvariable 0.399 0.49 UNEMP Unemploymentrate 5.35 1.79 Source:FederalReserveBankofNewYork/EquifaxConsumerCreditPanel,BureauofLaborStatisticsfortheunemploymentrate,andBureauofEconomicAnalysisforincomeinformation. 29

Table3:TobitEstimationResultsandMarginalEffectsforConsumerFinanceDebt Consumerfinancedebt Tobitcoefficient Marginaleffects Unconditional Conditional Probability expectedvalue(Y*) expectedvalue uncensored PrimeborrowersinArkansas -1,268*** -138*** -220*** -.0427*** (113.575) (12.657) (19.788) (0.004) NonprimeborrowersinLouisiana 3,286*** 686*** 731*** .168*** (95.912) (18.532) (20.194) (0.004) PrimeborrowersinLouisiana -1,164*** -129*** -203*** -.0397*** (102.845) (12.044) (18.253) (0.004) NonprimeborrowersinMissouri 1,661*** 277*** 337*** .0749*** (93.394) (14.495) (18.302) (0.004) PrimeborrowersinMissouri -1,616*** -167*** -276*** -.0524*** (96.025) (11.267) (17.005) (0.003) NonprimeborrowersinMississippi 2,598*** 494*** 556*** .127*** (98.924) (18.384) (20.615) (0.005) PrimeborrowersinMississippi -1,262*** -138*** -219*** -.0426*** (113.564) (12.664) (19.791) (0.004) NonprimeborrowersinOklahoma 3,356*** 707*** 749*** .173*** (95.994) (18.934) (20.358) (0.004) PrimeborrowersinOklahoma -856*** -99.1*** -152*** -.0302*** (103.984) (12.445) (18.631) (0.004) NonprimeborrowersinTennessee 3,084*** 627*** 678*** .156*** (92.116) (16.290) (18.769) (0.004) PrimeborrowersinTennessee -1,051*** -118*** -185*** -.0363*** (93.474) (11.434) (16.869) (0.003) NonprimeborrowersinTexas 2,780*** 542*** 601*** .137*** (83.612) (12.039) (15.924) (0.003) PrimeborrowersinTexas -365*** -45.4*** -66.4*** -.0135*** (83.800) (10.901) (15.499) (0.003) AGE<25 -3,482*** -571*** -702*** -.156*** (55.011) (8.799) (10.929) (0.002) AGE25−39 -934*** -153*** -188*** -.0418*** (29.766) (4.872) (5.990) (0.001) AGE≥55 -646*** -106*** -130*** -.0289*** (28.957) (4.740) (5.832) (0.001) UNEMP -78.1*** -12.8*** -15.8*** -.0035*** (10.003) (1.640) (2.017) (0.000) INC -27,827*** -4,562*** -5,611*** -1.24*** (3,026.145) (496.290) (610.220) (0.136) INC2 1,205*** 198*** 243*** .0539*** (141.500) (23.206) (28.534) (0.006) Constant 154,116*** (16,196.435) Sigma 5,526*** (38.863) Observations 505,965 StateFE NO QuarterFE YES PseudoR-squared 0.0143 Note:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.*,**,and***denotesignificanceatthe10%,5%,and1%levels,respectively. Source:FederalReserveBankofNewYork/EquifaxConsumerCreditPanel,BureauofLaborStatisticsforthe unemploymentrate,andBureauofEconomicAnalysisforincomeinformation. 30

Table4:TobitEstimationResultsandMarginalEffectsforBankCardDebt Bankcarddebt Tobitcoefficient Marginaleffects Unconditional Conditional Probability expectedvalue(Y*) expectedvalue uncensored PrimeborrowersinArkansas 4,052*** 1,775*** 1,342*** .151*** (139.870) (60.025) (45.670) (0.005) NonprimeborrowersinLouisiana -1,022*** -353*** -292*** -.0358*** (132.389) (46.350) (38.103) (0.005) PrimeborrowersinLouisiana 3,911*** 1,703*** 1,290*** .146*** (135.485) (56.784) (43.551) (0.005) NonprimeborrowersinMissouri 823*** 311*** 248*** .0297*** (130.701) (48.900) (39.115) (0.005) PrimeborrowersinMissouri 3,718*** 1,605*** 1,219*** .138*** (125.548) (49.609) (38.862) (0.004) NonprimeborrowersinMississippi -552*** -195*** -160*** -.0195*** (143.886) (50.931) (41.680) (0.005) PrimeborrowersinMississippi 4,039*** 1,768*** 1,337*** .15*** (143.371) (62.053) (47.084) (0.005) NonprimeborrowersinOklahoma -640*** -225*** -185*** -.0226*** (146.989) (51.769) (42.455) (0.005) PrimeborrowersinOklahoma 3,340*** 1,418*** 1,083*** .124*** (131.124) (53.146) (41.232) (0.005) NonprimeborrowersinTennessee -57 -20.7 -16.7 -.00203 (126.078) (45.724) (37.044) (0.004) PrimeborrowersinTennessee 3,612*** 1,552*** 1,181*** .134*** (121.824) (47.833) (37.546) (0.004) NonprimeborrowersinTexas 851*** 322*** 256*** .0308*** (110.741) (40.584) (32.736) (0.004) PrimeborrowersinTexas 4,262*** 1,884*** 1,421*** .159*** (115.378) (43.446) (34.656) (0.004) AGE<25 -6,239*** -2,791*** -2,094*** -.235*** (67.086) (28.797) (21.782) (0.002) AGE25−39 -2,379*** -1,065*** -798*** -.0895*** (44.793) (20.161) (15.070) (0.002) AGE≥55 -1,906*** -853*** -640*** -.0717*** (45.651) (20.172) (15.175) (0.002) UNEMP -225*** -101*** -75.5*** -.00846*** (14.962) (6.715) (5.031) (0.001) INC 52,837*** 23,640*** 17,730*** 1.99*** (4,173.364) (1,862.392) (1,397.825) (0.156) INC2 -2,337*** -1,046*** -784*** -.0879*** (194.386) (86.764) (65.118) (0.007) Constant -297,991*** (22,424.004) Sigma 10,516*** (88.112) Observations 505,965 StateFE NO QuarterFE YES PseudoR-squared 0.00449 Note:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.*,**,and***denotesignificanceatthe10%,5%,and1%levels,respectively. Source:FederalReserveBankofNewYork/EquifaxConsumerCreditPanel,BureauofLaborStatisticsforthe unemploymentrate,andBureauofEconomicAnalysisforincomeinformation. 31

Table5:TobitEstimationResultsandMarginalEffectsforRetailCredit Retailcredit Tobitcoefficient Marginaleffects Unconditional Conditional Probability expectedvalue(Y*) expectedvalue uncensored PrimeborrowersinArkansas -686*** -171*** -165*** -.0675*** (50.555) (13.049) (12.376) (0.005) NonprimeborrowersinLouisiana -553*** -141*** -135*** -.0553*** (50.397) (13.253) (12.460) (0.005) PrimeborrowersinLouisiana -721*** -178*** -173*** -.0707*** (47.866) (12.569) (11.818) (0.005) NonprimeborrowersinMissouri -168*** -46.2*** -42.5*** -.0174*** (48.514) (13.458) (12.330) (0.005) PrimeborrowersinMissouri -491*** -127*** -121*** -.0494*** (44.234) (12.099) (11.157) (0.005) NonprimeborrowersinMississippi -267*** -72*** -67*** -.0275*** (53.717) (14.539) (13.483) (0.006) PrimeborrowersinMississippi -676*** -168*** -163*** -.0666*** (51.481) (13.237) (12.580) (0.005) NonprimeborrowersinOklahoma -406*** -107*** -100*** -.0412*** (53.557) (14.189) (13.297) (0.005) PrimeborrowersinOklahoma -671*** -167*** -162*** -.0662*** (49.269) (12.861) (12.130) (0.005) NonprimeborrowersinTennessee -396*** -104*** -98.1*** -.0402*** (46.711) (12.705) (11.750) (0.005) PrimeborrowersinTennessee -822*** -199*** -196*** -.0797*** (44.397) (11.891) (11.068) (0.005) NonprimeborrowersinTexas 54.9 15.7 14.2 .00582 (41.152) (11.684) (10.583) (0.004) PrimeborrowersinTexas -586*** -149*** -142*** -.0583*** (41.343) (11.513) (10.525) (0.004) AGE<25 -1,783*** -432*** -425*** -.173*** (28.054) (6.693) (6.615) (0.003) AGE25−39 -794*** -192*** -189*** -.0772*** (16.679) (4.002) (3.948) (0.002) AGE≥55 -143*** -34.6*** -34*** -.0139*** (14.899) (3.611) (3.548) (0.001) UNEMP 10.8** 2.61** 2.56** .00105** (5.342) (1.294) (1.272) (0.001) INC -2,455 -595 -584 -.239 (1,517.882) (367.742) (361.411) (0.148) INC2 97.8 23.7 23.3 .00951 (70.771) (17.146) (16.851) (0.007) Constant 13,449* (8,146.125) Sigma 3,214*** (18.999) Observations 505,965 StateFE NO QuarterFE YES PseudoR-squared 0.00265 Note:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.*,**,and***denotesignificanceatthe10%,5%,and1%levels,respectively. Source:FederalReserveBankofNewYork/EquifaxConsumerCreditPanel,BureauofLaborStatisticsforthe unemploymentrate,andBureauofEconomicAnalysisforincomeinformation. 32

Table 6: Tobit Estimation Results and Marginal Effects for Depository Institution Personal Loan Debt Depositoryinstitution Tobitcoefficient Marginaleffects personalloandebt Unconditional Conditional Probability expectedvalue(Y*) expectedvalue uncensored PrimeborrowersinArkansas 8,577*** 666*** 1,339*** .0312*** (878.766) (67.241) (135.881) (0.003) NonprimeborrowersinLouisiana 9,243*** 730*** 1,450*** .0341*** (847.223) (63.017) (129.945) (0.003) PrimeborrowersinLouisiana 8,791*** 686*** 1,375*** .0322*** (829.203) (61.988) (127.292) (0.003) NonprimeborrowersinMissouri 2,285*** 152*** 341*** .0074*** (765.233) (49.827) (113.551) (0.002) PrimeborrowersinMissouri 3,859*** 267*** 583*** .0129*** (855.477) (58.050) (128.359) (0.003) NonprimeborrowersinMississippi 7,382*** 556*** 1,143*** .0263*** (853.328) (62.614) (130.547) (0.003) PrimeborrowersinMississippi 11,496*** 959*** 1,834*** .0441*** (955.628) (80.868) (151.702) (0.004) NonprimeborrowersinOklahoma 4,772*** 337*** 725*** .0162*** (820.430) (56.717) (123.654) (0.003) PrimeborrowersinOklahoma 13,512*** 1,184*** 2,187*** .0538*** (894.046) (72.771) (140.010) (0.003) NonprimeborrowersinTennessee 3,993*** 277*** 603*** .0134*** (744.148) (49.243) (110.853) (0.002) PrimeborrowersinTennessee 4,676*** 330*** 710*** .0158*** (740.720) (49.507) (110.600) (0.002) NonprimeborrowersinTexas 7,221*** 542*** 1,117*** .0257*** (724.473) (47.794) (107.775) (0.002) PrimeborrowersinTexas 6,761*** 502*** 1,042*** .0238*** (695.387) (45.233) (103.048) (0.002) AGE<25 -13,525*** -1,162*** -2,180*** -.0533*** (652.443) (51.916) (102.623) (0.002) AGE25−39 -5,395*** -464*** -870*** -.0213*** (318.104) (26.016) (50.458) (0.001) AGE≥55 -8,374*** -719*** -1,350*** -.033*** (364.886) (28.882) (57.284) (0.001) UNEMP -117 -10.1 -18.9 -.000462 (86.434) (7.433) (13.935) (0.000) INC -126,226*** -10,845*** -20,346*** -.497*** (29,490.591) (2,527.474) (4,749.393) (0.114) INC2 4,889*** 420*** 788*** .0193*** (1,376.687) (118.082) (221.772) (0.005) Constant 733,203*** (157,583.556) Sigma 39,820*** (1,825.205) Observations 505,965 StateFE NO QuarterFE YES PseudoR-squared 0.00348 Note:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.*,**,and***denotesignificanceatthe10%,5%,and1%levels,respectively. Source:FederalReserveBankofNewYork/EquifaxConsumerCreditPanel,BureauofLaborStatisticsforthe unemploymentrate,andBureauofEconomicAnalysisforincomeinformation. 33

Table7:TobitEstimationResultsandMarginalEffectsforTotalAutoLoanDebt Autoloandebt Tobitcoefficient Marginaleffects Unconditional Conditional Probability expectedvalue(Y*) expectedvalue uncensored PrimeborrowersinArkansas 2,816*** 971*** 804*** .0441*** (341.246) (115.022) (96.023) (0.005) NonprimeborrowersinLouisiana 1,534*** 513*** 430*** .0237*** (323.855) (107.184) (90.281) (0.005) PrimeborrowersinLouisiana 1,357*** 452*** 380*** .021*** (330.575) (109.737) (92.315) (0.005) NonprimeborrowersinMissouri 184 59.7 50.8 .00282 (306.026) (99.032) (84.298) (0.005) PrimeborrowersinMissouri -570* -181* -156* -.00864* (292.531) (93.926) (80.233) (0.004) NonprimeborrowersinMississippi -686** -218** -187** -.0104** (339.927) (108.319) (92.848) (0.005) PrimeborrowersinMississippi 614* 201* 170* .00942* (360.867) (118.247) (100.082) (0.006) NonprimeborrowersinOklahoma 1,710*** 575*** 481*** .0265*** (398.948) (131.449) (110.972) (0.006) PrimeborrowersinOklahoma 2,901*** 1,003*** 829*** .0454*** (326.750) (110.518) (92.092) (0.005) NonprimeborrowersinTennessee -2,312*** -707*** -618*** -.0344*** (301.040) (94.019) (81.271) (0.005) PrimeborrowersinTennessee -3.39 -1.09 -.933 -.0000517 (296.287) (95.691) (81.528) (0.005) NonprimeborrowersinTexas 4,411*** 1,577*** 1,285*** .0699*** (282.433) (89.596) (76.652) (0.004) PrimeborrowersinTexas 3,079*** 1,068*** 882*** .0483*** (274.559) (89.473) (75.743) (0.004) AGE<25 -12,596*** -4,456*** -3,648*** -.199*** (334.669) (79.258) (77.322) (0.004) AGE25−39 -1,492*** -528*** -432*** -.0236*** (108.634) (36.642) (30.526) (0.002) AGE≥55 -10,344*** -3,659*** -2,996*** -.164*** (269.335) (59.160) (60.340) (0.003) UNEMP -266*** -94.1*** -77.1*** -.00421*** (38.239) (13.300) (10.958) (0.001) INC -6,582 -2,329 -1,906 -.104 (11,075.033) (3,921.437) (3,208.880) (0.176) INC2 217 76.9 63 .00344 (516.674) (182.898) (149.680) (0.008) Constant 38,078 (59,452.782) Sigma 23,521*** (788.180) Observations 505,965 StateFE NO QuarterFE YES PseudoR-squared 0.00455 Note:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.*,**,and***denotesignificanceatthe10%,5%,and1%levels,respectively. Source:FederalReserveBankofNewYork/EquifaxConsumerCreditPanel,BureauofLaborStatisticsforthe unemploymentrate,andBureauofEconomicAnalysisforincomeinformation. 34

Table8:TobitEstimationResultsandMarginalEffectsforBankAutoLoanDebt Bankautoloandebt Tobitcoefficient Marginaleffects Unconditional Conditional Probability expectedvalue(Y*) expectedvalue uncensored PrimeborrowersinArkansas 10,958*** 1,739*** 2,179*** .0981*** (475.430) (73.494) (92.260) (0.004) NonprimeborrowersinLouisiana 892* 104* 159* .0065* (490.122) (56.613) (86.967) (0.004) PrimeborrowersinLouisiana 8,892*** 1,326*** 1,727*** .0765*** (474.381) (67.615) (89.786) (0.004) NonprimeborrowersinMissouri 3,589*** 454*** 657*** .0277*** (452.814) (55.022) (81.627) (0.003) PrimeborrowersinMissouri 9,910*** 1,524*** 1,947*** .087*** (425.908) (56.475) (78.517) (0.003) NonprimeborrowersinMississippi -1,686*** -181*** -292*** -.0116*** (521.201) (56.184) (90.316) (0.004) PrimeborrowersinMississippi 6,342*** 874*** 1,197*** .0519*** (509.998) (70.295) (95.767) (0.004) NonprimeborrowersinOklahoma 5,600*** 754*** 1,049*** .0451*** (487.933) (64.497) (90.352) (0.004) PrimeborrowersinOklahoma 14,888*** 2,655*** 3,098*** .143*** (457.379) (75.883) (90.384) (0.004) NonprimeborrowersinTennessee -921** -101** -161** -.00644** (453.871) (50.469) (79.502) (0.003) PrimeborrowersinTennessee 10,626*** 1,670*** 2,105*** .0945*** (428.406) (57.970) (79.430) (0.003) NonprimeborrowersinTexas 4,741*** 622*** 879*** .0375*** (403.034) (47.080) (71.698) (0.003) PrimeborrowersinTexas 12,121*** 1,992*** 2,443*** .111*** (404.524) (50.347) (73.083) (0.003) AGE<25 -10,125*** -1,769*** -2,094*** -.0971*** (244.491) (42.512) (50.357) (0.002) AGE25−39 -1,087*** -190*** -225*** -.0104*** (139.922) (24.455) (28.935) (0.001) AGE≥55 -10,610*** -1,854*** -2,194*** -.102*** (142.190) (24.355) (28.978) (0.001) UNEMP -703*** -123*** -145*** -.00674*** (51.513) (8.992) (10.646) (0.000) INC -45,925*** -8,025*** -9,497*** -.44*** (15,492.347) (2,707.325) (3,203.792) (0.149) INC2 1,755** 307** 363** .0168** (723.557) (126.443) (149.631) (0.007) Constant 263,682*** (83,005.073) Sigma 26,853*** (112.895) Observations 505,965 StateFE NO QuarterFE YES PseudoR-squared 0.00598 Note:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.*,**,and***denotesignificanceatthe10%,5%,and1%levels,respectively. Source:FederalReserveBankofNewYork/EquifaxConsumerCreditPanel,BureauofLaborStatisticsforthe unemploymentrate,andBureauofEconomicAnalysisforincomeinformation. 35

Table9:TobitEstimationResultsandMarginalEffectsforFinanceCompanyAutoLoanDebt Financecompanyautoloandebt Tobitcoefficient Marginaleffects Unconditional Conditional Probability expectedvalue(Y*) expectedvalue uncensored PrimeborrowersinArkansas -3,968*** -890*** -912*** -.0495*** (424.376) (91.151) (95.278) (0.005) NonprimeborrowersinLouisiana 830** 212** 202** .0111** (349.664) (88.499) (84.964) (0.005) PrimeborrowersinLouisiana -4,833*** -1,059*** -1,099*** -.0595*** (449.607) (91.981) (98.684) (0.005) NonprimeborrowersinMissouri -1,996*** -472*** -470*** -.0257*** (344.396) (82.238) (81.336) (0.005) PrimeborrowersinMissouri -9,001*** -1,758*** -1,947*** -.103*** (531.586) (91.754) (108.000) (0.005) NonprimeborrowersinMississippi -500 -123 -120 -.00658 (371.780) (91.783) (89.297) (0.005) PrimeborrowersinMississippi -4,636*** -1,021*** -1,057*** -.0572*** (488.026) (99.367) (107.012) (0.005) NonprimeborrowersinOklahoma -1,930*** -457*** -455*** -.0249*** (393.965) (96.139) (94.071) (0.006) PrimeborrowersinOklahoma -9,058*** -1,767*** -1,958*** -.104*** (579.967) (97.395) (116.692) (0.005) NonprimeborrowersinTennessee -3,133*** -719*** -727*** -.0396*** (344.600) (79.573) (79.980) (0.004) PrimeborrowersinTennessee -9,323*** -1,805*** -2,009*** -.106*** (558.476) (94.173) (112.428) (0.005) NonprimeborrowersinTexas 2,592*** 692*** 647*** .0356*** (311.476) (75.787) (74.135) (0.004) PrimeborrowersinTexas -5,285*** -1,144*** -1,196*** -.0645*** (413.667) (83.922) (90.281) (0.004) AGE<25 -12,121*** -2,532*** -2,700*** -.145*** (599.443) (86.920) (115.423) (0.004) AGE25−39 -1,801*** -376*** -401*** -.0216*** (148.658) (27.563) (31.379) (0.001) AGE≥55 -7,556*** -1,579*** -1,683*** -.0906*** (378.267) (54.726) (72.823) (0.002) UNEMP 15.9 3.32 3.54 .000191 (42.420) (8.864) (9.451) (0.001) INC -504 -105 -112 -.00605 (12,541.820) (2,620.675) (2,794.227) (0.150) INC2 148 30.9 32.9 .00177 (583.355) (121.964) (129.999) (0.007) Constant -26,014 (67,681.956) Sigma 23,967*** (1,384.178) Observations 505,965 StateFE NO QuarterFE YES PseudoR-squared 0.00627 Note:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.*,**,and***denotesignificanceatthe10%,5%,and1%levels,respectively. Source:FederalReserveBankofNewYork/EquifaxConsumerCreditPanel,BureauofLaborStatisticsforthe unemploymentrate,andBureauofEconomicAnalysisforincomeinformation. 36

Table10:TobitEstimationResultsandMarginalEffectsforTotalDebt Totaldebt Tobitcoefficient Marginaleffects Unconditional Conditional Probability expectedvalue(Y*) expectedvalue uncensored PrimeborrowersinArkansas 4,821*** 2,810*** 1,985*** .0822*** (283.218) (161.429) (114.426) (0.005) NonprimeborrowersinLouisiana 2,525*** 1,422*** 1,009*** .0435*** (271.935) (151.380) (107.606) (0.005) PrimeborrowersinLouisiana 5,174*** 3,031*** 2,140*** .0881*** (274.153) (157.347) (111.447) (0.005) NonprimeborrowersinMissouri 1,310*** 724*** 515*** .0227*** (245.487) (133.946) (95.525) (0.004) PrimeborrowersinMissouri 3,381*** 1,929*** 1,366*** .0581*** (289.087) (158.545) (112.980) (0.005) NonprimeborrowersinMississippi 804*** 441*** 314*** .0139*** (281.767) (154.210) (109.919) (0.005) PrimeborrowersinMississippi 5,043*** 2,949*** 2,083*** .0859*** (324.509) (189.832) (134.170) (0.005) NonprimeborrowersinOklahoma 3,016*** 1,712*** 1,213*** .0519*** (321.598) (178.996) (127.268) (0.005) PrimeborrowersinOklahoma 5,714*** 3,374*** 2,381*** .097*** (270.745) (154.683) (109.640) (0.005) NonprimeborrowersinTennessee 718*** 393*** 280*** .0124*** (240.676) (130.806) (93.353) (0.004) PrimeborrowersinTennessee 3,356*** 1,915*** 1,356*** .0577*** (243.829) (133.835) (95.337) (0.004) NonprimeborrowersinTexas 4,678*** 2,721*** 1,923*** .0798*** (224.269) (121.291) (86.542) (0.004) PrimeborrowersinTexas 5,924*** 3,508*** 2,475*** .1*** (229.087) (124.586) (88.788) (0.004) AGE<25 -13,876*** -8,491*** -5,966*** -.233*** (151.382) (71.582) (50.609) (0.003) AGE25−39 -4,113*** -2,517*** -1,768*** -.069*** (93.933) (55.293) (38.859) (0.002) AGE≥55 -7,325*** -4,482*** -3,149*** -.123*** (99.313) (56.501) (39.603) (0.002) UNEMP -285*** -174*** -122*** -.00478*** (29.694) (18.225) (12.801) (0.001) INC -40,738*** -24,927*** -17,514*** -.683*** (8,657.224) (5,294.760) (3,720.209) (0.145) INC2 1,864*** 1,140*** 801*** .0313*** (404.210) (247.159) (173.662) (0.007) Constant 229,410*** (46,389.054) Sigma 22,843*** (484.102) Observations 505,965 StateFE NO QuarterFE YES PseudoR-squared 0.00187 Note:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.*,**,and***denotesignificanceatthe10%,5%,and1%levels,respectively. Source:FederalReserveBankofNewYork/EquifaxConsumerCreditPanel,BureauofLaborStatisticsforthe unemploymentrate,andBureauofEconomicAnalysisforincomeinformation. 37

Table11:TobitEstimationResultsandMarginalEffectsforTotalNonprimeDebtforArkansasBorderCountiesExcludingThoseBorderingMississippiRiverandMissouri Totaldebt Tobitcoefficient Marginaleffects Unconditional Conditional Probability expectedvalue(Y*) expectedvalue uncensored border 3,759*** 2,188*** 1,546*** .0739*** (545.135) (310.708) (220.271) (0.009) AGE<25 -10,463*** -5,980*** -4,233*** -.207*** (712.844) (387.911) (276.147) (0.012) AGE25−39 -6,387*** -3,651*** -2,584*** -.126*** (607.629) (334.625) (237.960) (0.011) AGE≥55 -2,266*** -1,295*** -917*** -.0448*** (621.542) (351.101) (248.907) (0.012) UNEMP 628*** 359*** 254*** .0124*** (241.803) (136.731) (96.923) (0.005) INC 203,596*** 116,362*** 82,363*** 4.03*** (52,244.256) (29,451.668) (20,885.213) (0.986) INC2 -9,031*** -5,162*** -3,653*** -.179*** (2,428.036) (1,369.854) (971.307) (0.046) Constant -1,143,395*** (281,517.631) Sigma 19,847*** (670.487) Observations 10,163 StateFE NO QuarterFE YES PseudoR-squared 0.00389 Note:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.*,**,and***denotesignificanceatthe10%,5%,and1%levels,respectively. Source:FederalReserveBankofNewYork/EquifaxConsumerCreditPanel,BureauofLaborStatisticsforthe unemploymentrate,andBureauofEconomicAnalysisforincomeinformation. 38

Table12:TobitEstimationResultsandMarginalEffectsforConsumerFinanceNonprimeDebtfor ArkansasBorderCountiesExcludingThoseBorderingMississippiRiverandMissouri Consumerfinancedebt Tobitcoefficient Marginaleffects Unconditional Conditional Probability expectedvalue(Y*) expectedvalue uncensored border 2,861*** 430*** 557*** .115*** (198.480) (33.191) (39.650) (0.008) AGE<25 -4,263*** -562*** -792*** -.159*** (391.094) (50.067) (71.293) (0.014) AGE25−39 -1,601*** -211*** -298*** -.0596*** (219.198) (28.992) (40.627) (0.008) AGE≥55 -512** -67.4** -95.1** -.0191** (226.221) (29.836) (42.036) (0.008) UNEMP -349*** -45.9*** -64.8*** -.013*** (89.129) (11.712) (16.528) (0.003) INC -23,628 -3,113 -4,391 -.88 (18,070.844) (2,381.858) (3,358.031) (0.674) INC2 1,090 144 203 .0406 (839.150) (110.604) (155.935) (0.031) Constant 122,570 (97,303.746) Sigma 5,733*** (191.770) Observations 10,163 StateFE NO QuarterFE YES PseudoR-squared 0.0136 Note:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.*,**,and***denotesignificanceatthe10%,5%,and1%levels,respectively. Source:FederalReserveBankofNewYork/EquifaxConsumerCreditPanel,BureauofLaborStatisticsforthe unemploymentrate,andBureauofEconomicAnalysisforincomeinformation. 39

Table13: TobitEstimationResultsandMarginalEffectsforDepositoryInstitutionNonprimePersonal Loan Debt for Arkansas Border Counties Excluding Those Bordering Mississippi River and Missouri Depositoryinstitution Tobitcoefficient Marginaleffects personalloandebt Unconditional Conditional Probability expectedvalue(Y*) expectedvalue uncensored border 9,196*** 751*** 1,456*** .0507*** (1,688.249) (140.775) (267.729) (0.006) AGE<25 -9,265*** -682*** -1,425*** -.0474*** (1,961.440) (141.660) (299.244) (0.008) AGE25−39 -8,444*** -622*** -1,299*** -.0432*** (1,631.789) (117.182) (248.409) (0.006) AGE≥55 -7,169*** -528*** -1,103*** -.0367*** (1,560.462) (112.618) (238.054) (0.006) UNEMP 3,396*** 250*** 522*** .0174*** (689.224) (49.131) (104.733) (0.002) INC -514,427*** -37,870*** -79,134*** -2.63*** (88,111.246) (6,506.256) (13,511.222) (0.516) INC2 24,033*** 1,769*** 3,697*** .123*** (4,101.672) (302.813) (628.906) (0.024) Constant 2,687,785*** (472,700.124) Sigma 27,275*** (2,771.479) Observations 10,163 StateFE NO QuarterFE YES PseudoR-squared 0.00957 Note:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.*,**,and***denotesignificanceatthe10%,5%,and1%levels,respectively. Source:FederalReserveBankofNewYork/EquifaxConsumerCreditPanel,BureauofLaborStatisticsforthe unemploymentrate,andBureauofEconomicAnalysisforincomeinformation. 40