fomc minutes · May 10, 1965

FOMC Minutes

A meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee was held in

the

offices of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in

Washington,

D. C.,

PRESENT:

on Tuesday,

Mr.

Mr.

Mr.

Mr.

Mr.

Mr.

Mr.

Mr.

Mr.

Mr.

Mr.

May 11,

1965,

at 9:30 a.m.

Martin, Chairman

Hayes, Vice Chairman

Balderston

Bryan

Daane

Ellis

Galusha

Maisel

Robertson

Scanlon

Shepardson

Messrs. Hickman, Clay, and Irons, Alternate Members of

the Federal Open Market Committee

Messrs. Wayne, Shuford, and Swan, Presidents of the

Federal Reserve Banks of Richmond, St. Louis, and

San Francisco, respectively

Mr. Young, Secretary

Mr. Sherman, Assistant Secretary

Mr. Kenyon, Assistant Secretary

Mr. Broida, Assistant Secretary

Mr. Hackley, General Counsel

Mr. Noyes, Economist

Messrs. Baughman, Holland, and Koch, Associate

Economists

Mr. Holmes, Manager, Sys:em Open Market Account

Mr. Molony, Assistant to the Board of Governors

Mr. Cardon, Legislative Counsel, Board of Governors

Messrs. Partee and Williams, Advisers, Division of

Research and Statistics, Board of Governors

Mr. Hersey, Adviser, Division of International

Finance, Board of Governors

Mr. Axilrod, Chief, Government Finance Section,

Division of Research and Statistics, Board

of Governors

Miss Eaton, General Assistant, Office of the

Secretary, Board of Governors

Messrs. Hilkert and Patterson, First Vice Presidents

of the Federal Reserve Banks of Philadelphia and

Atlanta, respectively

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Messrs. Eisenmenger, Mann, Jones, Parsons, Tow,

and Green, Vice Presidents of the Federal

Reserve Banks of Boston, Cleveland, St. Louis,

Minneapolis, Kansas City, and Dallas, respec

tively

Mr. Lynn, Director of Research, Federal Reserve

Bank of San Francisco

Messrs. Fousek and Parthemos, Assistant Vice

Presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks of

New York and Richmond, respectively

Messrs. Geng and Meek, Managers of the Securities

Department, Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Mr. MacLaury, Manager, Foreign Department, Feceral

Reserve Bank of New York

Mr. Rothwell, Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of

Philadelphia

Chairman Martin noted that two new members of the Committee were

attending their first meeting today--Sherman J. Maisel, member of the

Board of Governors, and Hugh D. Galusha, Jr., President of the Federal

Reserve Bank of Minneapolis--and that both had executed their oaths of

office as members of the Federal Open Market Committee prior to today's

meeting.

Upon motion duly made and seconded,

and by unanimous vote, the minutes of the

meeting of the Federal Open Market Commit

tee held on April 13, 1945, were approved.

Before this meeting there had been distributed to the members

of the Committee a report from the Special Manager of the System Open

Market Account on foreign exchange market operations and on Open Market

Account and Treasury operations in foreign currencies for the period

April 13 through May 5, 1965, and a supplemental report for May 6 through

10, 1965.

Committee.

Copies of these reports have been placed in the files of the

5/11/65

In comments supplementing the written reports, Mr. MacLaury

said that

the Treasury had not yet decided whether to show a decline

in the gold stock this week, but probably would reach a decision today.

The last published change was the $150 million drop during the week

ended April 14.

Since mid-April, however, sales to foreign countries

out of the Stabilization Fund's holdings had continued, with the result

that the Fund's holdings, which were approximately $150 million at mid

April, were now down to about $45 million.

Between now and the end of

May, a further drain was anticipated on the Stabilization Fund's gold

holdings of more than $100 million, mainly attributable to further

sales to Spain ($30 million, for value today), Austria ($12.5 million),

and France

($50 million).

There was little doubt, therefore, that there

would have to be another drop in the gold stock this month;

the only

question concerned its timing.

On the London gold market, Mr. MacLaury reported, the fixing

price reached an April high of about $35.17

at mid-month.

Thereafter,

the price eased as supplies from new production, together with some

sales by disappointed speculators, sufficed to meet the continued

moderately active demand.

figure by recent standards.

This morning the price was $35.1020, a low

The gold pool on balance picked up gold

during the latter half of April, and for the month as a whole showed

a surplus of about $10 million, leaving the cumulative deficit since

the beginning of the year at $183 million.

That figure had been

maintained with minor fluctuations thus far in May.

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In the exchange markets, Mr. MacLaury observed, the Committee

would recall that sterling began to show a somewhat better tone fol

lowing the presentation of the British budget on April 6 and particu

larly after the Prime Minister's speech to the Economic Club of New

York on April 14.

As the sterling rate strengthened (from about

$2.7950 at mid-month to about $2.7975 on April 20) the New York Reserve

Bank, with the agreement of the Bank of England, began to sell limited

amounts of sterling in the New York market to reduce somewhat System

and Treasury balances that had been acquired last fall at the time of

the sterling crisis.

During the week of April 22-28, $9.1 million

equivalent was sold in New York for System account and $7 million for

Treasury account.

lion equivalent

In addition, $1.4 million equivalent and $2.8 mil

for the two accounts, respectively, were sold directly

to the Bank of England as it picked up dollars on a moderate scale in

London.

As a result of those sales, the System's sterling position

was reduced from about $52 million equivalent to about $41.5 million,

while the Treasury's position dropped from $71.5 million equivalent to

$61.7 million.

Although the sales, as was the intention, were absorbed by the

market without difficulty, Mr. MacLaury continued, it had not seemed

wise to press the operations further for the time being.

As the Com

mittee was aware, the market for sterling had not been particularly

strong in the last couple of weeks.

The one exception was at the end

of April when the Bank of England, rather than announcing the reduction

in Bank rate that had been widely expected by the market, introduced

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special deposit requirements for the London clearing banks and Scottish

banks.

The market reacted favorably to that unexpected tightening of

British monetary policy, and the pound moved nearly to parity with

the Bank of England taking in some $60 million.

intake in the recent period.

That was the largest

Thereafter, the market moved in a range

of about $2.7975-90 without any strong trend; this morning the rate

was $2.7986.

Sterling eased a week ago today (May 4) when the British

authorities announced only a moderate increase of reserves in April

(of $22.4 million, to $2,352.1 million).

The market had expected a

larger increase and was taken aback somewhat by the statement that the

Bank of England had had recourse to further central bank credits prior

to the budget message, only part of which had subsequently been repaid.

During April, the Bank of England drew some $200 million from central

banks other than the Federal Reserve System, and on balance repaid $40

million of its drawings on the System.

Its indebtedness to foreign

central banks after those transactions, therefore, stood at $280 million

drawn on the Federal Reserve swap and some $800 million drawn on other

central banks.

Although the technical position of sterling remained strong

and market sentiment was definitely better than it was a month or so

ago, Mr. MacLaury said, there clearly had been no rush by the market

to cover forward sterling commitments.

However, the strengthening

of the forward rate, apart from reflecting speculation on a Bank rate

reduction, did indicate that there might be some covering of such

commitments going on.

The market was still vulnerable to unfavorable

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headlines, and probably would remain so as long as the British efforts

to reach agreement on an incomes policy remained in a state of flux

and uncertainty continued concerning the government's stability, partic

ularly in the light of the steel nationalization discussions.

Under

the circumstances, it was of great importance that the British authorities

continue to have at their disposal resources with which to counter pos

sible speculative pressures.

In this connection, Mr. MacLaury noted

that all of the hurdles had been cleared for the British International

Monetary Fund drawing of $1.4 billion later this month.

It was under

stood that the British would use a good part of the proceeds to pay

off their short-term indebtedness.

Press reports had indicated that

some $700 million would be required for that purpose, but the New York

Bank's calculations indicated that $1.1 billion would be required.

Accordingly, assuming no large market transactions in the intervening

period, about $300 million would remain from the drawing after repayment

of short-term debts.

With respect to continental currencies, Mr. MacLaury reported

that the System had been able to make some progress during the period

in paying off swap drawings.

The most notable change was the prepay

ment of $50 million equivalent of the swap drawings with the Swiss

National Bank.

The major portion of that repayment ($45 million was

made possible by purchases of francs from the Swiss National Bank when

difficulties of two small Swiss banks reportedly contributed to market

selling of Swiss francs and necessitated heavy offical support of the

Swiss franc.

That problem was a temporary one, although the Swiss franc

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had tended to remain well below its ceiling.

There was some possibility

that further repayments on that drawing could be made before its maturity

on June 1, since the Swiss authorities were now using dollars from their

reserves to purchase Italian lire in connection with remittances by

Italian workers in Switzerland.

Such remittances had previously been

used to pay down the $100 million swap between the Swiss National Bank

and the Bank of Italy, but that swap now had been fully liquidated.

In addition to repayments on the Swiss drawing,

Mr.

MacLaury

said, early in the period the System paid off the last $5 million

equivalent of its drawing on the German Federal Bank,

equivalent of its drawing on the Netherlands Bank,

to $45 million equivalent.

at the moment,

bringing the latter

the System's gross

$525 million and its net debtor position was $245

debtor position was

million.

Thus,

and also $5 million

Those figures compared with $580 million and $210 million,

respectively,

at the time of the last meeting of the Committee.

So far as the situation in

MacLaury continued,

the Netherlands was concerned,

Mr.

during the period the Syscem was also able to

reduce its forward guilder commitments by $25.3 million equivalent,

to the present level of $54.5 million equivalent.

The Treasury's guilder

obligations were also reduced, by $20.6 million equivalent to $64.1

million equivalent.

That meant, in effect, that the series of forward

guilder contracts undertaken last December and January had now either

been liquidated or rolled over through new sales.

further reductions in

The prospects for

the U.S. guilder obligations were mixed; on the one

hand the Account Management had been told that the Dutch money market

5/11/65

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was expected to remain tight throughout May; on the other hand, the

New York Bank might be able to acquire some guilders, as well as other

needed currencies, at the time of the U.K. drawing on the Fund.

Thereupon, upon motion duly made

and seconded, and by unanimous vote,

the System open market transactions in

foreign currencies during the period

April 13 through May 10, 1965, were

approved, ratified, and confirmed.

As he mentioned earlier, Mr. MacLaury said, it was hoped to

reduce further the System's drawings on the Swiss National Bank.

However, in the event that was not possible, he requested the Com

mittee's approval of a renewal for another three months of the drawing

on the Swiss National Bank, now in the amount of $20 million, which

matured on June 1.

This would be a first renewal.

Possible renewal of the S20 million

drawing on the Swiss National Bank for a

further period of three months was noted

without objection.

Mr. MacLaury then noted that the $750 million swap arrangement

with the Bank of England would mature on May 28, 1965, and recommended

its renewal for another twelve months.

Mr. Daane said that in light of the discussions at Paris and

Basle last week he thought it was important to support the British

by renewing the swap line.

Chairman Martin expressed similar views.

Renewal of the $750 million swap

arrangement with the Bank of England

for a further period of twelve months

was approved unanimously.

Finally, Mr. MacLaury said, the System probably would roll over

its $15 million equivalent sterling/guilder swap for another three

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months (and the Treasury would do the same).

This would be a second

renewal.

Renewal of the $15 million equivalent

sterling/guilder swap for a further period

of three months was noted without objection.

Chairman Martin then invited Mr. Daane to comment on develop

ments at the meetings he had attended recently in Paris and Basle of

Working Party 3, the Group of Ten Deputies, and the Bank for Inter

national Settlements.

Mr. Daane said he would report first on the weekend meeting

of the BIS at Basle.

The tone of the discussion at that meeting was

quite mild, for the obvious reason that the substance, relating mainly

tc the British drawing on the IMF, had already been covered in earlier

meetings.

Lord Cromer of the Bank of England discussed recent develop

ments in sterling in a little more detail than the British had at the

preceding meetings in Paris, and was quite optimistic with respect to

the recent strength of the pound.

He noted that the British had gained

something over $100 million equivalent in spot sterling since announce

ment of the budget, most of which was acquired since the April 30

announcement of special bank deposit requirements.

They had repaid

about $100 million of continental central bank advances and added $22

million to their reserves, and their total gain came to about $140

million, taking into account the decrease in Federal Reserve and U.S.

Treasury holdings of sterling that Mr. MacLaury had reported.

That

left them with short-term obligations under the stabilization package

of slightly under $1.1 billion--specifically, $1.097 billion.

Lord

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Cromer also commented at some length on his recent letter to the clear

ing banks.

The spirit of that letter was being relayed to all financial

institutions; they would be informed that the budget contemplated an

increase of only 5 per cent in bank advances from mid-March 1965 to

mid-March 1966.

That would represent quite a change from the last two

years, when the increase in advances had been 14 and 16 per cent,

respectively.

Lord Cromer also reported that Britain was experiencing

a shortage of mortgage money for house building.

There was general satisfaction expressed with the credit measures

now being taken by the British, Mr. Daane said.

As the chairman of the

Basle meeting put it, 5 per cent was a severe limit.

The only critical

question raised at Basle was with respect to the method the British

used to finance their domestic budget deficit.

In effect, through the

Exchange Equalization Account they used the proceeds of their sales of

foreign exchange for this purpose.

That meart that the larger their

external deficit the more easily they could finance their domestic

Some of the Basle members noted that that was a rather odd

deficit.

procedure unless it was conceded that domestic deficits always should

be financed in an inflationary fashion.

Mr. Blessing, President of the Bundesbank, gave a rather strongly

worded statement on conditions in Germany at the Basle meeting, Mr. Daane

continued.

Mr. Blessing noted that the boom was continuing and that

restrictive measures were being taken in both short- and long-term

markets.

Among other things he expected the rate of house construction

to be dampened and considered that a desirable development.

The Germans

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were making a determined effort to keep prices from rising.

Their

balance of payments now seemed to be moving into deficit.

Turning to the preceding meetings in Paris, Mr. Daane said

that the two half-day sessions of the Working Party 3 meeting on

May 5 and 6 were devoted almost entirely to interrogation of the

British and discussion of their situation, leaving only a brief

period for review of the U.S. situation.

He felt that the tone of

the whole discussion was sympathetic and constructive.

There was

general concern about the narrowness of the margin of safety in the

British program.

It was felt that the British would manage quite

well if all of their projections proved accurate, but that there was

no real margin for error.

There was general uneasiness about the

degree of progress the British were making toward their goal of

releasing resources to the export industries.

It was thought that

their program did not provide for a sufficient cut-back in domestic

demand, especially since all of the cut-back called for rested on

the private rather than the government sector of the economy.

A

budget hardly could be considered deflationary or even neutral when

it called for a substantial increase in government spending.

And there

was some feeling that the monetary measures taken still had allowed too

great a degree of credit availability, although the April 30 action on

bank advances won commendation.

Finally, considerable skepticism was

expressed abouc the probable efficacy, at least in the short run, of

the government's incomes policy.

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The British representatives volunteered the suggestion that

the whole British situation be reviewed at Working Party 3 meetings

in July, September, and December, Mr. Daane continued.

His own judg

ment was that the willingness of the continental countries to go along

with the British rested more on the content of Chancellor Callaghan's

letter of intent to the Managing Director of the IMF than on the govern

ment's program.

In his letter Mr. Callaghan said flatly that the Brit

ish were determined to take such further action as was necessary, includ

ing monetary action.

It was hard to quarrel with such a statement.

Discussion of the British situation was continued in the suo

sequent meeting of the Group of Ten Deputies, Mr. Daane said.

That

meeting was concerned specifically with the question of activating the

General Arrangements to Borrow in connection with the British Fund

drawing.

Most of the session was devoted to the wording of the com

munique to be issued; after the earlier meetings there was a clear

Only two sub

initial consensus that the GAB should be activated.

stantive issues were considered at any length, both of which related

to the composition of the proposed drawing.

The gold component in the

proposal had been raised to $400 million from the figures of $250 million

and $350 million that had been discussed earlier.

Many of the conti

nental representatives expressed satisfaction over that increase, but a

number felt that $400 million was still too low.

The American repre

sentatives took no part in this discussion on the ground that it basically

was a question for the IMF.

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There also was some dissatisfaction expressed over the size of

the dollar component, $250 million, Mr. Daane observed.

The Americans

indicated that they thought that amount was sufficiently high, with

Under Secretary of the Treasury Deming resting the U.S. case principally

on two grounds.

The first was that as a matter of basic principle the

Fund should not draw on the currency of a deficit country in connection

with this sort of operation.

Mr. Polak of tne Fund endorsed that prin

ciple, but it was not accepted by the continental representatives, who

pointed out that most of their countries now were in a deficit position.

Secondly, Mr. Deming advanced the more pragmatic argument that the

exposure of the U.S. after the drawing would be much greater than that

of other countries because of the System's swap line with the Bank of

England, the Export-Import Bank credit, and the volume of dollar secu

rities in the British portfolio.

The continental representatives were

unwilling to accept the existence of the swap line or the Export-Import

Bank credit as a justification for a low dollar component because those

were matters of this country's own bilateral doing.

However, they were

quite willing to accept the proposition that the U.S. had what, in a

sense, was an unwanted responsibility as a result of the dollar secu

rities in the British portfolio.

In any case, they agreed to activate

the GAB and to go along with the revised package as proposed by the

Managing Director.

The Deputies also held a preliminary discussion of the renewal

of the General Arrangements to Borrow, Mr, Daane commented.

The GAB

would expire in October 1966, but renewal was required by October 1965.

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From that discussion it seemed to him that most countries did not plan

to raise quest:.ons about the general structure of the Arrangements.

However, some questions probably would be raised about their duration.

The original GAB had had a four-year term, but some representatives,

including the French, expressed the view that a shorter term, such as

two years, would be more desirable on renewal in light of the studies

under way on means of improving the international payments mechanism.

Mr. Deming indicated that he did not feel there was a link between the

studies and the GAB, and expressed a tentative preference for another

four-year term.

The final item on the agenda, Mr. Daane said, was a report by

Chairman Ossola of the Study Group on Creation of Reserve Assets.

Mr.

Ossola outlined the Group's planned report and indicated that it would

be submitted for study to the Group of Ten Deputies possibly about

June 10 or 12.

Decisions with respect to procedures for handling the

report, as well as with respect to its substance, were left open.

Mr. Ellis asked whether any views had been expressed at the

meetings on the progress of the U.S. balance of payments program.

Mr.

Daane replied there was a feeling that the U.S. program was working,

but the continental countries were mainly interested in the way the

United States viewed it--what effects were expected, how long it would

be carried on, and so forth.

There was very little indication of any

trepidation on their part with regard to its effects on them.

At the

Basle meeting, he (Mr. Daane) had given a cautiously optimistic report

of progress to date which seemed to have been welcomed.

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Chairman Martin noted that the agenda for today's meeting

called for a discussion at this point of the possibility of entering

into swap arrar.gements with Mexico, Venezuela, and Peru.

He pro

posed that the discussion be deferred until a later meeting when

Mr. Mitchell, who originally had suggested the matter for discussion,

would be present.

There were no objections to the Chairman's proposal.

Before this meeting there had been distributed to the members

of the Committee a report from the Manager of the System Open Market

Account covering open market operations in U.S. Government securities

and bankers' acceptances for the period April 13 through May 5, 1965,

and a supplemental report for May 6 through

10, 1965.

Copies of both

reports have been placed in the files of the Committee.

In supplementation of the written reports, Mr. Holmes commented

as follows:

The money market remained generally steady during the

past four weeks, holding firm enough to keep Federal funds

generally at 4-1/8 or 4 per cent and member bank borrowing

around $400-$500 million, while also accommodating a suc

cessful Treasury refunding operation. As in the similar

period of other recent years, the major money market banks

benefited from temporary Treasury redeposits of April 15

tax receipts. However, the money market as a whole did

not ease as it had in similar circumstances in the past,

possibly because of the high rate of reserve utilization

and the smaller cushion of excess reserves in banks out

side the money centers.

System operations provided reserves on balance over

the period, particularly in the latter part when normal

month-end reserve drains were augmented by swap repay

ments and continuing substantial growth in required re

serves. Much of the recent reserve need was met through

short-term repurchase agreements with nonbank dealers.

In this connection the Committee's recent authorization

to permit such agreements against Treasury issues of any

maturity, during periods of Treasury refunding, proved

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particularly helpful. The System's holding of Treasury issues

under repurchase agreements reached a level of $685 million on

May 5--the day that subscription books closed for the Treasury's

refunding. Of this $685 million, some $501 million were against

rights in the refunding and if it were not for the Committee's

new authorization, the repurchase agreements against rights

would have had to be terminated on May 6 to the extent that

dealers turned in those rights for the Treasury's reopened

nine-year bond. The dealers did in fact convert their rights

mainly into bonds and if the Desk had had to cope with massive

repurchase agreement withdrawals a huge offsetting provision

of reserves would have been needed--probably in the form of

outright bill purchases which would have added to downward

pressure on rates. The System also held on May 5 some $11

million of other long-term (i.e., over two-year) issues under

repurchase agreements, as permitted under the revised authoriza

tion. Holdings of Treasury issues under repurchase agreement

declined on May 6, but rose again to $701 million on Friday,

May 7, and still included some $501 million against rights

and $9 million against issues maturing in over two years.

The Treasury refunding was well received by the market

after a bit of initial hesitation, and a useful amount of

debt extension has been achieved. The public subscription

of about $2 billion of the reopened 4-1/4 per cent bonds of

1974 was somewhat more than most market participants had

anticipated. But on the whole the bonds are regarded as

reasonably "well placed." Dealers have a sizable job of

distribution yet to be done, but the mild market reaction

to the large subscriptions to the long bonds indicates that

they are approaching the task with confidence.

Treasury bills have continued in demand during recent

weeks, with normal refunding demands and other seasonal demands

augmented, as indicated in the written reports, by Treasury

account purchases. In yesterday's auction, the three-month

bill rate edged down slightly further to about 3.89 per cent

while the six-month issue was sold at an average rate of

I would see little prospect for higher

about 3.95 per cent.

bill rates on the immediate horizon, given the reduced level

of dealer holdings in the wake of the refunding, and the pos

sibility of some demand being generated by attrition from the

refunding. Dealers are generally cautious, however, at cur

rent rate levels and it may well be that some upward tendency

will develop as the next tax date approaches and as the

period of seasonal Treasury cash needs draws closer.

There is little to add to the written reports by way of

comment on other markets. Tax-exempt issues have been coming

to market in good volume at slightly higher rates than prevailed

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a few months ago. Today, several large issues are reaching

the market, including $100 million State of California bonds.

Corporate bond issues have come to market at rates very close

to those prevailing earlier, but a number of these issues

have been a little sticky in distribution. The sizable over

hang of undistributed bonds in both markets has contributed

to a certain underlying feeling of caution.

In the bankers' acceptance market, dealers' inventories

have declined substantially since dealers raised their rates

1/8 per cent on April 23--partly reflecting particularly

heavy purchases by a major New York City bank. During the

recent period, repurchase agreements in bankers' acceptances

again proved a useful adjunct of open market operations.

As far as third-country acceptances are concerned, we

have distributed a new tabulation dated May 6 showing hold

ings in our portfolio, and propose to distribute similar

(Note:

tabulations at least twice a month in the future.

A copy of this tabulation and of the accompanying memorandum

has been placed in the Committee's files.)

Mr. Swan noted that there had been a good deal of comment about

the demand for Treasury bills by public fund, as one of the factors

leading to relatively low bill rates recently.

demand was expected to continue.

Mr

He asked whether such

Holmes replied that a reversal

was expected; public funds probably would be net sellers of bills in

the period ahead, adding to possible upward rate pressures.

Mr. Robertson asked whether Mr. Holmes planned to supplement

tabulations on third-country acceptances of the type distributed with

a memorandum to the Committee on the desirability and workability of

alternative means of reducing the volume of such acceptances in the

Bank's portfolio.

Mr. Holmes said that personnel of the Bank had held several

discussions of this subject and had concluded that any request to

dealers for a smaller volume of third-country acceptances was likely

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5/11/65

to produce undesirable reactions in the market and to lead to other

problems, as Messrs. Hayes and Treiber had noted at recent meetings.

It seemed preferable to deal with any problems in this connection at

the point where the acceptances were created, rather than in the

secondary market.

Mr. Holmes added that he would have a memorandum

prepared for the Committee outlining the reasoning underlying these

views.

Mr. Balderston asked if Mr. Holmes would analyze briefly for

the Committee the factors that had led the Desk to buy a substantial

volume of Treasury bills on Friday, April 30, after the Treasury had

announced the terms of the current refunding but before the books

were open.

Mr. Holmes said that as he recalled the transactions in

question the System's purchases were made in response to indicated

reserve needs.

At the same time, the Treasury also was buying bills

for its investment accounts.

He thought the Treasury probably was

concerned about the hesitant reception accorded the 4 per cent notes

to be issued, which were priced close to the market.

Although the

System's purchases were made for a different reason, both sets of

operations obviously had effects on the bill market.

Thereupon, upon motion duly made

and seconded, and by unanimous vote,

the open market transactions in Govern

ment securities and bankers' acceptances

during the period April 13 through

May 10, 1965, were approved, ratified,

and confirmed.

Chairman Martin called at this point for the staff economic

and financial reports, supplementing the written reports that had

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been distributed prior to the meeting, copies of which have been placed

in the files of the Committee.

Mr. Noyes made the following statement on economic conditions:

It often seems that the uncertainty which plagues us

when we try to look ahead focuses on a particular period,

and we feel that once that time has passed, many of our

doubts will be resolved.

Early May was such a time this year. Much of the

speculation as to the pattern of economic developments in

1965 emphasized that our foresight was clouded by the pos

sibility that by May 1 we might see either a steel strike,

or an overly generous settlement, with the impact of one

or the other of these alternative possibilities affecting

a wide range of business decisions.

As is almost always the case, the passage of time has

only partially resolved the doubts that concerned us earlier

and has brought its share of new ones. Nevertheless, it

does seem to me that the additional knowledge that we now

possess is favorable, on balance, to the continuing healthy

expansion of the economy. This seems to me to be true

whether one was more concerned about the possibility that

a sharp curtailment of activity in steel would spread to

other lines and precipitate a downturn; or, on the other

hand, that the very rapid pace of the first four months

would set in motion an inflationary spiral, which would be

further aggravated by rising labor costs.

As is suggested at several points in the staff comments

on the questions suggested for discussion today, we are now

moving into a period when demand pressures should be less

intense; that is, demands will be rising less rapidly in

relation to our expanding capacity. At the same time, the

shift now seems likely to be less violent than we feared

earlier, partly because of the nature of the interim

settlement in steel, and partly because capital expenditure

plans are being revised upward. The magnitude of the change

in the outlook can be illustrated very roughly with the

GNP aggregates. Earlier in the year we speculated about

GNP growth in the second quarter only about one-third as

large as in the first--say perhaps something like $5 billion,

as compared to $15 billion. Now the first quarter expansion

looks closer to $14 billion or less, and a gain of $7 billion

or more in the second does not seem unreasonable.

A more favorable view of the outlook along these lines

apparently received nearly unanimous support at the meeting

of the Business Council in Hot Springs last week, where both

the possibility of a downturn and the danger of "overheating"

got short shrift.

5/11/65

-20-

Naturally, as a central banker, one must view all this

optimism with skepticism and, as usual, one can find some

basis for misgivings. While most of the recent rise in

wholesale prices is associated with a recovery in farm

products from unusually depressed levels, the fact remains

that the run-up last summer and fall in prices of sensitive

industrial materials, which was associated at the time with

transitory supply developments, has not yet been reversed.

However, in fairness it would be unreasonable to expect

downward price adjustments to have occurred in the period

when the economy was running under the forced draft of steel

strike anticipations and auto strike make-up. The time

when these prices will really be tested lies just ahead.

The increase in plant and equipment expenditure plans

deserves special mention, but for the short-run,some

further pick-up in this area seems altogether fortunate,

as does the rise in housing starts and building permits.

Retail sales hit an extraordinarily high level in

February and were off a little in March and again in April.

Were it noc for the fact that the February figure was so

obviously out of line on the high side, two consecutive

months of decline in retail sales, in an otherwise booming

economy, might be cause for concern. In the circumstances,

it is hard to regard what has happened so far as other

than a healthy adjustment, especially in the light of the

fact that sales for the week ending May 1 seem to be above

the normal post-Easter pattern.

Unemployment was up a little in April to 4.9 per cent

from the favorable 4.7 per cent in March. Industrial

production probably did not change much in April, as some

seasonally adjusted decline in autos was perhaps a little

more than offset by gains elsewhere. It looks like, if

anything, a stronger performance than might have been

anticipated on top of recent advances.

I am sure it is apparent by this time that I am

straining to find faults in a situation which has generally

developed more favorably than it was reasonable to hope.

To summarize, pressures on resources should ease a

little as we pass through a period of steel inventory

adjustment--and perhaps a lower level of auto demand--but

the chances of an actual decline in overall activity now

seem quite remote. At the same time, the period of maximum

danger of overheating should be behind us for the moment.

Certainly, continued vigilance is needed if monetary

policy is to contribute constructively to another year of

reasonably stable growth on top of the four just passed,

but I see nothing in domestic economic developments which

would suggest that the policies of the Committee thus far

this year have been inappropriate, or that they are in

need of change at this time.

-21-

5/11/65

Mr. Holland made the following statement concerning financial

developments:

This seems to me to be one of those fortunate occasions

when the fog of financial statistics has also lifted a bit,

enabling us to perceive a little better the terrain over

which we have just come, and thereby to judge better current

conditions and prospects.

The most helpful new numbers in this respect are the

just-released flow-of-funds data through the first quarter,

for they let us view the big bank credit bulge this year

against the perspective of broader finncial and economic

developments. When we do so, we see that the bank credit

jump was not simply the most obvious part of a massive

credit upsurge, but rather a powerful competitive enlarge

ment of the banking system's share of a total private credit

flow that actually grew rather less than past relationships

might have suggested.

Ordinarily, periods of vigorous growth in private GNP

such as we had in the first quarter generate--and in turn

are reinforced by--a relatively even more rapid increase

in private borrowing, as individuals and businesses rely

heavily upon external sources of funds to supplement their

own internal resources. In the first quarter of 1965,

however, net funds raised by the domestic nonfinancial

sector expanded just about as much percentagewise as did

GNP itself, and this is true whether one compares these

first quarter results with the preceding quarter or with

the average for the year 1964 as a whole. These data,of

course, have their weaknesses, but they reflect, if anything,

a shade more conservative rather than a more liberal relative

use of external debt by the private sector in financing its

1965 bulge in spending. That run-up in spending had its

destabilizing potential, but it lay more in the type and

concentration of expenditures made than in how they were

financed.

Beyond the first quarter, the available data narrow

down to descriptions of the banking system and little else,

with a corresponding loss of perspective. Nonetheless, one

can see signs of change of pace in banking alone that ought

to be indicative of some redressing of the enlarged bank share

of financial flows that developed late last year. I would

judge three factors to be at work dampening bank credit and

(1) some moderation

deposit expansion after the first quarter:

in demands for financing by bank customers, (2) virtual comple

tion of the public's shifts out of stocks of other financial

assets and into time accounts in response to the attraction of

the latest round of interest rate increases on time deposits;

5/11/65

-22-

and (3) a mild further tightening of bank reserves and

relative liquidity positions, with Federal Reserve policy

chiefly responsible for the former and Treasury debt manage

ment actions contributing to the latter.

The effect of these influences is not shown symmet

rically in our summary banking statistics. This is in

good part oecause a late surge of bank expansion took

place at the very end of March; this rise is captured in

the March data in the end-of-month series used to measure

bank loans and investments, but is largely carried forward

into the April numbers in the average bank deposit series

which is based upon an average of the daily figures through

out each month. On an end-of-month basis, total bank loans

and investments are now estimated to have risen about $1.8

billion during April. This is only about two-thirds as

much as the average for the first three months of 1965,

but still a shade higher than last year's pace. Business

loan growth appeared down from $1.2 billion in March to

$700 million in April. There still exists a vigorous

demand for bank loans by business, however, as attested

by the $300 million rise (not seasonally adjusted) at New

York City reporting banks in the week of May 5. Leading

bankers also seem to be expecting good loan demand, for

prime-name banks are still pushing CD sales quite vigorously,

a source of funds that they have manipulated quite adroitly

this year to capture extra funds to loan to businesses when

needed.

Other than New York City CDs, time deposit growth has

been much slower in March and April than earlier this year,

presumably reflecting the wearing out of the impact effect

of higher time deposit rates. At the same time, the rate

of growth of money supply rebounded in March and April to

a 5 per cent annual rate, and the savings flow at mutual

savings banks seemed to improve a little relative to seasonal

expectations. Presumably the flow of financial savings in

the d:rection of other nonbank intermediaries and direct

market securities has also recovered somewhat in the last

month or so.

This redirected savings flow can represent a needed

cushion for the enlarged supplies of longer-term Federal,

corporate and municipal securities now being brought to

market. A concentration of these supplies in a few brief

weeks, however, does create a potential short-run digestion

problem that leaves the capital markets technically vulner

able to upward interest rate pressures at this juncture.

This is most true of the municipal and U.S. Government

markets, where dealer inventories of longer-term securities

are currently large by historical standards.

-23-

5/11/65

In these circumstances, the "even keel" constraint on

monetary policy might well be construed to extend a few

days beyond the May 17 payment date for the Treasury refund

ing issues, just as sometimes it has been regarded as ending

a few day. before payment date when the refunding issues

were shorter-term, dealer holdings were low, or redistribu

tion to final investors was rapid. Furthermore, after the

"even keel" period is presumed over, it might be deemed wise.

in the light of the more satisfactory economic outlook

described by Mr. Noyes, not to tighten money market conditions

in a way that would compound upward rate pressures in the

longer-term securities markets as dealers try to speed the

redistribution of their current inventories of bonds.

What particular measures of money market and reserve

conditions might fit within the definition of "even keel"

are, of course, matters of judgment on which reasonable men

can differ. The staff's own effort at a consensus in this

respect is expressed in its answer to question 6.

Mr. Daane asked whether there was any evidence of pressure on

banks to raise the prime rate.

Mr. Holland said he had not heard much

talk of increasing the prime rate lately.

There was evidence of some

upward pressure on rates on nonprime loans and on term loans, but

there was no sign, as far as he knew, that banks were poised for an

increase in the prime rate itself.

Mr. Robertson and Mr. Wayne observed that there seemed to be

a tendency to dispense with the prime rate altogether.

Mr. Hayes com

mented that New York banks appeared to be sensitive to the political

implications of any change in the prime rate.

Mr. Hersey then presented the following statement on the

balance of payments:

On the surface, the balance of payments outcome in March

and April can be described as a surplus, without qualifica

tions: a surplus with or without seasonal adjustment, and a

surplus on either the Commerce Department definition or the

"official settlements" definition. But this outcome was

probably heavily influenced by the catching up of exports

5/11/65

-24

after the interruptions of the port strike--as well as by the

sharp reduction that has occurred in outflows of bank credit.

Since the Green Book 1/ was put out, we have gotten the

March export total, and we now have enough weekly information

on the settlement items to allow us to make a fair guess of

the April surplus, which looks like about $200 million before

seasonal adjustment. While this is much less than the sur

plus in March, now revised to $433 million, the difference

seems to reflect mainly seasonal factors. The result in April

was a decline in liabilities to foreign official accounts.

And foreign private balances, which usually tend to rise in

April, failed to increase.

To get around some of the difficulties of guessing month

to-month seasonal changes and irregularities, I will speak

mainly in terms of average monthly figures, comparing the

March-April averages with averages for the five preceding

months, October through February. I will mention seasonal

corrections only when they make an important difference. In

the October to February period, as you know, the monthly

deficits were very large, and were running at a much higher

level than for the year 1964 as a whole. The shift from that

5-month period to March-April, with surpluses suddenly emerg

ing, is very striking.

In round terms, what we have to explain is a change from

an average monthly deficit on the Commerce Department defini

tion of nearly $500 million a month in the preceding five

months to an average monthly surplus of $300 million in March

and April--that is, a shift in level of about $800 million.

On the official settlements basis, the change has been

only about half as much. The difference between the two

measures of improvement--$800 million per month on the standard

calculation, and $400 million on :he official settlements

calculation--is huge, and I will have to come back to that

later.

First we might look at the conventional measure, and

inquire what were the increases in receipts and drops in pay

ments that produced so great an improvement in the position,

and also try to arrive at some judgment as to how much of the

improvement was in some sense or other strictly temporary.

One factor was the reflux of U.S. corporate liquid funds.

From confidential Canadian data, we know of about $400 million

in March. Even if there was no further reflow in April, this

1/ The report "Currency Economic and Financial Conditions,"

prepared by the Board's staff for the Committee.

5/11/65

-25-

would explain $200 million of the monthly average overall

improvement, since the net movement in the preceding 5

months was small. Continued reflows of U.S. liquid funds

at that average pace seem unlikely.

the net out

Two other main elements are involved:

flows of U.S. bank credit, and merchandise trade. In both

cases we have data only through March, but I believe that

reasonable guesses can be made for April.

The part of the overall improvement that was due to

the cut in U.S. bank credit outflow, which was a cut of

about $250 million a month, unadjusted, we do not need to

think of as strictly temporary. If things go well with the

voluntary program, it may be quite a while before the ques

tion of "what next?" will have to be faced in this area.

The:e is every reason to think that April's outflow was

small, like that of March, and no reason to fear any change

for the worse in the near future.

It is very different with the trade surplus. What

happened in March was that unadjusted exports nearly doubled,

approaching $3 billion. Though imports also jumped, exceeding

$2 billion, the statistical trade surplus rose from only $50

million in February to $850 million in March. In the five

months October through February, it had averaged a subnormal

$400 million.

Durirg the port strike, exports had been held back much

more than imports. The catching-up process was in full

swing in March, but there was still a long way to go. In

April the statistical trade surplus can easily have been

about as big as it was in March. By now, in May, there

should begin to be a rather sharp taper.ng off in exports,

and by June we ought to be back to a new normal trade sur

plus.

We will have to wait till July or August for statistics

that will allow us to make a judgment of what the new normal

level is.

In the meantime, a guess in the range of $500 to

$600 million a month seems plausible, and allows us to say

that of March's $850 million trade surplus, we may have to

count as strictly temporary an excess over normal of some

$300 million; and something like the same will doubtless

apply to April. Furthermore, actual net receipts must have

been abnormally large; I find it implausible to suppose that

any great amount of the delayed exports had already been paid

for. If, then, we take out this strictly temporary element

in the trade picture, the balance of payments on the conven

tional basis was not in surplus by anything like $300 million

a month in March and April and may even have been in deficit.

I want to come back now to the question of why the change

in the official settlements deficit since the period around

the turn of the year has been so much less encouraging than

the improvement in the conventional balance. In fact, when

5/11/65

-26-

we make a correction for the abnormal trade situation, the

change looks very moderate indeed.

What has happened is this.

In 1964 foreign private

holders, especially commercial banks abroad, were building

up their holdings of dollars in the United States--by $1-1/2

billion for the year as a whole. In March and April of this

year, however, foreign private balances in the United States

appear to have declined by about $250 million. Usually in

April there is an increase, sometimes exceeding the usual

March decline. This year, there was a sizable draw-down

in March, associated with the return flow of U.S. corporate

liquid funds from Canada. But our tentative figures indicate

that the normal April build-up of foreign private balances

failed to develop.

Now you will recall that during the year 1964, the

official settlements deficit was $1-1/2 billion, while the

conventional deficit was $3 billion, the difference

representing the build-up of foreign commercial bank and

other private balances. Around the turn of the year, in

the October-to-February period, the monthly average deficit

on the official settlements basis, seasonally adjusted, was

heavy, about $300 million a month. The conventional deficit

was heavier still, averaging $500 million a month. In

March and April, however, the relationship was completely

reversed. The official settlements balance was now a sur

plus of about $100 million (this allows for some seasonal

correction but none for the trade abnormality). The

conventional balance, instead of looking the less favor

able of the two as it had before, was an even larger sur

plus, averaging $300 million a month.

In principle, one can't say that either of the two

measurements is wrong. Both can be "right," because each

measures a different thing. It is important that we under

stand clearly what we are measuring with either. The

large apparent improvement in the U.S. payments situation

shown by the standard calculation represents the effects

of the export catch-up, plus the effects of the cutback

in bank lending, plus the reflux of corporate liquid funds,

plus other changes in current transactions and in U.S.

capital outflow, but does not count as an adverse factor

the apparent shift in the movement of foreign private

balances from an inflow to an outflow. At a time when

our concern is to halt the accretions of foreign official

reserves in order to stop the gold outflow, we need to

keep watching all the elements of the situation. One of

the elements to watch is the movement of private foreign

balances. Perhaps because of the drop in U.S. capital

outflow, perhaps also as an effect of the temporarily

high level of our exports, foreign commercial bank

5/11/65

-27-

balances in the United States have appa:ently been tending

to fall in the past two months.

Our measures to reduce U.S. capital outflow are thus

not immediately exerting their full force on foreign official

reserves. This does not mean they are useless. The Gore

Amendment and the voluntary program for the banks have

made a very important change in the situation. Perhaps

it was inevitable that last year's build-up of foreign com

mercial bank balances would slow down greatly this year.

If so, the official settlements balance might have increased

very sharply in the absence of the new measures. The new

measures seem to be accomplishing what could be expected of

them. The question remains, whether that is enough.

Mr. Hayes commented that he had found Mr. Hersey's explanation

of the differences between the balance of payments figures on the two

bases of measurement to be lucid and interesting.

He felt that it was

vital for the Committee to keep the figures on both bases in view,

rather than concentrating on one to the exclusion of the other.

Prior to this meeting the staff had prepared and distributed

certain questions suggested for consideration by the Committee, and

comments thereon.

These materials were as follows:

(1) Business activity--What does the extension of the steel

wage contract suggest as to the near-term outlook for indus

trial activity, inventories, and prices"

The interim steel agreement has had a stabilizing

influence on the near-term outlook. Had settlement

of a new steel contract been reached by May 1, steel

production probably would be declining sharply now,

as it did in 1962 and 1963, while steel consumers

were using up excess stocks accumulated as a strike

hedge. The interim agreement offers an opportunity

for a more orderly adjustment of steel production to

final consumption rates. At the same time, the terms

of the agreement, and the range of the differences

between the union and the companies, suggest that the

final settlement is not likely to involve excessive

wage and price increases in steel--or in other sectors

of the economy where labor settlements in the past

have tended to follow the steel pattern.

5/11/65

-28It is too early to tell how promptly steel

inventories will level off or decline. The threat

of a steel strike on or after September 1 continues

to be a source of some uncertainty, Production is

high, and is expected to decline only moderately

over the next month or so, even if shipments fall as

is expected. Some further increase in steel stocks

is likely up to midyear, but at a rate substantially

lower than in recent months. The impact of the

settlement, therefore, on the near-term outlook for

overall economic activity may show mainly in a

reduced rate of inventory accumulation without

significant repercussions outside the steel indus

try.

There is no evidence a, yet that the 2.6 per

cent wage increase provided in the interim agree

ment will give rise to any appreciable steel price

increases. Since 1962, labor costs per ton of

steel have been declining. The steel wage increase

is well below that granted in the earlier auto

settlement, and less than the average rise in manu

facturing or the increases provided in the recent

can and rubber pacts. Current negotiations in

the aluminum industry, and those coming up prior

to September 1 in aircraft and shipbuilding, are

not expected to produce any breakthrough in the

general pattern of recent wage trends.

Even though wage cost increases have on the

average been maintained within the economy-wide

rate of gain in productivity, some selective

price increases may, nevertheless, follow contract

settlements. For example, the can industry raised

prices by 1 per cent, and some increases have been

reported in tire prices. Over all, however, the

industrial price level has edged up only slightly

so far this year.

(2) Capital spending--What are the implications for sustained

economic activity of the higher levels of capital spending

now being projected by businessmen?

The higher levels of business fixed-capital

spending now being projected for 1965 strengthen

prospects for continued economic expansion through

out the year. Results of the McGraw-Hill survey

conducted in March-early April indicate a rise in

capital spending from the fourth quarter of 1964

to the fourth quarter of 1965 of about 13 per cent,

5/11/65

-29substantially above the 7.5 per cent gain projected

earlier and not far below the large increase (16

per cent) posted over the preceding four-quarter

period. The raising of business investment sights

provides some offset to the expected slackening in

the pace of inventory investment.

Pressures on capacity appear to be a major

influence contributing to this year's large planned

increases in capital spending. According to the

McGraw-Hill report, manufacturers will place much

greater emphasis on capacity expansion this year

than in the preceding five years. Manufacturers

reported that on average they were operating at

88 per cent of capacity at the end of 1964, and

nearly one-third were operating at or above pre

ferred capacity utilization rates. Further expan

sion in factory output in the first quarter prob

ably brought the average capacity utilization rate

to 90 per cent, a factor undoubtedly contributing

to the recent step-up of investment plans. Manu

facturers now plan to expand capacity by 6 per

cent this year, as compared with their stated in

crease of 4 per cent last year. The prospective

large increase in capacity is an encouraging

element in the outlook for price stability.

(3) Balance of payments--How do the major types of capital

flows in the U.S. balance of payments appear to be responding

to the program of voluntary restraint?

Judgments about program effects are necessarily

still tentative, but the partial information, statis

tical and other, available on developments since

February 10 is moderately encouraging. As noted

below, significant declines have occurred in out

flows of long-term and short-term bank credit.

There have been some further term-loan com

mitments by banks to borrowers subject to the IET

since the Gore Amendment went into effect, but

through April these apparently amounted to less

than $60 million. Commitments to borrowers in the

less developed countries were large, amounting to

about $200 million in this two-and-a-half month

period, with the greater part in March and signif

icantly less in April. On an annual rate basis,

commitments to the less developed countries were

about equal to their 1964 average, though much

less than their rate in the latter part of 1964

and first six weeks of 1965. In contrast, the flow

5/11/65

-30of new commitments to industrial countries was

reduced to roughly one-fourth of its 1964 rate.

The actual net outflow of long-term bank credit

during March (revised preliminary data from the

Treasury's Form B-3) was $43 million--an annual

rate (without seasonal correction) of about $0.5

billion, or about one-half the rate in the year

1964. The outflow in April may have been at least

as gceat as in March, since it is known that one

very large individual loan committed in March was

scheduled for disbursement in April.

Tentative indications (inferred from the Federal

Reserve Form 391) are that net bank-reported short

term outflows in March were much less than the $100

million shown in the Green Book, and possibly close

to zero. If the figure turns out to be at this

lower level, it would represent a drop of about

$100 million from the average of the five preceding

months. The corresponding drop in 1964 was $54

million. It seems clear that a significant decline

has occurred from the rates of these short-term

outflows experienced earlier--$1.5 billion in the

year 1964 as a whole, and somewhat under a $1 bil

lion annual rate in the five months from October

through February.

For direct investment outflows, preliminary

quantitative information covering the first quarter

will not be available until June. The Department

of Commerce has been obtaining single-figure estimates

from large corporations with foreign subsidiaries and

branches of the planned change between 1964 and 1965

in each company's own "balance of payments" (includ

ing its exports to all areas as well as its investment

income from and capital outflow to industrial countries,

but not including its imports). Assistant Secretary

Brimmer stated in a recent speech that these reports

indicate a planned $1.2 billion improvement in 1965,

occurring principally through export expansion rather

than curtailment of new investment.

The remaining major types of identifiable capital

flows in the U.S. balance of payments are securities

transactions and movements of liquid funds. Securities

transactions are affected by the IET where it is

applicable, and the program of voluntary restraint

for nonbank financial institutions may possibly have

some influence on them. However, the sharp drop in

purchases of new foreign securities (seasonally ad

justed) from $600 million in the fourth quarter of

1964 to about $300 million in the first quarter of

5/11/65

-311965 is unrelated to the program, and represents

largely the ending of a temporary bulge in Canadian

new issues in the United States.

With respect to U.S. corporate liquid funds,

the only sizable inflows since mid-February thus far

identified are from Canada. Confidential Canadian

data show a decline in March in their banks' U.S.

dollar liabilities to others than banks in the

United States of $375 million. In turn, Canadian

banks reduced holdings with their agencies in New

York in March by about $320 million. Both of these

movements were in good part seasonal.

The reflux of U.S. funds from Canada benefits

the U.S. balance of payments as presently computed.

However, this reflux is offset by the decline in

Canadian bank holdings of U.S. dollars in New York

if the balance is calculated on an "official settle

ments" basis.

(4) Savings flows--What are the implications of the recent

abatement in time deposit growth for the overall volume and

composition of funds being supplied to credit markets?

Rapid growth of commercial bank time deposits early

in 1965 resulted mainly from shifts among existing

stocks of financial assets in response to increases in

rates on savings deposits and CDs, rather than from a

growth in total financial saving. Net acquisitions of

all types of financial assets by consumers and corpora

tions together increased only marginally in the first

quarter, according to preliminary flow-of-funds estimates.

Shifts in asset preferences were reflected in reduced

demands for money balances, for claims against nonbank

intermediaries (especially savings and loan shares), and

also for market securities.

The large first-quarter increase in time deposits,

together with the rise in Treasury balances at commercial

banks, permitted an enlargement of funds supplied by

the banking system at a time of strong demands for credit.

Credit demands were heavily concentrated in categories of

financing--such as business loans and consumer creditin which banks participate most actively. Since last fall

banks have been able to finance a large customer loan

expansion and to increase their purchases of municipal

securities without heavy liquidation of Treasury issues.

In both the last quarter of 1964 and the first quarter

of 1965 the share of total funds supplied by commercial

banks was higher than in the first three quarters of 1964.

5/11/65

-32Slower growth of time deposits during March and

April seems principally to have reflected the comple

tion of the adjustment to the higher level of interest

rates mentioned earlier. To some extent, however, it

probably also reflected larger-than-usual deposit

withdrawals for payment of individual income taxes

in those two months. Barring further changes in

interest rate relationships, the pace of time deposit

expansion in the months ahead should continue to be

less rapid than in January and February.

Continued growth in economic activity and a likely

rise in the ratio of financial saving to income from

the rather low first-quarter level probably will in

crease the volume of total financial saving considerably

in the second and third quarters. With slower growth

of time deposits expected, the share of the enlarged

total savings flow channeled through the banking

system should be significantly smaller in the coming

months than it was during the first quarter.

(5) Bank credit--What do recent developments suggest as to the

pace of business demands for bank credit?

After rising rapidly in the first quarter, growth

in business loans at all commercial banks moderated in

April, with the abatement of some temporary stimulating

factors. Indications are that business loan demands

over the next few months will remain relatively strong,

but will expand considerably less rapidly than in the

first quarter of this year.

The moderation of business loans in April reflected

the continued unwinding of temporary factors that raised

bank lending so sharply earlier in the year. There was,

for example, more than seasonal repayment of the commodity

dealer loans built up during the dock strike. In addi

tion, there was probably further abatement of foreign

lending as commitments were cleaned up in line with the

voluntary credit restraint program.

Continued steel stockpiling in anticipation of a

May 1 shutdown, on the other hand, led to a strong

contraseasonal increase in borrowings by the metal and

metal products industries. April business loans were

also probably increased somewhat by the over $500 mil

lion of additional corporate tax payments under the

revised tax payment schedule.

Beneath the cross-currents induced by these

temporary factors a basically strong underlying loan

demand is evident. Loan demands in April were partic

ularly strong in miscellaneous manufacturing and mining

5/11/65

-33and construction, and also showed some strength in trade

and textiles. A further sharp increase in business loans

took place at New York and Chicago banks in the first

week of May.

The industrial distribution of business borrowing

thus far in 1965 suggests that bank loans have been

used to finance growth in capital spending as well as

working capital needs. The impression that recent

financing needs of firms have been partly of a long

run nature is reinforced by the increase in the ratio

of term loans to total loans to a record high in New

York City. Upward revisions of plans for plant and

equipment spending implied by the recent McGraw-Hill

survey, together with the continuing need for some

inventory financing, suggest that business loan expan

sion will continue vigorous over the next few months,

but probably less so than in the first quarter of the

year.

(6) Money market relationships--Assuming a continuation of current

monetary policy and taking into account the Treasury refunding,

what range of money market conditions, interest rates, reserve

availability, and reserve utilization by the banking system might

prove mutually consistent during coming weeks?

Market activity associated with the current Treasury

financing has produced some slight further reduction of

bill yields relative to other money market rates. The

financing stimulated additional demand for bills from

holders of "rights," and this demand was supplemented by

official bill purchases in the market in the last state

ment week totaling about $650 million (about two-thirds

of which was for Treasury accounts). Under these condi

tions the yields on 3- and 6-.:,onth bills declined to

trading levels of around 3.90 and 3.96 per cent, respec

tively, despite continued tautness in the Federal funds

market and the maintenance of relatively high rates on

negotiable CDs, bankers' acceptances, and dealer loans.

Net borrowed reserves of banks in recent weeks

have been close to $100 million, somewhat below the

average in late March and the first half of April. Bor

rowings have varied in a wider range, as is usual, but

the $465 million average for the last three weeks was

only slightly below the preceding 3-week period. In

addition to the relatively high level of member bank

borrowing, nonborrowed reserves increased rapidly in

April, as Government deposits rose sharply and private

demand deposit expansion continued brisk. The money

supply rose at a 5.3 per cent annual rate, and the

5/11/65

-34demand deposit component at a 5.8 per cent rate. Time

deposit growth, however, slackened further last month.

In coming weeks, conflicting pressures will be at

work in the money markets. Downward pressure on bill

yields will be exerted by the unusually low current

level of short-term bills in dealers' inventories and

by the reinvestment demand resulting from attrition

in the current refunding. Upward pressure will come

from cessation of heavy bill purchases by sellers of

"rights" and by official accounts, from expected

redistribution of reserves away from money centers,

and from continuation of vigorous bank loan demand.

On balance, it seems likely that net borrowed reserves

in the $100-$150 million range would be associated

with some modest net upward pressure on bill yields.

In this environment, yields on 3-month bills would be

likely to rise above 3.90 per cent again, while other

sensitive money market indicators, such as rates on

Federal funds and dealer loans, should continue firm.

Private demand deposits may continue to rise

fairly rapidly in the next few weeks, particularly

if there is a shift of balances out of Treasury

accounts. The yield structure specified above is

not likely to generate deposits through encouragement

of bank acquisitions of bills and other money market

instruments. On the other hand, economic expansion

is adding to transaction needs for money, and under

the reserve and market conditions specified, demand

deposit growth appears likely to continue at a rate

averaging perhaps around 4 per cent in the next few

months.

The immediate outlook for longer term interest

rates is greatly dependent upon dealers' success in

retailing their more than $500 million awards of the

reopened 4-1/4's of 1974. This is a larger position

in the 4-1/4's, by almost $100 million, than they

took when the same issue was offered at this time

last year, and dealers' total position in over-5-year

issues is now about $500 million above last year.

Also, financing costs are now much closer to the

4-1/4 per cent coupon than last year. If dealers

encounter difficulty in distributing their holdings

of the 4-1/4's, long-term markets may be vulnerable

to some upward interest rate pressures. Also

contributing to this vulnerability is the relatively

full calendar of corporate and tax-exempt bond

offerings, and the continuing heavy dealer inventories

of the latter. Nevertheless, investor confidence in

5/11/65

-35current market rate levels is shown by the sizable

($2 billion) public exchange for the 4-1/4's in the

Treasury refunding.

Chairman Martin next called for the go-around of comments and

views on economic conditions and monetary policy, beginning with

Mr. Hayes, who made the following statement:

Business activity. The business situation is strong,

and there continue to be confirming signs that the outlook

for the balance of the year is brighter than was thought

likely several months ago. The postponement of the strike

deadline in the steel industry should lead to some downward

adjustment in production in that industry, but not so much

as might have occurred if a final settlement had been reachedsome users will doubtless continue to build up stockpiles.

After we make due allowance for some upward bias in the

McGraw-Hil: survey of business spending on plant and equip

ment, the latest survey still suggests that the advance

during 1965 is likely to exceed earlier expectations.

High levels of capacity utilization and of corporate profits

and cash flows provide a firm backing for expanded capital

spending. It is also good to note accumulating evidence that

residential construction activity is bottoming out. These

and other data raise the possibility that overall economic

activity will show both a higher level and a steeper growth

rate than seemed probable a few months ago.

Prices. While the terms of the ultimate steel settle

ment are of course a continuing major urcertainty, there is

some ground for encouragement in the mocerate nature of the

interim agreement and, with respect to industry in general,

in the tendency for wage settlements so far this year to be

about in line with the guideposts. However, I find cause

for concern in the fact that producers in several areas

continue to test markets with higher prices, in some cases

successfully, as evidenced most recently by the price in

creases for copper and tires (and, I might add, aluminum)

and by the mild upward drift in raw commodity prices and

industrial wholesale prices. Even if various upcoming

labor negotiations are settled on reasonable terms, they

may offer an excuse for higher prices in the present

buoyant business atmosphere. Fortunately, there still is

little evidence that upward price pressures are substantial

enought to be having any appreciable effect on business

men's inventory decisions--but we must keep a close eye on

this area for possible adverse tendencies in the coming months.

5/11/65

-36-

Balance of payments. The President's balance of pay

ments program has been an important factor in the sharp

improvement in the balance of payments figures in March

and April. It has contributed to a large-scale repatriation

of short-term funds from abroad and is responsible for

keeping the rise in outstanding bank loans to relatively

moderate proportions. An analysis of the performance of

Second District banks reveals that they have made a

determined effort to comply with the guidelines. In the

corporate sector the program's principal effect appears

to have been the repatriation of short-term funds. I am

troubled by the fact that we have had no indications of sig

nificant deferments or cancellations of direct investment

projects in the sensitive Common Market area. Besides the

effects of the President's program, there were two other

significant factors behind the recent payments improvement.

As usual, U.S. corporations repatriated large amounts in

March to meet regular tax and dividend needs; and the end

of the dock strike in early March led to a very sharp rise

in exports and in our export surplus.

Although the balance of payments outlook for the second

quarter is clearly favorable, it would be very unwise to let

this lead to any feeling of complacency over the payments

problem. Since the President's program represents a temporary

line of attack designed to give time for more basic improve

ments, we must do all we can over the ccming year or so

to contribute to that basic betternent.

Bank credit and money. Following the record bank credit

expansion of the first quarter, at an annual rate of nearly

13 per cent, the preliminary estimates for April suggest

tentatively a reversion to a growth rate about in line with

that of the past few years--a rate which has appeared gen

erous and perhaps excessive in relation to the real growth

of the economy. Loans continue to account for most of the

total bank credit increase, and business loans remain strong.

Total reserves and required reserves grew in April at a

rate exceeding even the substantial pace of the first quarterbut the April figures were almost certainly influenced by a

change in the mix of the deposit expansion. This change in

mix probably reflects largely the completion of adjustments

to the late-November Regulation Q liberalization. The

annual rate of growth of the money supply and time deposits

combined in the first four months of 1965 was 8.6 per cent,

well above the 6.1 per cent for the corresponding period of

1964. Whereas some of this steep gain had earlier seemed

to reflect the strengthened competitive position of the

commercial banks--in the credit market because of the

unchanged prime rate, and in the deposit market because

-37-

5/11/65

of the change in Regulation Q--it is interesting to note

that the public's total nonbank liquid assets grew in the

first quarter at a rate of 8.6 per cent, i.e., in effect

just as rapidly as money supply and time deposits combined.

Monetary policy. It would seem appropriate to try

to maintain even keel conditions in the money market during

the coming two weeks, since the new Treasury securities

will not be delivered until next Monday, and particularly

in view of the heavy subscription to the longer 4-1/4s,

which may make for a relatively sensitive "after-market."

Thus I believe monetary policy should not be changed in the

period in question. Because of significant temporary

influences in the bill market, we probably must resign

ourselves to continuance, for a time, of the current

relatively low level of bill rates, even though net

borrowed reserves are maintained in the $100-200 million

range. No change in the directive is needed at this

time, apart from an updating of the reference to the

Treasury financing. The draft directive prepared by the

staff appears acceptable, with a slight change in the

wording of the statement with respect to the balance of

payments. 1/ In place of the phrase of the first sentence

which reads "and some apparent improvement in our inter

national payments position," I would suggest "and a

beginning toward improvement in the U.S. international

balance of payments."

Looking a little further ahead, I think it likely

that we shall have to take some further steps to check

the recent growth of bank credit. A slower pace would

clearly be desirable in view of the latent price threat

and the over-riding importance of improving our inter

national payments position. Some further tightening

would seem to carry little risk in view of the evident

very considerable strength of the economy.

Mr. Shuford remarked that, as had been fully pointed out this

morning, from all indications the domestic economy was continuing a

strong and widely-based expansion.

Recent surveys suggested no

reversals in the immediate future and, for the present, the interim

steel settlement had avoided a strike and its accompanying adverse

economic effects.

1/

The draft directive is appended to these minutes as Attachment A.

5/11/65

-38

Economic activity in the Eighth District had generally kept

pace with the national advance, Mr. Shuford said.

Measures of

production, employment, spending, and bank credit had all risen

markedly since last fall, although there had been some slowing in

recent weeks.

While there still was little evidence that price movements

had departed from the patterns of the past several years, there was

some indication of increases and Mr. Shuford was inclined to believe

that the economy might be approaching a point at which significant

price increases were imminent.

In his judgment the Committee should

be prepared to foster a moderating monetary environment if excessive

demand appeared.

With respect to the international situation, while basic

problems remained, the most recent data suggested some moderate im

provements to Mr. Shuford.

The voluntary credit restraint program

had been reasonably effective; whether the iprovements would continue

or could be maintained, of course, remained to be seen.

Mr. Shuford noted that the strong demands being generated

by the domestic economy had tightened financial conditions somewhat

since last autumn.

The structure of interest rates had moved up more

in the five-month period from November to April than it had in the

preceding year.

The increase occurred despite seasonal forces tending

to push interest rates down.

The money supply had expanded 3.6 per

cent in the year ending last November and, according to weekly data,

the average growth in money had continued at a rate near that from

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5/11/65

November to date.

Although the rise in bank credit, particularly

loans, had accelerated in recent months, part of that rise probably

represented an expansion in the banking system's share of credit

rather than net additions to credit in the economy.

On considering those factors--the strength in the domestic

economy, reasonable price stability, and the absence of a compelling

reason to take restrictive actions on account of international

considerations--and in view of the Treasury financing, Mr. Shuford

favored no change in policy today.

In this connection he noted

that the Committee would meet again in two weeks.

The staff's draft

directive was acceptable to him.

Mr. Bryan reported that the performance of the Sixth District

economy seemed to be good by the usual statistical measures.

In

fact, on the basis of employment in particular and some other measures,

the District was doing better than the nation.

The one development

that gave him some concern was that the value of new construction

contracts in the District had been a sixth less during the first

quarter than a year ago.

Mr. Bryan said he had little comment on the staff questions.

Postponement of the steel strike, under the announced terms, seemed to

him to set a minimum for the prospective settlement, and probably

more could be expected.

It allowed more time for steel stockpiling,

and for a developing hedging against the expectation of selective

price increases.

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5/11/65

Capital spending plans were encouraging and all to the good,

Mr. Bryan remarked, subject only to the recognition that capital

plans, until they were far committed with cash outlays, were subject

to rapid cancellation.

There was nothing in the Sixth District in

the way of hard facts that gave an independent judgment on the

balance of payments figures or on the voluntary credit restraint

program.

His opinion was simply that it was undoubtedly having a

favorable effect; but other factors were having an unfavorable effect,

and the net balance of forces was unclear at the moment.

On the

savings question, he would merely note that of the gains in savings

accruing to commercial banks in the first quarter not all had been

at the expense of the savings and loan associations and mutual savings

banks.

The tine deposit growth, therefore, was in part "for real."

While this savings growth rate in commercial banks was now coming

down out of orbit, the savings flows outside the commercial banks

were again picking up.

As Mr. Bryan looked at the figures, except for the Federal

funds rate, the behavior of other money market rates had been es

sentially easy.

Longer rates had been easy to steady.

again draw attention to the growth in reserves.

March (seasonally adjusted at an annual rate),

He would

From January through

total reserves had

gone up by more than 9 per cent, nonborrowed reserves by just under

6 per cent, and total required reserves by 8 per cent.

Under those

circumstances he could do no more than repeat the suggestion he had

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5/11/65

made heretofore--if the Committee was going to give instructions

essentially in terms of free reserves, its target should move further

into a net borrowed reserve figure.

As soon as the Treasury refund

ing was out of the way, Mr. Bryan thought the Committee should move

toward a $150 million target rather than the figure of $100 million

that had been characteristic of recent weeks.

Mr. Bryan believed it was clear that the Committee had to

halt what he regarded as a completely excessive reserve expansion.

He took no comfort in the behavior of prices.

He thought the System

would need to make its discount rate effective by keeping the banks,

in the absence of untoward developments in the money market and

money market rates, more heavily in debt at the discount window than

He advocated no change

had generally been the case in recent weeks.

in the discount rate at this time.

Some change in the directive seemed

desirable, but he had no specific suggestiors.

Mr. Hilkert observed that economic advances had been common

for over a year now in the Third District.

Recently--since December-

those advances ceased in a number of the District's major economic

areas, but since March the tempo had picked up again.

Unemployment

rates again had stabilized or had begun to drop; output was increas

ing; and store sales were strong, but as usual were not keeping up

with national increases.

Unemployment claims remained at very favorable levels relative

to similar periods of recent years both in Pennsylvania and Delaware,

5/11/65

-42

Mr. Hilkert said.

Unemployment rates (insured rates, seasonally

adjusted) were down or stable in April in all but one major labor

market.

Electric power consumption by manufacturing industries in

the District retained an unusually favorable position relative to

national output measures, and increases in manufacturing employment

confirmed the strength in output.

Capital spending plans in the District, as in the nation, had

been raised substantially since earlier estimates, Mr. Hilkert con

tinued.

Manufacturers in the Philadelphia Metropolitan Area now

planned to spend $526 million on plant and equipment in 1965.

That

represented an upward revision of nearly 17 per cent since previous

estimates made in October 1964, and, if realized, would be an increase

in capital expenditures of almost 35 per cent over last year's figures.

Most other areas in the District also showed sizable upward revisions.

This spring's findings for the Philadelphia Metropolitan Area con

tinued an upward trend which began in 1962.

Since then, Philadelphia

manufacturers each spring had raised their fall estimates, and also

had increased the actual amount spent on plant and equipment each year.

On the financial front, Mr. Hilkert reported that business

loans in the District had lagged behind those in the nation.

Since

the beginning of the year, for example, business loans at District

weekly reporting member banks had increased by less than 1 per cent,

while national business loans were up by almost 6 per cent.

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5/11/65

As for the steel outlook, Mr. Hilkert continued, a brief dis

cussion with the largest producer in the District revealed that that

company's shipments since the contract extension agreement were less

than in other recent months, but only slightly so, and that there had

been very few order cancellations.

That producer expected orders to

pick up in August, with the pickup perhaps related more to anticipa

tions of risirg prices than to anticipations of a strike.

Mr. Hickman said that events of the past few weeks had altered

his appraisal of the near-term outlook for business only with respect

to timing.

Thus, in response to the staff's first question, the interim

steel contract suggested to him the following changes in the outlook:

(1) improved prospects for steel production, possibly through August,

which would contribute to a larger total tonnage for 1965 than had been

previously thought likely;

(2) deferral and enlargement of the inventory

liquidation to come when final settlement was reached; and (3) a possible

carry-over of the steel adjustment problem late into 1966.

In view of a continued, but slackening, rate of inventory accumula

tion of steel, Mr. Hickman continued, the iron and steel component of the

production index would probably change little in months immediately ahead.

At the same time, the auto component, although continuing at high levels,

would probably trend slightly downward.

When the steel liquidation phase

began, it might be expected to exert a drag on the production index of as

much as 1-1/2 points from current levels, stretched over a period of six

to nine months.

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5/11/65

So far as the steel wage-price question was concerned, Mr.

Hickman believed that the final settlement would be close to the

guidelines on the wage side and would not involve a general steel

price increase.

While "selective" advances in isolated product lines

were possible, they were unlikely to hit the big-tonnage items of the

flat-rolled group, where product differentiation was minimal.

Recently,

there seemed to have been a renewed flurry of price increases in other

industrial items, including aluminum, copper, tires, and trucks.

While

the weights of those items were small in the broad price averages,

upward movement was again discernible in the diffusion indexes, which

suggested the reed for continuing close attention to price developments.

With reference to the staff's second question, Mr. Hickman said,

the expected continuation of strong forward movement in capital spending

this year was all the more important because of developments to which

he had just referred.

Also, the Cleveland Reserve Bank's spring survey

of capital spending plans in the Cleveland area showed a substantial

gain for 1965 over 1964, like the Philadelphia plans reported by Mr.

Hilkert.

year.

The improvement was concentrated in the second half of the

In addition, he noted that the McGraw-Hill survey suggested

continued strength in capital spending next year.

Such strength might

be crucial for the economy in light of the presently expected additional

fiscal drag in early 1966, resulting from higher social security taxes,

if not corrected by appropriate adjustments in timing of tax payments.

In regard to the balance of payments situation, Mr. Hickman

remarked that there was very little that could be added to the staff's

5/11/65

-45

comments in the green book.

It was gratifying that banks and corpora

tions were apparently responding favorably to the voluntary credit

restraint program.

While reports from Fourth District banks suggested

some difficulty in meeting the guidelines, there were indications of

progress, and it was only a matter of time before appropriate adjust

ments were made.

Reports from large District corporations confirmed

that efforts were being made to cooperate with the President's program.

On the matters of savings flows and bank credit (questions 4

and 5), Mr. Hickman commented that the recent abatement in the growth

of time deposits should have only a limited effect on the volume of

credit available for investment.

Against the background of System

policy and relatively large savings flows, there should be little dif

ficulty in meeting demands for credit, short of an unexpectedly large

run-up in capital spending.

Special factors that sparked a marked

expansion in business loans earlier this year had passed, except that

the deferral of the steel adjustment might extend business borrowing

in that area temporarily.

Insofar as policy over the next two weeks was concerned, Mr.

Hickman thought that the Committee had no alternative, given the cur

rent Treasury refinancing operation, but to maintain an even keel with

in the policy directive adopted at the last meeting (or the one recom

mended by the staff for this meeting, since the two were substantially

the same).

Since such a directive would call for no change in money

market conditions, he again recommended a bill rate in the range of

3.95-4.05 per cent, borrowings above $400 million on average, and net

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5/11/65

borrowed reserves at whatever level was required to maintain those

objectives--within, say, a range of $50 to $150 million.

Since the

91-day bill rate had been somewhat below the desired range, and since

covered differentials were moving slightly against the United States,

he would like to see the Treasury either issue a strip of bills or

add to the existing supply of bills through the regular weekly auction,

if and when such action was feasible.

Mr. Maisel said he had nothing to add to the staff materials

and preceding comments of members nor did he have any changes to pro

pose in the directive.

Mr. Daane remarked that he had little to add to what had been

said.

He agreed that the securities issued in the Treasury financing

still had to be fully digested, and that an even keel policy therefore

was called for until the Committee met again in two weeks.

With regard

to the balance of payments reference in the directive, he thought it

would be desirable to avoid the evaluations implicit both in the use

of the word "apparent" to qualify "improvement"

as proposed by the

staff and in the alternative phrase that Mr. Hayes had suggested.

Moreover, he would not favor another minor change proposed by the stafffrom the "balance of payments" to "payments position"--particularly since

the Committee presumably would not change its policy today.

purpose in changing words for the sake of change itself.

He saw no

Accordingly,

he recommended that the phrase read "and some improvement in our inter

national balance of payments."

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5/11/65

Mr. Shepardson said that he also had little to add.

He thought

the staff reports indicated a generally favorable economic situation,

although he was concerned that too optimistic an attitude was taken

with respect to some indicators.

He shared the concern Mr. Bryan had

expressed; the recent rate of credit expansion was very high and in his

judgment the Committee should be looking toward some tempering of that

rate.

In view of the Treasury financing, he agreed that it was appropriate

for the Committee to make no change in policy during the coming two weeks,

but he hoped that the Committee might be able to move to a little lower

rate of credit expansion subsequently.

With regard to the directive, Mr. Shepardson shared Mr. Daane's

view that the word "apparent" should be omitted from the reference to

the balance of payments improvement.

He also questioned the proposed

insertion of the word "further" before "growth in the reserve base,

bank credit, and the money supply."

The addition of that word implied

to him that higher growth rates were desired; if anything the Committee

should be leaning toward lower rates of growth.

Accordingly, he would

omit the word "further."

Mr. Robertson then made the following statement:

It seems to me that the weight of the evidence before

us this morning calls for no change in monetary policy dur

ing the next two weeks.

With regard to the business situation, I find my view

neatly summed up by the first sentence appearing in the

Green Book, which says: "Changes reported in the domestic

economic scene since early March have been of a kind generally

conducive to further expansion in activity over the near-term

without widespread price advances." A moderate slowing down

in the pace of business expansion is taking place, but for

reasons that do not call for a prompt response on the part

of monetary policy.

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5/11/65

On the financial side, too, some signs of moderation

and readjustment are showing. Bank loan demand is not

so unremittingly strong, and the latest money supply and

time deposit figures seem to be explainable as readjust

ments from their unusual January-February performance.

Bill rates have drifted down a bit in connection with the

Treasury refunding, and I am not happy about the extent

to which that may have been deliberately brought about

by heavy official purchases of bills instigated by the

Treasury for purposes of sweetening the refunding. But

I am not concerned about the lower level of the three

month bill rate per se. I think fluctuations in yields,

dowrward .as well as upward, ought to be expected and

allowed to occur as part of the regular functioning of

the market. In addition, I do not believe this, or even

an appreciably lower, bill rate would constitute any

threat to the balance of payments improvement we are

seeking to achieve. Short-term interest-sensitive fund

flows seem to be fairly well in hand and we should con

centrate our general economic and monetary policies on

our more fundamental objectives.

I am concerned about one aspect of the securities

markets:

the possibility that some upward adjustment of

longer-term interest yields might take place under the

weight of current Federal, state, local, and corporate

bond marketings. I would not want to try to tinker with

the long market to interfere with some temporary yield

fluctuations that might occur as part of the process of

digestion, but I also would want to be careful not to

have our monetary policy either trigger or aggravate

such a development. Accordingly, I would favor having

the Desk aim at keeping money market and reserve conditions

unchanged between now and the next meeting of the Committee.

I would vote to approve the curren: directive to the

Manager as drafted by the staff. I would prefer, however,

as I mentioned last time, to substitute "support" for

"reinforce" in the last sentence of the first paragraph,

in order to avoid any connotation that further tightening

is needed or desired.

Mr. Robertsor added that he agreed that the word "apparent"

should be deleted since the facts certainly indicated some improvement

in the balance of payments, and he would also delete the word "position"

after "international payments."

word "further,"

However, he did not favor omitting the

as suggested by Mr. Shepardson.

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5/11/65

Mr. Wayne reported that the steady advance of Fifth District

business continued with strength evident in almost every sector.

Over half of the respondents in the Bank's latest business survey

anticipated further gains in the weeks immediately ahead, and the

others were confident that current strength would be sustained.

Rates

of insured unemployment declined more than seasonally over the first

four months of the year.

The outlook for the District's agricultural

sector, however, was somewhat less favorable than for the rest of the

economy.

Last week the new acreage-poundage program for flue-cured

tobacco was approved by growers.

Even if that new program spurred

tobacco farmers to produce a better-quality, higher-priced product,

as was anticipated, the net effect might be to reduce income from this

year's marketirgs by as much as 10 or 15 per cent, from $718 million

to $650 million or perhaps even to $600 million.

The outlook for general business continued favorable, Mr. Wayne

said. While the interim steel settlement had not eliminated the

uncertainty surrounding that industry, it had at least pushed the

critical point four months into the future.

Steel consumption remained

strong and, given the political situation in steel labor, it appeared

likely that contract negotiations this summer would provide steel users

with a continuing incentive to maintain inventories at high, if not

rising, levels.

For the near term, the diminished urgency of strike

hedge buying and the possibility of some slackening in automobiles and

durable goods output might lead to somewhat lower steel production

figures.

It was too early to assess the impact on prices of the current

steel negotiations, but he was not optimistic on that score.

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5/11/65

Considering the longer-term prospect,

Mr.

Wayne said,

it

now

seemed clear that business plant and equipment spending would continue

to be a stimulating factor for the remainder of the year.

Coupled

with probable increases in Federal Government spending for defense

and perhaps also for velfare, those outlays might well insure a con

tinuation of the present expansion even in the face of a major inter

ruption in steel in the second half.

The latest Newsweek survey, how

ever, showed a significant reduction in manufacturers' capital appropria

tions in 1964's fourth quarter and was a reminder that businessmen's

stated investment intentions were not always matched by their actual

investment performance.

In the international area, Mr. Wayne observed, there seemed to

be substantial evidence that the voluntary restraint program had reduced,

at least temporarily, all major types of capital outflows.

The program

appeared to have been especially effective in curtailing bank term

loans to foreigners and, judging from the behavior of short rates, in

promoting return flows of liquid capital.

He also was encouraged by

reports of postponement of foreign investment plans and of stepped-up

borrowing abroad by U.S. corporations.

At the present juncture, how

ever, the magnitude of the improvement, as well as its permanency, was

uncertain.

In the absence of more supporting data than had been pro

vided to date, the estimated $1.2 billion improvement indicated for

this year in the reports by U.S. corporations to the Department of

Commerce seemed optimistic to him.

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5/11/65

Mr. Wayne recalled that at the last meeting he had suggested

the possibility that the demand for bank loans might ease, and there

were indications that that might be happening.

During the four weeks

ended April 28, commercial and industrial loans made by weekly re

porting banks declined slightly, probably reflecting the receding

effects of the dock strike, the reduction in foreign lending, and

some small slowdown in automobile sales.

Further, some slowing in

consumer credit loans seemed possible in the immediate future.

During

the first. quarter of 1965 the monthly increase in outstanding instal

ment credit was about 40 per cent above the average monthly increase

for last year.

Commercial banks increased their holdings of instal

ment loans by almost 60 per cent more than last year's average rise.

Such sharp inc-eases as those, coming after a long and sustained rise

in consumer credit, were usually followed by a much slower growth.

On

the other hand, expanding outlays for plant and equipment were being

financed to some extent by term loans from banks and that might help

sustain loan demand.

In the policy area, it seemed to Mr. Wayne that the Committee

had realized little in the way of results from its last two moves to

firmer conditions.

It was true that marginal reserve availability had

declined substantially as free reserves of $32 million in February

gave way to net borrowed reserves of about $140 million in April, but

the impact of that change on the rate structure had been small indeed.

Long-term rates had held steady or declined very slightly while some

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5/11/65

short-term rates had risen slightly and others had barely moved.

He

was aware that in recent weeks the repatriation of funds from abroad,

heavy institutional demand for bills, and the current Treasury refund

ing might have distorted the relationship between the Committee's policy

posture and some money rates.

Some of the effects of those factors

might diminish soon and perhaps some rate adjustments would be seer.,

but in the face of the Committee's tightening moves, total reserves,

nonborrowed reserves, and bank credit had increased at rates well above

the average for last year.

The behavior of those indicators made Mr.

Wayne doubt whether the Committee had in fact tightened.

In any

event, if loan demand eased off and if there was some slowdown in the

automobile and steel industries, there might be no need for firmer

credit conditions.

In view of that possibility and because of the

Treasury refunding and the early date of the next meeting, Mr. Wayne

favored no change in policy at this time.

The directive as prepared

and submitted by the staff with such changes in wording as the Com

mittee might be able to arrive at was satisfactory to him.

He thought

the substance of the draft directive was appropriate.

Mr. Clay observed that recent developments in the domestic

economy suggested a moderation in the pace of economic activity from

the unsustainable rate of growth of the first quarter.

It was evident

that automobile sales were adjusting to a more reasonable pattern.

While the interim steel agreement avoided the abrupt adjustment of a

strike or a final settlement, it probably would have some moderating

influence on output.

Those adjustments were taking place in an

5/11/65

-53

environment of general economic expansion.

In that connection, the

economic outlook was bolstered substantially by the latest projections

on business capital outlays.

Moreover, the prospective extension of

industrial capacity should be an important factor in maintaining

relative stability of prices.

Bank credit developments also appeared to be moderating, Mr.

Clay said, as several temporary factors requiring a larger volume of

business loans earlier in the year had abated.

for credit remained strong, however.

The underlying demand

Continued expansion in economic

activity, including business capital outlays, required a larger volume

of financing.

The staff statement indicated that the international balance

of payments developments were on the encouraging side, Mr. Clay commented,

but it obviously was too early to know the magnitude of the improvement

and the ultimate impact of the Administration program.

The domestic situation as well as international payments develop

ments suggested to Mr. Clay that monetary policy should be continued

unchanged.

The period of digestion following the Treasury refunding

also indicated a continuation of the present monetary policy during

the next interval between Committee meetings.

In carrying out such a

policy, Mr. Clay said, it should be the aim of the Committee to main

tain money market conditions essentially unchanged.

No special effort

should be made to move the Treasury bill rate upward, and reserve

availability should not be reduced for that purpose.

Neither should

monetary policy action be permitted to put pressure on longer-term

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5/11/65

interest rates.

In his opinion no change should be made in the Federal

Reserve discount rate.

The draft economic policy directive appeared

satisfactory to him.

Mr. Scanlon reported that economic activity in the Seventh Dis

trict remained strong.

tional areas.

Shortages of skilled labor were evident in addi

Durable goods producers continued to receive a good flow

of new orders and were optimistic that those would continue.

The Chicago

Reserve Bank continued to receive reports of new expansion programs as

firms encountered continued strong demand for their products.

The Bank's contacts in the steel industry indicated that output

was expected to decline only slightly through the remainder of the second

quarter, Mr. Scanlon said.

There had been surprisingly few order can

cellations or postponements following the four-month extension of the

While there was some evidence that production of goods

strike deadline.

containing steel had been accelerated because of strike fears, adjustments

would be confined largely to the steel industry itself.

Local experts in

the industry now anticipated a first half-second half decline in steel

production of 22 per cent compared to declines of 19 per cent and 15 per

cent in the second halves of 1962 and 1963 when strike threats boosted

first half output.

It was believed that the total buildup of steel inven

tories from September 1964 through June 1965 would amount to 9 million

tons.

A working estimate used by steel analysts was that 1 million tons

of steel would be liquidated in the third quarter of 1965 and another 4

million in the fourth quarter.

That estimate envisaged production of 8.8

to 9.0 million passenger cars this year and an FRB production index of 141

in the fourth quarter.

5/11/65

-55

With respect to capital spending, Mr. Scanlon continued, infor

mation obtained from contacts with business firms, announcements of new

projects, and statistics on new orders for various types of machinery

and equipment--including such components as gears, bearings, and fluid

power drives--all suggested further expansion of plans, consistent with

the recently reported McGraw-Hill survey.

Overall, the rise in capital

spending appeared to be proceeding at a vigorous, but orderly, pace.

From a District

standpoint increases in activity in firms producing

those goods would help to offset expected second half declines in

autos and steel.

He had little to add to the staff comments on the balance of

payments, Mr. Scanlon said, other than that the voluntary credit restraint

program was working very well thus far with banks in the Seventh District.

All of the major banks were within their base.

to be

There continued

concern, however, that the program for nonfinancial establishments was

lacking in clearly defined goals.

Bankers were fearful that anything

they might accomplish toward improving the balance of payments would

be offset by continued large outflows of direct investment.

On savings flows, Mr. Scanlon noted that the recent abatement

in time deposit growth seemed due largely to a sharp reduction in

month-to-month gains in corporate deposits outside New York.

The

recent slowing in corporate time deposit growth at small banks appeared

related in part to a narrowing in the spread between CD rates at small

and large banks.

Since smaller banks had to offer somewhat higher rates

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5/11/65

on CDs than large banks, the CD rate ceiling apparently had made it

more difficult for the smaller banks to roll over maturing CDs and to

attract new funds.

Unfavorable publicity resulting from investigations

of bank failures also had contributed to the decline in corporate time

deposits at small banks.

In addition, the typically small corporate

customers of the smaller banks had sizable fractions of their total

liquid asset hcldings in bank accounts; thus, the impact on time accounts

of quarterly tax and dividend payments probably was somewhat greater

than it was for larger firms able to raise cash from a wider variety

of sources.

For the first four months as a whole, Mr. Scanlon continued,

it seemed that some of the reduction in corporate holdings of time

deposits (and other liquid assets) was associated with the climb in

capital spending, including the buildup of inventories.

That such

factors were important during the period in corporate firancial manage

ment showed up also in the sharp rise in business borrowing from banks.

If the recent slackening in time deposit growth was to be attributed

mainly to reduction in corporate holdings, due to increased disburse

ments of cash, the likelihood was that corporations would have a

smaller volume of funds to supply to the market in coming weeks.

On bank credit, demand factors still appeared to Mr. Scanlon

to be sufficiently strong so that business loan expansion during the

summer might be as large or larger than usual.

The estimated step

up in capital expenditures could be expected to strengthen the demand

for bank loans so long as the cost of bank borrowing remained low

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5/11/65

relative to capital market financing.

In addition, postponment of

the steel settlement would probably encourage some further inventory

building, and increased credit needs, by steel users.

With respect to money market developments, District banks had

increased their holdings of Governments from the low end-of-March level.

Chicago banks as a group

They had done very little borrowing lately.

had been reporting very moderate net purchases of Federal funds, but

their CDs had risen by about $50 million over the past month.

Mr.

Scanlon concurred in the staff analysis relative to the outlook for

bill rates.

As to policy, Mr. Scanlon agreed with those who favored no

change today and certainly would not recommend any easier position.

He shared Mr. Wayne's views on the directive.

Mr. Galusha said that the weather, as usual, had dominated

recent developments in the agricultural sector of the Ninth Distric:;

the past winter had been the most severe in history in many parts

of the District.

However, the area was now emerging from its effects.

The livestock situation had improved markedly recently.

A fundamental

change in habits apparently was in process, with people eating more

beef.

The nonagricultural sector of the District was prospering,

Mr. Galusha continued.

There had been some evidence of an inventory

buildup, especially in the Twin Cities area.

Because of the recent

disasters, the prospective demand for new construction in the District

was heavy.

It was estimated that in Minnesota, and in the Twin Cities

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5/11/65

area particularly, the floods did $80-.90 million of damage, and last

week's tornadoes $20-$30 million.

Those were not unmixed tragedies

because the rebuilt plants would be better than the old ones.

In the area of personal expenditures, Mr. Galusha noted that

requests for reservations at Western national parks were high.

It

appeared that travel to those parks would be at an unprecedented level

this summer.

As to banking, Mr. Galusha continued, information from weekly

reporting banks suggested that District loan demand, like that of the

nation, slackened somewhat in April.

Although total credit at weekly

reporting banks increased slightly more in April than March, it

increased less on a seasonally adjusted basis.

The average loan

deposit ratio of District reporting banks presently was higher than

at any time since early 1960 and net Federal funds purchases were

high through April, so he would not suggest that District banks were

now wallowing in funds.

In fact, District banks might have some prob

lems in coming months, in view of the pressuce that would be put on

them in connection with reconstruction.

In a concluding remark, Mr. Galusha said that he agreed with

the consensus expressed so far on the directive.

Mr. Swan commented there had not been much change recently in

the Twelfth District economy.

In March, employment rose somewhat more

slowly than earlier in the year and there was no change in the rate of

unemployment.

Preliminary California figures

for April, however, showed

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5/11/65

some increase in the unemployment rate there.

The farm labor situation

still seemed to be generating more heat than light.

The special panel

appointed by Secretary of Labor Wirtz had recommended current use of

2,500 foreign workers, including 1,500 from Mexico.

tion dissatisfied people at both extremes;

That recommenda

it was a considerably smaller

number than the growers had requested, and there were those who felt

that no foreign workers should be brought in at all.

Mr. Swan said that business loans at reporting banks in the

District decreased slightly in the four weeks ending April 23, in con

trast to earlier gains and to an increase in April 1964.

Also, the

decline in savings deposits during April was considerably less than a

year ago, although virtually all of the decline in savings accounts

at reporting banks nationally was accounted for by banks in the Twelfth

District.

Despite the business loan decrease and the strength in

savings deposits, District banks seemed to come under somewhat more

pressure during April, and were borrowing more from the Reserve Bank

than earlier in the year.

The increase in real estate loans in April

was larger than that of the entire first quarter, but because the first

quarter rise had been much less than in 1964 and because the April

increase was concentrated in one week it was too early to say whether

the rise reflected any change in bank attitudes toward mortgages.

Mr. Swan remarked that he had little to add, or to differ with,

with respect to the staff comments on the questions.

He agreed that

the extension of the steel contract did have a stabilizing influence

on the near-term outlook, and it seemed to him that the announced capital

5/11/65

-60

spending plans were related to capacity pressures and were not out of

line with the rest of activity.

In light of domestic developments, the situation with respect

to the foreign loan program, and the current Treasury financing, Mr.

Swan agreed that there should be no change in policy today.

That

decision would seem to call for about the same level of member bank

borrowing and net borrowed reserves as had been experienced recently.

In view of the general tightness of Federal funds and other areas of

the money market besides Treasury bills he certainly would not favor

efforts to raise the bill rate within a generally unchanged posture

of policy.

It would be one thing if market forces led to some increase;

but if they did not he would not do anything about it in the next two

weeks.

The draft directive was acceptable to Mr. Swan.

However, he

also would suggest that the word "apparent" be deleted.

Mr. Irons reported that conditions in the Eleventh District

continued generally favorable.

Some preliminary figures suggested

that

there might have been a slight slip off in April--certainly not a large

one.

There had been a minor decline in District industrial production

recently and construction also had slipped off somewhat.

Unemployment

was up a bit in the last month but was still running under the national

rate.

Purchases of new cars had slackened somewhat but total retail

sales were holding up well.

The agricultural situation was somewhat mixed, Mr. Irons noted.

Conditions in the eastern half or two-thirds of the District continued

quite favorable but in the western part they were quite dry.

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5/11/65

On the financial front, Mr. Irons continued, bank credit and

bank loans increased in April but less than previously, as in the nation

as a whole.

District banks had been active users of Federal funds, with

purchases recently running about $275 million in excess of sales.

holdings of Treasury bills were down a bit.

Bank

Borrowings from the Reserve

Bank were little changed and discounting activity had not been unduly

high.

Mr. Irons said he would omit the detailed comments he had planned

to make on the national situation since others had already made similar

points.

He recommended that there be no change in policy at this time.

Such a conclusion was indicated by the economic situation, which in his

judgment continued to show strength and also signs of somewhat greater

For

stability in movement than the Committee might have anticipated.

example, the inventory situation appeared less unmanageable than earlier,

and the interim steel settlement also worked in that direction.

The

fact that the Treasury financing would be in the process of being con

cluded in the period before the next meeting also argued for no change

in policy.

Specifically, Mr. Irons said, he favored net borrowed reserves

of something above $100 million--perhaps in the range of $100-$125

million.

He would expect the Federal funds rate to be in the 4 to 4-1/8

per cent area, more frequently at the latter figure than the former.

He

was not overly concerned about a bill rate level of around 3.90 per cent.

Perhaps a 3.94 or 3.95 per cent rate would be better, and he would not

object if it moved to that level, but he certainly would not favor

deliberate, positive actions to force the rate up.

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5/11/65

The staff draft of the directive seemed satisfactory to Mr.

Irons.

He was prepared to leave the semantic questions to others at

the meeting.

Mr. Ellis commented that New England continued to illustrate

that substantial and widespread expansion in aggregate demand and

production could not be relied upon to resolve structural unemploy

ment, at least within a single region such as New England.

Both

manufacturing and nonmanufacturing employment rose more than seasonally

in March, and total nonfarm employment reached a new peak, with each

State in the District registering year-to-year gains.

The regional

unemployment rate for March was 4.4 per cent, below the 4.7 per cent

national rate.

The insured unemployment level as of mid-April had

declined 24 per cent in twelve months.

Supporting those statistics, Mr. Ell.'s said, were the many

pages of employment advertisements in the daily press as well as

testimony from a large Connecticut employer that Boston employers

were trying to dissuade Boston newspapers from carrying ads for employ

ment in Connecticut.

The same Connecticut employer claimed that the

Pennsylvania Employment Office was withholding its services to potential

recruiters.

A spokesman for one of the larger private shipyards used

personal appeals to oust a Seattle recruiting officer who was offering

moving costs and tempting wages to draw trained workers to the West

Coast.

At yesterday's meeting of the directors of the Boston Reserve

Bank two directors complained of the lack of skilled labor, and one

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5/11/65

observed that he could expand employment by 2,000 if he could find

the right workers.

Those directors would not accept the notion that

New England suffered from distress unemployment at present.

Despite such evidences of over-full employment, Mr. Ellis con

tinued, New England continued to account for eight of the nation's 29

major labor areas classified as having a substantial labor surplus.

Nevertheless, the dominant tone of the region was one of prosperous

expansion.

Last minute telephone confirmations indicated current

upward revisions in the 1965 capital spending plans of New England

manufacturers, which presently tallied out as an expected gain of 19

per cent.

For three years, the reporting manufacturers had used bor

rowing to a greater extent than they had planned in advance.

Last

spring they foresaw financing 9 per cent of 1964 outlays by borrowing

but they actually financed 14 per cent in that manner.

This year

they reported intentions to borrow 6 per cent of their 19 per cent

higher outlays.

Mr. Ellis saw no reason to disagree with the standard expecta

tions expressed in the staff memorandum resulting from the steel negotia

tions or the capital spending surveys.

Both the extension of the steel

wage contract and the further upward revision of capital spending served

to strengthen the near-term outlook for business.

international capital

With respect to

flows, he could only report that of the ten New

England banks reporting monthly progress under the guidelines, only

four were above year-end levels at all.

Two banks exceeded the target,

by 26 per cent and 57 per cent, respectively, the group averaged a 4

per cent growth from December to March.

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5/11/65

The principal implication Mr. Ellis associated with the current

rate of time deposit growth was that it probably represented a less

excessive situation than prevailed in January and February.

Growth in

those two months quite clearly represented shifting from one type of

account holding to another in response to the higher time deposit rates

allowed under Regulation Q.

Recent liquid asset growth had exceeded

the true rate of saving out of income so in part it had to represent

one-time switching of assets.

Mr. Ellis remarked that the steel moratorium, slower auto sales,

a moderation in the balance of payments crises, and slower expansion of

retail sales all suggested that some of the pressure at the margin on

bank loans to business might diminish.

The current reports on business

loans, however, gave a contrary indication.

Mr. Ellis noted that the staff memorandum listed several factors

that would be operating in money markets in the next few weeks, even

within the framework of even keel.

He would single out two that might

operate to avo:.d further weakening of bill rates.

First, the Treasury

would not need to continue operations at the short end of the market

to render its anchor issue more attractive.

Secondly, reserve projec

tions indicated that instead of injecting substantial funds to achieve

reserve objectives, the System Account might be able to make net sales

in meeting the objectives for the next two weeks.

Thus, within the

framework of even keel, Mr. Ellis hoped and anticipated that there

would be a rise of a few points in short bill rates and continued firm

ness in the money market, with member bank borrowing averaging $450

million and net borrowed reserves in the $100-$150 million range.

-65

5/11/65

On the draft directive, Mr. Ellis favored dropping the word

"apparent."

On reflection he also would endorse Mr. Shepardson's

suggestion to drop the word "further"; he was not sure what the word

implied but on his interpretation it conflicted with the preceding

phrase regarding avoiding the emergence of inflationary pressures.

He did not think the Committee could continue for long to characterize

a nine per cent growth rate in the reserve base as "moderate," or to

permit such a rate to be maintained without recognizing that it was

promoting inflationary pressures.

Mr. Balderston commented that since the next meeting of the

Committee would be held in only two weeks he would favor the status

quo with respect to policy.

He thought that in the interval before

the next meeting Committee members might well consider carefully the

points Mr. Bryan had made today.

He (Mr. Balderston) was impressed

not only by the fact that total reserves had been growing at a 9 per

cent rate since the beginning of the year but also by the fact that

demand deposit turnover at reporting centers outside New York was

about 8 per cent higher in March than six months earlier.

Mr. Balderston subscribed to the changes in the draft directive

suggested by Mr. Ellis; he would delete the words "apparent" and "further."

Chairman Martin remarked that there seemed to be general agree

ment today with respect to policy, although some differences of opinion

existed as to the best wording of certain phrases in the first paragraph

of the directive.

There ensued some further discussion of the directive

language to be employed.

5/11/65

-66Thereupon, upon motion duly made

and seconded, and by unanimous vote,

the Federal Reserve Bank of New York

was authorized and directed, until

otherwise directed by the Committee,

to execute transactions in the System

Account in accordance with the following

current economic policy directive:

The economic and financial developments reviewed at

this meeting indicate a generally strong further expansion

of the domestic economy and some improvement in our inter

national balance of payments, but with gold outflows con

tinuing. In this situation, it remains the Federal Open

Market Committee's current policy to reinforce the volun

tary restraint program to strengthen the international

position of the dollar, and to avoid the emergence of

inflationary pressures, while accommodating moderate

growth in the reserve base, bank credit, and the money

supply.

To implement this policy, while taking into account

the current Treasury financing, System open market opera

tions over the next two weeks shall be conducted with a

view to maintaining about the same conditions in the

money market as have prevailed in recent weeks.

It was agreed that the next meeting of the Committee would be

held on Tuesday, May 25, 1965, at 9:30 a.m.

Thereupon the meeting adjourned.

ecretary

Attachment A

CONFIDENTIAL (FR)

May 10, 1965

Draft of Current Economic Policy Directive

for Consideration by the Federal Open Market Committee

at its Meeting on May 11, 1965

The economic and financial developments reviewed at this

meeting indicate a generally strong further expansion of the domestic

economy and some apparent improvement in our international payments

position, but with gold outflows continuing.

In this situation, it

remains the Federal Open Market Committee's current policy to rein

force the voluntary restraint program to strengthen the international

position of the dollar, and to avoid the emergence of inflationary

pressures, while accommodating moderate further growth in the reserve

base, bank credit, and the money supply.

To implement this policy, while taking into account the current

Treasury financing, System open market operations over the next two

weeks shall be conducted with a view to maintaining about the same

conditions in the money market as have prevailed in recent weeks.

Cite this document
APA
Federal Reserve (1965, May 10). FOMC Minutes. Fomc Minutes, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/fomc_minutes_19650511
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_fomc_minutes_19650511,
  author = {Federal Reserve},
  title = {FOMC Minutes},
  year = {1965},
  month = {May},
  howpublished = {Fomc Minutes, Federal Reserve},
  url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/fomc_minutes_19650511},
  note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}