FOMC Minutes
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Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee
September 25–26, 2018
A joint meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee
and the Board of Governors was held in the offices of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
in Washington, D.C., on Tuesday, September 25, 2018,
at 2:00 p.m. and continued on Wednesday, September 26, 2018, at 9:00 a.m. 1
PRESENT:
Jerome H. Powell, Chairman
John C. Williams, Vice Chairman
Thomas I. Barkin
Raphael W. Bostic
Lael Brainard
Richard H. Clarida
Loretta J. Mester
Randal K. Quarles
James Bullard, Charles L. Evans, Esther L. George,
Eric Rosengren, and Michael Strine, Alternate
Members of the Federal Open Market Committee
Patrick Harker, Robert S. Kaplan, and Neel Kashkari,
Presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks of
Philadelphia, Dallas, and Minneapolis, respectively
Mark A. Gould, First Vice President, Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco
James A. Clouse, Secretary
Matthew M. Luecke, Deputy Secretary
David W. Skidmore, Assistant Secretary
Michelle A. Smith, Assistant Secretary
Mark E. Van Der Weide, General Counsel
Michael Held, Deputy General Counsel
Steven B. Kamin, Economist
Thomas Laubach, Economist
David W. Wilcox, Economist
David Altig, Kartik B. Athreya, Thomas A. Connors,
Mary C. Daly, David E. Lebow, Trevor A. Reeve,
William Wascher, and Beth Anne Wilson,
Associate Economists
1 The Federal Open Market Committee is referenced as the
“FOMC” and the “Committee” in these minutes.
Simon Potter, Manager, System Open Market Account
Lorie K. Logan, Deputy Manager, System Open
Market Account
Ann E. Misback, Secretary, Office of the Secretary,
Board of Governors
Matthew J. Eichner, 2 Director, Division of Reserve
Bank Operations and Payment Systems, Board of
Governors; Andreas Lehnert, Director, Division of
Financial Stability, Board of Governors
Jennifer L. Burns, Deputy Director, Division of
Supervision and Regulation, Board of Governors;
Rochelle M. Edge, Deputy Director, Division of
Monetary Affairs, Board of Governors; Michael T.
Kiley, Deputy Director, Division of Financial
Stability, Board of Governors
Jon Faust, Senior Special Adviser to the Chairman,
Office of Board Members, Board of Governors
Antulio N. Bomfim, Special Adviser to the Chairman,
Office of Board Members, Board of Governors
Joseph W. Gruber and John M. Roberts, Special
Advisers to the Board, Office of Board Members,
Board of Governors
Linda Robertson, Assistant to the Board, Office of
Board Members, Board of Governors
Eric M. Engen, Joshua Gallin, and Michael G.
Palumbo, Senior Associate Directors, Division of
Research and Statistics, Board of Governors;
Christopher J. Erceg, Senior Associate Director,
Division of International Finance, Board of
Governors
Ellen E. Meade, Edward Nelson, and Joyce K. Zickler, 3
Senior Advisers, Division of Monetary Affairs,
Board of Governors; Jeremy B. Rudd, Senior
Attended through the discussion of developments in financial markets and open market operations.
3 Attended opening remarks for Tuesday session only.
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Adviser, Division of Research and Statistics, Board
of Governors
David López-Salido, Associate Director, Division of
Monetary Affairs, Board of Governors; Stacey
Tevlin, Associate Director, Division of Research
and Statistics, Board of Governors
Eric C. Engstrom, Deputy Associate Director, Division
of Monetary Affairs, and Adviser, Division of
Research and Statistics, Board of Governors
Penelope A. Beattie, 4 Assistant to the Secretary, Office
of the Secretary, Board of Governors
Jeffrey Huther, Section Chief, Division of Monetary
Affairs, Board of Governors
David H. Small, Project Manager, Division of
Monetary Affairs, Board of Governors
Benjamin K. Johannsen, Senior Economist, Division of
Monetary Affairs, Board of Governors
Achilles Sangster II, Information Management Analyst,
Division of Monetary Affairs, Board of Governors
Gregory L. Stefani, First Vice President, Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Michael Dotsey and Geoffrey Tootell, Executive Vice
Presidents, Federal Reserve Banks of Philadelphia
and Boston, respectively
Edward S. Knotek II, Spencer Krane, and Mark L.J.
Wright, Senior Vice Presidents, Federal Reserve
Banks of Cleveland, Chicago, and Minneapolis,
respectively
Jonathan P. McCarthy and Jonathan L. Willis, Vice
Presidents, Federal Reserve Banks of New York
and Kansas City, respectively
William Dupor, Assistant Vice President, Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Jim Dolmas, Senior Research Economist, Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas
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Attended Tuesday session only.
Developments in Financial Markets and Open Market Operations
The manager of the System Open Market Account
(SOMA) discussed U.S. and global financial developments. In global markets, strains in emerging market
economies (EMEs) contributed to volatility in currency
and equity markets over the period. In addition, concerns about trade tensions between the United States
and China were the focus of a great deal of attention
among market participants. Such concerns led the
Shanghai Composite index to drop as much as 8 percent
at one point over the intermeeting period before recovering somewhat. The renminbi, however, was relatively
stable, reportedly in part because investors believed that
Chinese authorities were prepared to take measures to
counter significant renminbi depreciation.
Regarding domestic financial markets, the manager
noted that U.S. equity markets had posted strong gains,
spurred by optimism regarding the U.S. economic outlook and rising corporate earnings. Longer-term Treasury yields moved higher, and market-based measures of
the expected path of the funds rate edged up. According
to the Open Market Desk’s Survey of Primary Dealers
and Survey of Market Participants, a 25 basis point increase in the target range for the federal funds rate at the
September meeting was widely expected; moreover, investors appeared to be placing high odds on a further
quarter-point policy firming at the December meeting.
In U.S. money markets, the spread between the threemonth London interbank offered rate and three-month
overnight index swap (OIS) rates continued to narrow.
The widening in that spread earlier in the year appeared
to reflect an especially rapid run-up in Treasury bill supply. Treasury bill supply remained elevated and reportedly continued to contribute to upward pressure on
overnight repurchase agreement (repo) rates. The relatively high level of repo rates was associated with continued very modest take-up in the Federal Reserve’s
overnight reverse repurchase agreement (ON RRP) operations. Elevated repo rates may also have contributed
to the relatively tight spread between the interest on excess reserves (IOER) rate and the effective federal funds
rate. That spread stood at 3 basis points over much of
the period and seemed likely to narrow to 2 basis points
in the near future. As yet, there were no signs that the
upward pressure on the federal funds rate relative to the
IOER rate was due to scarcity of aggregate reserves in
the banking system. The level of reserves in the banking
system temporarily dipped sharply in mid-September in
connection with a sizable inflow of tax receipts to the
Minutes of the Meeting of September 25–26, 2018
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Treasury’s account at the Federal Reserve; however, that
reduction in reserves in the banking system did not seem
to have any effect on the federal funds market or the
effective federal funds rate.
In reviewing Federal Reserve operations, the manager
noted that market reaction to the ongoing reduction in
the System’s holdings of Treasury and agency securities
had been muted to date. With the increase in the caps
on redemptions to be implemented beginning in October, reinvestment of Treasury securities would occur almost exclusively in the middle month of each quarter in
connection with the Treasury’s midquarter refunding
auctions. Under the baseline path for interest rates, the
Federal Reserve’s reinvestments of principal payments
on agency mortgage-backed securities would likely fall to
zero beginning in October; however, prepayments could
rise somewhat above the redemption cap in some
months in the future given the uncertainties surrounding
prepayment projections.
By unanimous vote, the Committee ratified the Desk’s
domestic transactions over the intermeeting period.
There were no intervention operations in foreign currencies for the System’s account during the intermeeting period.
Staff Review of the Economic Situation
The information reviewed for the September 25–26
meeting indicated that labor market conditions continued to strengthen in recent months and that real gross
domestic product (GDP) appeared to be rising at a
strong rate in the third quarter, similar to its pace in the
first half of the year. The flooding and damage from
Hurricane Florence, which made landfall on September 14, seemed likely to have a modest, transitory effect
on national economic growth in the second half of the
year. Consumer price inflation, as measured by the
12-month percentage change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE), remained near
2 percent in July. Survey-based measures of longer-run
inflation expectations were little changed on balance.
Total nonfarm payroll employment increased at a strong
pace, on average, in July and August. The national unemployment rate decreased to 3.9 percent in July and remained at that level in August, while the labor force participation rate and the employment-to-population ratio
moved down somewhat, on balance, over those two
months. The unemployment rates for African Americans, Asians, and Hispanics in August were below their
levels at the end of the previous expansion. The share
of workers employed part time for economic reasons declined further to below its level in late 2007. The rate of
private-sector job openings continued to be elevated in
June and July, while the rate of quits moved higher on
balance; initial claims for unemployment insurance benefits were at a historically low level in mid-September.
Total labor compensation per hour in the nonfarm business sector increased 3.3 percent over the four quarters
ending in the second quarter, and average hourly earnings for all employees rose 2.9 percent over the
12 months ending in August.
Industrial production expanded at a solid pace in July
and August. Automakers’ assembly schedules suggested
that light motor vehicle production would be roughly
flat in the fourth quarter, although broader indicators of
manufacturing production, such as the new orders indexes from national and regional manufacturing surveys,
pointed to further solid gains in factory output in the
near term.
Real PCE appeared to be rising strongly in the third
quarter. Retail sales increased somewhat in August, and
the data for July were revised up to show a sizable gain.
However, the rate of light motor vehicle sales moved
down in July and August from the robust pace in the
second quarter. The staff’s preliminary assessment was
that the consequences of Hurricane Florence would
have a slight negative effect on aggregate real PCE
growth in the third quarter but that spending would
bounce back in the fourth quarter. More broadly, recent
readings on key factors that influence consumer spending—including gains in employment, real disposable
personal income, and households’ net worth—continued to be supportive of solid real PCE growth in the
near term. Moreover, consumer sentiment, as measured
by the University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers,
remained upbeat in August and early September.
Real residential investment looked to be declining further in the third quarter. Starts for new single-family
homes and multifamily units were, on average, below
their second-quarter rates in July and August. The issuance of building permits for both types of housing
stepped down, on net, over those two months, which
suggested that starts might move lower in coming
months. Sales of both new and existing homes declined
somewhat in July, and existing home sales were flat in
August.
Growth in real private expenditures for business equipment and intellectual property appeared to be moderating a little in the third quarter following strong gains in
expenditures in the first half of the year. Nominal shipments of nondefense capital goods excluding aircraft
rose briskly in July, although spending for transportation
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equipment investment moved down in recent months.
Forward-looking indicators of business equipment
spending—such as increases in new and unfilled capital
goods orders, along with upbeat readings on business
sentiment from national and regional surveys—pointed
to robust gains in equipment spending in the near term.
Nominal business expenditures for nonresidential structures outside of the drilling and mining sector declined
in July, and the number of crude oil and natural gas rigs
in operation—an indicator of business spending for
structures in the drilling and mining sector—held about
steady in recent weeks.
Total real government purchases looked to be rising further in the third quarter. Nominal defense spending in
July and August was consistent with continued increases
in real federal purchases. Real expenditures by state and
local governments appeared to be roughly flat, as state
and local government payrolls decreased slightly in July
and August, while nominal construction spending by
these governments rose modestly in July.
The nominal U.S. international trade deficit widened in
June and July, with declining exports and rising imports.
The decline in exports largely reflected lower exports of
capital goods, while greater imports of industrial supplies
boosted overall imports. The available data suggested
that the change in net exports would be a notable drag
on real GDP growth in the third quarter.
Total U.S. consumer prices, as measured by the PCE
price index, increased 2.3 percent over the 12 months
ending in July. Core PCE price inflation, which excludes
changes in consumer food and energy prices, was
2.0 percent over that same period. The consumer price
index (CPI) rose 2.7 percent over the 12 months ending
in August, while core CPI inflation was 2.2 percent. Recent readings on survey-based measures of longer-run
inflation expectations—including those from the Michigan survey, the Survey of Professional Forecasters, and
the Desk’s Survey of Primary Dealers and Survey of
Market Participants—were little changed on balance.
Foreign economic growth slowed in the second quarter,
as a pickup in growth for the advanced foreign economies (AFEs) was more than offset by slower growth in
the EMEs. Incoming indicators for the AFEs pointed
to some moderation in the pace of growth in the third
quarter, especially for Canada and Japan, while indicators for the EMEs suggested a pickup in many countries
from the unusually slow pace of the second quarter.
Foreign inflation had risen a bit recently, boosted by
higher oil prices and, in the EMEs, higher food prices
and recent currency depreciation.
Staff Review of the Financial Situation
Nominal Treasury yields increased over the intermeeting
period, as market reactions to domestic economic data
releases that were, on balance, slightly stronger than expected appeared to outweigh ongoing concerns about
trade policy and negative developments in some EMEs.
FOMC communications over the period were largely in
line with expectations and elicited little market reaction.
Domestic stock prices rose, buoyed in part by positive
news about corporate earnings, while foreign equity indexes declined and the broad dollar index moved up. Financing conditions for nonfinancial businesses and
households remained supportive of economic activity
on balance.
Global financial markets were volatile during the intermeeting period amid significant stress in some EMEs,
ongoing focus on Brexit and on fiscal policy in Italy, and
continued trade tensions. On balance, the dollar was little changed against AFE currencies and appreciated
against EME currencies, as financial pressures on some
EMEs weighed on broader risk sentiment. Turkey and
Argentina experienced significant stress, and other
countries with similar macroeconomic vulnerabilities
also came under pressure. There were small outflows
from dedicated emerging market funds, and EME sovereign bond spreads widened. Trade tensions weighed
on foreign equity prices, as the United States continued
its trade negotiations with Canada and placed additional
tariffs on Chinese products.
FOMC communications elicited limited price reactions
in financial markets over the intermeeting period, and
market-implied measures of monetary policy expectations were little changed. The probability of an increase
in the target range for the federal funds rate occurring at
the September FOMC meeting, as implied by quotes on
the federal funds futures contracts, increased to near certainty. The market-implied probability of an additional
rate increase at the December FOMC meeting rose to
about 75 percent. The market-implied path for the federal funds rate beyond 2018 increased a touch.
Evolving trade-related risks and other international developments reportedly weighed somewhat on market
sentiment. However, domestic economic data releases
came in a bit above market expectations, on net, with the
stronger-than-expected average hourly earnings in the
August employment report notably boosting Treasury
yields. Nominal Treasury yields moved up over the intermeeting period, with the 10-year yield rising above
3 percent. Measures of inflation compensation derived
from Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities over the
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next 5 years ticked up and were little changed 5 to
10 years ahead.
over the intermeeting period and stayed near their postcrisis lows.
Broad U.S. equity price indexes increased about 4 percent since the August FOMC meeting, as positive news
about corporate earnings and the domestic economy
outweighed negative international developments. Stock
prices increased for many sectors in the S&P 500 index,
as the second-quarter earnings reports for firms that reported later in the earnings cycle came in strong. However, concerns about economic prospects abroad—particularly with respect to trade policy and China—appeared to weigh on stocks in the energy and basic materials sectors, which declined. Option-implied volatility
on the S&P 500 index at the one-month horizon—the
VIX—moved down but remained somewhat above the
extremely low levels seen in late 2017. Spreads of investment- and speculative-grade corporate bond yields over
comparable-maturity Treasury yields narrowed a bit on
net.
Residential mortgage financing conditions remained accommodative on balance. For borrowers with low
credit scores, however, conditions were still somewhat
tight despite continued easing in credit availability. Refinancing activity continued to be muted in recent
months, and the growth in purchase mortgage originations slowed a bit relative to year-earlier levels, in part
reflecting the notable increase in mortgage rates earlier
this year.
Short-term funding markets functioned smoothly over
the intermeeting period. An elevated level of Treasury
bills outstanding, following heavy issuance this summer,
continued to put upward pressure on money market
rates and reduced the attractiveness of the Federal Reserve’s ON RRP facility. Take-up at the facility averaged
$2.9 billion per day over the intermeeting period.
Spreads of unsecured funding rates over comparablematurity OIS rates continued to retrace the rise in
spreads recorded earlier this year.
On balance, financing conditions for large nonfinancial
firms remained accommodative in recent months. Demand for corporate borrowing appeared to have declined, in part because of strong earnings, rising interest
rates, and seasonal factors. In July and August, gross
issuance of corporate bonds was relatively weak, while
commercial and industrial loan growth moderated.
Meanwhile, the pace of equity issuance was solid in July
but fell in August, reflecting seasonal factors. Financing
conditions for small businesses remained favorable, and
survey-based measures of credit demand among small
business owners showed signs of strengthening, although demand was still weak relative to pre-crisis levels.
Gross issuance of municipal bonds continued to be
solid.
In the commercial real estate (CRE) sector, financing
conditions also remained accommodative. Although
CRE loan growth at banks moderated in July and August, issuance of commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) was robust. CMBS spreads were little changed
On net, financing conditions in consumer credit markets
were little changed in recent months and remained
largely supportive of growth in household spending.
However, the supply of credit to consumers with subprime credit scores remained tight. More broadly, although interest rates for credit cards and auto loans continued to rise, consumer credit expanded at a solid pace.
Staff Economic Outlook
In the U.S. economic forecast prepared for the September FOMC meeting, real GDP was projected to increase
in the second half of this year at a rate that was just a
little slower than in the first half of the year. The staff’s
preliminary assessment was that the effects of Hurricane
Florence would lead to a slight reduction in real GDP
growth in the third quarter and a small addition to
growth in the fourth quarter as economic activity returned to more normal levels and some disrupted activity was made up. Over the 2018–20 period, output was
projected to rise at a rate above or at the staff’s estimate
of potential growth and then slow to a pace below it in
2021. The unemployment rate was projected to decline
further below the staff’s estimate of its longer-run natural rate but to bottom out in 2020 and begin to edge up
in 2021. Relative to the forecast prepared for the previous meeting, the projection for real GDP growth this
year was revised up a little, primarily in response to
stronger-than-expected incoming data on household
spending and business investment. The projection for
the medium term was not materially changed, in part because the recently enacted tariffs on Chinese goods and
the retaliatory actions of China were judged to have only
a small net effect on U.S. real GDP growth over the next
few years. In addition, the staff continued to anticipate
that supply constraints might restrain output growth
somewhat in the medium term. The unemployment rate
was projected to be a little lower over the medium term
than in the previous forecast, partly in response to the
staff’s assessment that the natural rate of unemployment
was a bit lower than previously assumed. With labor
market conditions already tight, the staff continued to
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assume that projected employment gains would manifest
in smaller-than-usual downward pressure on the unemployment rate and in larger-than-usual upward pressure
on the labor force participation rate.
The staff forecast for total PCE price inflation in 2018
was revised up slightly, mainly because of a faster-thanexpected increase in consumer energy prices in the second half. The staff continued to project that total PCE
inflation would remain near the Committee’s 2 percent
objective over the medium term and that core PCE price
inflation would run slightly higher than total inflation
over that period because of a projected decline in consumer energy prices in 2019 through 2021.
The staff viewed the uncertainty around its projections
for real GDP growth, the unemployment rate, and inflation as similar to the average of the past 20 years. The
staff also saw the risks to the forecasts for real GDP
growth and the unemployment rate as balanced. On the
upside, household spending and business investment
could expand faster than the staff projected, supported
in part by the tax cuts enacted last year. On the downside, trade policies and foreign economic developments
could move in directions that have significant negative
effects on U.S. economic growth. Risks to the inflation
projection also were seen as balanced. The upside risk
that inflation could increase more than expected in an
economy that was projected to move further above its
potential was counterbalanced by the downside risk that
longer-term inflation expectations may be lower than
was assumed in the staff forecast.
Participants’ Views on Current Conditions and the
Economic Outlook
In conjunction with this FOMC meeting, members of
the Board of Governors and Federal Reserve Bank presidents submitted their projections of the most likely outcomes for real GDP growth, the unemployment rate,
and inflation for each year from 2018 through 2021 and
over the longer run, based on their individual assessments of the appropriate path for the federal funds rate.
The longer-run projections represented each participant’s assessment of the rate to which each variable
would be expected to converge, over time, under appropriate monetary policy and in the absence of further
shocks to the economy. These projections are described
in the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP), which
is an addendum to these minutes.
In their discussion of the economic situation and the
outlook, meeting participants agreed that information
received since the FOMC met in August indicated that
the labor market continued to strengthen and that economic activity rose at a strong rate. Job gains were
strong, on average, in recent months, and the unemployment rate stayed low. Recent data suggested that household spending and business fixed investment grew
strongly. On a 12-month basis, both overall inflation
and inflation for items other than food and energy remained near 2 percent. Indicators of longer-term inflation expectations were little changed on balance.
Meeting participants noted that a number of communities suffered devastating losses associated with Hurricane Florence. Despite the magnitude of the stormrelated destruction, participants expected the imprint on
the level of overall economic activity at the national level
to be relatively modest, consistent with the experience
following several previous major storms.
Based on recent readings on spending, employment, and
inflation, almost all participants saw little change in their
assessment of the economic outlook, although a few of
them judged that recent data pointed to a pace of economic activity that was stronger than they had expected
earlier this year. Participants noted a number of favorable economic factors that were supporting above-trend
GDP growth; these included strong labor market conditions, stimulative federal tax and spending policies, accommodative financial conditions, solid household balance sheets, and continued high levels of household and
business confidence. A number of participants observed
that the stimulative effects of the changes in fiscal policy
would likely diminish over the next several years. A couple of participants commented that recent strong growth
in GDP may also be due in part to increases in the
growth rate of the economy’s productive capacity.
In their discussion of the household sector, participants
generally characterized consumption growth as strong,
and they judged that robust increases in disposable income, high levels of consumer confidence, and solid
household balance sheets had contributed to the
strength in spending. Several participants noted that the
household saving rate had been revised up significantly
in the most recent estimates published by the Bureau of
Economic Activity. A few of those participants remarked that the upward revision in the saving rate could
be viewed as evidence of the strength of the financial
position of the household sector and could be a factor
that would further support solid expansion of consumption spending. However, a couple of participants noted
that the higher saving rate may not be a precursor to
higher future consumption growth. For example, the
higher saving rate may indicate some greater caution on
the part of consumers, greater inequality of income and
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wealth—which would imply a lower aggregate propensity to spend—or changing consumer behavior in a low
interest rate environment. With regard to residential investment, a few participants noted weak residential construction activity at the national or District level, which
was attributed in part to higher interest rates or supply
constraints.
Participants noted that business fixed investment had
grown strongly so far this year. A few commented that
recent changes in federal tax policy had likely bolstered
investment spending. Contacts in most sectors remained optimistic about their business prospects, and
surveys of manufacturing activity were broadly favorable. Despite this optimism, a number of contacts cited
factors that were causing them to forego production or
investment opportunities in some cases, including labor
shortages and uncertainty regarding trade policy. In particular, tariffs on aluminum and steel were cited as reducing new investment in the energy sector. Contacts
also suggested that firms were attempting to diversify the
set of countries with which they trade—both imports
and exports—as a result of uncertainty over tariff policy.
Contacts in the agricultural industry reported that tariffs
imposed by China had resulted in lower crop prices, further depressing incomes in that sector, although a new
federal program was expected to offset some income
losses.
In their discussion of labor markets, participants generally agreed that conditions continued to strengthen.
Contacts in many Districts reported tight labor markets,
with difficulty finding qualified workers. In some cases,
firms were coping with labor shortages by increasing salaries, benefits, or workplace amenities in order to attract
and retain workers. Other business contacts facing labor
shortages were responding by increasing training for
less-qualified workers. For the economy overall, participants generally agreed that, on balance, recent data suggested some acceleration in labor costs, but that wage
growth remained moderate by historical standards,
which was due in part to tepid productivity growth.
Regarding inflation, participants noted that on a
12-month basis, both overall inflation and inflation for
items other than food and energy remained near 2 percent. Indicators of longer-term inflation expectations
were little changed on balance. In general, participants
viewed recent consumer price developments as consistent with their expectation that inflation was on a trajectory to achieve the Committee’s symmetric 2 percent
objective on a sustained basis. Several participants commented that inflation may modestly exceed 2 percent for
a period of time. Reports from business contacts and
surveys in a number of Districts also indicated some
firming in inflationary pressures. In particular, some
contacts indicated that input prices had been bolstered
by strong demand or import tariffs. Moreover, several
participants reported that firms in their Districts that
were facing higher input prices because of tariffs perceived that they had an increased ability to raise the
prices of their products. A couple of participants emphasized that because inflation had run below the Committee’s 2 percent objective for the past several years,
some measures of trend inflation or longer-term inflation expectations were below levels consistent with the
2 percent objective; these participants judged that a
modest increase in inflation expectations would be important for achieving the inflation objective on a sustained basis.
In their discussion of developments in financial markets,
a number of participants noted that financial conditions
remained accommodative: The rise in interest rates and
appreciation of the dollar over the intermeeting period
had been offset by increases in equity prices, and broader
measures continued to point to accommodative financial
conditions. Some participants commented about the
continued growth in leveraged loans, the loosening of
terms and standards on these loans, or the growth of this
activity in the nonbank sector as reasons to remain
mindful of vulnerabilities and possible risks to financial
stability.
Participants commented on a number of risks and uncertainties associated with their outlook for economic
activity, the labor market, and inflation over the medium
term. Participants generally agreed that risks to the outlook appeared roughly balanced. Some participants
commented that trade policy developments remained a
source of uncertainty for the outlook for domestic
growth and inflation. The divergence between domestic
and foreign economic growth prospects and monetary
policies was cited as presenting a downside risk because
of the potential for further strengthening of the U.S. dollar; some participants noted that financial stresses in a
few EMEs could pose additional risks if they were to
spread more broadly through the global economy and
financial markets. With regard to upside risks, participants variously noted that high consumer confidence,
accommodative financial conditions, or greater-thanexpected effects of fiscal stimulus could lead to strongerthan-expected economic outcomes. Tightening resource utilization and an increasing ability of firms to
raise output prices were cited as factors that could lead
to higher-than-expected inflation, while lower-thanexpected growth, a strengthening of the U.S. dollar, or
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inflation expectations persistently running below 2 percent were mentioned as risks that could lead to lower
inflation.
A few participants offered perspectives on the term
structure of interest rates and what a potential inversion
of the yield curve might signal about economic prospects in light of the historical regularity that an inverted
yield curve has often preceded the onset of recessions in
the United States. On the one hand, an inverted yield
curve could indicate an increased risk of recession; on
the other hand, the low level of term premiums in recent
years—reflecting, in part, central bank asset purchases—
could temper the reliability of the slope of the yield curve
as an indicator of future economic activity. In addition,
the recent rise and possible further increases in longerterm interest rates might diminish the likelihood that the
yield curve would invert in the near term.
In their consideration of monetary policy at this meeting,
participants generally judged that the economy was
evolving about as anticipated, with real economic activity rising at a strong rate, labor market conditions continuing to strengthen, and inflation near the Committee’s
objective. Based on their current assessments, all participants expressed the view that it would be appropriate
for the Committee to continue its gradual approach to
policy firming by raising the target range for the federal
funds rate 25 basis points at this meeting. Almost all
considered that it was also appropriate to revise the
Committee’s postmeeting statement in order to remove
the language stating that “the stance of monetary policy
remains accommodative.” Participants discussed a
number of reasons for removing the language at this
time, noting that the Committee would not be signaling
a change in the expected path for policy, particularly as
the target range for the federal funds rate announced after the Committee’s meeting would still be below all of
the estimates of its longer-run level submitted in the September SEP. In addition, waiting until the target range
for the federal funds rate had been increased further to
remove the characterization of the policy stance as “accommodative” could convey a false sense of precision in
light of the considerable uncertainty surrounding all estimates of the neutral federal funds rate.
With regard to the outlook for monetary policy beyond
this meeting, participants generally anticipated that further gradual increases in the target range for the federal
funds rate would most likely be consistent with a sustained economic expansion, strong labor market conditions, and inflation near 2 percent over the medium
term. This gradual approach would balance the risk of
tightening monetary policy too quickly, which could lead
to an abrupt slowing in the economy and inflation moving below the Committee’s objective, against the risk of
moving too slowly, which could engender inflation persistently above the objective and possibly contribute to
a buildup of financial imbalances.
Participants offered their views about how much additional policy firming would likely be required for the
Committee to sustainably achieve its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. A few participants expected that policy would need to become
modestly restrictive for a time and a number judged that
it would be necessary to temporarily raise the federal
funds rate above their assessments of its longer-run level
in order to reduce the risk of a sustained overshooting
of the Committee’s 2 percent inflation objective or the
risk posed by significant financial imbalances. A couple
of participants indicated that they would not favor
adopting a restrictive policy stance in the absence of
clear signs of an overheating economy and rising inflation.
Participants reaffirmed that adjustments to the path for
the policy rate would depend on their assessments of the
evolution of the economic outlook and risks to the outlook relative to the Committee’s statutory objectives.
Many of them noted that future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate will depend on the
evaluation of incoming information and its implications
for the economic outlook. In this context, estimates of
the level of the neutral federal funds rate would be only
one among many factors that the Committee would consider in making its policy decisions.
Building on comments expressed at previous meetings,
a couple of participants indicated that it would be desirable to assess the Committee’s strategic approach to the
conduct of policy and to hold a periodic and systematic
review of the strengths and weaknesses of the Committee’s monetary policy framework.
Committee Policy Action
In their discussion of monetary policy for the period
ahead, members judged that information received since
the Committee met in August indicated that the labor
market had continued to strengthen and that economic
activity had been rising at a strong rate. Job gains had
been strong, on average, in recent months, and the unemployment rate had stayed low. Household spending
and business fixed investment had grown strongly. On
a 12-month basis, both overall inflation and inflation for
items other than food and energy remained near 2 percent. Indicators of longer-term inflation expectations
were little changed on balance.
Minutes of the Meeting of September 25–26, 2018
Page 9
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Members viewed the recent data as consistent with an
economy that was evolving about as they had expected.
Consequently, members expected that further gradual
increases in the target range for the federal funds rate
would be consistent with sustained expansion of economic activity, strong labor market conditions, and inflation near the Committee’s symmetric 2 percent objective over the medium term. Members continued to
judge that the risks to the economic outlook remained
roughly balanced.
After assessing current conditions and the outlook for
economic activity, the labor market, and inflation, members voted to raise the target range for the federal funds
rate to 2 to 2¼ percent. Members agreed that the timing
and size of future adjustments to the target range for the
federal funds rate would depend on their assessment of
realized and expected economic conditions relative to
the Committee’s maximum-employment objective and
symmetric 2 percent inflation objective. They reiterated
that this assessment would take into account a wide
range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments.
With regard to the postmeeting statement, members
agreed to remove the sentence indicating that “the
stance of monetary policy remains accommodative.”
Members made various points regarding the removal of
the sentence from the statement. These points included
that the characterization of the stance of policy as “accommodative” had provided useful forward guidance in
the early stages of the policy normalization process, that
this characterization was no longer providing meaningful information in light of uncertainty surrounding the
level of the neutral policy rate, that it was appropriate to
remove the characterization of the stance from the
Committee’s statement before the target range for the
federal funds rate moved closer to the range of estimates
of the neutral policy rate, and that the Committee’s earlier communications had helped prepare the public for
this change.
At the conclusion of the discussion, the Committee
voted to authorize and direct the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, until it was instructed otherwise, to execute transactions in the SOMA in accordance with the
following domestic policy directive, to be released at
2:00 p.m.:
“Effective September 27, 2018, the Federal
Open Market Committee directs the Desk to
undertake open market operations as necessary
to maintain the federal funds rate in a target
range of 2 to 2¼ percent, including overnight
reverse repurchase operations (and reverse repurchase operations with maturities of more
than one day when necessary to accommodate
weekend, holiday, or similar trading conventions) at an offering rate of 2.00 percent, in
amounts limited only by the value of Treasury
securities held outright in the System Open
Market Account that are available for such operations and by a per-counterparty limit of
$30 billion per day.
The Committee directs the Desk to continue
rolling over at auction the amount of principal
payments from the Federal Reserve’s holdings
of Treasury securities maturing during September that exceeds $24 billion, and to continue reinvesting in agency mortgage-backed securities
the amount of principal payments from the
Federal Reserve’s holdings of agency debt and
agency mortgage-backed securities received
during September that exceeds $16 billion. Effective in October, the Committee directs the
Desk to roll over at auction the amount of principal payments from the Federal Reserve’s holdings of Treasury securities maturing during each
calendar month that exceeds $30 billion, and to
reinvest in agency mortgage-backed securities
the amount of principal payments from the
Federal Reserve’s holdings of agency debt and
agency mortgage-backed securities received
during each calendar month that exceeds
$20 billion.
Small deviations from these
amounts for operational reasons are acceptable.
The Committee also directs the Desk to engage
in dollar roll and coupon swap transactions as
necessary to facilitate settlement of the Federal
Reserve’s agency mortgage-backed securities
transactions.”
The vote also encompassed approval of the statement
below to be released at 2:00 p.m.:
“Information received since the Federal Open
Market Committee met in August indicates that
the labor market has continued to strengthen
and that economic activity has been rising at a
strong rate. Job gains have been strong, on average, in recent months, and the unemployment
rate has stayed low. Household spending and
business fixed investment have grown strongly.
On a 12-month basis, both overall inflation and
Page 10
Federal Open Market Committee
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
inflation for items other than food and energy
remain near 2 percent. Indicators of longerterm inflation expectations are little changed, on
balance.
Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment
and price stability. The Committee expects that
further gradual increases in the target range for
the federal funds rate will be consistent with
sustained expansion of economic activity,
strong labor market conditions, and inflation
near the Committee’s symmetric 2 percent objective over the medium term. Risks to the economic outlook appear roughly balanced.
In view of realized and expected labor market
conditions and inflation, the Committee decided to raise the target range for the federal
funds rate to 2 to 2¼ percent.
In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal
funds rate, the Committee will assess realized
and expected economic conditions relative to its
maximum employment objective and its symmetric 2 percent inflation objective. This assessment will take into account a wide range of
information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures
and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments.”
Voting against this action: None.
Ms. George voted as alternate member at this meeting.
To support the Committee’s decision to raise the target
range for the federal funds rate, the Board of Governors
voted unanimously to raise the interest rates on required
and excess reserve balances to 2.20 percent, effective
September 27, 2018. The Board of Governors also
voted unanimously to approve a ¼ percentage point increase in the primary credit rate (discount rate) to
2.75 percent, effective September 27, 2018. 5
Following the vote, Chairman Powell noted that he had
asked Governor Clarida to serve as chair of a subcommittee on communications issues. The other members
of the subcommittee will include Governor Brainard,
President Kaplan, and President Rosengren. The role of
the subcommittee will be to help prioritize and frame
communications issues for the Committee.
It was agreed that the next meeting of the Committee
would be held on Wednesday–Thursday, November 7–8, 2018. The meeting adjourned at 10:00 a.m. on
September 26, 2018.
Notation Vote
By notation vote completed on August 21, 2018, the
Committee unanimously approved the minutes of the
Committee meeting held on July 31–August 1, 2018.
Voting for this action: Jerome H. Powell, John C.
Williams, Thomas I. Barkin, Raphael W. Bostic, Lael
Brainard, Richard H. Clarida, Esther L. George, Loretta
J. Mester, and Randal K. Quarles.
_____________________________
James A. Clouse
Secretary
In taking this action, the Board approved requests to establish that rate submitted by the Boards of Directors of the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Richmond, Atlanta, Chicago, St. Louis, Kansas City, Dallas, and
San Francisco. This vote also encompassed approval by the
Board of Governors of the establishment of a 2.75 percent
primary credit rate by the remaining Federal Reserve Banks,
effective on the later of September 27, 2018, and the date such
Reserve Banks informed the Secretary of the Board of such a
request. (Secretary’s note: Subsequently, the Federal Reserve
Banks of New York and Minneapolis were informed by the
Secretary of the Board of the Board’s approval of their establishment of a primary credit rate of 2.75 percent, effective September 27, 2018.) The second vote of the Board also encompassed approval of the establishment of the interest rates for
secondary and seasonal credit under the existing formulas for
computing such rates.
5
Page 1
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Summary of Economic Projections
In conjunction with the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting held on September 25–26, 2018,
meeting participants submitted their projections of the
most likely outcomes for real gross domestic product
(GDP) growth, the unemployment rate, and inflation for
each year from 2018 to 2021 and over the longer run. 1
Each participant’s projections were based on information available at the time of the meeting, together with
his or her assessment of appropriate monetary policy—
including a path for the federal funds rate and its longerrun value—and assumptions about other factors likely
to affect economic outcomes. The longer-run projections represent each participant’s assessment of the
value to which each variable would be expected to converge, over time, under appropriate monetary policy and
in the absence of further shocks to the economy. 2 “Appropriate monetary policy” is defined as the future path
of policy that each participant deems most likely to foster outcomes for economic activity and inflation that
best satisfy his or her individual interpretation of the
statutory mandate to promote maximum employment
and price stability.
All participants who submitted longer-run projections
expected that, in 2018, real GDP would expand at a pace
exceeding their individual estimates of the longer-run
growth rate of real GDP. All participants anticipated
that real GDP growth would moderate in the coming
years, and a majority of participants projected growth in
2021 to be below their estimates of the longer-run rate.
All participants who submitted longer-run projections
expected that the unemployment rate would run below
their estimates of its longer-run level throughout the
projection period. Participants generally projected that
inflation, as measured by the four-quarter percentage
change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE), would be at or near the Committee’s
2 percent objective at the end of 2018 and would continue at close to that rate through 2021. Compared with
the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) from
June, a solid majority of participants marked up their
projections of real GDP growth and most increased
their forecast of the unemployment rate in 2018, with
Four members of the Board of Governors, one more than
in June 2018, were in office at the time of the September 2018
meeting and submitted economic projections. The office of
the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
1
participants indicating that these revisions mostly reflected incoming data. Participants’ projections of inflation were largely unchanged from June. Table 1 and figure 1 provide summary statistics for the projections.
As shown in figure 2, almost all participants continued
to expect that the evolution of the economy, relative to
their objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent
inflation, would likely warrant further gradual increases
in the federal funds rate. The medians of participants’
projections of the federal funds rate through 2020 were
unchanged relative to their June projections, and the median of participants’ projections for 2021 was the same
as that for 2020. The median projection for the longerrun federal funds rate rose slightly, with several participants citing increases in model-based estimates of the
longer-run real federal funds rate and strong economic
data as reasons for the revision. A substantial majority
of participants expected that the year-end 2020 and 2021
federal funds rate would be above their estimates of the
longer-run rate.
In general, participants continued to view the uncertainty around their economic projections as broadly similar to the average of the past 20 years. Risks to their
outlooks were viewed as balanced, although a couple
more participants than in June saw risks to their inflation
projections as weighted to the upside.
The Outlook for Economic Activity
The medians of participants’ projections for the growth
rate of real GDP, conditional on their individual assessments of appropriate monetary policy, were 3.1 percent
for 2018, 2.5 percent for 2019, and 2.0 percent for 2020.
For this SEP, participants also submitted projections for
economic variables in 2021 for the first time. Participants’ projections for real GDP growth in 2021 were almost all below participants’ projections of growth in
2020 and, for a majority of participants, below their
longer-run projections of real GDP growth. Some participants cited the waning of fiscal stimulus, less accommodative monetary policy, or anticipated appreciation of
the dollar as factors contributing to their forecasts for a
moderation of real GDP growth over the course of the
projection period.
was vacant at the time of this FOMC meeting; First Vice President Mark A. Gould submitted economic projections.
2 One participant did not submit longer-run projections for
real GDP growth, the unemployment rate, or the federal funds
rate.
2.4
2.4
3.1
3.1
2.1
2.1
3.4
3.4
2.1
2.1
3.4
n.a.
2.1
n.a.
2.1
n.a.
3.0
2.9
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
1.9 – 2.0 2.0 – 2.3 2.0 – 2.2 2.0 – 2.3
1.9 – 2.1 2.0 – 2.3 2.0 – 2.3
n.a.
1.9 – 2.2 2.0 – 2.3 2.0 – 2.2 2.0 – 2.3
2.0 – 2.2 1.9 – 2.3 2.0 – 2.3
n.a.
2.0
2.0
2.1 – 2.4 2.9 – 3.4 3.1 – 3.6 2.9 – 3.6 2.8 – 3.0 2.1 – 2.4 2.1 – 3.6 2.1 – 3.9 2.1 – 4.1 2.5 – 3.5
2.1 – 2.4 2.9 – 3.4 3.1 – 3.6
n.a.
2.8 – 3.0 1.9 – 2.6 1.9 – 3.6 1.9 – 4.1
n.a.
2.3 – 3.5
1.9 – 2.0 2.0 – 2.1 2.1 – 2.2 2.0 – 2.2
1.9 – 2.0 2.0 – 2.2 2.1 – 2.2
n.a.
2.0 – 2.1 2.0 – 2.1 2.1 – 2.2 2.0 – 2.2
2.0 – 2.1 2.0 – 2.2 2.1 – 2.2
n.a.
Note: Projections of change in real gross domestic product (GDP) and projections for both measures of inflation are percent changes from the fourth quarter of the previous
year to the fourth quarter of the year indicated. PCE inflation and core PCE inflation are the percentage rates of change in, respectively, the price index for personal consumption
expenditures (PCE) and the price index for PCE excluding food and energy. Projections for the unemployment rate are for the average civilian unemployment rate in the fourth
quarter of the year indicated. Each participant’s projections are based on his or her assessment of appropriate monetary policy. Longer-run projections represent each participant’s
assessment of the rate to which each variable would be expected to converge under appropriate monetary policy and in the absence of further shocks to the economy. The projections
for the federal funds rate are the value of the midpoint of the projected appropriate target range for the federal funds rate or the projected appropriate target level for the federal
funds rate at the end of the specified calendar year or over the longer run. The June projections were made in conjunction with the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on
June 12–13, 2018. One participant did not submit longer-run projections for the change in real GDP, the unemployment rate, or the federal funds rate in conjunction with the June
12–13, 2018, meeting, and one participant did not submit such projections in conjunction with the September 25–26, 2018, meeting.
1. For each period, the median is the middle projection when the projections are arranged from lowest to highest. When the number of projections is even, the median is the
average of the two middle projections.
2. The central tendency excludes the three highest and three lowest projections for each variable in each year.
3. The range for a variable in a given year includes all participants’ projections, from lowest to highest, for that variable in that year.
4. Longer-run projections for core PCE inflation are not collected.
Federal funds rate
June projection
Memo: Projected
appropriate policy path
2.0
2.0
2.1
2.1
3.7
3.4 – 3.6 3.4 – 3.8 3.5 – 4.0 4.3 – 4.6 3.7 – 3.8 3.4 – 3.8 3.3 – 4.0 3.4 – 4.2 4.0 – 4.6
3.6 – 3.7 3.4 – 3.5 3.4 – 3.7
n.a.
4.3 – 4.6 3.5 – 3.8 3.3 – 3.8 3.3 – 4.0
n.a.
4.1 – 4.7
Core PCE inflation4
June projection
2.0
2.1
4.5
4.5
2.1
2.1
3.7
n.a.
PCE inflation
June projection
3.5
3.5
Unemployment rate
June projection
3.5
3.5
3.7
3.6
Change in real GDP
June projection
Variable
Median1
Central tendency2
Range3
2018 2019 2020 2021 Longer 2018
2019
2020
2021
2018
2019
2020
2021
Longer
Longer
run
run
run
3.1
2.5
2.0
1.8
1.8
3.0 – 3.2 2.4 – 2.7 1.8 – 2.1 1.6 – 2.0 1.8 – 2.0 2.9 – 3.2 2.1 – 2.8 1.7 – 2.4 1.5 – 2.1 1.7 – 2.1
2.8
2.4
2.0 n.a.
1.8
2.7 – 3.0 2.2 – 2.6 1.8 – 2.0
n.a.
1.8 – 2.0 2.5 – 3.0 2.1 – 2.7 1.5 – 2.2
n.a.
1.7 – 2.1
Percent
Table 1. Economic projections of Federal Reserve Board members and Federal Reserve Bank presidents,
under their individual assessments of projected appropriate monetary policy, September 2018
Page 2
Federal Open Market Committee
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Summary of Economic Projections of the Meeting of September 25–26, 2018
Page 3
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Figure 1. Medians, central tendencies, and ranges of economic projections, 2018–21 and over the longer run
Percent
Change in real GDP
Median of projections
Central tendency of projections
Range of projections
3
Actual
2
1
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
Longer
run
Percent
Unemployment rate
7
6
5
4
3
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
Longer
run
Percent
PCE inflation
3
2
1
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
Longer
run
Percent
Core PCE inflation
3
2
1
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
Longer
run
Note: Definitions of variables and other explanations are in the notes to table 1. The data for the actual values of
the variables are annual.
Page 4
Federal Open Market Committee
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Figure 2. FOMC participants’ assessments of appropriate monetary policy: Midpoint of target range or target level for
the federal funds rate
Percent
5.0
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
2018
2019
2020
2021
Longer run
Note: Each shaded circle indicates the value (rounded to the nearest 1/8 percentage point) of an individual participant’s judgment of the midpoint of the appropriate target range for the federal funds rate or the appropriate target
level for the federal funds rate at the end of the specified calendar year or over the longer run. One participant did not
submit longer-run projections for the federal funds rate.
Summary of Economic Projections of the Meeting of September 25–26, 2018
Page 5
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
While most participants made slight upward revisions to
their unemployment rate projections for this year, their
projections in subsequent years and in the longer run
were largely unchanged. A substantial majority of participants expected the unemployment rate to bottom out
in 2019 or 2020 at levels below their estimates of the unemployment rate in the longer run, and then to rise a
little in 2021.
Figures 3.A and 3.B show the distributions of participants’ projections for real GDP growth and the unemployment rate from 2018 to 2021 and over the longer
run. The distribution of individual projections for real
GDP growth for this year shifted noticeably to the right
relative to that in the June SEP; the distribution for projected real GDP growth for 2019 also shifted to the
right, albeit only a little. The distributions of individual
projections for the unemployment rate in 2018 and 2019
shifted up a little relative to the distributions in June,
while the distributions of the projections for the unemployment rate in the longer run were largely unchanged.
The Outlook for Inflation
The medians of projections for total PCE price inflation
were 2.1 percent in 2018, 2.0 percent in 2019, and
2.1 percent in 2020 and 2021. The medians of projections for core PCE price inflation were 2.0 percent in
2018 and 2.1 percent in 2019, 2020, and 2021. For the
entire period between 2018 and 2020, these medians
were very similar to the June SEP. Figures 3.C and 3.D
provide information on the distributions of participants’
views about the outlook for inflation. Relative to the
June SEP, a number of participants revised slightly down
their projections for total PCE inflation this year and
next. Most participants projected total PCE price inflation in the range of 1.9 to 2.0 percent for 2018 and 2019
and 2.1 to 2.2 percent in 2020 and 2021. Most participants projected that core PCE inflation would run at
1.9 to 2.0 percent in 2018 and at 2.1 to 2.2 percent in
2019, 2020, and 2021. Relative to the June SEP, a larger
number of participants projected that core PCE inflation
in 2019 and 2020 would fall in the 2.1 to 2.2 percent
range.
Appropriate Monetary Policy
Figure 3.E shows distributions of participants’ judgments regarding the appropriate target—or midpoint of
the target range—for the federal funds rate for the end
of each year from 2018 to 2021 and over the longer run.
The distribution of projected policy rates for year-end
2018 was higher than in the June SEP, with projections
clustered around 2.4 percent. The distributions of participants’ views of the appropriate federal funds rate at
Table 2. Average historical projection error ranges
Percentage points
2018
2019
2020
2021
Change in real GDP1 . . . . . . ±1.2
Variable
±1.8
±1.9
±2.0
Unemployment
rate1
±0.3
±1.1
±1.6
±2.0
Total consumer
prices2
±0.8
±1.0
±1.1
±1.1
. . . ±0.5
±1.7
±2.3
±2.7
Short-term interest
......
....
rates3
NOTE: Error ranges shown are measured as plus or minus the
root mean squared error of projections for 1998 through 2017 that
were released in the fall by various private and government forecasters.
As described in the box “Forecast Uncertainty,” under certain assumptions, there is about a 70 percent probability that actual outcomes for
real GDP, unemployment, consumer prices, and the federal funds rate
will be in ranges implied by the average size of projection errors made
in the past. For more information, see David Reifschneider and Peter
Tulip (2017), “Gauging the Uncertainty of the Economic Outlook Using Historical Forecasting Errors: The Federal Reserve’s Approach,”
Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-020 (Washington:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, February),
www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2017/files/2017020pap.
pdf.
1. Definitions of variables are in the general note to table 1.
2. Measure is the overall consumer price index, the price measure
that has been most widely used in government and private economic
forecasts. Projections are percent changes on a fourth quarter to
fourth quarter basis.
3. For Federal Reserve staff forecasts, measure is the federal funds
rate. For other forecasts, measure is the rate on 3-month Treasury
bills. Projection errors are calculated using average levels, in percent,
in the fourth quarter.
the ends of 2019 and 2020 were relatively wide, as was
the case in the June SEP.
In discussing their projections, almost all participants
continued to express the view that the appropriate trajectory of the federal funds rate would likely involve
gradual increases. This view was predicated on several
factors, including a judgment that a gradual path of policy firming would appropriately balance the risk of a
buildup of inflationary pressures or other imbalances associated with high levels of resource utilization, against
the risk that factors such as diminishing fiscal stimulus
and adverse developments in foreign economies could
become a significant drag on real GDP growth. As always, the appropriate path of the federal funds rate
would depend on incoming economic data and their implications for participants’ economic outlooks and assessments of risks.
Uncertainty and Risks
In assessing the appropriate path of the federal funds
rate, FOMC participants take account of the range of
possible economic outcomes, the likelihood of those
outcomes, and the potential benefits and costs should
they occur. As a reference, table 2 provides measures of
forecast uncertainty, based on the forecast errors of various private and government forecasts over the past
Page 6
Federal Open Market Committee
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Figure 3.A. Distribution of participants’ projections for the change in real GDP, 2018–21 and over the longer run
Number of participants
2018
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
September projections
June projections
1.4 1.5
1.6 1.7
1.8 1.9
2.0 2.1
2.2 2.3
2.4 2.5
2.6 2.7
2.8 2.9
3.0 3.1
3.2 3.3
Percent range
Number of participants
2019
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.4 1.5
1.6 1.7
1.8 1.9
2.0 2.1
2.2 2.3
2.4 2.5
2.6 2.7
2.8 2.9
3.0 3.1
3.2 3.3
Percent range
Number of participants
2020
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.4 1.5
1.6 1.7
1.8 1.9
2.0 2.1
2.2 2.3
2.4 2.5
2.6 2.7
2.8 2.9
3.0 3.1
3.2 3.3
Percent range
Number of participants
2021
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.4 1.5
1.6 1.7
1.8 1.9
2.0 2.1
2.2 2.3
2.4 2.5
2.6 2.7
2.8 2.9
3.0 3.1
3.2 3.3
Percent range
Number of participants
Longer run
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.4 1.5
1.6 1.7
1.8 1.9
2.0 2.1
2.2 2.3
2.4 2.5
2.6 2.7
2.8 2.9
Percent range
Note: Definitions of variables and other explanations are in the notes to table 1.
3.0 3.1
3.2 3.3
Summary of Economic Projections of the Meeting of September 25–26, 2018
Page 7
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Figure 3.B. Distribution of participants’ projections for the unemployment rate, 2018–21 and over the longer run
Number of participants
2018
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
September projections
June projections
3.0 3.1
3.2 3.3
3.4 3.5
3.6 3.7
3.8 3.9
4.0 4.1
4.2 4.3
4.4 4.5
4.6 4.7
4.8 4.9
5.0 5.1
Percent range
Number of participants
2019
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
3.0 3.1
3.2 3.3
3.4 3.5
3.6 3.7
3.8 3.9
4.0 4.1
4.2 4.3
4.4 4.5
4.6 4.7
4.8 4.9
5.0 5.1
Percent range
Number of participants
2020
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
3.0 3.1
3.2 3.3
3.4 3.5
3.6 3.7
3.8 3.9
4.0 4.1
4.2 4.3
4.4 4.5
4.6 4.7
4.8 4.9
5.0 5.1
Percent range
Number of participants
2021
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
3.0 3.1
3.2 3.3
3.4 3.5
3.6 3.7
3.8 3.9
4.0 4.1
4.2 4.3
4.4 4.5
4.6 4.7
4.8 4.9
5.0 5.1
Percent range
Number of participants
Longer run
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
3.0 3.1
3.2 3.3
3.4 3.5
3.6 3.7
3.8 3.9
4.0 4.1
4.2 4.3
4.4 4.5
Percent range
Note: Definitions of variables and other explanations are in the notes to table 1.
4.6 4.7
4.8 4.9
5.0 5.1
Page 8
Federal Open Market Committee
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Figure 3.C. Distribution of participants’ projections for PCE inflation, 2018–21 and over the longer run
Number of participants
2018
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
September projections
June projections
1.9 2.0
2.1 2.2
2.3 2.4
Percent range
Number of participants
2019
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.9 2.0
2.1 2.2
2.3 2.4
Percent range
Number of participants
2020
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.9 2.0
2.1 2.2
2.3 2.4
Percent range
Number of participants
2021
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.9 2.0
2.1 2.2
2.3 2.4
Percent range
Number of participants
Longer run
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.9 2.0
2.1 2.2
Percent range
Note: Definitions of variables and other explanations are in the notes to table 1.
2.3 2.4
Summary of Economic Projections of the Meeting of September 25–26, 2018
Page 9
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Figure 3.D. Distribution of participants’ projections for core PCE inflation, 2018–21
Number of participants
2018
September projections
June projections
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.9 2.0
2.1 2.2
2.3 2.4
Percent range
Number of participants
2019
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.9 2.0
2.1 2.2
2.3 2.4
Percent range
Number of participants
2020
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.9 2.0
2.1 2.2
2.3 2.4
Percent range
Number of participants
2021
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.9 2.0
2.1 2.2
Percent range
Note: Definitions of variables and other explanations are in the notes to table 1.
2.3 2.4
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Federal Open Market Committee
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Figure 3.E. Distribution of participants’ judgments of the midpoint of the appropriate target range for the federal funds
rate or the appropriate target level for the federal funds rate, 2018–21 and over the longer run
Number of participants
2018
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
September projections
June projections
1.88 2.12
2.13 2.37
2.38 2.62
2.63 2.87
2.88 3.12
3.13 3.37
3.38 3.62
3.63 3.87
3.88 4.12
4.13 4.37
4.38 4.62
4.63 4.87
4.88 5.12
Percent range
Number of participants
2019
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.88 2.12
2.13 2.37
2.38 2.62
2.63 2.87
2.88 3.12
3.13 3.37
3.38 3.62
3.63 3.87
3.88 4.12
4.13 4.37
4.38 4.62
4.63 4.87
4.88 5.12
Percent range
Number of participants
2020
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.88 2.12
2.13 2.37
2.38 2.62
2.63 2.87
2.88 3.12
3.13 3.37
3.38 3.62
3.63 3.87
3.88 4.12
4.13 4.37
4.38 4.62
4.63 4.87
4.88 5.12
Percent range
Number of participants
2021
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.88 2.12
2.13 2.37
2.38 2.62
2.63 2.87
2.88 3.12
3.13 3.37
3.38 3.62
3.63 3.87
3.88 4.12
4.13 4.37
4.38 4.62
4.63 4.87
4.88 5.12
Percent range
Number of participants
Longer run
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.88 2.12
2.13 2.37
2.38 2.62
2.63 2.87
2.88 3.12
3.13 3.37
3.38 3.62
3.63 3.87
3.88 4.12
4.13 4.37
Percent range
Note: Definitions of variables and other explanations are in the notes to table 1.
4.38 4.62
4.63 4.87
4.88 5.12
Summary of Economic Projections of the Meeting of September 25–26, 2018
Page 11
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
20 years, for real GDP growth, the unemployment rate,
and total PCE price inflation. Those measures are represented graphically in the “fan charts” shown in the top
panels of figures 4.A, 4.B, and 4.C. The fan charts display the median SEP projections for the three variables
surrounded by symmetric confidence intervals derived
from the forecast errors reported in table 2. If the degree of uncertainty attending these projections is similar
to the typical magnitude of past forecast errors and the
risks around the projections are broadly balanced, then
future outcomes of these variables would have about a
70 percent probability of being within these confidence
intervals. For all three variables, this measure of uncertainty is substantial and generally increases as the forecast horizon lengthens.
Participants’ assessments of the level of uncertainty surrounding their individual economic projections are
shown in the bottom-left panels of figures 4.A, 4.B, and
4.C. Nearly all participants viewed the degree of uncertainty attached to their economic projections for real
GDP growth and inflation as broadly similar to the average of the past 20 years. 3 A couple more participants
than in June viewed the uncertainty around the unemployment rate as higher than average.
Because the fan charts are constructed to be symmetric
around the median projections, they do not reflect any
asymmetries in the balance of risks that participants may
see in their economic projections. Participants’ assessments of the balance of risks to their economic projections are shown in the bottom-right panels of figures 4.A, 4.B, and 4.C. Most participants assessed the
risks to their projections of real GDP growth and the
unemployment rate as broadly balanced—in other
words, as broadly consistent with a symmetric fan chart.
At the end of this summary, the box “Forecast Uncertainty”
discusses the sources and interpretation of uncertainty surrounding the economic forecasts and explains the approach
3
Those participants who did not judge the risks to their
real GDP growth and unemployment rate projections as
balanced were roughly evenly split between those who
viewed the risks as being weighted to the upside and
those who viewed the risks as being weighted to the
downside. Risks around both total and core inflation
projections were judged to be broadly balanced by a
solid majority of participants; however, those participants who saw the risks as uneven saw them as weighted
to the upside.
In discussing the uncertainty and risks surrounding their
economic projections, many participants pointed to upside risks to real GDP growth from fiscal stimulus or
stronger-than-expected effects of business optimism.
Many participants also pointed to downside risks for the
economy and inflation stemming from factors such as
trade policy, stresses in emerging market economies, or
stronger-than-anticipated appreciation of the dollar.
Participants’ assessments of the appropriate future path
of the federal funds rate were also subject to considerable uncertainty. Because the Committee adjusts the federal funds rate in response to actual and prospective developments over time in real GDP growth, the unemployment rate, and inflation, uncertainty surrounding the
projected path for the federal funds rate importantly reflects the uncertainties about the paths for those key economic variables along with other factors. Figure 5 provides a graphical representation of this uncertainty, plotting the median SEP projection for the federal funds rate
surrounded by confidence intervals derived from the results presented in table 2. As with the macroeconomic
variables, the forecast uncertainty surrounding the appropriate path of the federal funds rate is substantial and
increases for longer horizons.
used to assess the uncertainty and risks attending the participants’ projections.
Page 12
Federal Open Market Committee
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Figure 4.A. Uncertainty and risks in projections of GDP growth
Median projection and confidence interval based on historical forecast errors
Percent
Change in real GDP
Median of projections
70% confidence interval
4
3
2
Actual
1
0
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
FOMC participants’ assessments of uncertainty and risks around their economic projections
Number of participants
Uncertainty about GDP growth
Risks to GDP growth
September projections
June projections
Lower
18
Broadly
similar
Number of participants
Higher
September projections
June projections
18
16
16
14
14
12
12
10
10
8
8
6
6
4
4
2
2
Weighted to
downside
Broadly
balanced
Weighted to
upside
Note: The blue and red lines in the top panel show actual values and median projected values, respectively, of the
percent change in real gross domestic product (GDP) from the fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter
of the year indicated. The confidence interval around the median projected values is assumed to be symmetric and is
based on root mean squared errors of various private and government forecasts made over the previous 20 years; more
information about these data is available in table 2. Because current conditions may differ from those that prevailed,
on average, over the previous 20 years, the width and shape of the confidence interval estimated on the basis of the
historical forecast errors may not reflect FOMC participants’ current assessments of the uncertainty and risks around
their projections; these current assessments are summarized in the lower panels. Generally speaking, participants who
judge the uncertainty about their projections as “broadly similar” to the average levels of the past 20 years would view
the width of the confidence interval shown in the historical fan chart as largely consistent with their assessments of
the uncertainty about their projections. Likewise, participants who judge the risks to their projections as “broadly
balanced” would view the confidence interval around their projections as approximately symmetric. For definitions of
uncertainty and risks in economic projections, see the box “Forecast Uncertainty.”
Summary of Economic Projections of the Meeting of September 25–26, 2018
Page 13
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Figure 4.B. Uncertainty and risks in projections of the unemployment rate
Median projection and confidence interval based on historical forecast errors
Percent
Unemployment rate
10
Median of projections
70% confidence interval
9
8
7
6
Actual
5
4
3
2
1
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
FOMC participants’ assessments of uncertainty and risks around their economic projections
Number of participants
Uncertainty about the unemployment rate
Risks to the unemployment rate
September projections
June projections
Lower
18
Broadly
similar
Number of participants
Higher
September projections
June projections
18
16
16
14
14
12
12
10
10
8
8
6
6
4
4
2
2
Weighted to
downside
Broadly
balanced
Weighted to
upside
Note: The blue and red lines in the top panel show actual values and median projected values, respectively, of
the average civilian unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of the year indicated. The confidence interval around
the median projected values is assumed to be symmetric and is based on root mean squared errors of various private
and government forecasts made over the previous 20 years; more information about these data is available in table 2.
Because current conditions may differ from those that prevailed, on average, over the previous 20 years, the width
and shape of the confidence interval estimated on the basis of the historical forecast errors may not reflect FOMC
participants’ current assessments of the uncertainty and risks around their projections; these current assessments are
summarized in the lower panels. Generally speaking, participants who judge the uncertainty about their projections as
“broadly similar” to the average levels of the past 20 years would view the width of the confidence interval shown in the
historical fan chart as largely consistent with their assessments of the uncertainty about their projections. Likewise,
participants who judge the risks to their projections as “broadly balanced” would view the confidence interval around
their projections as approximately symmetric. For definitions of uncertainty and risks in economic projections, see the
box “Forecast Uncertainty.”
Page 14
Federal Open Market Committee
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Figure 4.C. Uncertainty and risks in projections of PCE inflation
Median projection and confidence interval based on historical forecast errors
Percent
PCE inflation
Median of projections
70% confidence interval
3
2
1
Actual
0
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
FOMC participants’ assessments of uncertainty and risks around their economic projections
Number of participants
Uncertainty about PCE inflation
Risks to PCE inflation
September projections
June projections
Lower
18
Broadly
similar
Number of participants
September projections
June projections
18
16
16
14
14
12
12
10
10
8
8
6
6
4
4
2
2
Higher
Weighted to
downside
Broadly
balanced
Number of participants
Uncertainty about core PCE inflation
18
Broadly
similar
Number of participants
Risks to core PCE inflation
September projections
June projections
Lower
Weighted to
upside
Higher
September projections
June projections
18
16
16
14
14
12
12
10
10
8
8
6
6
4
4
2
2
Weighted to
downside
Broadly
balanced
Weighted to
upside
Note: The blue and red lines in the top panel show actual values and median projected values, respectively, of the
percent change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) from the fourth quarter of the previous
year to the fourth quarter of the year indicated. The confidence interval around the median projected values is assumed
to be symmetric and is based on root mean squared errors of various private and government forecasts made over the
previous 20 years; more information about these data is available in table 2. Because current conditions may differ from
those that prevailed, on average, over the previous 20 years, the width and shape of the confidence interval estimated
on the basis of the historical forecast errors may not reflect FOMC participants’ current assessments of the uncertainty
and risks around their projections; these current assessments are summarized in the lower panels. Generally speaking,
participants who judge the uncertainty about their projections as “broadly similar” to the average levels of the past
20 years would view the width of the confidence interval shown in the historical fan chart as largely consistent with their
assessments of the uncertainty about their projections. Likewise, participants who judge the risks to their projections
as “broadly balanced” would view the confidence interval around their projections as approximately symmetric. For
definitions of uncertainty and risks in economic projections, see the box “Forecast Uncertainty.”
Summary of Economic Projections of the Meeting of September 25–26, 2018
Page 15
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Figure 5. Uncertainty in projections of the federal funds rate
Median projection and confidence interval based on historical forecast errors
Percent
Federal funds rate
Midpoint of target range
Median of projections
70% confidence interval*
6
5
4
3
2
1
Actual
0
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
Note: The blue and red lines are based on actual values and median projected values, respectively, of the Committee’s target for the federal funds rate at the end of the year indicated. The actual values are the midpoint of the
target range; the median projected values are based on either the midpoint of the target range or the target level.
The confidence interval around the median projected values is based on root mean squared errors of various private
and government forecasts made over the previous 20 years. The confidence interval is not strictly consistent with the
projections for the federal funds rate, primarily because these projections are not forecasts of the likeliest outcomes for
the federal funds rate, but rather projections of participants’ individual assessments of appropriate monetary policy.
Still, historical forecast errors provide a broad sense of the uncertainty around the future path of the federal funds rate
generated by the uncertainty about the macroeconomic variables as well as additional adjustments to monetary policy
that may be appropriate to offset the effects of shocks to the economy.
The confidence interval is assumed to be symmetric except when it is truncated at zero—the bottom of the lowest
target range for the federal funds rate that has been adopted in the past by the Committee. This truncation would
not be intended to indicate the likelihood of the use of negative interest rates to provide additional monetary policy
accommodation if doing so was judged appropriate. In such situations, the Committee could also employ other tools,
including forward guidance and large-scale asset purchases, to provide additional accommodation. Because current
conditions may differ from those that prevailed, on average, over the previous 20 years, the width and shape of the
confidence interval estimated on the basis of the historical forecast errors may not reflect FOMC participants’ current
assessments of the uncertainty and risks around their projections.
* The confidence interval is derived from forecasts of the average level of short-term interest rates in the fourth
quarter of the year indicated; more information about these data is available in table 2. The shaded area encompasses
less than a 70 percent confidence interval if the confidence interval has been truncated at zero.
Page 16
Federal Open Market Committee
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Forecast Uncertainty
The economic projections provided by the members of
the Board of Governors and the presidents of the Federal
Reserve Banks inform discussions of monetary policy among
policymakers and can aid public understanding of the basis
for policy actions. Considerable uncertainty attends these
projections, however. The economic and statistical models
and relationships used to help produce economic forecasts
are necessarily imperfect descriptions of the real world, and
the future path of the economy can be affected by myriad
unforeseen developments and events. Thus, in setting the
stance of monetary policy, participants consider not only
what appears to be the most likely economic outcome as embodied in their projections, but also the range of alternative
possibilities, the likelihood of their occurring, and the potential costs to the economy should they occur.
Table 2 summarizes the average historical accuracy of a
range of forecasts, including those reported in past Monetary
Policy Reports and those prepared by the Federal Reserve
Board’s staff in advance of meetings of the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC). The projection error ranges
shown in the table illustrate the considerable uncertainty associated with economic forecasts. For example, suppose a
participant projects that real gross domestic product (GDP)
and total consumer prices will rise steadily at annual rates of,
respectively, 3 percent and 2 percent. If the uncertainty attending those projections is similar to that experienced in the
past and the risks around the projections are broadly balanced, the numbers reported in table 2 would imply a probability of about 70 percent that actual GDP would expand
within a range of 1.8 to 4.2 percent in the current year, 1.2 to
4.8 percent in the second year, 1.1 to 4.9 percent in the third
year, and 1.0 to 5.0 percent in the fourth year. The corresponding 70 percent confidence intervals for overall inflation would be 1.2 to 2.8 percent in the current year, 1.0 to
3.0 percent in the second year, and 0.9 to 3.1 percent in the
third and fourth years. Figures 4.A through 4.C illustrate
these confidence bounds in “fan charts” that are symmetric
and centered on the medians of FOMC participants’ projections for GDP growth, the unemployment rate, and inflation. However, in some instances, the risks around the projections may not be symmetric. In particular, the unemployment rate cannot be negative; furthermore, the risks around
a particular projection might be tilted to either the upside or
the downside, in which case the corresponding fan chart
would be asymmetrically positioned around the median projection.
Because current conditions may differ from those that
prevailed, on average, over history, participants provide
judgments as to whether the uncertainty attached to their
projections of each economic variable is greater than, smaller
than, or broadly similar to typical levels of forecast uncertainty seen in the past 20 years, as presented in table 2 and
reflected in the widths of the confidence intervals shown in
the top panels of figures 4.A through 4.C. Participants’ cur-
rent assessments of the uncertainty surrounding their projections are summarized in the bottom-left panels of those figures. Participants also provide judgments as to whether the
risks to their projections are weighted to the upside, are
weighted to the downside, or are broadly balanced. That is,
while the symmetric historical fan charts shown in the top
panels of figures 4.A through 4.C imply that the risks to participants’ projections are balanced, participants may judge that
there is a greater risk that a given variable will be above rather
than below their projections. These judgments are summarized in the lower-right panels of figures 4.A through 4.C.
As with real activity and inflation, the outlook for the
future path of the federal funds rate is subject to considerable
uncertainty. This uncertainty arises primarily because each
participant’s assessment of the appropriate stance of monetary policy depends importantly on the evolution of real activity and inflation over time. If economic conditions evolve
in an unexpected manner, then assessments of the appropriate setting of the federal funds rate would change from that
point forward. The final line in table 2 shows the error ranges
for forecasts of short-term interest rates. They suggest that
the historical confidence intervals associated with projections
of the federal funds rate are quite wide. It should be noted,
however, that these confidence intervals are not strictly consistent with the projections for the federal funds rate, as these
projections are not forecasts of the most likely quarterly outcomes but rather are projections of participants’ individual assessments of appropriate monetary policy and are on an endof-year basis. However, the forecast errors should provide a
sense of the uncertainty around the future path of the federal
funds rate generated by the uncertainty about the macroeconomic variables as well as additional adjustments to monetary
policy that would be appropriate to offset the effects of
shocks to the economy.
If at some point in the future the confidence interval
around the federal funds rate were to extend below zero, it
would be truncated at zero for purposes of the fan chart
shown in figure 5; zero is the bottom of the lowest target
range for the federal funds rate that has been adopted by the
Committee in the past. This approach to the construction of
the federal funds rate fan chart would be merely a convention;
it would not have any implications for possible future policy
decisions regarding the use of negative interest rates to provide additional monetary policy accommodation if doing so
were appropriate. In such situations, the Committee could
also employ other tools, including forward guidance and asset
purchases, to provide additional accommodation.
While figures 4.A through 4.C provide information on
the uncertainty around the economic projections, figure 1
provides information on the range of views across FOMC
participants. A comparison of figure 1 with figures 4.A
through 4.C shows that the dispersion of the projections
across participants is much smaller than the average forecast
errors over the past 20 years.
Cite this document
Federal Reserve (2018, September 25). FOMC Minutes. Fomc Minutes, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/fomc_minutes_20180926
@misc{wtfs_fomc_minutes_20180926,
author = {Federal Reserve},
title = {FOMC Minutes},
year = {2018},
month = {Sep},
howpublished = {Fomc Minutes, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/fomc_minutes_20180926},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}