FOMC Minutes
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Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee
September 17–18, 2019
A joint meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee
and the Board of Governors was held in the offices of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
in Washington, D.C., on Tuesday, September 17, 2019,
at 10:15 a.m. and continued on Wednesday,
September 18, 2019, at 9:00 a.m. 1
PRESENT:
Jerome H. Powell, Chair
John C. Williams, Vice Chair
Michelle W. Bowman
Lael Brainard
James Bullard
Richard H. Clarida
Charles L. Evans
Esther L. George
Randal K. Quarles
Eric Rosengren
Patrick Harker, Robert S. Kaplan, Neel Kashkari,
Loretta J. Mester, and Michael Strine, Alternate
Members of the Federal Open Market Committee
Thomas I. Barkin, Raphael W. Bostic, and Mary C.
Daly, Presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks of
Richmond, Atlanta, and San Francisco, respectively
James A. Clouse, Secretary
Matthew M. Luecke, Deputy Secretary
David W. Skidmore, Assistant Secretary
Michelle A. Smith, Assistant Secretary
Mark E. Van Der Weide, General Counsel
Michael Held, Deputy General Counsel
Steven B. Kamin, Economist
Thomas Laubach, Economist
Stacey Tevlin, Economist
Rochelle M. Edge, Eric M. Engen, William Wascher,
Jonathan L. Willis, and Beth Anne Wilson,
Associate Economists
Ann E. Misback, Secretary, Office of the Secretary,
Board of Governors
Eric Belsky, 2 Director, Division of Consumer and
Community Affairs, Board of Governors; Matthew
J. Eichner, 3 Director, Division of Reserve Bank
Operations and Payment Systems, Board of
Governors; Michael S. Gibson, Director, Division
of Supervision and Regulation, Board of
Governors; Andreas Lehnert, Director, Division of
Financial Stability, Board of Governors
Daniel M. Covitz, Deputy Director, Division of
Research and Statistics, Board of Governors;
Michael T. Kiley, Deputy Director, Division of
Financial Stability, Board of Governors; Trevor A.
Reeve, Deputy Director, Division of Monetary
Affairs, Board of Governors
Jon Faust, Senior Special Adviser to the Chair, Office
of Board Members, Board of Governors
Joshua Gallin, Special Adviser to the Chair, Office of
Board Members, Board of Governors
Brian M. Doyle, Wendy E. Dunn, Joseph W. Gruber,
Ellen E. Meade, and Ivan Vidangos, Special
Advisers to the Board, Office of Board Members,
Board of Governors
Linda Robertson, Assistant to the Board, Office of
Board Members, Board of Governors
Shaghil Ahmed, Senior Associate Director, Division of
International Finance, Board of Governors
Antulio Bomfim, Jane E. Ihrig, and Edward Nelson,
Senior Advisers, Division of Monetary Affairs,
Board of Governors; Jeremy B. Rudd, Senior
Adviser, Division of Research and Statistics, Board
of Governors
Lorie K. Logan, Manager pro tem, System Open
Market Account
1 The Federal Open Market Committee is referenced as the
“FOMC” and the “Committee” in these minutes.
2 Attended through the discussion of the review of the monetary policy framework.
3 Attended through the discussion of developments in financial markets and open market operations.
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David López-Salido, Associate Director, Division of
Monetary Affairs, Board of Governors; John J.
Stevens, Associate Director, Division of Research
and Statistics, Board of Governors
Andrew Figura and John M. Roberts, Deputy Associate
Directors, Division of Research and Statistics,
Board of Governors; Christopher J. Gust, Deputy
Associate Director, Division of Monetary Affairs,
Board of Governors; Matteo Iacoviello and Andrea
Raffo,2 Deputy Associate Directors, Division of
International Finance, Board of Governors; Jeffrey
D. Walker,3 Deputy Associate Director, Division
of Reserve Bank Operations and Payment Systems,
Board of Governors
Zeynep Senyuz, 4 Assistant Director, Division of
Monetary Affairs, Board of Governors
Penelope A. Beattie, 5 Assistant to the Secretary, Office
of the Secretary, Board of Governors
Section Chief, Division of
Martin
International Finance, Board of Governors
Bodenstein,2
David H. Small, 6 Project Manager, Division of
Monetary Affairs, Board of Governors
Hess T. Chung,2 Group Manager, Division of Research
and Statistics, Board of Governors
Jonathan E. Goldberg, Edward Herbst,2 and Benjamin
K. Johannsen, Principal Economists, Division of
Monetary Affairs, Board of Governors
Fabian Winkler,2 Senior Economist, Division of
Monetary Affairs, Board of Governors
Randall A. Williams,2 Senior Information Manager,
Division of Monetary Affairs, Board of Governors
James Hebden,2 Senior Technology Analyst, Division
of Monetary Affairs, Board of Governors
Achilles Sangster II, Information Management Analyst,
Division of Monetary Affairs, Board of Governors
4 Attended the discussion of developments in financial markets and open market operations.
5 Attended Tuesday’s session only.
Kenneth C. Montgomery, First Vice President, Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston
David Altig,2 Kartik B. Athreya, Michael Dotsey,
Jeffrey Fuhrer,2 Sylvain Leduc, Simon Potter, 7 and
Ellis W. Tallman, Executive Vice Presidents,
Federal Reserve Banks of Atlanta, Richmond,
Philadelphia, Boston, San Francisco, New York,
and Cleveland, respectively
David Andolfatto, Marc Giannoni, Evan F. Koenig,2
Paula Tkac, and Mark L.J. Wright, Senior Vice
Presidents, Federal Reserve Banks of St. Louis,
Dallas, Dallas, Atlanta, and Minneapolis,
respectively
Jonas Fisher, Giovanni Olivei, Giorgio Topa, and
Patricia Zobel, Vice Presidents, Federal Reserve
Banks of Chicago, Boston, New York, and New
York, respectively
Jonas Arias,2 Thorsten Drautzburg,2 and Leonardo
Melosi,2 Senior Economists, Federal Reserve Banks
of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, and Chicago,
respectively
Fernando Duarte,2 Financial Economist, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York
Review of Monetary Policy Strategy, Tools, and
Communication Practices
Committee participants continued their discussions related to the ongoing review of the Federal Reserve’s
monetary policy strategy, tools, and communication
practices. Staff briefings provided an assessment of the
risk that the federal funds rate could, in some future
downturn, be constrained by the effective lower bound
(ELB) and discussed options for mitigating the costs associated with this constraint. The staff’s analysis suggested that the ELB would likely bind in most future recessions, which could make it more difficult for the
FOMC to achieve its longer-run objectives of maximum
employment and symmetric 2 percent inflation. The
staff discussed several options for mitigating ELB risks,
including using forward guidance and balance sheet policies earlier and more aggressively than in the past.
Attended the discussion of the review of the monetary policy
framework through the end of the meeting.
7 Attended opening remarks for Tuesday session only.
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The staff also illustrated the properties of “makeup”
strategies using model simulations. Under such strategies, policymakers would promise to make up for past
inflation shortfalls with a sustained accommodative
stance of policy that is intended to generate higher future
inflation. These strategies are designed to provide accommodation at the ELB by keeping the policy rate low
for an extended period in order to support an economic
recovery. Because of their properties both at and away
from the ELB, makeup strategies may also more firmly
anchor inflation expectations at 2 percent than a policy
strategy that does not compensate for past inflation
misses. The staff analysis emphasized, however, that the
benefits of makeup strategies depend importantly on the
private sector’s understanding of these strategies and
their confidence that future policymakers would follow
through on promises to keep policy accommodative.
Participants generally agreed with the staff’s analysis that
the risk of future ELB episodes had likely increased over
time, and that future ELB episodes and the reduced effect of resource utilization on inflation could inhibit the
Committee’s ability to achieve its employment and inflation objectives. The increased ELB risk was attributed
in part to structural changes in the U.S. economy that
had lowered the longer-run real short-term interest rate
and thus the neutral level of the policy rate. In this context, a couple of participants noted that uncertainty
about the neutral rate made it especially challenging to
determine any appropriate changes to the current framework. In light of a low neutral rate and shortfalls of inflation below the 2 percent objective for several years,
some participants raised the concern that the policy
space to reduce the federal funds rate in response to future recessions could be compressed further if inflation
shortfalls continued and led to a decline in inflation expectations, a risk that was also discussed in the staff analysis. These participants pointed to long, ongoing ELB
spells in other major foreign economies and suggested
that, to avoid similar circumstances in the United States,
it was important to be aggressive when confronted with
forces holding inflation below objective. A couple of
participants judged that the lack of monetary policy
space abroad and the possibility that fiscal space in the
United States might be limited reinforced the case for
strengthening the FOMC’s monetary policy framework
as a matter of prudent planning.
With regard to the current monetary policy framework,
participants agreed that this framework served the Committee well in the aftermath of the financial crisis. A
number of participants noted that the Committee’s ex-
perience with forward guidance and balance sheet policies would likely allow the Committee to deploy these
tools earlier and more aggressively in the event that they
were needed. A few indicated that the uncertainty about
the effectiveness of these policies was smaller than the
uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness of a makeup
strategy.
Participants generally agreed that the current framework
also served the Committee well by providing a strong
commitment to achieving the Committee’s maximumemployment and symmetric inflation objectives. Such a
commitment was seen as flexible enough to allow the
Committee to choose policy actions that best support its
objectives in a wide array of economic circumstances.
Because of the downside risk to inflation and employment associated with the ELB, most participants were
open to the possibility that the dual-mandate objectives
of maximum employment and stable prices could be
best served by strategies that deliver inflation rates that
over time are, on average, equal to the Committee’s
longer-run objective of 2 percent. Promoting such outcomes may require aiming for inflation somewhat above
2 percent when the policy rate was away from the ELB,
recognizing that inflation would tend to be lower than
2 percent when the policy rate was constrained by the
ELB. Participants suggested several alternatives for doing so, including strategies that make up for past inflation shortfalls and those that respond more aggressively
to below-target inflation than to above-target inflation.
In this context, several participants suggested that the
adoption of a target range for inflation could be helpful
in achieving the Committee’s objective of 2 percent inflation, on average, as it could help communicate to the
public that periods in which the Committee judged inflation to be moderately away from its 2 percent objective were appropriate. A couple of participants suggested analyzing policies in which there was a target
range for inflation whose midpoint was modestly higher
than 2 percent or in which 2 percent was an inflation
floor; these policies might enhance policymakers’ scope
to provide accommodation as appropriate when the
neutral real interest rate was low.
Although ensuring inflation outcomes averaging 2 percent over time was seen as important, many participants
noted that the illustrated makeup strategies delivered
only modest benefits in the staff’s model simulations.
These modest benefits in part reflected that the responsiveness of inflation to resource slack had diminished,
making it more difficult to provide sufficient accommodation to push inflation back to the Committee’s objective in a timely manner. Some participants suggested
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that the modest effects were particularly pronounced using the FRB/US model and indicated the need for more
robustness analysis of simulation results along several dimensions and for further comparison to other alternative strategies. In addition, several participants noted
that the implementation of the makeup strategies in the
form of either average inflation targeting or price-level
targeting in the simulations was tied too rigidly to the
details of particular rules. An advantage of the current
framework over such alternative approaches is that it has
provided the Committee with the flexibility to assess a
broad range of factors and information in choosing its
policy actions, and these actions can vary depending on
economic circumstances in order to best achieve the
Committee’s dual mandate. Similarly, makeup strategies
could be implemented more flexibly in order to deliver
more accommodation during a future downturn and
through the subsequent recovery than what could be
achieved with a mechanical makeup rule.
Participants also discussed a number of challenges associated with makeup strategies. Many participants expressed reservations with the makeup strategies analyzed
by the staff. Some participants raised the concern that
the effective use of the makeup strategies in the form of
the average inflation targeting and price-level targeting
rules that the staff presented depended on future policymakers following through on commitments to keep policy accommodative for a long time. Such commitments
might be difficult for future policymakers to follow
through on, especially in situations in which the labor
market was strong and inflation was above target. A few
participants acknowledged that credibly committing to
makeup strategies posed challenges. However, they
pointed to the commitments that central banks around
the world made to inflation targeting as examples in
which similar challenges had been overcome. A couple
of participants raised the concern that keeping policy
rates low for a long time could lead to excessive risktaking in financial markets and threaten financial stability. However, a couple of other participants judged that
macroprudential tools could be used to help ensure that
any overleveraging of households and firms did not
threaten the financial system, while monetary policy
needed to be focused on achieving maximum employment and symmetric 2 percent inflation. A few participants viewed the communication challenges associated
with average-inflation targeting strategies, including the
difficulty of conveying the dangers of low inflation to
the public, as greater than for some other strategies that
use threshold-based forward guidance. Several participants noted that makeup strategies could unduly limit
the policy response in situations in which inflation had
been running above 2 percent amid signs of an impending economic downturn. Accordingly, these participants
favored makeup strategies that only reversed past inflation shortfalls relative to makeup strategies that reversed
both past inflation shortfalls and past overruns.
Participants continued to discuss the benefits of the
Committee’s review of the monetary policy framework
as well as the Committee’s Statement on Longer-Run
Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, which articulates
the Committee’s approach to monetary policy. As they
did at their meeting in July, participants mentioned several issues that this statement might possibly address.
These issues included the conduct of monetary policy in
the presence of the ELB constraint, the role of inflation
expectations in the Committee’s pursuit of its inflation
goal, the best means of conveying the Committee’s balanced approach to monetary policy, the symmetry of its
inflation goal, and the time frame over which the Committee aimed to achieve it. Participants expected that
they would continue their deliberations on these and
other topics pertinent to the review at upcoming meetings. They also generally agreed that the Committee’s
consideration of possible modifications to its policy
strategy, tools, and communication practices would take
some time, and that the process would be careful, deliberate, and patient.
Developments in Financial Markets and Open Market Operations
The manager pro tem first discussed developments in
global financial markets over the intermeeting period.
Global financial markets were volatile over the intermeeting period, with market participants reacting to incoming information about U.S.–China trade tensions
and the global growth outlook. In the weeks following
the July FOMC meeting, U.S. yields declined sharply and
risk asset prices fell amid a spate of largely negative news
about risks to the global economic outlook. These price
moves reversed to some degree in September as developments on trade and economic data turned more positive. On net, Treasury yields remained substantially
lower, while the S&P 500 and corporate credit spreads
reversed most or all of their earlier losses to end the period little changed.
Even after the partial rebound in September, marketand survey-based indicators of policy rate expectations
suggested that investors viewed it as very likely that the
Committee would ease policy further at this meeting. All
respondents from the Desk’s Survey of Primary Dealers
and Survey of Market Participants viewed a 25 basis
Minutes of the Meeting of September 17–18, 2019
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point decrease in the target range as the most likely outcome at this meeting. Looking beyond September, most
survey respondents expected another 25 basis point cut
by year-end. Further out, while the median of respondents’ modal forecasts for the end of 2020 pointed to no
rate cuts next year, individual forecasts were much more
dispersed, with nearly half of respondents expecting at
least one additional 25 basis point cut in 2020, and about
one-fourth expecting two or more cuts. Market participants remained attentive to a range of global risk factors
that could affect the policy rate path, including trade tensions between the United States and China, developments in Europe, political tensions in Hong Kong, uncertainties related to Brexit, and escalating geopolitical
tension in the Middle East following attacks on Saudi oil
facilities.
The manager pro tem turned next to a discussion of
money market conditions. Money markets were stable
over most of the period, and the reduction in the interest
on excess reserves (IOER) rate following the July
FOMC meeting fully passed through to money market
rates. However, money markets became highly volatile
just before the September meeting, apparently spurred
partly by large corporate tax payments and Treasury settlements, and remained so through the time of the meeting. In an environment of greater perceived uncertainty
about potential outflows related to the corporate tax
payment date, typical lenders in money markets were less
willing to accommodate increased dealer demand for
funding. Moreover, some banks maintained reserve levels significantly above those reported in the Senior Financial Officer Survey about their lowest comfortable
level of reserves rather than lend in repo markets.
Money market mutual funds reportedly also held back
some liquidity in order to cushion against potential outflows. Rates on overnight Treasury repurchase agreements rose to over 5 percent on September 16 and above
8 percent on September 17.
Highly elevated repo rates passed through to rates in unsecured markets. Federal Home Loan Banks reportedly
scaled back their lending in the federal funds market in
order to maintain some liquidity in anticipation of higher
demand for advances from their members and to shift
more of their overnight funding into repo. In this environment, the effective federal funds rate (EFFR) rose to
the top of the target range on September 16. The following morning, in accordance with the FOMC’s directive to the Desk to foster conditions to maintain the
EFFR in the target range, the Desk conducted overnight
repurchase operations for up to $75 billion. After the
operation, rates in secured and unsecured markets declined sharply. Rates in secured markets were trading
around 2.5 percent after the operation. Market participants reportedly expected that additional temporary
open market operations would be necessary both over
subsequent days and around the end of the quarter.
Many also reportedly expected another 5 basis point
technical adjustment of the IOER rate.
By unanimous vote, the Committee ratified the Desk’s
domestic transactions over the intermeeting period.
There were no intervention operations in foreign currencies for the System’s account during the intermeeting period.
Staff Review of the Economic Situation
The information available for the September 17–18
meeting indicated that labor market conditions remained
strong and that real gross domestic product (GDP) appeared to be increasing at a moderate rate in the third
quarter. Consumer price inflation, as measured by the
12-month percentage change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE), was below
2 percent in July. Survey-based measures of longer-run
inflation expectations were little changed.
Total nonfarm payroll employment expanded at a solid
pace in July and August, although at a slower rate than
in the first half of the year. (Separately, the Bureau of
Labor Statistics’ preliminary estimate of the upcoming
benchmark revision to payroll employment, which will
be incorporated in the published data in February 2020,
indicated that the revised pace of average monthly job
gains from April 2018 to March 2019 would be notably
slower than in the current published data.) The unemployment rate remained at 3.7 percent through August,
and both the labor force participation rate and the employment-to-population ratio moved up. The unemployment rates for African Americans and Hispanics declined over July and August, while the rates for whites
and Asians increased; the unemployment rate for each
group was below its level at the end of the previous economic expansion, though persistent differentials between these rates remained. The average share of workers employed part time for economic reasons in July and
August continued to be below its level in late 2007. Both
the rate of private-sector job openings and the rate of
quits moved roughly sideways in June and July and were
still at relatively high levels; the four-week moving average of initial claims for unemployment insurance benefits through early September was near historically low
levels. Total labor compensation per hour in the business sector increased 4.4 percent over the four quarters
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ending in the second quarter, a faster rate than a year
earlier. Average hourly earnings for all employees rose
3.2 percent over the 12 months ending in August, the
same pace as a year earlier.
Total consumer prices, as measured by the PCE price
index, increased 1.4 percent over the 12 months ending
in July. This increase was slower than a year earlier, as
core PCE price inflation (which excludes changes in
consumer food and energy prices) moved down to
1.6 percent, consumer food price inflation remained below core inflation, and consumer energy prices declined.
The average monthly change in core PCE prices in recent months was faster than earlier this year, suggesting
that the soft inflation readings during the earlier period
were transitory. The trimmed mean measure of
12-month PCE price inflation constructed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas remained at 2 percent in
July. The consumer price index (CPI) rose 1.7 percent
over the 12 months ending in August, while core CPI
inflation was 2.4 percent. Recent survey-based measures
of longer-run inflation expectations were little changed
on balance. The preliminary September reading from
the University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers
dipped after edging up in August, but it remained within
its recent range; the measures of longer-run inflation expectations from the Desk’s Survey of Primary Dealers
and Survey of Market Participants were little changed.
Real consumer expenditures appeared to be rising solidly
in the third quarter after expanding strongly in the second quarter. Real PCE rose briskly in July, while the
components of the nominal retail sales data used by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to estimate PCE
were flat in August and the rate of sales of light motor
vehicles only edged up, suggesting some slowing in consumer spending growth in the third quarter from its
strong second-quarter pace. Key factors that influence
consumer spending—including a low unemployment
rate, further gains in real disposable income, high levels
of households’ net worth, and generally low borrowing
rates—were supportive of solid real PCE growth in the
near term. The preliminary September reading on the
Michigan survey measure of consumer sentiment picked
up a little after weakening notably in August, although
the Conference Board survey measure of consumer confidence did not show a similar decline in August.
Real residential investment seemed to be picking up a
little in the third quarter after declining over the previous
year and a half. Starts of new single-family homes were
higher in July and August than the second-quarter average, and starts of multifamily units rose in August after
falling back in July. Building permit issuance for new
single-family homes—which tends to be a good indicator of the underlying trend in construction of such
homes—was higher in July and August than its secondquarter average. Sales of existing homes rose modestly
in July, while new home sales declined following an outsized increase in June.
Real nonresidential private fixed investment looked to
be declining further in the third quarter. Nominal shipments of nondefense capital goods excluding aircraft decreased in July, and forward-looking indicators generally
pointed to continued softness in business equipment
spending. Orders for nondefense capital goods excluding aircraft increased in June but were still below the
level of shipments, most measures of business sentiment
deteriorated, analysts’ expectations of firms’ longer-term
profit growth declined further, and trade policy concerns
continued to weigh on firms’ investment decisions.
Nominal business expenditures for nonresidential structures outside the drilling and mining sector decreased in
July, and the number of crude oil and natural gas rigs in
operation—an indicator of business spending for structures in the drilling and mining sector—continued to decline through mid-September.
Industrial production increased modestly, on net, over
July and August, but production remained notably lower
than at the beginning of the year. Automakers’ assembly
schedules indicated that the production of light motor
vehicles would be roughly flat in the near term (although
the labor strike at General Motors was expected to temporarily disrupt vehicle production), while new orders
indexes from national and regional manufacturing surveys and a persistent drag from trade tariffs pointed toward continued softness in factory output in coming
months.
Total real government purchases appeared to be rising
at a slower pace in the third quarter than in the second
quarter. Federal defense spending over July and August
decelerated, and federal hiring of temporary workers for
next year’s decennial census was modest in August.
State and local government payrolls rose moderately
over July and August, and nominal spending by these
governments on structures in July was below its secondquarter average.
The nominal U.S. international trade deficit remained
about unchanged in June before narrowing in July. Exports, which had been soft over most of the past year,
declined sharply in June but partially rebounded in July.
This pattern was particularly notable in exports of nonaircraft capital goods and consumer goods. Imports also
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declined sharply in June and then declined a little further
in July. Imports of oil and consumer goods fell in June,
while imports of capital goods dropped significantly in
July. The BEA estimated that the change in net exports
was a drag of about ¾ percentage point on real GDP
growth in the second quarter.
Foreign economic growth remained subdued in the second quarter. Growth picked up in Canada as oil production rebounded, but growth slowed sharply in Europe
amid a downturn in manufacturing activity and persistent policy-related uncertainty. Growth also slowed in
China and India. Recent indicators suggested widespread weakness in manufacturing abroad even as services activity appeared to be holding up relatively well.
Foreign inflation rose in the second quarter, pushed up
by earlier increases in oil prices as well as by rising food
prices in some emerging economies. However, data on
foreign core consumer prices showed little sign of underlying inflationary pressures abroad. Late in the intermeeting period, an attack on a key oil facility in Saudi
Arabia disrupted Saudi oil production and caused an initial spike in prices on near-dated oil futures contracts.
Staff Review of the Financial Situation
Financial market developments over the intermeeting
period were driven by an escalation in international trade
tensions, growing concerns about the global economic
growth outlook, and the prospect of more policy accommodation by central banks. Nominal Treasury yields
posted very large declines in August as investors reacted
to the U.S. Administration’s announcement of additional tariffs on Chinese goods, along with the depreciation of the Chinese renminbi through the perceived
threshold of 7 renminbi per U.S. dollar and the associated implications of these actions for the global economic outlook. Treasury yields partially rebounded following better-than-expected incoming economic data in
the United States and abroad, a perceived reduction in
the probability of a no-deal Brexit, and some positive
headlines about trade policy. The market-implied path
of the federal funds rate shifted down on net. Broad
equity price indexes were down as much as 6 percent in
early August but almost fully recovered by the end of the
intermeeting period. Spreads on investment-grade corporate bonds widened modestly, while those on speculative-grade corporate bonds were little changed on net.
Financing conditions for businesses and households
were largely unaffected by the intermeeting turbulence
in financial markets and remained generally supportive
of spending and economic activity.
Measures of expectations of the near- and medium-term
path for the federal funds rate were particularly sensitive
to news about U.S.–China trade tensions, while FOMC
communications had only modest effects on marketbased measures of policy rate expectations. A straight
read of the option-implied probability distribution of the
federal funds rate suggested that the odds investors attached to a 25 basis point reduction in the target range
of the federal funds rate at the September FOMC meeting increased from about 50 percent at the time of the
July FOMC meeting to 90 percent by the end of the intermeeting period. Respondents to the Desk’s Survey of
Primary Dealers and Survey of Market Participants assigned, on average, similarly high odds to a rate decrease
at the September FOMC meeting. In addition, marketimplied expectations for the federal funds rate at yearend and beyond moved down. A straight read of OIS
(overnight index swap) forward rates suggested that investors expected the federal funds rate to decline about
45 basis points by year-end, to a level nearly 10 basis
points lower than was expected at the time of the July
FOMC meeting, and to decrease an additional roughly
45 basis points by the end of 2020.
Nominal Treasury yields decreased, on net, over the intermeeting period, with longer-term yields falling the
most. The spread between 10-year and 3-month Treasury yields became a bit more negative, while the spread
between 10-year and 2-year Treasury yields turned negative for the first time since 2007 and fluctuated around
zero until the September FOMC meeting. Measures of
inflation compensation derived from Treasury InflationProtected Securities declined on net.
Broad stock price indexes decreased slightly, on net,
over the intermeeting period amid heightened volatility.
The escalation of trade tensions between China and the
United States weighed on equity prices, but investors’
expectations that major central banks would shift toward
more accommodative monetary policies provided some
support. Equity prices were also boosted by better-thananticipated corporate earnings and retail-sector data.
Stock prices of firms with high exposure to China underperformed the broader market somewhat, as did
bank stocks amid downward revisions to banks’ earnings
forecasts. Conversely, the stock prices of utilities and
real estate firms increased noticeably, reportedly benefiting from demand by investors reaching for less cyclical
and higher-yielding assets. One-month option-implied
volatility on the S&P 500 index—the VIX—was little
changed, on net, over the intermeeting period and remained at the lower end of its historical distribution after
retracing a sharp increase in early August.
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Despite the volatility in many domestic and global financial markets over the intermeeting period, conditions in
domestic short-term funding markets remained stable
until the Monday before the September FOMC meeting,
when flows associated with a combination of corporate
tax payments and Treasury coupon securities settlements led to significant tightening of conditions, particularly for overnight funding. The EFFR rose to the top
of the target range on September 16 and exceeded it by
5 basis points on September 17, after which funding
pressures eased somewhat following the Desk’s open
market operations. On net, the EFFR averaged
2.14 percent over the current intermeeting period, with
the spread to the IOER rate down a bit relative to the
previous intermeeting period.
Early in the intermeeting period, bond yields in the advanced foreign economies (AFEs) plunged and foreign
equities declined notably following an increase in U.S.–
China trade tensions. Some weakness in foreign economic data, growing concerns about global growth, and
the prospect of more monetary policy accommodation
abroad contributed to further declines in yields. Later in
the period, AFE yields partially rebounded and foreign
equity prices fully recovered on some easing of U.S.–
China trade tensions, as well as perceptions of reduced
political uncertainty in the United Kingdom and Italy.
Financial market reactions were mixed after the European Central Bank (ECB) announced a package of policy
easing measures, including a rate cut on deposits at the
ECB, resumption of its asset purchase program, and
more favorable terms for longer-term lending to banks.
The dollar appreciated against emerging market currencies but was little changed, on balance, against AFE currencies, leaving the broad dollar index slightly higher.
Emerging market sovereign bond spreads widened notably. The Argentine peso depreciated sharply and Argentine sovereign yields soared following the defeat of
the current pro-market president in the primary election
and the subsequent announcement of plans for debt restructuring and the imposition of capital controls.
Financing conditions for nonfinancial businesses remained accommodative. Overall issuance of corporate
bonds was solid in August, driven by resilient investment-grade issuance. While speculative-grade corporate
bond issuance was somewhat subdued in August, it was
comparable to that seen over the same period in 2018.
Growth of commercial and industrial loans at banks
ticked up, driven by faster growth at large domestic
banks. There were no initial public equity offerings by
domestic firms in August amid increased market volatility, but several deals were expected to be completed in
the coming months. On balance, the credit quality of
nonfinancial corporations weakened slightly, with the
volume of nonfinancial corporate bond downgrades
modestly outpacing that of upgrades in recent months.
Credit conditions for both small businesses and municipalities remained accommodative on balance.
In the commercial real estate (CRE) sector, financing
conditions remained generally accommodative. Bank
CRE loan growth slowed moderately since the second
quarter, driven by slower growth in loans secured by
nonfarm nonresidential properties. The volume of
agency and non-agency commercial mortgage-backed
securities issuance was slightly weaker in July and August
than in the same period last year, though industry analysts reportedly anticipated that issuance would soon
pick up in response to recent declines in interest rates.
Financing conditions in the residential mortgage market
eased over the intermeeting period. Residential mortgage rates declined less than long-term Treasury yields,
as the increase in prepayment risk and the rise in implied
interest rate volatility reportedly reduced the demand for
mortgage-backed securities. Home-purchase originations and refinancing originations both rose.
Financing conditions in consumer credit markets remained generally supportive of growth in consumer
spending, although supply conditions continued to be
tight for subprime credit card borrowers. Consumer
credit expanded at a moderate pace in the second quarter
overall, with bank credit data pointing to continued
growth through July and August. In consumer assetbacked securities markets, issuance was solid, and
spreads remained at relatively low levels, though somewhat above their post-crisis averages.
Staff Economic Outlook
The projection for U.S. economic activity prepared by
the staff for the September FOMC meeting was little
changed in the near term; real GDP growth was still
forecast to be slower in the second half of the year than
in the first half, mostly attributable to continued soft
business investment and a slower increase in government spending. The projection for real GDP growth
over the medium term was a bit weaker than the previous forecast, primarily reflecting the effects of a higher
projected path for the foreign exchange value of the dollar and a lower trajectory for economic growth abroad,
which were partially offset by a lower assumed path for
interest rates. Real GDP was forecast to expand at a rate
a little above the staff’s estimate of potential output
Minutes of the Meeting of September 17–18, 2019
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growth in 2019 and 2020 and then slow to a pace slightly
below potential output growth in 2021 and 2022. The
unemployment rate was projected to be roughly flat
through 2022 and to remain below the staff’s estimate of
its longer-run natural rate, which was revised down a little. In addition, the staff revised up its estimate of the
level of trend productivity in recent years after incorporating the BEA’s recent annual revisions to the national
income and product accounts. Both of these supply-side
adjustments led to a somewhat higher projected path for
potential output, implying that estimates of current and
projected resource utilization were less tight than the
staff previously assumed.
The staff’s forecast of total PCE price inflation for this
year was revised down somewhat, reflecting slightly
lower projected paths for consumer food and energy
prices, along with a little lower forecast for core PCE
prices. The core PCE price inflation forecast for this
year was revised down to reflect recent data as well as
downward-revised data for earlier in the year from the
BEA’s annual revision. Both total and core inflation
were projected to move up slightly next year, as the low
readings early this year were expected to be transitory;
nevertheless, both inflation measures were forecast to
continue to run below 2 percent through 2022.
The staff continued to view the uncertainty around its
projections for real GDP growth, the unemployment
rate, and inflation as generally similar to the average of
the past 20 years. Moreover, the staff still judged that
the risks to the forecast for real GDP growth were tilted
to the downside, with a corresponding skew to the upside for the unemployment rate. Important factors in
that assessment were that international trade tensions
and foreign economic developments seemed more likely
to move in directions that could have significant negative effects on the U.S. economy than to resolve more
favorably than assumed. In addition, softness in business investment and manufacturing so far this year was
seen as pointing to the possibility of a more substantial
slowing in economic growth than the staff projected.
The risks to the inflation projection were also viewed as
having a downward skew, in part because of the downside risks to the forecast for economic activity
Participants’ Views on Current Conditions and the
Economic Outlook
In conjunction with this FOMC meeting, members of
the Board of Governors and Federal Reserve Bank presidents submitted their projections of the most likely outcomes for real GDP growth, the unemployment rate,
and inflation for each year from 2019 through 2022 and
over the longer run, based on their individual assessments of the appropriate path for the federal funds rate.
The longer-run projections represented each participant’s assessment of the rate to which each variable
would be expected to converge, over time, under appropriate monetary policy and in the absence of further
shocks to the economy. These projections are described
in the Summary of Economic Projections, which is an
addendum to these minutes.
Participants agreed that the labor market had remained
strong over the intermeeting period and that economic
activity had risen at a moderate rate. Job gains had been
solid, on average, in recent months, and the unemployment rate had remained low. Although household
spending had risen at a strong pace, business fixed investment and exports had weakened. On a 12-month
basis, overall inflation and inflation for items other than
food and energy were running below 2 percent. Marketbased measures of inflation compensation remained
low; survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations were little changed.
Participants generally viewed the baseline economic outlook as positive and indicated that their views of the
most likely outcomes for economic activity and inflation
had changed little since the July meeting. However, for
most participants, that economic outlook was premised
on a somewhat more accommodative path for policy
than in July. Participants generally had become more
concerned about risks associated with trade tensions and
adverse developments in the geopolitical and global economic spheres. In addition, inflation pressures continued to be muted. Many participants expected that real
GDP growth would moderate to around its potential
rate in the second half of the year. Participants agreed
that consumer spending was increasing at a strong pace.
They also expected that, in the period ahead, household
spending would likely remain on a firm footing, supported by strong labor market conditions, rising incomes, and accommodative financial conditions. Several participants indicated that the housing sector was
starting to rebound, stimulated by a significant decline in
mortgage rates. With regard to the contrast between robust consumption growth and weak investment growth,
several participants mentioned that uncertainties in the
business outlook and sustained weak investment could
eventually lead to slower hiring, which, in turn, could
damp the growth of income and consumption.
In their discussion of the business sector, participants
saw trade tensions and concerns about the global out-
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look as the main factors weighing on business investment, exports, and manufacturing production. Participants judged that trade uncertainty and global developments would continue to affect firms’ investment spending, and that this uncertainty was discouraging them
from investing in their businesses. A couple of participants noted that businesses had the capacity to adjust to
ongoing uncertainty concerning trade, and some firms
were reconfiguring supply chains and making logistical
arrangements as part of contingency planning to mitigate
the effects of trade tensions on their businesses.
Participants discussed developments in the manufacturing and the agricultural sectors of the U.S. economy.
Manufacturing production remained lower than at the
beginning of the year, and recent indicators suggested
that conditions were unlikely to improve materially over
the near term. Participants saw the ongoing global slowdown and trade uncertainty as contributing importantly
to these declines. A few participants noted ongoing
challenges in the agricultural sector, including those associated with tariffs, weak export demand, and more intense financial burdens arising from the increase in carryover debt in preceding years. Participants commented
on the potential disruption to global oil production arising from the attack on Saudi Arabia’s facilities.
Participants judged that conditions in the labor market
remained strong, with the unemployment rate near historical lows and continued solid job gains, on average, in
recent months. The labor force participation rate of
prime-age individuals, especially of prime-age women,
moved up in August, continuing its upward trajectory,
and the unemployment rate of African Americans fell to
its lowest rate on record. However, a number of participants noted that, although the labor market was clearly
in a strong position, the preliminary benchmark revision
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicated that payroll
employment gains would likely show less momentum
coming into this year when the revisions are incorporated in published data early next year. A few participants observed that it would be important to be vigilant
in monitoring incoming data for any sign of softening in
labor market conditions. That said, reports from business contacts in many Districts pointed to continued
strong labor demand, with some firms still reporting difficulties finding qualified workers and others broadening
their recruiting to include traditionally marginalized
groups. In some Districts, employers were also expanding training and provision of nonwage benefits, which
could help sustain their expansion of hiring against a
background of a very tight national labor market without
spurring above-trend aggregate wage growth. Some
firms were also reluctant to raise wages because of their
limited pricing power, while others thought the wages
they were offering were in line with the skill sets of the
workers available to fill new positions. Participants generally viewed overall wage growth as broadly consistent
with modest average rates of labor productivity growth
in recent years and as exerting little upward pressure on
inflation. A couple of participants noted that, with inflationary pressures remaining muted and wage growth
moderate even as employment and spending expanded
further, they had again adjusted downward their estimates of the longer-run normal unemployment rate.
In their discussion of inflation developments, participants noted that, despite a recent firming in the incoming data, readings on overall and core PCE inflation had
continued to run below the Committee’s symmetric
2 percent objective. Furthermore, in light of weakness
in the global economy, perceptions of downside risks to
growth, and subdued inflation pressures, some participants continued to view the risks to the outlook for inflation as weighted to the downside. Some participants,
however, saw the recent inflation data as consistent with
their previous assessment that much of the weakness
seen early in the year was transitory. In this connection,
several participants noted that recent monthly readings,
notably for CPI inflation, seemed broadly consistent
with the Committee’s longer-run inflation objective of
2 percent, while the trimmed mean measure of PCE inflation, constructed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, remained at 2 percent in July.
In their discussion of the outlook for inflation, participants generally agreed that, under appropriate policy, inflation would move up to the Committee’s 2 percent objective over the medium term. Participants saw inflation
expectations as reasonably well anchored, but many participants observed that market-based measures of inflation compensation and some survey measures of consumers’ inflation expectations were at historically low
levels. Some of these participants further noted that
longer-term inflation expectations could be somewhat
below levels consistent with the Committee’s 2 percent
inflation objective, or that continued weakness in inflation could prompt expectations to drift lower.
Participants generally judged that downside risks to the
outlook for economic activity had increased somewhat
since their July meeting, particularly those stemming
from trade policy uncertainty and conditions abroad. In
addition, although readings on the labor market and the
overall economy continued to be strong, a clearer picture
Minutes of the Meeting of September 17–18, 2019
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of protracted weakness in investment spending, manufacturing production, and exports had emerged. Participants also noted that there continued to be a significant
probability of a no-deal Brexit, and that geopolitical tensions had increased in Hong Kong and the Middle East.
Several participants commented that, in the wake of this
increase in downside risk, the weakness in business
spending, manufacturing, and exports could give rise to
slower hiring, a development that would likely weigh on
consumption and the overall economic outlook. Several
participants noted that statistical models designed to
gauge the probability of recession, including those based
on information from the yield curve, suggested that the
likelihood of a recession occurring over the medium
term had increased notably in recent months. However,
a couple of these participants stressed the difficulty of
extracting the right signal from these probability models,
especially in the current period of unusually low levels of
term premiums.
With regard to developments in financial markets, participants noted that longer-term U.S. Treasury rates had
been volatile over the intermeeting period but, on net,
had registered a sizable decline. Participants observed
that a key source of downward pressure on Treasury
rates arose from flight-to-safety flows, driven by downside risks to global growth, escalating trade tensions, and
disappointing global data. Low interest rates abroad
were also considered an important influence on U.S.
longer-term rates. Participants expressed a range of
views about the implications of low longer-term Treasury rates. Some participants judged that a prolonged inversion of the yield curve could be a matter of concern.
Participants also noted that equity prices had exhibited
volatility but had been largely flat, on balance, over the
intermeeting period. Several participants cited considerations that led them to be concerned about financial stability, including low risk spreads and a buildup of corporate debt, corporate stock buybacks financed through
low-cost leverage, and the pace of lending in the CRE
market. However, several others pointed to signs that
the financial system remained resilient.
In their consideration of the monetary policy options at
this meeting, most participants believed that a reduction
of 25 basis points in the target range for the federal funds
rate would be appropriate. In discussing the reasons for
such a decision, these participants pointed to considerations related to the economic outlook, risk management,
and the need to center inflation and inflation expectations on the Committee’s longer-run objective of 2 percent.
Participants noted that there had been little change in
their economic outlook since the July meeting and that
incoming data had continued to suggest that the pace of
economic expansion was consistent with the maintenance of strong labor market conditions. However, a
couple of participants pointed out that data revisions announced in recent months implied that the economy had
likely entered the year with somewhat less momentum
than previously thought. In addition, data received since
July had confirmed the weakening in business fixed investment and exports. One risk that the economy faced
was that the softness recorded of late in firms’ capital
formation, manufacturing, and exporting activities
might spread to their hiring decisions, with adverse implications for household income and spending. Participants observed that such an eventuality was not embedded in their baseline outlook; however, a couple of them
indicated that this was partly because they assumed that
an appropriate adjustment to the policy rate path would
help forestall that eventuality. Several also noted that,
because monetary policy actions affected economic activity with a lag, it was appropriate to provide the requisite policy accommodation now to support economic activity over coming quarters.
Participants favoring a modest adjustment to the stance
of monetary policy at this juncture cited other risks to
the economic outlook that further underscored the case
for such a move. As their discussion of risks had highlighted, downside risks had become more pronounced
since July: Trade uncertainty had increased, prospects
for global growth had become more fragile, and various
intermeeting developments had intensified geopolitical
risks. Against this background, risk-management considerations implied that it would be prudent for the
Committee to adopt a somewhat more accommodative
stance of policy. In addition, a number of participants
suggested that a reduction at this meeting in the target
range for the federal funds rate would likely better align
the target range with a variety of indicators of the appropriate policy stance, including those based on estimates
of the neutral interest rate. A few participants observed
that the considerations favoring easing were reinforced
by the proximity of the federal funds rate to the ELB. If
policymakers provided adequate accommodation while
still away from the ELB, this course of action would help
forestall the possibility of a prolonged ELB episode.
Many participants also cited the level of inflation or inflation expectations as justifying a reduction of 25 basis
points in the federal funds rate at this meeting. Inflation
had generally fallen short of the Committee’s objective
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for several years and, notwithstanding some stronger recent monthly readings on inflation, the 12-month rate
was still below 2 percent. Some estimates of trend inflation were also below 2 percent. Several participants additionally stressed that survey measures of longer-term
inflation expectations and market-based measures of inflation compensation were near historical lows and that
these values pointed to the possibility that inflation expectations were below levels consistent with the 2 percent objective or could soon fall below such levels.
Against this backdrop, participants suggested that a policy easing would help underline policymakers’ commitment to the symmetric 2 percent longer-run objective.
With inflation pressures muted and U.S. inflation likely
being weighed down by global disinflationary forces,
policymakers saw little chance of an outsized increase in
inflation in response to additional policy accommodation and argued that such an increase, should it occur,
could be addressed in a straightforward manner using
conventional monetary policy tools.
Several participants favored maintaining the existing target range for the federal funds rate at this meeting.
These participants suggested that the baseline projection
for the economy had changed very little since the Committee’s previous meeting and that the state of the economy and the economic outlook did not justify a shift
away from the current policy stance, which they felt was
already adequately accommodative. They acknowledged
the uncertainties that currently figured importantly in
evaluations of the economic outlook, but they contended that the key uncertainties were unlikely to be resolved soon. Furthermore, as they did not believe that
these uncertainties would derail the expansion, they did
not see further policy accommodation as needed at this
time. Changes in the stance of policy, they believed,
should instead occur only when the macroeconomic
data readily justified those moves. In this connection, a
couple of participants suggested that, if it decided to provide more policy accommodation at the present juncture, the Committee might be taking out too much insurance against possible future shocks, leaving monetary
policy with less scope to boost aggregate demand in the
event that such shocks materialized. A few of the participants favoring an unchanged target range for the federal funds rate also expressed concern that an easing of
monetary policy at this meeting could exacerbate financial imbalances.
A couple of participants indicated their preference for a
50 basis point cut in the federal funds rate at this meeting. These participants suggested that a larger policy
move would help reduce the risk of an economic downturn and would more appropriately recognize important
recent developments, such as slowing job gains, weakening investment, and continued low values of marketbased measures of inflation compensation. In addition,
these participants stressed the need for a policy stance—
possibly one using enhanced forward guidance—that
was sufficiently accommodative to make it unlikely that
the United States would experience a protracted period
of the kind seen abroad in which the economy became
mired in a combination of undesirably low inflation,
weak economic activity, and near-zero policy rates. They
also argued that it was desirable for the Committee to
seek and maintain a level of accommodation sufficient
to deliver inflation at 2 percent on a sustained basis and
that such a policy would be consistent with inflation exceeding 2 percent for a time.
With regard to monetary policy beyond this meeting,
participants agreed that policy was not on a preset course
and would depend on the implications of incoming information for the evolution of the economic outlook. A
few participants judged that the expectations regarding
the path of the federal funds rate implied by prices in
financial markets were currently suggesting greater provision of accommodation at coming meetings than they
saw as appropriate and that it might become necessary
for the Committee to seek a better alignment of market
expectations regarding the policy rate path with policymakers’ own expectations for that path. Several participants suggested that the Committee’s postmeeting statement should provide more clarity about when the recalibration of the level of the policy rate in response to
trade uncertainty would likely come to an end.
Participants’ Discussion of Recent Money Market
Developments
The manager pro tem provided a summary of the most
recent developments in money markets. Open market
operations conducted on the previous day had helped to
ease strains in money markets, but the EFFR had nonetheless printed 5 basis points above the top of the target
range. With significant pressures still evident in repo
markets and the federal funds market, and in accordance
with the FOMC’s directive to maintain the federal funds
rate within the target range, the Desk conducted another
repo operation on the morning of the second day of the
meeting. The staff presented a proposal to lower the
IOER rate and the overnight reverse repurchase agreement rate by 5 basis points, relative to the target range
for the federal funds rate, in order to foster trading of
federal funds within the target range.
Minutes of the Meeting of September 17–18, 2019
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Participants agreed that developments in money markets
over recent days implied that the Committee should
soon discuss the appropriate level of reserve balances
sufficient to support efficient and effective implementation of monetary policy in the context of the ample-reserves regime that the Committee had chosen. A few
participants noted the possibility of resuming trend
growth of the balance sheet to help stabilize the level of
reserves in the banking system. Participants agreed that
any Committee decision regarding the trend pace of balance sheet expansion necessary to maintain a level of reserve balances appropriate to facilitate policy implementation should be clearly distinguished from past largescale asset purchase programs that were aimed at altering
the size and composition of the Federal Reserve’s asset
holdings in order to provide monetary policy accommodation and ease overall financial conditions. Several participants suggested that such a discussion could benefit
from also considering the merits of introducing a standing repurchase agreement facility as part of the framework for implementing monetary policy.
Committee Policy Action
In their discussion of monetary policy for this meeting,
members noted that information received since the July
meeting indicated that the labor market remained strong
and that economic activity had been rising at a moderate
rate. Job gains had been solid, on average, in recent
months, and the unemployment rate had remained low.
Household spending had been rising at a strong pace.
However, business fixed investment and exports had
weakened, and this outcome suggested that risks and uncertainty associated with international trade developments and with ongoing weakness in global economic
growth were continuing to weigh on the domestic economy. On a 12-month basis, both the overall inflation
rate and inflation for items other than food and energy
were running below 2 percent. Market-based measures
of inflation compensation remained low. Survey-based
measures of longer-term inflation expectations were little changed. In light of these developments, most members agreed to lower the target range for the federal
funds rate to 1¾ to 2 percent at this meeting.
With this adjustment to policy, those members who supported the policy action sought to make the overall
stance of monetary policy most consistent with helping
to offset the effects on aggregate demand of weak global
growth and trade policy uncertainty, insure against further downside risks arising from those sources and from
geopolitical developments, and promote a more rapid
return of inflation to the Committee’s symmetric 2 percent objective than would otherwise occur. A couple of
these members observed that, because monetary policy
actions affected aggregate spending with a lag, the present meeting was an appropriate occasion for providing
accommodation that would support economic activity in
the period ahead. Two members preferred to maintain
the current target range for the federal funds rate at this
meeting. These members noted that economic data received over the intermeeting period had been largely
positive and that they anticipated, under an unchanged
policy stance, continued strong labor markets and solid
growth in activity, with inflation gradually moving up to
the Committee’s 2 percent objective. These members
also suggested that providing further accommodation
during a period of high economic activity and elevated
asset prices could have adverse consequences for financial stability. One member preferred a reduction in the
target range of 50 basis points in the federal funds rate
at this meeting. This member suggested that such a
larger rate adjustment would be more consistent with the
achievement of the Committee’s objectives over time
and, in particular, with helping preclude the possibility
of a protracted period in which inflation and employment were below the Committee’s objectives.
Members agreed that, in determining the timing and size
of future adjustments to the target range for the federal
funds rate, the Committee would assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its maximumemployment objective and its symmetric 2 percent inflation objective. They also agreed that those assessments
would take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators
of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and
readings on financial and international developments.
With regard to the postmeeting statement, members
agreed to update the language of the Committee’s description of incoming data to acknowledge the weakening in investment spending and in U.S. exports, as well
as the recent strong rate of increase of household spending.
At the conclusion of the discussion, the Committee
voted to authorize and direct the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, until instructed otherwise, to execute
transactions in the SOMA in accordance with the following domestic policy directive, to be released at
2:00 p.m.:
“Effective September 19, 2019, the Federal
Open Market Committee directs the Desk to
undertake open market operations as necessary
to maintain the federal funds rate in a target
range of 1¾ to 2 percent, including overnight
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reverse repurchase operations (and reverse repurchase operations with maturities of more
than one day when necessary to accommodate
weekend, holiday, or similar trading conventions) at an offering rate of 1.70 percent, in
amounts limited only by the value of Treasury
securities held outright in the System Open
Market Account that are available for such operations and by a per-counterparty limit of
$30 billion per day.
The Committee directs the Desk to continue
rolling over at auction all principal payments
from the Federal Reserve’s holdings of Treasury
securities and to continue reinvesting all principal payments from the Federal Reserve’s holdings of agency debt and agency mortgagebacked securities received during each calendar
month. Principal payments from agency debt
and agency mortgage-backed securities up to
$20 billion per month will continue to be reinvested in Treasury securities to roughly match
the maturity composition of Treasury securities
outstanding; principal payments in excess of
$20 billion per month will continue to be reinvested in agency mortgage-backed securities.
Small deviations from these amounts for operational reasons are acceptable.
The Committee also directs the Desk to engage
in dollar roll and coupon swap transactions as
necessary to facilitate settlement of the Federal
Reserve’s agency mortgage-backed securities
transactions.”
The vote also encompassed approval of the statement
below to be released at 2:00 p.m.:
“Information received since the Federal Open
Market Committee met in July indicates that the
labor market remains strong and that economic
activity has been rising at a moderate rate. Job
gains have been solid, on average, in recent
months, and the unemployment rate has remained low. Although household spending has
been rising at a strong pace, business fixed investment and exports have weakened. On a
12-month basis, overall inflation and inflation
for items other than food and energy are running below 2 percent. Market-based measures
of inflation compensation remain low; surveybased measures of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed.
Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment
and price stability. In light of the implications
of global developments for the economic outlook as well as muted inflation pressures, the
Committee decided to lower the target range for
the federal funds rate to 1¾ to 2 percent. This
action supports the Committee’s view that sustained expansion of economic activity, strong
labor market conditions, and inflation near the
Committee’s symmetric 2 percent objective are
the most likely outcomes, but uncertainties
about this outlook remain. As the Committee
contemplates the future path of the target range
for the federal funds rate, it will continue to
monitor the implications of incoming information for the economic outlook and will act as
appropriate to sustain the expansion, with a
strong labor market and inflation near its symmetric 2 percent objective.
In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal
funds rate, the Committee will assess realized
and expected economic conditions relative to its
maximum employment objective and its symmetric 2 percent inflation objective. This assessment will take into account a wide range of
information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures
and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments.”
Voting for this action: Jerome H. Powell, John C.
Williams, Michelle W. Bowman, Lael Brainard, Richard
H. Clarida, Charles L. Evans, and Randal K. Quarles.
Voting against this action: James Bullard, Esther L.
George, and Eric Rosengren.
President Bullard dissented because he believed that
lowering the target range for the federal funds rate by
50 basis points at this time would provide insurance
against further declines in expected inflation and a slowing economy subject to elevated downside risks. In addition, a 50 basis point cut at this time would help promote a more rapid return of inflation and inflation expectations to target. President George dissented because she believed that an unchanged setting of policy
was appropriate based on incoming data and the outlook
for economic activity over the medium term. Recognizing the risks to the outlook from the effects of trade policy and weaker global activity, President George would
be prepared to adjust policy should incoming data point
Minutes of the Meeting of September 17–18, 2019
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to a materially weaker outlook for the economy. President Rosengren dissented because he judged that monetary policy was already accommodative. In his view,
additional accommodation was not needed for an economy in which labor markets are already tight and could
pose risks of further inflating the prices of risky assets
and encouraging households and firms to take on too
much leverage.
Consistent with the Committee’s decision to lower the
target range for the federal funds rate to 1¾ to 2 percent,
the Board of Governors voted unanimously to lower the
interest rate paid on required and excess reserve balances
to 1.80 percent and voted unanimously to approve a
¼ percentage point decrease in the primary credit rate to
2.50 percent, effective September 19, 2019.
It was agreed that the next meeting of the Committee
would be held on Tuesday–Wednesday, October 29–
30, 2019. The meeting adjourned at 10:40 a.m. on September 18, 2019.
Notation Vote
By notation vote completed on August 20, 2019, the
Committee unanimously approved the minutes of the
Committee meeting held on July 30–31, 2019.
_______________________
James A. Clouse
Secretary
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Summary of Economic Projections
In conjunction with the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting held on September 17–18, 2019,
meeting participants submitted their projections of the
most likely outcomes for real gross domestic product
(GDP) growth, the unemployment rate, and inflation for
each year from 2019 to 2022 and over the longer run.
Each participant’s projections were based on information available at the time of the meeting, together with
his or her assessment of appropriate monetary policy—
including a path for the federal funds rate and its longerrun value—and assumptions about other factors likely
to affect economic outcomes. The longer-run projections represent each participant’s assessment of the
value to which each variable would be expected to converge, over time, under appropriate monetary policy and
in the absence of further shocks to the economy. 1 “Appropriate monetary policy” is defined as the future path
of policy that each participant deems most likely to foster outcomes for economic activity and inflation that
best satisfy his or her individual interpretation of the
statutory mandate to promote maximum employment
and price stability.
Participants who submitted longer-run projections expected that, under appropriate monetary policy, growth
of real GDP in 2019 would run slightly or somewhat
above their individual estimates of its longer-run rate.
Participants expected real GDP growth to edge down
over the projection horizon, with all participants projecting growth in 2022 to be at or modestly below their estimates of its longer-run rate. Almost all participants
who submitted longer-run projections expected that the
unemployment rate through 2022 would run below their
estimates of its longer-run level. All participants continued to project that total inflation, as measured by the
four-quarter percent change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE), would increase
from 2019 to 2020, and many expected another slight
increase in 2021. The vast majority of participants expected that inflation would be at or slightly above the
Committee’s 2 percent objective in 2021 and 2022. The
median of participants’ projections for core PCE price
inflation increased over the projection period, rising to
2.0 percent in 2021. Table 1 and figure 1 provide summary statistics for the projections. Compared with the
Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) from June
1 One participant did not submit longer-run projections for
real GDP growth, the unemployment rate, or the federal funds
rate.
2019, some participants slightly revised down their estimates of the longer-run unemployment rate; the median
estimate of the longer-run unemployment rate was unchanged. Participants’ projections for total and core inflation were generally little changed compared with their
projections in June.
As shown in figure 2, participants expected that the evolution of the economy, relative to their objectives of
maximum employment and 2 percent inflation, would
likely warrant a federal funds rate target by the end of
this year at or below the target range that the Committee
adopted at its July 30–31 meeting. Compared with the
June SEP submissions, the median projection for the
federal funds rate was 50 basis points lower for the end
of 2019 and 25 basis points lower for the end of 2020
and 2021. In the September SEP submissions, the median for the federal funds rate for 2020 was equal to the
median for 2019. The median of participants’ assessments of the appropriate level for the federal funds rate
in 2022 was slightly below the median of participants’
estimates of its longer-run level. Some participants revised lower their assessments of the longer-run federal
funds rate, but the median assessment of the longer-run
federal funds rate was unchanged.
Most participants regarded the uncertainties around
their forecasts for GDP growth, total inflation, and core
inflation as broadly similar to the average over the past
20 years. Just over half of the participants viewed the
level of uncertainty around their unemployment rate
projections as being similar to the average of the past
20 years, while the rest of the participants viewed uncertainty as higher. Most participants assessed the risks to
their outlooks for real GDP growth as weighted to the
downside and for the unemployment rate as weighted to
the upside. Most participants judged the risks to the inflation outlook as broadly balanced; some participants
viewed the risks to inflation as weighted to the downside,
and no participant assessed risks to inflation as weighted
to the upside. Participants’ assessments of the uncertainties and risks around their forecasts for real GDP
growth and the unemployment rate were little changed
overall relative to June. The uncertainties around their
projections for headline and core inflation were little
1.5
1.5
1.8
1.8
PCE inflation
June projection
Core PCE inflation4
June projection
1.9
2.1
1.9
1.9
1.9
1.9
3.7
3.7
2.0
2.0
2.1
2.4
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
3.8
3.8
1.9
1.8
2.4
2.0
2.0
3.9
1.8
2.5
2.5
2.0
2.0
4.2
4.2
1.9
1.9
1.6–2.1
1.9–2.4
1.7–1.8
1.7–1.8
1.5–1.6
1.5–1.6
3.6–3.7
3.6–3.7
2.1–2.3
2.0–2.2
2019
1.6–2.1
1.9–2.4
1.9–2.0
1.9–2.0
1.8–2.0
1.9–2.0
3.6–3.8
3.5–3.9
1.8–2.1
1.8–2.2
2020
1.6–2.4
1.9–2.6
2.0
2.0–2.1
2.0
2.0–2.1
3.6–3.9
3.6–4.0
1.8–2.0
1.8–2.0
2021
1.9–2.6
2.0–2.2
2.0–2.2
3.7–4.0
1.7–2.0
2022
Central Tendency2
2.5–2.8
2.5–3.0
2.0
2.0
4.0–4.3
4.0–4.4
1.8–2.0
1.8–2.0
Longer
run
1.6–2.1
1.9–2.6
1.6–1.8
1.4–1.8
1.4–1.7
1.4–1.7
3.5–3.8
3.5–3.8
2.1–2.4
2.0–2.4
2019
1.6–2.4
1.9–3.1
1.7–2.1
1.8–2.1
1.7–2.1
1.8–2.1
3.3–4.0
3.3–4.0
1.7–2.3
1.5–2.3
2020
1.6–2.6
1.9–3.1
1.8–2.3
1.8–2.2
1.8–2.3
1.9–2.2
3.3–4.1
3.3–4.2
1.7–2.1
1.5–2.1
2021
Range3
1.6–2.9
1.8–2.2
1.8–2.2
3.3–4.2
1.6–2.1
2022
2.0–3.3
2.4–3.3
2.0
2.0
3.6–4.5
3.6–4.5
1.7–2.1
1.7–2.1
Longer
run
Note: Projections of change in real gross domestic product (GDP) and projections for both measures of inflation are percent changes from the fourth
quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter of the year indicated. PCE inflation and core PCE inflation are the percentage rates of change in, respectively,
the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) and the price index for PCE excluding food and energy. Projections for the unemployment rate
are for the average civilian unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of the year indicated. Each participant’s projections are based on his or her assessment of
appropriate monetary policy. Longer-run projections represent each participant’s assessment of the rate to which each variable would be expected to converge
under appropriate monetary policy and in the absence of further shocks to the economy. The projections for the federal funds rate are the value of the midpoint
of the projected appropriate target range for the federal funds rate or the projected appropriate target level for the federal funds rate at the end of the specified
calendar year or over the longer run. The June projections were made in conjunction with the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on June 18-19,
2019. One participant did not submit longer-run projections for the change in real GDP, the unemployment rate, or the federal funds rate in conjunction with
the June 18-19, 2019, meeting, and one participant did not submit such projections in conjunction with the September 17-18, 2019, meeting.
1. For each period, the median is the middle projection when the projections are arranged from lowest to highest. When the number of projections is even,
the median is the average of the two middle projections.
2. The central tendency excludes the three highest and three lowest projections for each variable in each year.
3. The range for a variable in a given year includes all participants’ projections, from lowest to highest, for that variable in that year.
4. Longer-run projections for core PCE inflation are not collected.
Federal funds rate
June projection
1.9
2.4
3.7
3.6
Unemployment rate
June projection
Memo: Projected
appropriate policy path
Median1
2019 2020 2021 2022 Longer
run
2.2
2.1
Variable
Change in real GDP
June projection
Percent
Table 1. Economic projections of Federal Reserve Board members and Federal Reserve Bank presidents,
under their individual assumptions of projected appropriate monetary policy, September 2019
Page 2
Federal Open Market Committee
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Summary of Economic Projections of the Meeting of September 17–18, 2019
Page 3
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Figure 1. Medians, central tendencies, and ranges of economic projections, 2019-22 and over the longer run
Percent
Change in real GDP
Median of projections
Central tendency of projections
Range of projections
3
Actual
2
1
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
Longer
run
Percent
Unemployment rate
7
6
5
4
3
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
Longer
run
Percent
PCE inflation
3
2
1
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
Longer
run
Percent
Core PCE inflation
3
2
1
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
Longer
run
Note: Definitions of variables and other explanations are in the notes to table 1. The data for the actual values
of the variables are annual.
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Federal Open Market Committee
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Figure 2. FOMC participants’ assessments of appropriate monetary policy: Midpoint of target range
or target level for the federal funds rate
Percent
5.0
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
2019
2020
2021
2022
Longer run
Note: Each shaded circle indicates the value (rounded to the nearest 1/8 percentage point) of an individual
participant’s judgment of the midpoint of the appropriate target range for the federal funds rate or the appropriate
target level for the federal funds rate at the end of the specified calendar year or over the longer run. One participant
did not submit longer-run projections for the federal funds rate.
Summary of Economic Projections of the Meeting of September 17–18, 2019
Page 5
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
changed as well, but more participants saw the inflation
risks as broadly balanced than in June.
The Outlook for Real GDP Growth and Unemployment
As shown in table 1, the median of participants’ projections for the growth rate of real GDP in 2019, conditional on their individual assessments of appropriate
monetary policy, was 2.2 percent, a bit above the median
estimate of its longer-run rate of 1.9 percent. Almost all
participants continued to expect GDP growth to slow
over the projection period, with the median projection
at 2.0 percent in 2020, 1.9 percent in 2021, and 1.8 percent in 2022. Relative to the June SEP, the medians of
the projections for real GDP growth in 2019, 2020,
2021, and the longer run were unchanged or revised
slightly higher.
The median of projections for the unemployment rate in
the fourth quarter of 2019 was 3.7 percent, ½ percentage
point below the median assessment of its longer-run
level of 4.2 percent. The medians of projections for
2020, 2021, and 2022 were 3.7 percent, 3.8 percent, and
3.9 percent, respectively. The median projected unemployment rate for 2019 was slightly higher than in the
June SEP, while the median projected unemployment
rates for 2020 and 2021 were unchanged relative to the
June SEP. A vast majority of participants who submitted longer-run projections expected that the unemployment rate in 2022 would be below their estimates of its
longer-run level, with some participants projecting a gap
of ½ percentage point or more.
Figures 3.A and 3.B show the distributions of participants’ projections for real GDP growth and the unemployment rate, respectively, from 2019 to 2022 and in
the longer run. The distribution of individual projections for real GDP growth for 2019 shifted up somewhat relative to that in the June SEP. The distributions
of individual projections of real GDP growth for 2020
and 2021 and for the longer run were little changed overall. The distributions of individual projections for the
unemployment rate for 2019 to 2021 and for the longer
run were also little changed overall relative to those in
June.
The Outlook for Inflation
As shown in table 1, the median of projections for total
PCE price inflation was 1.5 percent in 2019, 1.9 percent
in 2020, and 2.0 percent in 2021; these medians were unchanged from June. For 2022, the median projection for
total PCE was 2.0 percent. The medians of projections
for core PCE price inflation were 1.8 percent for 2019
and 1.9 percent for 2020. The median projections for
core inflation for 2021 and 2022 were 2.0 percent. These
medians were also unchanged from June for each year
included in the June SEP.
Figures 3.C and 3.D provide information on the distributions of participants’ views about the outlook for inflation. The distributions of projections for total and
core PCE price inflation in 2019, 2020, and 2021 were
little changed overall relative to those in June. For 2022,
all participants projected total and core inflation between
1.8 and 2.2 percent.
Appropriate Monetary Policy
Figure 3.E shows distributions of participants’ judgments regarding the appropriate target—or midpoint of
the target range—for the federal funds rate at the end of
each year from 2019 to 2022 and over the longer run.
Compared with the June projections, the range of projections for 2019, 2020, and 2021 shifted toward lower
values and narrowed somewhat. The vast majority of
participants viewed the appropriate levels of the federal
funds rate at the end of 2019, 2020, and 2021 as lower
than those that they deemed appropriate in June. All
participants lowered their projections for the appropriate level of the federal funds rate, relative to June, at
some point in the projection period, and none raised
their projections for the federal funds rate for any year.
Compared with the projections prepared for the June
SEP, the median federal funds rate was 50 basis points
lower in 2019 and 25 basis points lower in 2020 and
2021. Muted inflation pressures, slower global growth,
and weak business fixed investment were cited as reasons for downward revisions to the appropriate path for
the federal funds rate, as were trade tensions and riskmanagement considerations.
The median federal funds rate projection for the end of
2019 was 1.88 percent. Seven participants assessed that
the most likely appropriate federal funds rate at the end
of 2019 was 1.63 percent, while five assessed that the
most likely appropriate rate at year-end was 2.13 percent.
The median for 2020 was 1.88 percent, equal to the median for 2019. For subsequent years, the medians of the
projections were 2.13 percent at the end of 2021 and
2.38 percent at the end of 2022. Some participants revised lower their estimates of the longer-run level of the
federal funds rate, while a majority of participants’ estimates were unchanged. The median estimate of the
longer-run federal funds rate was 2.50 percent, unchanged from the median estimate in June.
Uncertainty and Risks
In assessing the appropriate path of the federal funds
rate, FOMC participants take account of the range of
Page 6
Federal Open Market Committee
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Figure 3.A. Distribution of participants’ projections for the change in real GDP, 2019-22 and over the longer run
Number of participants
2019
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
September projections
June projections
1.4−
1.5
1.6−
1.7
1.8−
1.9
2.0−
2.1
2.2−
2.3
2.4−
2.5
Percent range
Number of participants
2020
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.4−
1.5
1.6−
1.7
1.8−
1.9
2.0−
2.1
2.2−
2.3
2.4−
2.5
Percent range
Number of participants
2021
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.4−
1.5
1.6−
1.7
1.8−
1.9
2.0−
2.1
2.2−
2.3
2.4−
2.5
Percent range
Number of participants
2022
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.4−
1.5
1.6−
1.7
1.8−
1.9
2.0−
2.1
2.2−
2.3
2.4−
2.5
Percent range
Number of participants
Longer run
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.4−
1.5
1.6−
1.7
1.8−
1.9
2.0−
2.1
2.2−
2.3
Percent range
Note: Definitions of variables and other explanations are in the notes to table 1.
2.4−
2.5
Summary of Economic Projections of the Meeting of September 17–18, 2019
Page 7
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Figure 3.B. Distribution of participants’ projections for the unemployment rate, 2019-22 and over the longer run
Number of participants
2019
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
September projections
June projections
3.2−
3.3
3.4−
3.5
3.6−
3.7
3.8−
3.9
4.0−
4.1
4.2−
4.3
4.4−
4.5
4.6−
4.7
Percent range
Number of participants
2020
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
3.2−
3.3
3.4−
3.5
3.6−
3.7
3.8−
3.9
4.0−
4.1
4.2−
4.3
4.4−
4.5
4.6−
4.7
Percent range
Number of participants
2021
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
3.2−
3.3
3.4−
3.5
3.6−
3.7
3.8−
3.9
4.0−
4.1
4.2−
4.3
4.4−
4.5
4.6−
4.7
Percent range
Number of participants
2022
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
3.2−
3.3
3.4−
3.5
3.6−
3.7
3.8−
3.9
4.0−
4.1
4.2−
4.3
4.4−
4.5
4.6−
4.7
Percent range
Number of participants
Longer run
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
3.2−
3.3
3.4−
3.5
3.6−
3.7
3.8−
3.9
4.0−
4.1
4.2−
4.3
Percent range
Note: Definitions of variables and other explanations are in the notes to table 1.
4.4−
4.5
4.6−
4.7
Page 8
Federal Open Market Committee
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Figure 3.C. Distribution of participants’ projections for PCE inflation, 2019-22 and over the longer run
Number of participants
2019
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
September projections
June projections
1.3−
1.4
1.5−
1.6
1.7−
1.8
1.9−
2.0
2.1−
2.2
2.3−
2.4
Percent range
Number of participants
2020
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.3−
1.4
1.5−
1.6
1.7−
1.8
1.9−
2.0
2.1−
2.2
2.3−
2.4
Percent range
Number of participants
2021
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.3−
1.4
1.5−
1.6
1.7−
1.8
1.9−
2.0
2.1−
2.2
2.3−
2.4
Percent range
Number of participants
2022
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.3−
1.4
1.5−
1.6
1.7−
1.8
1.9−
2.0
2.1−
2.2
2.3−
2.4
Percent range
Number of participants
Longer run
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.3−
1.4
1.5−
1.6
1.7−
1.8
1.9−
2.0
2.1−
2.2
Percent range
Note: Definitions of variables and other explanations are in the notes to table 1.
2.3−
2.4
Summary of Economic Projections of the Meeting of September 17–18, 2019
Page 9
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Figure 3.D. Distribution of participants’ projections for core PCE inflation, 2019-22
Number of participants
2019
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
September projections
June projections
1.3−
1.4
1.5−
1.6
1.7−
1.8
1.9−
2.0
2.1−
2.2
2.3−
2.4
Percent range
Number of participants
2020
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.3−
1.4
1.5−
1.6
1.7−
1.8
1.9−
2.0
2.1−
2.2
2.3−
2.4
Percent range
Number of participants
2021
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.3−
1.4
1.5−
1.6
1.7−
1.8
1.9−
2.0
2.1−
2.2
2.3−
2.4
Percent range
Number of participants
2022
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.3−
1.4
1.5−
1.6
1.7−
1.8
1.9−
2.0
2.1−
2.2
Percent range
Note: Definitions of variables and other explanations are in the notes to table 1.
2.3−
2.4
Page 10
Federal Open Market Committee
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Figure 3.E. Distribution of participants’ judgments of the midpoint of the appropriate target range for the
federal funds rate or the appropriate target level for the federal funds rate, 2019-22 and over the longer run
Number of participants
2019
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
September projections
June projections
1.38−
1.62
1.63−
1.87
1.88−
2.12
2.13−
2.37
2.38−
2.62
2.63−
2.87
2.88−
3.12
3.13−
3.37
3.38−
3.62
Percent range
Number of participants
2020
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.38−
1.62
1.63−
1.87
1.88−
2.12
2.13−
2.37
2.38−
2.62
2.63−
2.87
2.88−
3.12
3.13−
3.37
3.38−
3.62
Percent range
Number of participants
2021
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.38−
1.62
1.63−
1.87
1.88−
2.12
2.13−
2.37
2.38−
2.62
2.63−
2.87
2.88−
3.12
3.13−
3.37
3.38−
3.62
Percent range
Number of participants
2022
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.38−
1.62
1.63−
1.87
1.88−
2.12
2.13−
2.37
2.38−
2.62
2.63−
2.87
2.88−
3.12
3.13−
3.37
3.38−
3.62
Percent range
Number of participants
Longer run
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1.38−
1.62
1.63−
1.87
1.88−
2.12
2.13−
2.37
2.38−
2.62
2.63−
2.87
2.88−
3.12
Percent range
Note: Definitions of variables and other explanations are in the notes to table 1.
3.13−
3.37
3.38−
3.62
Summary of Economic Projections of the Meeting of September 17–18, 2019
Page 11
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
possible economic outcomes, the likelihood of those
outcomes, and the potential benefits and costs should
they occur. As a reference, table 2 provides measures of
forecast uncertainty—based on the forecast errors of
various private and government forecasts over the past
20 years—for real GDP growth, the unemployment rate,
and total PCE price inflation. Those measures are represented graphically in the “fan charts” shown in the top
panels of figures 4.A, 4.B, and 4.C. The fan charts display the SEP medians for the three variables surrounded
by symmetric confidence intervals derived from the
forecast errors reported in table 2. If the degree of uncertainty attending these projections is similar to the typical magnitude of past forecast errors and the risks
around the projections are broadly balanced, then future
outcomes of these variables would have about a 70 percent probability of being within these confidence intervals. For all three variables, this measure of uncertainty
is substantial and generally increases as the forecast horizon lengthens.
Participants’ assessments of the level of uncertainty surrounding their individual economic projections are
shown in the bottom-left panels of figures 4.A, 4.B, and
4.C. Most participants continued to view the uncertainties around their forecasts for GDP growth, total inflation, and core inflation as broadly similar to the average
over the past 20 years. Just over half of the participants
viewed the level of uncertainty around their unemployment rate projections as being similar to the average of
the past 20 years, while the rest of the participants
viewed uncertainty as higher. 2
Because the fan charts are constructed to be symmetric
around the median projections, they do not reflect any
asymmetries in the balance of risks that participants may
see in their economic projections. Participants’ assessments of the balance of risks to their current economic
projections are shown in the bottom-right panels of figures 4.A, 4.B, and 4.C. Most participants continued to
view the risks to their outlooks for real GDP growth as
weighted to the downside and for the unemployment
rate as weighted to the upside. Most participants—four
more than in the June SEP—judged the risks to the inflation outlook as broadly balanced; some participants
viewed the risks to inflation as weighted to the downside,
and no participants assessed risks to inflation as
weighted to the upside.
At the end of this summary, the box “Forecast Uncertainty”
discusses the sources and interpretation of uncertainty surrounding the economic forecasts and explains the approach
2
Table 2. Average historical projection error ranges
Percentage points
2019
2020
2021
2022
Change in real GDP1 . . . . . . ±1.2
Variable
±1.8
±1.9
±2.0
±0.3
±1.1
±1.6
±2.0
±0.8
±1.0
±1.1
±1.0
. . . ±0.5
±1.7
±2.2
±2.7
Unemployment
rate1
Total consumer
prices2
Short-term interest
......
....
rates3
NOTE: Error ranges shown are measured as plus or minus the
root mean squared error of projections for 1999 through 2018 that
were released in the fall by various private and government forecasters.
As described in the box “Forecast Uncertainty,” under certain assumptions, there is about a 70 percent probability that actual outcomes for
real GDP, unemployment, consumer prices, and the federal funds rate
will be in ranges implied by the average size of projection errors made
in the past. For more information, see David Reifschneider and Peter
Tulip (2017), “Gauging the Uncertainty of the Economic Outlook Using Historical Forecasting Errors: The Federal Reserve’s Approach,”
Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-020 (Washington:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, February),
https://dx. doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2017.020.
1. Definitions of variables are in the general note to table 1.
2. Measure is the overall consumer price index, the price measure
that has been most widely used in government and private economic
forecasts. Projections are percent changes on a fourth quarter to
fourth quarter basis.
3. For Federal Reserve staff forecasts, measure is the federal funds
rate. For other forecasts, measure is the rate on 3-month Treasury
bills. Projection errors are calculated using average levels, in percent,
in the fourth quarter.
In discussing the uncertainty and risks surrounding their
economic projections, several participants mentioned
trade developments, concerns about foreign economic
growth, and weaker business fixed investment as sources
of uncertainty or downside risk to the U.S. economic
growth outlook. For the inflation outlook, the possibility that inflation expectations could be drifting below
levels consistent with the FOMC’s 2 percent inflation
objective and the potential for weaker domestic demand
to put downward pressure on inflation were viewed as
downside risks. A few participants noted the possibility
that higher tariffs could lead to aggregate price pressure
as a source of upside risk to inflation. A number of participants mentioned that their assessments of risks remained roughly balanced, in part because the downward
revisions to their appropriate path for the federal funds
rate were offsetting factors that would otherwise contribute to asymmetric risks.
Participants’ assessments of the appropriate future path
of the federal funds rate are also subject to considerable
uncertainty. Because the Committee adjusts the federal
used to assess the uncertainty and risks attending the participants’ projections.
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Federal Open Market Committee
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Figure 4.A. Uncertainty and risks in projections of GDP growth
Median projection and confidence interval based on historical forecast errors
Percent
Change in real GDP
Median of projections
70% confidence interval
4
3
Actual
2
1
0
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
FOMC participants’ assessments of uncertainty and risks around their economic projections
Number of participants
Uncertainty about GDP growth
September projections
June projections
Lower
Broadly
similar
Number of participants
Risks to GDP growth
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
Higher
September projections
June projections
Weighted to
downside
Broadly
balanced
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
Weighted to
upside
Note: The blue and red lines in the top panel show actual values and median projected values, respectively, of the
percent change in real gross domestic product (GDP) from the fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth
quarter of the year indicated. The confidence interval around the median projected values is assumed to be symmetric
and is based on root mean squared errors of various private and government forecasts made over the previous 20 years;
more information about these data is available in table 2. Because current conditions may differ from those that
prevailed, on average, over the previous 20 years, the width and shape of the confidence interval estimated on the
basis of the historical forecast errors may not reflect FOMC participants’ current assessments of the uncertainty and
risks around their projections; these current assessments are summarized in the lower panels. Generally speaking,
participants who judge the uncertainty about their projections as “broadly similar” to the average levels of the past 20
years would view the width of the confidence interval shown in the historical fan chart as largely consistent with their
assessments of the uncertainty about their projections. Likewise, participants who judge the risks to their projections
as “broadly balanced” would view the confidence interval around their projections as approximately symmetric. For
definitions of uncertainty and risks in economic projections, see the box “Forecast Uncertainty.”
Summary of Economic Projections of the Meeting of September 17–18, 2019
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Figure 4.B. Uncertainty and risks in projections of the unemployment rate
Median projection and confidence interval based on historical forecast errors
Percent
Unemployment rate
Median of projections
70% confidence interval
10
9
8
7
Actual
6
5
4
3
2
1
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
FOMC participants’ assessments of uncertainty and risks around their economic projections
Number of participants
Uncertainty about the unemployment rate
September projections
June projections
Lower
Broadly
similar
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
Higher
Number of participants
Risks to the unemployment rate
September projections
June projections
Weighted to
downside
Broadly
balanced
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
Weighted to
upside
Note: The blue and red lines in the top panel show actual values and median projected values, respectively, of the
average civilian unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of the year indicated. The confidence interval around the
median projected values is assumed to be symmetric and is based on root mean squared errors of various private and
government forecasts made over the previous 20 years; more information about these data is available in table 2.
Because current conditions may differ from those that prevailed, on average, over the previous 20 years, the width
and shape of the confidence interval estimated on the basis of the historical forecast errors may not reflect FOMC
participants’ current assessments of the uncertainty and risks around their projections; these current assessments are
summarized in the lower panels. Generally speaking, participants who judge the uncertainty about their projections as
“broadly similar” to the average levels of the past 20 years would view the width of the confidence interval shown in the
historical fan chart as largely consistent with their assessments of the uncertainty about their projections. Likewise,
participants who judge the risks to their projections as “broadly balanced” would view the confidence interval around
their projections as approximately symmetric. For definitions of uncertainty and risks in economic projections, see the
box “Forecast Uncertainty.”
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Federal Open Market Committee
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Figure 4.C. Uncertainty and risks in projections of PCE inflation
Median projection and confidence interval based on historical forecast errors
Percent
PCE inflation
Median of projections
70% confidence interval
3
2
1
Actual
0
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
FOMC participants’ assessments of uncertainty and risks around their economic projections
Number of participants
Uncertainty about PCE inflation
September projections
June projections
Lower
Broadly
similar
Number of participants
Risks to PCE inflation
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
Higher
September projections
June projections
Weighted to
downside
Broadly
balanced
Number of participants
Uncertainty about core PCE inflation
Broadly
similar
Weighted to
upside
Number of participants
Risks to core PCE inflation
September projections
June projections
Lower
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
Higher
September projections
June projections
Weighted to
downside
Broadly
balanced
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
Weighted to
upside
Note: The blue and red lines in the top panel show actual values and median projected values, respectively,
of the percent change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) from the fourth quarter of
the previous year to the fourth quarter of the year indicated. The confidence interval around the median projected
values is assumed to be symmetric and is based on root mean squared errors of various private and government
forecasts made over the previous 20 years; more information about these data is available in table 2. Because current
conditions may differ from those that prevailed, on average, over the previous 20 years, the width and shape of the
confidence interval estimated on the basis of the historical forecast errors may not reflect FOMC participants’ current
assessments of the uncertainty and risks around their projections; these current assessments are summarized in the
lower panels. Generally speaking, participants who judge the uncertainty about their projections as “broadly similar”
to the average levels of the past 20 years would view the width of the confidence interval shown in the historical fan
chart as largely consistent with their assessments of the uncertainty about their projections. Likewise, participants
who judge the risks to their projections as “broadly balanced” would view the confidence interval around their
projections as approximately symmetric. For definitions of uncertainty and risks in economic projections, see the box
“Forecast Uncertainty.”
Summary of Economic Projections of the Meeting of September 17–18, 2019
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_____________________________________________________________________________________________
funds rate in response to actual and prospective developments over time in key economic variables—such as
real GDP growth, the unemployment rate, and inflation—uncertainty surrounding the projected path for
the federal funds rate importantly reflects the uncertainties about the paths for these economic variables, along
with other factors. Figure 5 provides a graphic representation of this uncertainty, plotting the SEP median for
the federal funds rate surrounded by confidence intervals derived from the results presented in table 2. 3 As
with the macroeconomic variables, the forecast uncertainty surrounding the appropriate path of the federal
funds rate is substantial and increases for longer horizons.
The confidence interval for the federal funds rate is assumed
to be symmetric except when it is truncated at zero, which is
3
the bottom of the lowest target range for the federal funds rate
that has been adopted in the past by the Committee.
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Federal Open Market Committee
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Figure 5. Uncertainty and risks in projections of the federal funds rate
Percent
Federal funds rate
Midpoint of target range
Median of projections
70% confidence interval*
6
5
4
3
2
1
Actual
0
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
Note: The blue and red lines are based on actual values and median projected values, respectively, of the
Committee’s target for the federal funds rate at the end of the year indicated. The actual values are the midpoint of
the target range; the median projected values are based on either the midpoint of the target range or the target level.
The confidence interval around the median projected values is based on root mean squared errors of various private
and government forecasts made over the previous 20 years. The confidence interval is not strictly consistent with the
projections for the federal funds rate, primarily because these projections are not forecasts of the likeliest outcomes for
the federal funds rate, but rather projections of participants’ individual assessments of appropriate monetary policy.
Still, historical forecast errors provide a broad sense of the uncertainty around the future path of the federal funds rate
generated by the uncertainty about the macroeconomic variables as well as additional adjustments to monetary policy
that may be appropriate to offset the effects of shocks to the economy.
The confidence interval is assumed to be symmetric except when it is truncated at zero - the bottom of the lowest
target range for the federal funds rate that has been adopted in the past by the Committee. This truncation would
not be intended to indicate the likelihood of the use of negative interest rates to provide additional monetary policy
accommodation if doing so was judged appropriate. In such situations, the Committee could also employ other tools,
including forward guidance and large-scale asset purchases, to provide additional accommodation. Because current
conditions may differ from those that prevailed, on average, over the previous 20 years, the width and shape of the
confidence interval estimated on the basis of the historical forecast errors may not reflect FOMC participants’ current
assessments of the uncertainty and risks around their projections.
* The confidence interval is derived from forecasts of the average level of short-term interest rates in the fourth
quarter of the year indicated; more information about these data is available in table 2. The shaded area encompasses
less than a 70 percent confidence interval if the confidence interval has been truncated at zero.
Summary of Economic Projections of the Meeting of September 17–18, 2019
Page 17
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Forecast Uncertainty
The economic projections provided by the members of
the Board of Governors and the presidents of the Federal
Reserve Banks inform discussions of monetary policy among
policymakers and can aid public understanding of the basis
for policy actions. Considerable uncertainty attends these
projections, however. The economic and statistical models
and relationships used to help produce economic forecasts
are necessarily imperfect descriptions of the real world, and
the future path of the economy can be affected by myriad
unforeseen developments and events. Thus, in setting the
stance of monetary policy, participants consider not only
what appears to be the most likely economic outcome as embodied in their projections, but also the range of alternative
possibilities, the likelihood of their occurring, and the potential costs to the economy should they occur.
Table 2 summarizes the average historical accuracy of a
range of forecasts, including those reported in past Monetary
Policy Reports and those prepared by the Federal Reserve
Board’s staff in advance of meetings of the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC). The projection error ranges
shown in the table illustrate the considerable uncertainty associated with economic forecasts. For example, suppose a
participant projects that real gross domestic product (GDP)
and total consumer prices will rise steadily at annual rates of,
respectively, 3 percent and 2 percent. If the uncertainty attending those projections is similar to that experienced in the
past and the risks around the projections are broadly balanced, the numbers reported in table 2 would imply a probability of about 70 percent that actual GDP would expand
within a range of 1.8 to 4.2 percent in the current year, 1.2 to
4.8 percent in the second year, 1.1 to 4.9 percent in the third
year, and 1.0 to 5.0 percent in the fourth year. The corresponding 70 percent confidence intervals for overall inflation would be 1.2 to 2.8 percent in the current year, 1.0 to
3.0 percent in the second year, 0.9 to 3.1 percent in the third
year, and 1.0 to 3.0 percent in the fourth year. Figures 4.A
through 4.C illustrate these confidence bounds in “fan
charts” that are symmetric and centered on the medians of
FOMC participants’ projections for GDP growth, the unemployment rate, and inflation. However, in some instances,
the risks around the projections may not be symmetric. In
particular, the unemployment rate cannot be negative; furthermore, the risks around a particular projection might be
tilted to either the upside or the downside, in which case the
corresponding fan chart would be asymmetrically positioned
around the median projection.
Because current conditions may differ from those that
prevailed, on average, over history, participants provide
judgments as to whether the uncertainty attached to their
projections of each economic variable is greater than, smaller
than, or broadly similar to typical levels of forecast uncertainty seen in the past 20 years, as presented in table 2 and
reflected in the widths of the confidence intervals shown in
the top panels of figures 4.A through 4.C. Participants’ cur-
rent assessments of the uncertainty surrounding their projections are summarized in the bottom-left panels of those figures. Participants also provide judgments as to whether the
risks to their projections are weighted to the upside, are
weighted to the downside, or are broadly balanced. That is,
while the symmetric historical fan charts shown in the top
panels of figures 4.A through 4.C imply that the risks to participants’ projections are balanced, participants may judge that
there is a greater risk that a given variable will be above rather
than below their projections. These judgments are summarized in the lower-right panels of figures 4.A through 4.C.
As with real activity and inflation, the outlook for the
future path of the federal funds rate is subject to considerable
uncertainty. This uncertainty arises primarily because each
participant’s assessment of the appropriate stance of monetary policy depends importantly on the evolution of real activity and inflation over time. If economic conditions evolve
in an unexpected manner, then assessments of the appropriate setting of the federal funds rate would change from that
point forward. The final line in table 2 shows the error ranges
for forecasts of short-term interest rates. They suggest that
the historical confidence intervals associated with projections
of the federal funds rate are quite wide. It should be noted,
however, that these confidence intervals are not strictly consistent with the projections for the federal funds rate, as these
projections are not forecasts of the most likely quarterly outcomes but rather are projections of participants’ individual assessments of appropriate monetary policy and are on an endof-year basis. However, the forecast errors should provide a
sense of the uncertainty around the future path of the federal
funds rate generated by the uncertainty about the macroeconomic variables as well as additional adjustments to monetary
policy that would be appropriate to offset the effects of
shocks to the economy.
If at some point in the future the confidence interval
around the federal funds rate were to extend below zero, it
would be truncated at zero for purposes of the fan chart
shown in figure 5; zero is the bottom of the lowest target
range for the federal funds rate that has been adopted by the
Committee in the past. This approach to the construction of
the federal funds rate fan chart would be merely a convention;
it would not have any implications for possible future policy
decisions regarding the use of negative interest rates to provide additional monetary policy accommodation if doing so
were appropriate. In such situations, the Committee could
also employ other tools, including forward guidance and asset
purchases, to provide additional accommodation.
While figures 4.A through 4.C provide information on
the uncertainty around the economic projections, figure 1
provides information on the range of views across FOMC
participants. A comparison of figure 1 with figures 4.A
through 4.C shows that the dispersion of the projections
across participants is much smaller than the average forecast
errors over the past 20 years.
Cite this document
Federal Reserve (2019, September 17). FOMC Minutes. Fomc Minutes, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/fomc_minutes_20190918
@misc{wtfs_fomc_minutes_20190918,
author = {Federal Reserve},
title = {FOMC Minutes},
year = {2019},
month = {Sep},
howpublished = {Fomc Minutes, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/fomc_minutes_20190918},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}