An Analysis of External Debt Positions of Eight Developing Countries Through 1990

International Finance Discussion Papers Number 227

August 1983

AN ANALYSIS OF EXTERNAL DEBT POSITIONS OF EIGHT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THROUGH 1990

by

Michael Dooley William Helkie Ralph Tryon John Underwood

NOTE: International Finance Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. References in pudlications to International Finance Discussion Papers (other than an acknowledgment by a writer that he has had access to unpublished material ) should be cleared with the author or authors.

An Analysis of External Debt Positions of Eight Developing Countries Through 1990*

Michael Dooley William Helkie Ralph Tryon John Underwood

August 1983

In this paper we trace the accumulation of large external debts by

eight developing countries since 1973 and provide a perspective on their

external positions through 1990. The principal conclusions we draw from the

analysis include:

1.

The accumulation since 1973 of external debt by six large Latin American debtors (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela) was not associated with trade deficits. Instead, these countries, to varying degrees, made net service payments to nonresidents and accumulated private and official claims on nonresidents.

An appropriate measure of the burden of external debt compares the real interest charges on debt to the ability of the country to make such payments to nonresidents. One such measure, the ratio of real interest payments to exports, rose dramatically for all eight countries studied in 1982. Under reasonable assumptions, the ratio will decline through 1990. The debt burden would be reduced rapidly by reductions of

real interest rates or equivalent changes in the present

value of outstanding external debts. Faster economic growth

in the industrial (OECD) countries and associated increases in

This paper represents the views of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or other members of

its staff.

-2export earnings have a powerful effect by 1990 but provide little relief for the next two years. The same conclusion applies to adjustment policies in the borrowing countries that result in larger trade surpluses.

4, For some countries continued capital outflows that do not generate foreign exchange earnings for the country could offset much of the improvement in the ratio of real interest payments to exports through 1990. On the other hand, earnings accruing to residents on new and existing foreign assets would be an important offset to interest payments to nonresidents if such earnings were made available to residents that had incurred external debt.

In the next section we present historical data on external debt, cumulated trade and current account deficits, and implicit private capital outflows for the eight countries mentioned above. In Section II a framework is presented that provides a useful measure of the present and prospective economic burden of the external debts of these countries. The preferred measure of the burden is shown to be the ratio of real interest payments to exports. A qualitative discussion of the behavior of this measure over time relative to the behavior of real interest rates, inflation rates and the balance of payments is also provided. Finally, in Section III, we present a description of the simulation model used to generate forecasts through 1990, the assumptions that are required for the projections, and a brief discussion of the results. Detailed tables containing both the historical data and baseline projections are provided in the Appendix.

I. The Accumulation of Debt 1974-1982 The rapid build-up of external liabilities by the eight developing

countries studied substantially augmented these countries' purchasing power

-3in world markets in recent years. But it would be a mistake to assume that this borrowing was associated with large merchandise trade deficits in all cases, While it is impossible to trace how the purchasing power provided by external creditors was utilized, the six Latin American countries as a group matched all of their imports with exports of merchandise.

As shown in columns 1 and 2 in Table 1, the cumulated trade deficits of Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru were less than 1/5 as large as their buildup in external debts. Argentina and Venezuela ran substantial cumulative trade surpluses, The two Asian countries, Korea and the Philippines, did show cumulated trade deficits equal to about 2/3 and 1/2 respectively of their buildup in external debt, a pattern more typical of developing countries as a group. A comprehensive analysis of the implications of these very different patterns of international payments for the countries studied is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is clear that we cannot assume that the build up in external debt was related to net imports of goods, or growth in productive capacity, in any simple manner. Each country studied has a unique history which, of course, also affects its prospects for the future.

As shown in Column 3 of Table 1 the most important net use of foreign exchange for Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru was net service payments, largely in the form of net interest payments on external debt. Brazil, for example, made $68 billion in net service payments over the nine years shown, Interest payments are considered payments for the services provided by the existing stock of financial capital provided by nonresidents. AS we shall see in the next section, however, in an inflationary environment a substantial share of such service payments should be considered inflation premiums rather than rental payments for the use of

foreign capital.

-3A-

Columns 4 and 5 in Table 1 show cumulative changes in official and private claims on nonresidents. The buildup in official reserve assets was an important use of funds for only three countries: Chile, Korea and Venezuela. In contrast, the accumulation of private claims on nonresidents accounted for more than half of the buildup of external debt for Venezuela and Argentina and accounted for 20 percent or more of the buildup for “our other countries,

The estimates for private claims on nonresidents shown in column 5 are derived from the other data in Table 1. Column 5 is the difference

between the buildup in external debt in column 1 and the recorded uses of

Table ]

External Debt and Cumulated Changes in, Balance of Payments Flows: 1974-1982 — (Billions of U.S. Dollars)

(3) (1) (2) Cumulated Net (4) (5) Cumulated Increase Cumulated Service and Cumul ated Cumulated Increase in Gross Trade Other Current Increase in in Private Claims

External Debt Deficit2/ Account Payments Official Reserves _on Nonresidents 3/

Argentina Brazil Chile

Korea Mexico

Peru Philippines

Venezuela

33 -10 20 2. 20 94 16 68 -1 if 15 3 10 3 0 34 21 -1 6 6 83 ; 9 37 0 36 YN 1 5 1 3 20 13 0 2 4 27 -33 26 9 26

T/ For a time series of yearly data and definitions see Appendix Tables 1-8,

2/ Deficit

+

3/ Difference between column 1 and columns 2-4,

-4foreign exchange in columns 2-4. Since it is a residual, the estimate for private claims on nonresidents is subject to errors in the other data series. For example, if export values are consistently understated or import values understated, perhaps to conceal financial capital flight, our estinate of the growth of private claims on nonresidents would be biased downward. While a large number of such errors are possible we do not think it is likely that the estimates shown are qualitatively misleading.

The importance of private accumulation of external assets has varied considerably among the developing countries studied. We have not attempted to explain this different experience among countries or for individual countries over time. It is clear, however, that the residents of a dettor country should be considered to be important creditors of the country. In some respects residents face incentives similar to small external creditors. Like other “fringe” creditors, residents respond to economic incentives and perceptions about the course of the economy and economic policy. They can, in part, offset new financial inflows from offical or other private sources. Efforts to limit residents' access to foreign assets have been an important aspect of exchange control policy in many of these countries. The success of such policies, however, is open to question, Moreover, fear of new exchange control measures may induce residents to reinvest earnings outside the exchange control area.

It should be noted that gross capital inflows and outflows are not in thamselves the cause of debt problems. Many countries have gross external debts which are roughly offset by gross external assets. The United States, for example, receives earnings on foreign investments that outweigh payments on gross debts. This situation is a problem only if the external receipts are for some reason -- for example the economic policies of the country -- not available to those who have to make payments on external debt. In general, this situation arises when all debtors become

concerned about a country's economic or political outlook. Residents will

-5prefer to invest in an instrument that is not subject to exchange controls imposed by their government. Moreover, earnings on assets outside the controlled market will likely remain outside the controlled market.

The historical data indicate that the source of external debts has varied considerably among the countries studied. The clear warning suggested by this data is that the analysis and simulations of likely future developments provided in the next two sections necessarily conceal important differences among individual countries that may be crucial in determining their prospects. Nevertheless it may be useful to proceed with a very general framework that later can be modified to consider individual countries in greater detail.

II. The Burden of External Debt

In order to evaluate recent developments as well as the outlook for these countries, it seems natural to compare a measure of debt service burden to a measure of the ability of each country to generate payments to nonresident creditors. One popular measure is the ratio of debt service, which includes interest payments and scheduled amortization on some or all debt, to export earnings. This measure has the advantage of showing the potential claim on export proceeds in the, presumably unusual, event that all creditors who have the contractual right to demand payment choose to do so. It is not, however, the appropriate number to consider in evaluating the medium-term outlook for these countries. A better measure is the countries’ expected ability to generate the foreign exchange necessary to make interest payments on expected levels of debt.

Table 2 shows alternative measures of debt service burdens for eight developing countries in 1982. Column 1 shows a conventional measure of the sum of interest payments, short term debt that must be rolled over at least once during the year, and scheduled repayments of longer term debt.

Mexico and Brazil by this measure had to arrange for nearly $45 billion and

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-6- $35 billion respectively in rollovers and new money in 1982. Column 2 shows that about half of this total represented short term debt. As shown in Column 3 about one-third of the remaining debt service was accounted for by scheduled amortization of longer term debt. The remaining $12 billion for each country shown in Column 4 represented gross interest payments. But we estimate that about half of these interest payments reflected an inflation premium contained in nominal interest charges. Our estimate of the inflation premium is the change in the U.S. GNP deflator times gross external debt in Column 1. The inflation premium was built in through the use of floating rate debt which has become the largest component of debt for these countries. These payments, shown in Column 5, are comparable to the scheduled amortization in Column 3 since they would have to be reloaned to the country in order to keep the nominal value of the debt increasing at the rate of inflation and therefore the real value of the debt unchanged. Column 6 shows our estimate of the real interest payments on foreign debt, This is a much smaller magnitude than the conventional debt service number of Column 1. This measure has the desirable property of isolating the foreign currency payment necessary to maintain, but not amortize, an existing real stock of foreign debt.

The ability to make these payments depends in the largest sense on the debtor country's productive capacity relative to its domestic absorption of output. An imperfect, but accessible, measure of this ability is the level of the dollar value of exports. The real net interest paynients expressed as a percentage of exports of goods and services in 1982, both measured in current dollars, are shown in Column 7. We will focus on this shorthand measure of a country's external debt position in the remainder of this paper. This ratio has several desirable properties. The numerator is the foreign currency payment, measured in current dollars, necessary to

maintain, but not to amortize, an existing real stock of foreign debt. The

-7denominator, exports of goods and services in current dollars, represents the ability of a country to make its interest payments. As long as the rate of real interest charges is the same across countries and over time, the path of this ratio is the same as the path of total external debt relative to exports.

We do not know what level of this ratio is sustainable for any country nor would we suggest that it is the only relevant measure of a country's debt position. However, this measure does clearly show a deterioration in the external position of several of these countries to levels that are very high by historical standards. Forecasts for this magnitude, or something like it, presumably help determine whether the much larger debt service payments including amortization, shown in Column 1, will in fact be demanded by creditors.

As shown in Appendix Tables 9-16, prior to 1981 and 1982 real interest payments for the eight countries were a very small or negative share of exports in spite of the fact that nominal debt was already rising rapidly. The reasons for this are straightforward. First, the dollar value of these countries' exports grew rapidly throughout the 1970's in both volume and value terms. Moreover, dollar prices of oil and other exports grew faster than the dollar prices of traded goods in general. While the denominator, the dollar value of exports, grew rapidly, the growth rate of the numerator was restrained by generally low or at times negative real interest rates on dollar debt. In part, this was due to the low rate of interest of fixed rate non-bank debt that helped keep total interest charges down early in the period.

In 1981 and 1982 this climate changed rapidly. Export growth fell and even become negative as world output growth leveled off while interest rates on floating rate dollar debt rose relative to inflation rates so that

real interest costs on existing debt increased substantially.

-8-

The impact of this change in the economic environment on the ratio of real interest payments to exports (K) is illustrated in Chart 1. In Chart 1 inflation is assumed to be zero; hence, real and nominal magnitudes are equal. At time ty real exports are growing at a constant rate (q).

Real debt (D), shown in the second panel, is growing at a constant rate (d). Since real interest payments (R), shown in the third panel, are equal to D times the real interest rate (r), and r is constant, R also grows at rate d. As long as g = d the K ratio (R/X), will remain at its initial value. A convenient way to insure that g = d is to assume:

1. That trade in goods is balanced so that the real value of debt

cannot change over time because of trade in goods. 2. That the real rate of interest, r, is equal to the growth rate of exports, g.

3. Under these conditions the real current account deficit wil] be equal to R = rD and will grow at rate d. This is shown in the bottom panel of Chart 1.

In this special case, the growth in debt is matched by the growth in exports, and as long as r is constant, K will remain unchanged.

If, for example, a country's exports are expected to grow et the same rate as, or more rapidly than, the real rate of interest, the outlook for roughly balanced trade and a current account deficit is not a cause for concern. However, a Change in the real rate of interest on dollar credits immediately alters these relationships. In terms of Chart 1, at time t the real rate of interest increases. There is no immediate effect: on D or X, but R jumps to R' and the ratio, K, also increases proportionately. If the balance of trade does not change, the current account deficit widens to CA' and the increased real interest payments are

added to the debt so that D grows at a higher rate along D' which further

Chart 1

Loa Exports ° X = time

to ty

Loo Debt D' Des

Loo Interest Payments

Loa Current Account

Q

-9increases K. In fact, it is interesting to note that if r > y, that is, it the real rate of interest exceeds the yrowth rate of exports, the trade balance will have to move into surplus in order to avoid an ever increasiny K.

The analysis is complicated somewhat in an inflationary environment. Chanyes in nominal interest rates that are matched by changes in the rate of inflation do not result in a chanye in the K ratio even though the current account deficit does change. This is illustrated in Chart 2 which is the same as Chart 1 except that all variables are measured in current dollars. As shown in the top panel at t, nominal exports grow at g +7, where 7 is the dollar rate of inflation. If nominal debt (ND) yrows at d +7, if the nominal rate of interest is r +7, ana if the nominal rate is unchanyed, then the nominal interest payment (Nk) also grows at d +7, Again, if d = y the K ratio remains unchanged.

| As before, assume that trade in yoods is balanced so that debt is not growing due to trade in yoods. This means that nominal debt is yrowing at the rate of nominal interest, r+m. In turn, this implies that the nominal current account is in deficit equal to NK =D (r+).

But because the nominal interest payments include amortization of debt equal to 7D, we have to be careful in relating balance of paymerts identities to changes in real debt positions. At ty a rise in nomiial interest rates matched by a rise in the rate of inflation does not cause the K ratio to change as long as trade remains balanced. This can be seen in the top two panels. The nominal value of exports beyins to grow at 3 + m'. Nominal debt also begins to yrow at d + 7'and, since y = d, the K ratio remains unchanged. The rise in nominal interest rates does yenerate a larger current account deficit. The laryer current account deficit implies

that nominal debt is growing more rapidly as shown in the second panel.

Log Chart 2 X's 7 Nominal Export me °°

NX = gem time Loa Nominal Debt ty ty ND'= d +m! D=ed+tT7 Log time Nominal Interest Payments to “1 . NR'= d+! =q+mT'! coer ees time Loa Nominal Current Account

+ TB =0 0 NCA time

NCA'

-10- For this reason, if current account balances are used to evaluate adjustment policies, the value of the current account objective should be adjusted upward if the inflation rate rises and adjusted downward if the inflation rate falls.

While we do not know what level of K is sustainable, we felt it was useful to project values of K under alternative assumptions about external economic developments and domestic policies of these countries. Presumably, forecasts of K (or something like it) are a factor which creditors would use to determine whether to continue lending to a particular country.

III. Simulations

In order to project the K ratios we built a simple simulation model incorporating the relationships described above./ Since there is only a very limited base of econometric work on the trade of developing countries from which to draw, we chose parameter values judgmentally. The values we chose are, however, consistent with some preliminary econometric work of our own reported in Appendix Tables 17-20.

The model first calculates current dollar exports -- the denominator of our measure of the debt burden. An aggregate export unit value index (for non-oil developing countries) is used for all eight countries. The index, which is measured in dollars, is assumed to rise in proportion to changes in the U.S. price level and to changes in industrial country economic activity, and to rise with an elasticity of 0.5 when the U.S. dollar depreciates (on a weighted average basis) against the currencies of other industrial countries. These estimates are based on an equation

reported in Appendix Table 17 that regresses the percent changes in the

1/ A copy of the program is available from the authors.

-l1export unit value on percent changes in U.S. prices, the dollar exchange rate, and industrial country economic activity using quarterly data for the period since 1970.

Based on estimates of the growth of real GNP in the OECD area, the model calculates export volume using an income elasticity of 2.0 and a relative price elasticity of 1.0 distributed over three years. These estimates are based on equations reported in Appendix Table 18 that regress real axports for various developing countries on industrial country income and relative prices (the developing country's domestic prices over industrial countries’ domestic prices measured in dollars) using quarterly data for the period since 1970. The relative price term varied considerably across countries ranging from -0.5 to 1.75. The estimated income elasticities were somewhat imprecise and were in the the range of 1.0 to 5.0, consistent with our assumption of 2.0. Given the preliminary nature of this work our assumed parameters should be viewed with some caution when applied to individual country simulations.

For Mexico and Venezuela the model projects oi] exports separately from nonoil exports. We assumed that the price of these countries' oi] export:s would change dollar for dollar with changes in the OPEC oil price. We assume that the OPEC oil price remains at $29 per barrel through 1984, rises to $32 per barrel in 1985, and stays at that level through 1990. Oi] export volume is determined from OECD GNP and the OPEC oil price using estimated elasticities of 1.0 and -0.25 respectively. These estimates are taken from the oi] consumption functions in the International Division's Multi-Country Model. We assume that for Mexico and Venezuela, the increase in exdorts would be proportional to the increase in OECD consumption,

Real interest payments on the external debt -- the numerator of our measure -- are calculated from a set of accounting identities. The

interest rate on bank debt is the sum of the LIBOR rate plus an assumed

-12-

spread. After 1984 the real interest rate faced by these countries is assumed to converge to 5 percent. The interest rate on external debt is the weighted average of the interest rates on bank debt and non-bank debt using the shares of external debt for each country as weights, (See Table 3,)

The implicit interest rate on non-bank debt for each country is computed from total net interest payments using the weights given above, and is extrapolated at its 1982 level. Interest payments on the external debt are the product of the interest rate and the annual average value of the external debt. The year-end value of the debt is the sum of the debt at the beginning of the year, the current account deficit, and any additional net capital outflows. The current account deficit equals the trade deficit,

Table 2

Bank Debt as a Percent of Net Debt in 1982

(Percent) Argentina 69.5 Brazil 60.3 Chile 56.5 Korea 60.4 Mexico 73.2 Peru 40.9 Philippines 56.4 Venezuelal/ 157.2

1/7 Venezuela held extensive official foreign exchange reserves. Hence, its gross bank debt was larger than its net debt. Venezuela was assumed to earn LIBOR minus 0.5 percentage points on its reserves in the simulation.

-13assuned to be a policy variable controlled by the debtor country in the control solution, plus interest payments on external debt, plus other service payments less net transfer receipts. Other service payments and net transfer receipts are extrapolated at their 1982 levels. Real interest payments on external debt (in current dollars) equal the product of the real interest rate and the annual average value of the external debt. The real interest rate equals the interest rate on external debt less the U.S. inflation rate. Nominal imports are derived from the trade balance identity in the control solution, given the value of exports and the trade balance itself; real imports are nominal imports deflated by an aggregate import unit value. The LDC import unit value is assumed to rise in proportion to changes in the U.S. price level and rise with an elasticity of 0.5 when the U.S. dollar depreciates on a trade-weighted basis (see Appendix Table 19).

The trade balances are assumed to follow projections included in IMF approved stabilization programs in 1983-84 for all of the countries studied with the exceptions of Venezuela and Korea as shown in Table 4. For Venezuela and Korea other sources were utilized. After 1984 the trade balances are assumed to follow a smooth trajectory toward zero in the baseline scenario.

OECD growth is assumed to recover to 1.8 percent in 1983, 3.4 percent in 1984, and remain at 3 percent from 1985 through 1990. The assumption for 1985-1990 is consistent with estimates of growth of potential output for OECD countries in the 1970's. Estimates for average interest rate charges on developing country bank debt and the U.S. GNP deflator are shown in columns 10 and 11 of Table 4. Taken together these assumptions imply about a 2 percentage point drop in real interest rates faced by these countries in 1990 as compared with 1983. The foreign exchange value of the

dollar is extrapolated at its average value for the first half of 1983.

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The baseline projections for each developing country studied are summarized in Table 5 and presented in greater detail in Appendix tables 9-16. In every case the ratio of interest payments to exports declines after 1984. But only for Argentina, Chile, and Mexico is there a decline betwean 1982 and 1984. In these three countries the approximately balanced current account projected for 1983-84 keeps nominal debt and interest payments nearly constant while the value of exports grows comparatively rapidly. In most cases the ratio falls to roughly half its 1982 level by the end of the projection period, but remains at levels that are high compared with 1974-1981.

The average annual rate of growth of external debt, which is not necessarily equal to the rate of growth of bank debt, is shown in Appendix tables 9-16. For 1983-84 the growth in total debt varies over a wide range from a high of 13 percent for the Philippines to minus 8 percent for Venezuela, but in every case there is a substantial slowing as compared to recen: years. With the exception of Korea and the Philippines the growth of nominal debt falls within a 9-14 percent range by 1990.

An analysis of the sensitivity of our simulation results to changes in the underlying assumptions is also summarized in Table 5L/

Five experiments were conducted. They are: (1) one percentage point higher real aconomic growth in the OECD countries throughout the forecast period; (2) a one percentage point drop in the LIBOR interest rate; (3) a fall in each country's real exchange rate equal to 5 percent; (4) one precentage point slower real economic growth in the country considered; and (5) private capital outflows in real terms continuing at the same rate as their average

in 1930-82.

1/ Detailed tables for each experiment are available from the authors.

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-15-

For our sensitivity analysis, we made two revisions to the model. Real imports, which were derived from an exogenous trade balance in the control solution, are projected using an income elasticity of 1.5 anda price elasticity of 1.0 distributed over three years. This estimate is basec on equations regressing real imports on real GNP and the real exchange rate for several developing countries. (The equations are summarized in Apperdix Table 20.) The estimated income elasticities were in the range of 0.6 to 2.0 and the real exchange rate elasticities were in the range of 0 to -2.7. In addition, we inserted an export multiplier on domestic GNP of 1.5 in the first year with a cumulative effect of 2 by the second year. Thus if real exports rise by 1 billion 1980 dollars, real GNP rises by 2 billion 1980 dollars after two years which in turn raises imports.

As shown in column 5 of Table 4 one percentage point higher real economic growth in the OECD countries throughout the forecast period generates a considerable improvement in the ratio of real interest payments to exports by 1990.2/ However, as shown in column 4, the effects of faster growth in 1983 and 1984 are quite small. It takes some time before the cumulative effects of the higher OECD growth rates have a significant impact on the stock of debt relative to the flow of exports. An assumption that is crucial to this result is that the rise in export receipts associated with higher growth rates in the OECD countries is offset only to a limited extent by increased imports. For Brazil and Mexico the trade surplus in 1990 is about $11 billion larger as compared to the baseline scenario and is greater by lesser amounts for the other countries studied. If this trade surplus did not materialize roughly half of the reduction in

the ratio associated with higher OECD growth would be forfeited,

1/ The real interest rate is not changed in this simulation.

-16-

While higher OECD growth has little impact in the short run, lower real interest rates, as shown in columns 6 and 7, have an immediate impact on the real cost of the debt. A one percentage point drop in LIBOR recluces our measure of the real burden of the foreign debt of these countries by one to two percentage points by 1984. However, in this case there is little or no increasing cumulative effect.

These countries could also reduce the rate of growth of their debts through reductions in the real exchange values of their currencies, Columns 8 and 9 show the effects of a 5 percent reduction in real exchange rates in 1983 that is maintained throughout the projection period. Roughly one quarter of the improvement in the ratio is realized by 1984.

As shown in columns 10 and 11, lower domestic economic growth would also have a substantial cumulative effect on the ratio of real interest payments to exports. The cumulative impact of one percentage point lower growth of domestic output would yield a 1-4 percentage point improvement in the ratio by 1990.

Finally in columns 12 and 13 the effects of private capital outflows that continue in real terms at their 1980-82 average are shown.

For several countries the improvement shown in the baseline scenario would be more than eliminated by further private capital outflows.

While our baseline scenario and sensitivity results rest ona number of tenuous assumptions some concluding comments are suggested by the simulation exercise,

First, the range of parameter estimates reported in Appendix Tables 17 to 20 suggest that further work on individual countries is needed, Our use of judgmental parameters in the simulation model necessarily reduces our confidence in the results of the model for particular countries. However, we believe that this type of exercise is a useful way to approach

the analysis of debt burdens.

-17-

Second, movements in market interest rates are clearly more important for the short run prospects as compared with the other factors considered,

Third, the policies followed by the debtor countries themselves are crucial to the outlook for their debt positions. Even the favorable effects of an increase in OECD growth can be substantially reduced if appropriate policies are not followed to allow the trade surplus to materialize. Moreover, capital outflows probably depend in large part on the confidence that domestic residents have in the soundness of domestic economic policies and the stability of domestic financial markets.

Finally, in the real world the effects we have considered are not independent of one another. In putting together a more realistic set of simulations one would want to combine the results for alternative assumptions about interest rates, economic activity, exchange rates and

capital flows in a more integrated pattern.

APPENDIX TABLE 3

GISTORICAL DATA -- ARGENTINA (BILLIONS OF G.S. DCLLARS)

CUAULATED CUMULATED CUMULATED CHANGE IB CHANGE IN CUSULATED CUAULATED I#PLICIT GROSS EXTERWAL CURRENT TRADE CAPITAL EXTERNAL ASSETS ACCOUNT BALANCE OUTFLOW DEBT SENCE SINCE 1973 SINCE 1973 SINCE 1973 SINCE 1973 1973 2/ 3/ 3/ &/ 1978 oe | 0.48 -~0.1 -0.7 0.8 1979 13.2 8.9 -1.9 -7.8 6.2 9981 31.6 3.4 726 “7.1. 20.6

- ee ee ee ree oem ern om > aos com enese 20 weer ee ee

t/ INCLUDING CUAULATED DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS. WHILE THESE IBFLOWS ARE HOT USUALLY CONSID2RED PART OF A COUNTRY*S EXTERNAL DEBT, THEY ABE INCLUDED HERE BECAUSE DIRECT INVESTAENT INFLOWS DO HELP FINANCE PRIVATE CAPITAL OUTFLOWS. CSAULATED DIRECT IBVESTMEBT FLOWS FROM 1973 THROUGH 1982 ABOUSTED TO $ 2.635 BILLION.

2/ TOTAL RESERVES LESS GOLD PLUS COMMERCIAL BANK ASSETS 3/ DEFICIT EQUALS + ®/ CUSULATED ISPLICIT CAPITAL OUTFLOW SINCE 1973 EQUALS THE CHENG IR

GROSS EXTERBAL DEBT SINCE 1973 ALNUS THE CHANGE IN EXTERNAL ASSETS SISCE 1973 SINGS THE CUSULATED CURREBT ACCOUNT BALANCE SINCE 1973

APPENDIX TABLE 2

HISTORICAL DATA -- BRAZIL (BILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)

CUMNDLATED CUAGLATED CUAULATED

CHANGE IN CHANGE IN CUMULATED CUMULATED IMPLICIT

GROSS EXTERNAL CURRENT TRADE CAPITAL

EXTERNAL ASSETS ACCOUNT BALANCE OUTFLOW

DEBT SINCE SINCE 1973 SINCE 48973 SINCE 1973 SINCE 1973

1973 1/ 2/ 3/ 3/ &/

1974 6.9 -0.9 725 4.8 0.3 1975 15.5 24 148.6 8.3 3. 3 1976 23.3 0.4 21.2 10.7 1.7 1977 31.5 4.1 26.3 10.8 4.1 1978 88.3 6.5 33.3 14.9 8.5 1979 56.9 3.5 43.8 14.7 9.6 1980 68. 1 -0.0 $6.7 37.6 its 1981 81.90 1.4 68.4 16.3. 41.2 1982 93.5 1.3 83.4 15.6 11.4

[LS A A EES SRS WP a) SEE ee ee ee ane ee 8 ee we ee eee @ ee

1/ INCLUDING CUSOLATED DIRECT TUVESTHERT IBFLOUS. WHILE THESE ISFLOWS ARE NOT USUALLY CONSIDERED PART OF A COUBTRY*S EKTERBAL DEBT, THEY ARE THCLUDED MERE BECAUSE DIRECT INVESTHERT IEFLOUS DO GMELP FINANCE PRIVATE CAPITAL OUTPLOSS. COAULATED DIRECT INVESTHENT PLOWS FROM 1973 THROUGH 1982 BSOUNTED TO § 15.88 BILLION.

2/ TOTAL RESERVES LESS GOLD PLUS COSNERCIAL BANK ASSETS 3/ DEFICIT BQUALS + 4/ CUSULATED ISPLICIT CAPITAL OUTFLOW SIBCE 1973 EQUALS THE CHANGE PT

GROSS EXTERMAL DEBT SINCE 1973 MINUS THE CHANGE IB EXTERSAL ASSETS SISCE 1973 MINOS Ti COMULATED CURRENT ACCOUNT BALABCE SINCE 1973

APPENDIX TABLE 3

HISTORICAL DATA —— CHILE (BILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)

CUMNULATED CUSULATED CUMULATED CHANGE IN CHANGE IN CUMULATED COMULATED IMPLICIT GROSS BITERNAL CURRENT TRADE CAPITAL EXTERNAL ASSETS ACCOUNT BALANCE OUTFLOW DEBT SINCE SINCE 1973 SINCE 1973 SINCE 4973 SINCE 1973 1973 1/ 2/ 3/ 3/ b/ 1974 0.4 -0.1 0.3 -0.2 0.2 1975 1.9 0.0 0.9 -0.3 1.0 1976 1.7 0.3 0.8 -0.9 0.6 1977 1.7 0.3 1.5 -0.8 -0.1 1978 3-4 1.7 2-6 -0.4 -0.9 1979 5.5 2.0 3-8 -0.0 -0.3 1981 13.4 | 3.8 10.5 3.4 -0.9 1982 15.4 2.6 12.8 3.2 -0.0

ee ee oe een © ee eee ae ae ee ew oe ow wee

t/ INCLUDING COMULATED DIRECT INVESTHENT INFLOWS. WHILE THESE IN}?LOWS ARE BOT USUALLY CONSIDERED PART OF A COUNTRY*S EXTERNAL DEBT, THEY ARE ; TNCLUDED HERE BECAUSE DIRECT INVESTMENT IBFLOSS DO HELP FINANCE PRIVATE CAPITAL OUTFLOWS. CUMULATED DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS FROM 1973 THROUGH 1982 ASOUNTED TO $ 1.57 BILLION.

2/ TOTAL RESERVES LESS GOLD PLUS COMMERCIAL BANK ASSETS 3/ DEFICIT EQUALS + 4/ CUSULATED IMPLICIT CAPITAL OUTFLOW SINCE 1973 EQUALS THE CHANGE IN

GROSS EXTERNAL DEBT SINCE 1973 MINUS THE CHANGE IN EXTERNAL ASSES SINCE 1973 MINUS THE CUMULATED CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE SINCE 1973

APPENDIX TABLE 4

HISTCRICAL DATA —— KOREA (BILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)

CUSULATED CUMULATED CUSULATED CHANGE IN CHANGE IN CUMULATED CUMULATED IMPLICIT GROSS EXTERNAL CURREST TRADE CAPITAL EXTERNAL ASSETS ACCOUNT BALANCE OUTFLON DEBT SINCE SINCE 1973 SINCE 1973 SIECE 1973 SIBCE 1973 1973 1/ 2/ 3/ 3/ 4/ 1974 1.7 -0.0 2.0 1.9 -0.3 1975 Q.8& 0.5 3.9 3.6 -0.0 1976 6.4 1.9 4.2 4.2 0.3 1977 8.8 3.2 4.2 4.7 1.4 1978 13.1 3-8 5.3 6.5 9.0 1979 18.4% 8.6 9.4 10.9 4.3 1980 23.9 5e4 14.8 15.2 3.7 1981 29.8 © 9.8 19.4 18.9 0.6 1982 33.6 5.8 21.9 21.3 5.9

2 EE EP EEE OD OD SD aD en Ce GRD ee PP SD Ge ey ee ee ee ee aw a eee eee

1/ INCLUDING CUNULATED DIRECT LUVESTMENT INFLOWS. WHILE THESE INFLOWS ARE NOT USUALLY CONSIDERED PART OF A COUNTRY®S EXTERNAL DEBT, THEY ARE INCLUDED HERE BECAUSE DIRECT INVESTHENT INFLOWS DO HELP FINANCE PRIVATE CAPITAL OUTFLOWS. CUMULATED DIRECT INVESTMENT PLOWS FROM 1973 THROUGH 1982 AMOUNTED TO $ 0.56 BILLION.

2/ TOTAL RESERVES LESS GOLD PLUS COSNERCIAL BANK ASSETS 3/ DEFICIT E)UALS + 4/ CUMULATED IMPLICIT CAPITAL OUTFLOW SINCE 1973 EQUALS THE CHANGE IRB

GROSS EXTERNIL DEBT SINCE 1973 MIBUS THE CHANGE IN EXTERNAL ASSETS SIHCE 1973 MINUS THE CUMULATED CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE SINCE 1973

APPENDIX TABLE 5

HISTORICAL DATA -- MEXICO (BILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)

CUMULATED CUMULATED CUMULATED

CHANGE IB CHANGE ZB CUAULATED CUAUDLATED IMSPLICIT

GROSS EXTEREAL CURRENT TRADE CAPITAL

EXTERNAL: ASSETS aACcCoUmT BALASCE OUTFLOW

DEBT SINCE SINCE 1973 SINCE 1973 SINCE 1973 SINCE 1973

1973 1/ 2/ 3/ 3/ a/

1974 8.5 0.0 2-9 2-8 1.6 1975 10.1 0.3 7o1 5.9 2.7 1976 16.7 -0.0 10.5 8.0 6.2 1977 23.3 0.5 12.3 8.5 10.5 1978 27.6 0.8 15.5 9.7 11.3 1979 36.4 1.3 21.0 11.9 14.1 1980 52.8 2.9 28.7 13.6 21.2 1981 75.5 3-5 42.6 16.7 29.4 1982 82.6 0.3 86.4 9.0 36.3

LP A APES AE PD CE APPS ED SEE AED ED ee ED A ED ene ene DO

t/ INCLUDING CUMULATED DIRECT LNVESTMENT INFLOWS. WHILE THESE INFLOWS ARE NOT USUALLY CONSIDERED PART OF A COUNTRY*S EXTERNAL DEBT, THEY ABE INCLUDED HERE BECAUSE DIRECT INVESTHENT INFLOWS DO HELP FINANCE PRIVATE CAPITAL OUTFLOWS. CUMULATED DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS FROS 1973 THROUGH 1982 ANOUNTED TO $ 9.83 BILLION.

2/ TOTAL RESERVES LESS GOLD PLUS COMMERCIAL BANK ASSETS 3/ DEFICIT FQUALS + 4/ CUMULATED IMPLICIT CAPITAL OUTFLOW SINCE 1973 EQUALS THE CHANGE IN

GROSS EXTERBAL DEBT SINCE 1973 MINUS THE CHANGE EN EXTERNAL ASSETS SINCE 1973 MIBUS THE CUMULATED CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE SINCE 1973

APPENDIX TABLE 6

HISTORICAL DATA —- PERU (BILLIONS OF 0.S. DOLLARS)

CUMULATED CUOMULATED CUSULATED CHANGE IN CHANGE IN CUMULATED CUKULATED IAPLICIT GROSS BITERNAL CURRENT TRADE CAPITAL EXTERNAL § ASSETS ACCOUNT BALANCE OUTFLOW DEBT SINCE SINCE 1973 SINCE 1973 SINCE 1973 SINCE 1973 1973 1 2/ 3/ 3/ &/ 1974 1.1 0.4 0.7 0.4 -0.1 1975 3.5 -0.1 2.3 1.5 1.3 1976 4.8 -0.2 3.5 2.2 1.6 1977 5.8 -0.1 bo% 2.7 1.5 1978 6.6 0.0 4.6 2.3 2.0 1979 7.2 1.8 3.8 0.8 2.3 1980 7.8 1.6 3.7 -0.1 2.5 1981 8.7 0.8 5.2 0.5 2.7 1982 10.7 1.0 6.6 1.3 3.1

1/ INCLUDING COMULATED DIRECT ISVESIMENT INFLOWS. WHILE THESE INFLOSS ARE MOT USUALLY CONSIDERED PART OF A COUNTRY*S EXTERNAL DEBT, THEY ARE IBCLUDED HERE BECAUSE DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS DO HELP PINANCE PRIVATE CAPITAL OUTFLOWS. CUMULATED DIRECT INVESTMENT? FLOWS FROM 1973 THROUGH 1982 AMNOUNTED TQ $ 1.10 BILLIOS.

2/ TOTAL RESERVES LESS GOID PLUS COMMERCIAL BANK ASSETS 3/ DEFICIT EQUALS + 4/ CUMULATHD IMPLICIT CAPITAL OUTFLOW SZNCE 1973 EQUALS THE CHANGE In

GROSS EXTERNAL DEBT SISCE 1973 ALNUS THE CHANGE IN EXTERNAL ASSETS SINCE $973 MINUS THE CUMULATED CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE SINCE 1973

APPENDIX TABLE 7

HISTORICAL DATA -— PHILIPPIWES (BILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)

CUMULATED CUMULATED CUMULATED

CHANGE IN CHANGE IN CUMULATED CUMULATED IMPLICIT

GROSS EXTERNAL CURRENT TRADE CAPITAI.

EXTERNAL ASSETS ACCOUNT BALANCE OUTFLO!

DEBT SENCE SINCE 1973 SINCE 1973 SINCE 1973 SINCE 1973

1973 1, 2/ 3/ 3/ a/

$974 1.0 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.2 1975 2.1 0.5 1.1 1.6 0.5 1976 3. 6 0.4 2.2 2.8 1.0 1977 5.2 0.2 3.1 3.6 2.0 1978 7.8 0.9 4.2 4.9 2.7 1979 10. 6 1.8 5.8 6.4 3.0 1980 13.7 3.3 7.9 8.4 2.7 1981 16.2 © 2.6 10.2 10.6 3.4 1982 19.9 2.4 13.6 13.4 3.9

1/ INCLUDING CUAULATED DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS. WHILE THESE INFLOWS ARB NOT USUALLY CONSIDERED PART OF A COGNTRY*S EXTERNAL DEBT, THEY ARE ISCLUDED HERE BECAUSE DIRECT INVESTMEST IBFLOWS DO HELP FINANCE PRIVATE CAPITAL OUTFLOWS. CUMULATED DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS FROM 1973 THROUGH 1982 AMOUNTED TO $ 1.62 BILLION.

2/ TOTAL RESERVES LESS GOLD PLUS COMNMERCIAL BANK ASSETS 3/ DEFICIT FQUALS + §/ CUMULATED IMPLICIT CAPITAL OUTFLOW SINCE 1973 EQUALS THE CHANGE IN

GROSS EXTERNAL DEBT SINCE 1973 MINUS THE CHANGE IN EXTERNAL ASSETS SINCE 1973 MINUS THE CUMULATED CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE SINCE 1973

APPENDIX TABLE 8

HISTORICAL DATA ~— VENEZUELA (BILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)

CUMULATZED CUMULATED CUMULATED

CHANGE IN CHANGE IH CUMULATED CUSULATED IMPLICIT

GROSS EXTERHAL | CURRENT TRADE CAPITAL

EXTERNAL ASSETS ACCOUNT BALANCE OUTFLO’

DEBT SINCE SINCE 1973 SINCE 1973 SINCE 1973 SINCE 1973

1973 1/ 2/ 3/ 3/f ay

1974 -1.9 4.2 -6.1 7.2 0.1 1975 -1.3 6.6 ~8.5 - 10.6 0.6 1976 -2.5 6.2 -9.0 ~12.5 0.3 1977 3.9 10.6 -6.1 “11.9 -0.6 1978 9.4 9.9 -0.8 ~9.7 0.3 1979 17.9 14.3 -1.5 13.9 5.1 1980 21.1 | 18.0 -6.7 ~22.1% 9.8 1981 - 23.9 17.8 11.1 -29.9 17.2 1982 27.0 9.1 -7.6 ~33.3 25.5

ed ee ee te ee ep ee eee Gee we ee

t/ INCLUDING CUMNULATED DERECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS. WHILE THESE INFLOWS ARE NOT USUALLY CONSIDERED PART OF A COUNTRY*S EXTERNAL DEBT, THEY ARE INCLUDED GERE BECAUSE DIRECT INVESTSENT ENFLOSS DO HELP FINANCE PRIVATE CAPITAL OUTFLOWS. CUMULATED DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS FROM 1973 THROUGH 1982 AMOUNTED TO $ ~0.33 BILLION.

2/ TOTAL RESERVES LESS GCLD PLUS COMMERCIAL BANK ASSETS 3/ DEFICIT YOQURES + &/ CUBULATE! IMPLICIV CAPITAL OUTFLOW SIBCE 1973 EQUALS THE CHANGE ZB

GROSS EXTERNAL DEBT SINCE 1973 MINUS THE CHANGE IS EXTERNAL ASSETS SINCE 1973 MINUS THE CUAULATED CURRENT ACCOUNT BALABCE SINCE 1973

1974 1975 1976 8977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

1974 1975 5976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

1983 1964 1985 1986 1987 1984 1989 1990

REAL IBTEREST OVER EXPORTS (PERCERT)

-7.6 -6.6

1,9 -0.4 1.6 4.4 9.6

2.9 26.1

26.3 20.2 18.7 17.4 16.8 a5.5 14.5 14.2

. FOTAL REAL

DEBT-NET GROTH RATE (PBECENT)

10.5 -15.4 711.6

6.9

18.5

83.5

82.7

ee ee ee ee ee ee

0.6 -1.5 2.8 5.6 7.9 725 721 7.0

Pe ITD ET OS I mS en

APPEMDIX TABLE 9

BASELISE SCEBARIO 1/ -—~ ABGENTIBA

‘BEAL BOMINAL EXPORTS OF EXPORTS OF INTEREST INTEREST GOODS ABD GOODS ASD PAYAEUTS PAYSEUTS SERVICES SERVICES (BILLIONS (BILLIONS (BILLIONS GROUTH

or or OF RATE DOLLARS) DOLLARS): DOLLARS) (PERCENT) -0.4 0.3 4.7 - -0.2 0.4 326 ~23.4 0.1 0.5 9.6 27. 8 -0.0 0.48 6.8 87.8 -0.1 0.8 728 18.7 -0.8 0.5 9.9 26.9 -1.1 0.9 11.2 13.1 6.3 3.0 11.8 5.4 2.8 3.8 10.5 9.8 2.5 3.9 12.6 19.5 2.6 4.9 13.8 9.6 2.7 4.3 15.7 13.6 2.9 a7 17.8 13.6 3.1 $.3 20.3 13.6 3.3 5.5 23.0 13.6 307 6.2 26.2 13.6

COBRERT IsPxLriIcit COSULATED

accouNt TRADE CAPITAL CAPITAL

BALANCE BALANCE OUTFLOV OUTFLOW (BILLIONS (BILLIONS (BILLIONS (BILLIONS

oF or or or DOLLABS) DOLLARS) DOLLARS) DOLLARS) 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 71.3 -0.5 0.0 0.8 0.6 1.1 -0.2 0.6 1.2 1.8 0.9 1.5 1.8 2.9 3.0 8.5 0.5 1.8 1.8 6.2 ~%.8 1.4 6.7 82.9 8.7 0.7 Te? 20.6 2.5 2.7 0.8 20.2 105 3.0 0.0 20.2 -1.1 3.5 0.90 20.2 72.7 2.0 0.0 20.2 -4.0 1.0 0.0 20.2 5.4 0.0 0.0 20.2 -5.8 -0.0 0.0 20.2 6.2 0.0 0.0 20.2

a/ HISTORICAL DATA FOR 1974-82, PROJECTIONS FOR 1983-90 2/ TOTAL BOMIBAL DEBT-NET DIVIDED BY U.S. GNP DEPLATOR

TOTAL TOTAL BOAINAL MOBINAL TOTAL BEAL DEBT-MET ODEBT-NET DEBT-NET (BILLIONS GRO#TE 27 OF BATE (1980= 100) DOLLARS) (PERCENT) 6.3 - 52.6 7.6 20.6 58.2 6.8 -10.5 49.2 6.8 -5.9 43.5 7.3 ta. 46.1 9.3 27.4 52.8 20.0 115.0 100.0 31.5 57.5 182.7 33.3 5.7 142.2 34.5 3.7 183.0 35.8 2.4 180.8 37.8 . 629 194.7 81.6 9.9 152.9 86.6 12.2 165.0 52.1 11.8 177.8 58.1 11.8 190.0 64.7 11.3 203.8 BEAL BONIBAL REAL IMPORTS IUTEREST INTEREST GROWTH RATE RAT? BATE (PERCENT) (PERCENT) (PEBCEST) - 5.0 -6.0 -4.3 5.8 -3.8 -19.8 6.9 1.2 37.6 6.1 -0.8 ~1.8 5-8 1.8 49.5 6.0 -5.3 28.9 6.1 -7.8 1120 11.7 1.3 -39.8 13.9 707 707 14.3 8.2 18.8 11.3 73 22.7 11.0 7.0 18.3 10.9 6.9 15.8 10.6 6.6 8.8 10.3 6.3 8.8 10.1 6.1 8.9 10.1 6.1

1978 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

1983 1984 31985 1986 3987 1988 1989 1990

1974 1975 1976 1977 31978 1979 1980 1981 $982

1983 1984 1985 1986 39387 1988 4989 1990

REAL INTEREST OVER Exports (PERCEST)

~5.8 1.2 3.8 1.8 -0.5 ~5.4 -6.0 8.0 24.0

REAL INTEREST PAISENTS (BILLIONS or DOLLARS)

-0.5 -0.1 0.4 0.2 -0.1 1.0 ~1.4 2.2 5.6

APPENDIX TABLE 10

BASELINE SCENARIO 1/ -- BRASIL

NOSXZBAL EXPORTS OF EXPORTS OF

ISTEREST PAYMEsSTS (BILLIONS oF DOLLARS)

0.6 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.7 8.2 6.3 9.2 10.5

GooDs SEBVICES (BILLIOBS OF DOLLARS)

9.3

9.8 11.2 13.5 49.5 18.0 23.2 26.9 23.4

29.5 25.2 23.2 22.2 21.3 20.5 19.5 19.3

TOTAL REAL DEBTI- SET GROVTa BATE (PERCENT)

10.8 315.90 20.6 30.4 11.0

3.7 11.3

8.2 8.0

ee a ae ere tree eee eee eee aoe eee ee tee eee ete

7.0 6.7 729 7.6 8.3 9.1 9.8 1.0

CURRENT aAccouRT BALAICE (BILLIONS oF DOLLARS)

-7.5 -7.1 -6.6 75.1 ~7.0 -10.5 -12.9 -13.7 -15.0

9.8 10.5 11.1 12.2 13.5 14.9 16.5 18.5

TRADE BALANCE (BILLIONS or DOLLARS)

74.8 -3.5 -2.8 -0.1 “1.1 -2.8 -2.9

1.3

0.7

-0.0

23.8 26.5 30.1 34.3 38.9 848.2 50.3 57.1

IsPLICcItT CAPITAL OUTFLOU

(BILLIONS

or

DOLLARS)

0.3 3.0

ly @ISTORICAL DATA FOR 2979-82, PROJECTIONS FOR 1983-90 2/ TOTAL BOAIWAL DEBI-BET DIVIDED BY U.S. GEP DEFLATOR

AND GOODS AND

SERVICES GROWTH RATE (PERCEST)

5.8 4.3 20.5

72.4 24.1 28.9 15.9 1.7

1.5 13.6 13.6 13.6 13.6 13.6 13.6

CUBULATED CAPITAL OOTFLOR (BILLIONS oF DOLLARS)

0.3 3.3 1.7 9.1

TOTAL NOMINAL DEBT-NET (BILLIOUS OF DOLLARS)

13.2 22.1. 25.8 31.6 81.1 50.5 63.6 72.8 86.0

93.0

98.8 108.2 121.5 138.2 $56.3 176.0 197.7

REAL ISPORTS GRO@TE

RATE

(PERCENT)

-14.3 6.9 -3.6 4.6 9.6 2.1 1.8 4.8

-17.5 -0.5 21.8 17.9 12.8 7o4 726 728

TOTAL

BOMNIBAL TOTAL REAL

DEBT- EET GROUTH RATE (PERCENT)

67.8 16.7 22.5 30.1 22.9 25.9 14.5 18.1

8.2 6.1 9.4 12.4 13.7 13.1 12.6 12.3

NOAIHAL ISTEREST RATE (PERCENT)

6.0 8.5 7.5 723

DEBT- MET 2/ (1980= 100)

34.7 53.2 58.7 67.6 81.6 90.1 100.0 103.7 1715.4

eae re eee ee ee a eee ee

121.1 123.6 130.1 180.6 153.7 167.2 181.0 195.5

REAL INTEREST

RATE (PERCENT)

-5.0 -0.6 1.8 0.8 0.2 -2.1

SPYSRVLA TADLSE il

BASELINE SCERABIO 1/ -- CHILE

BEAL BOMINAL EXPORTS OF EXPORTS OF TOTAL TOTAL BEAL INTEREST ISTEREST GOODS ABD GOODS AND BOBIUAL BOMINAL TOTAL BEAL INTEREST PAYHEUTS PAYSEBTS SERVICES SERVICES DEBT-#ET DEBT-EET DEBI-BET OVER (BILLIONS (BILLIONS (BILLIONS GROWTH (BILLIORES GROWTH 2/ ExXeorkts or or OF RATE or BATE (19802 100) (PERCENT) DOLLARS) DOLLARS) DOLLARS) (PERCENT) DOLLARS) (PERCENT) 1974 -12.3 ~0.3 0.2 2.3 - 8.4 - 85.5 1975 ~a4.5 -0.3 0.2 1.8 21.7 5.9 38.1 105.0 1976 -0.2 -0.0 0.3 2.4 33.3 5.4 ~8.5 90.9 1977 -0.3 -0.0 0.3 2-5 8.2 $.3 -1.9 83.8 1978 1.7 0.1 0.5 3.0 20.0 5.4 1.9 79.3 1979 -1.5 -0.1 0.6 4.7 56.7 7.0 29.6 92.4 1980 -3.5 ~0.2 0.8 6.3 38.0 8.6 22.9 100.0 1981 ~1.2 -0.1 1.0 6.1 -3.2 12.5 95.3 131.7 1982 7.7 0.5 1.8 6.5 6.6 15.2 21.6 150.9 1983 9.7 0.7 w2. Ct. 722 10.3 15.7 3.5 - 151.8 1984 6.8 0.6 1.2 8.8 17.7 16.1 2.3 189.0 1985 . 5.9 0.6 1.2 9.6 13.6 17.0 5.5 151.3 1986 5.4 0.6 8.3 10.9 13.6 18.8% 8.5 157.6 8987 a.8 0.6 4 12.8 93.6 20.5 2.0 168.3 1988 8.4 0.6 1.5 4.1 13.6 22.6 10.8 178.6 1989 3.9 0.6 1.6 16.0 13.6 24.8 9.8 188.6 1990 3.8 ' 007 1.7 18.2 13.6 27.2 9.6 198.8 CURREST IaPLICIT CUBOLATED TOTAL REAL ACCOUNT TRADE CAPITAL CAPITAL REAL BOBIRAL REAL DEBT-WET BALAICE BALANCE OUTFLOW OUTFLO ISPORTS INTEREST ISTEREST GROSTB (BILLIONS (BILLIONS (BILLIONS (BILLIONS GROWTH RATE RATE RATE OF or or oF RATE (PERCEST) (PERCEET) (PERCENT) DOLLABS) DOLLABS) DOLLARS) DOLLARS) (PERCENT) 197% - -0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 - 4.3 ~6.7 2975 22.9 -0.6 o.1 0.8 1.0 28.2 a.1 -5.1 1976 713.4 0.1 0.6 ~0.4 0.6 -0.3 5.7 -0.1 1977 -7.8 ~0.7 -Q.t -0.7 -0.1 33.0 6.4 -0.1 1978 5.48 -t.1 0.4 -0.8 -0.9 15.3 8.6 1.0 1979 16.5 -1.2 -0.8 0.6 -0.3 24.6 10.2 -1.1 1980 8.2 -2.0 -0.8 -0.2 -0.5 18.48 10.6 2.9 198% 31.7 ~4.7 2.6 0.8 -0.9 34.2 9.7 70.7 1982 18.6 2.3 0.2 0.9 -0.0° -18.0 9.7 3.6 1983 0.8 -1.0 1.3 0.0 -0.0 -6.3 7.7 9.5 1984 1.6 -0.9 1.5 0.0 -0.0 10.8 7.6 3.6 1985 1.8 -8.4 1.0 . 0.0 -0.0 15.3 7.8 3.4 1986 4.3 “1.9 0.5 0.0 70.90 13.6 7.3 3.3 1987 6.7 -2.5 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 12.4 Tel 3.1 1988 6.2 2.6 Q.0 0.0 -0.0 8.0 6.9 2.9 1989 5.6 2.7 0.0 0.0 -0.0 8.1 6.6 2.6 1990 5.4 2.9 0.0 0.0 -0.0 4.3 6.4 2.6

re ee ee re eee we.

ee a ee a

1/ HISTORICAL DATA FOB 1974-82, PBOJECTIONS FOR 1983-90 2/ TOTAL SCAINAL DEBT-NET DIVIDED BY U.S. GEP DEFLATOR

| | | |

$974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 31980 $981 1982

1983 1984 1985 3986 1987 1988 1989 1990

1978

1975

1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

1983 1988 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

BEAL INTEREST OVER BxPoRTS (PERCENT)

-0.8 ~0.6 2.0 0.6 0.1 ~1.1 -1.6 3.0 6.9

8.6 7.3 6.6 6.0 5.2 4.5 3.9 3.5

‘tOTAL REAL DEBT-NET GROgTE RATE (PERCENT)

31.7 2.8 6.4

32.2

23.3

13.6

—-3.4

26.2

4.2 1.4 1.5 0.0 -1.3

REAL ISTEREST PAYSEWTS (BILLIONS oF DOLLARS)

-0.0 -0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.4 0.8 2.0

2.6 2.4 2.5 2.6 2-6 2.5 2.5 2.5

CURREAT accouNt BALAECE (BILLIONS or DOLLABS)

~2.0 -1.9 ~0.3

0.0 -1.1 48.2 -5.3 —4.6 -2.5

2.48 -1.9 -2.0 -1.6 ~t.1 ~0.6 0.6 0.6

APPENDIX TABLE 12

BASELINE SCEEAERIO $/ -- KOREA

NOMINAL EXPORTS OF EXPORTS OF GOODS AND GOODS AUD

INTEREST PAYMENTS SERVICES (BILLIONS (BILLIOAS oF or DOLLARS) DOLLARS) 0.4 5.8 0.5 5.9 0.6 9.5 0.6 13.3 0.8 17.2 1.8 19.5 202 22.6 3.1 27.3 3.6 28.8 3.6 29.9 3.8 33.5 3.9 38.1 a. 83.3 &.1 89.2 4.1 55.9 a.1 63.6 4.1 72.2 TaPLIciIt TRADE CAPITAL BALANCE OUTFLOW (BILLIONS (BILLIONS oF or DOLLARS) DOLLARS) ~1.9 -0.3 -1.7 0.3 ~0.6 0.4 -0.5 1.1 1.8 2.6 -G.4 0.8 ~4.4 “0.6 -3.6 73.2 2.4 5.3 -2.3 0.0 1.6 0.0 ~1.6 0.0 -1.0 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

1/ MISTORICAL DATA FOR 1974-42, PROJECTIONS POR 1983-90

2/ TOTAL BOMLNAL DEBI-~NET DIVIDED BY U.S.

GNP DEPLATOR

2 ee en ere ee eee

SERVICES GROTH RATE (PERCENT)

9.9 60.7 38.2 31.3 13.8 15.6 20.8

4.2

LEE A TY OD AP ES GD SP SOD

5.17 12.3 13.6 13.6 13.6 13.6 13.6 13.6

CUMULATED CAPITAL OUTFLOW

(BILLIONS

OF

DOLLAES)

~-0.3

-0.0 0.3 1.4 a.0 4.3 3.7 0.5- 5.8

NOMIBAL TOTAL REAL

TOTAL TOTAL BOAT HAL DEBT-BET DEBT-NET (BILLIONS GROWTE oF RATE DOLLARS) (PERCEST)

4.8 -

6.9 43.8

7.5 8.7

8.5 13.3 12.1 42.8 56.6 37.2 2%.3 28.3 22.7 6.6

"30.8 33.9 32.7 7.5 34.5 5.5

"36.8 5.6 37.9 8.0 38.9 2.7 39.4 1.3 39.8 1.2 40.3 1.3

REAL BOAIBAL

IMPORTS INTEREST Gaouta BATE

RATE (PERCENT) (PERCENT)

- 10.0 -48.8 8.5 27.2 8.3 28.6 7.5 28.9 7.8

8.1 9.8 5.8 14.6 11.6 $4.1

1.5 13.6

4.1 19.3

6.4 411.3

9.8 11.1

8.2 $1.0

8.7 10.7

8.9 10.5 10.0 10.2

9.9 10.2

DEBT-AET 2/

(9980= 100)

37.6 99.6 51.0 54.3 V1.7 88.5 100.0 96.6 121.9

127.0 128.8 130.8 130.8 129.1 125.8 122.3 119.1

REAL INTEREST

RATE (PERCENT)

-1.0 -0.6 2-6 120 0.3 “1.5 71.9 3.8

1974 1975 1976 1977 1878 1979 1980 1981 3982

3983 1988 3985 3986 1987 1988 1989 1990

3974 1975 31976 1977 1978 1979 3980 1981 1982

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 $989 8990

APPENDIX TABLE 13

BASELINE SCENABIO 1/ -- HEXICO

REAL MOHIUAL EXPORTS OF EXPORTS OF TOTAL TOTAI.

REAL XETEREST IETEREST GOODS AED GOODs aND BOSINAL WOAINWAL TOTAL REAL INTEREST PAISEITS PAZHENTS SERVICES SERVICES DEBT-"ET DEBT- Blt DEET-HET OVER (BILLIONS (BILLIONS (BILLIONS GROWTH (BILLIONS GROTH 2/ BxrPORTS or or oF BATE or BATE (1980= 100).

(PERCEBT) DOLLAES) DOLL ABS) DOLLARS) (PERCEST) DOLLABS) (PERCENT) -8.3 -0.5 0.7 5.8 - 12.6 - 80.3 -$.7 0.8 1.0 6.8 10.3 17.3 3765 50.7

5.9 0.8 1.6 722 92.5 23.6 36.4 65.8

1.0 0.1 12.8 9.0 25.0 29.1 2323 75.8 -1.3 -0.1 2-2 911.5 27.8 32.3 31.6 78.2 6.5 1.0 3.0 16.0 39.1 39.3 20.7 85.5 -6.8 71.6 &.6 24.6 53.8 52.2 32.8 100.0

1.9 0.6 720 30.5 24.0 72.1 38.1 125.2 16.0 a9 9.6 30.4 -0.3 81.7 13.43 133.6

Sr er es GR eee eee: PPP PTD LT I SED EN, SS AS SS a

16.7 5.4 7.9 32.2 6.0 80.48 -1.6 127.5 12.8 4.6 728 36.7 qa.) 79.0 -1.8 120.4 10.6 4.8 726 at. 12.5 81.8 3.0 119.3

9.9 a5 7.9 45.3 9.4 87.1 720 122.7

9.3 8.6 8.3 89.6 9.7 96.12 10.8 130.3

8.8 8.8 8.8 $4.6 9.9 105.8 10.0 137.9

8.2 8.9 9.4 60.1 10.2 115.9 9.6 145.3

8.2 5.4 10.3 66.4 10. 4 127.0 9.6 153.1

CURRENT ISPLICIT COBULATED TOTAL REAL accoust TRADE CAPITAL CAPITAL REAL WOMI SAL REAL DEBI- NET BALAECE BALAICE OUTFLOW OUTFLON IuPORTS ISTEREST INTEREST GROUTH (BILLIONS (BILLIONS (BILLIONS (BILLIONS GROWTH RATE RATE BATE or or or or RATE (PERCENT) (PERCENT) (@ERCENT) DOLLARS) DOLL ARS) DOLLARS) DOLLARS) (PERCENT)

- 2.9 -2.8 1.6 1.6 - 6.5 74.5 25.8 48.2 -3.1 %.1 2.7 1.9 6.7 . 72.5 29.0 7303 2.1 3.5 6.2 -4&.9 728 2.1 15.8 -1.8 -0.5 8.3 10.5 ~7.6 6.8 0.8

3.1 302 -1.2 0.8 411.3 26.4 722 -0.5

9.3 5.5 2.2 2.8 18.1 26.5 8.4 2.9 17.0 7.7 -1.7 7.0 21.2 22.9 10.1 -3.4 25.2 713.9 ~3.1 8.3 29.8 34.6 41.3 0.9

6.7 -3.8 7.7 6.9 36.3 -28.6 12.5 6.3 4.6 0.2 10.0 0.0 36.3 2.6 9.8 6.6 ~5.6 0.3 10.0 0.0 36.3 4.3 9.7 5.7 -0.9 3.5 6.0 0.0 36.3 28.6 9.5 5.5

2.8 6.8 3.0 0.0 36.3 13.7 9.3 5.3

6.2 -10.2 0.0 0.0 36.3 $2.1 9.0 5.0

5.8 -10.7 6.9 0.0 36.3 $.3 8.8 4.8

5.8 01.3 0.0 0.0 36.3 5.5 9-5 4.5

5.3 ~ 02.2 0.0 0.0 36.3 5.8 8.5 4.5

i/ HISTORICAL DATA POR 1974-82, PROJECTIONS FOR 1983-90 2/ TOTAL NOMLMAL DEBT-BET DIVIDED BY U.S. GUP DEPLATOR

1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

1983 1988 19865 1986 31987 1988 1989 990

1978 - 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 3981 1982

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1968 1989 1990

REAL INTEREST OVER EXPORTS (PERCENT)

8.0 -12.2 1a -4.3 -1.6 1.3 -6.2 -0.5 9.1

4.4

TOTAL REAL

DE BT-NET GROWTH RATE

(PERCENT)

63.8 5.4 4.4 Lo -10.8 6.2 10.9"

ew ew ewe oe omen

2.1 -6.8 2.4 m4 70.6 -0.6 -0.7

-C.5

Le NS SD Seeman queen

REAL INTEREST PAYMESTS (BILLIONS

or DOLLARS)

-0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.0 0.1 0.3 =0.0 0.4

0.8% 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.48

CORREBT accoune

- BALANCE

(BILLIOES oF DOLLARS)

~0.7 =1.5 71.2

0.8

0.1 8.5 1.4

-0.2

0.2 -0.3 ~0.4 70.5 -0.5 70.5

APPENDIX TABLE 14 BASELINE SCENARIO 17 —

BOMINAL 2XPORTS OF EXPORTS OF

LUTEREST PAYMENTS (BILLIONS OF DOLL ABS)

0.2 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.6 1.0 0.8

0.9

TRADE BALANCE (BILLIONS ar DOLLARS)

-0.4 1.1 -0.7 -0.4

0.3 . 1.6

0.8 70.6

0.3 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.0

GOODS AND GOODS aAyD SERVICES SERVICES (BILLIONS GROWTH OF BATE DOLLARS) (PERCENT) 1.9 - 1.7 ~8.4 1.8 1.9 2.1 22.2 228 12.7 4.2 72.0 4.9 16.7. 4.3 ~12.2 3.9 ~8.0 8.0 2.2 8.5 12.8 5.1 13.6 5.8 13.6 6.6 13.6 7.5 13.6 8.5 13.6 9.7 13.6 ISPLICIT COMULATED CAPITAL CAPITAL OUTFLOW OUTFLOW (BILLIOHS (BILLIONS OF oF DOLLARS) DOLLARS) ~0.1 ~0.1 1.48 1.3 0.3 1.6 -0.1 1.5 0.5 2.0 0.3 2.3 0.2... 2.5 0.2 2.7 0.8 3.1 0.0 3.3 0.0 3.1 0.0 3.1 0.0 3.1 0.0 3.1 0.0 3.1 0.0 3.2 0.0 3.1

1/ BISTORICIL DATA POR 1974-82, PROJECTIONS POR 1983-90 2/ TOTAL MOXIMAL DEBT-NET DIVIDED BY G.S. GHP DEPLATOR

LS ED SN a ae eS ee oe ae eee

TOTAL BOSIWAL DEBT~NET (BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

3.3 5.9 722 8.0 8.7 8.1 6.2 9.6 11.3

18.8 4.1 11.3 11.6 14.9 12.3 12.7 13.2

REAL TAaPORTS GROWTH

RATE

(PERCE?)

ta.7 -15.8 2.3 -30.8 3.0 36.7 24.8 3.4

~21.0 -1.1 22.5 11.0 10.5 8.8 8.8 &.9

LLL SS SP Oe ED AP APD UE ad OO aD ene ee eee a

—— SLPS ES EE Nc wee ee eee we ee we

TOTAL

BOMIHAL TOTAL REAL DEBT-NET DEBT-BET GROWTH 2/

BATE (1980= 100) (PEBCENT)

- 67.2 78.8 110.1 22.0 127.1 14.1 132.6

8.7 138.0 -6.9 112.1

1.2 100.0 17.1 106.1 17.7 117.7 ‘0.9 915.1 72.7 107.7

1.6 105.2

2.5 103.7

3.8 103.0

3.3 102.8

3.3 101.7

3.8 1013.1

SOMISAL REAL INTEREST XIHTEREST RATE RATE (PERCENT) (PERCENT)

6.0 -5.0

§.6 ~8.6

6.1 0.8

$.3 1.2

7-2 -0.5 {1.9 0.6

9.8 ~3.7 10.1 0.2

9.6 3.4

8.1 4.9

8.0 8.0

7.9 3.9 7.8 3.8

726 3.6 7.5 3.5 7.3 3.3

Te3 3.3

| | |

197% 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1982 1982

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

1978 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

1983 1984 1985 1966 1987 1988 1989 1990

REAL INTEREST

OVER ExXPoRrs (PERCE ST)

-0.6 -2.2 0.6 -2.5 2.48 1.4 “1.7 3.0 8.2 11.3 9.6 8.9 8. 6.9 5.8 a.9 4.8

TOTAL REAL DEBT-NET GROUTE RATE (P ERCEET)

69.1 $3.7 32.8 21.6 12.3

5.7 12.8 18.1

3.8 7.8 9.0 0.3 -2.1 2.2 2.4

REAL INTEREST PATSEUTS (BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

-0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.8 Q.1 -0.1 0.2 0.7

wwwooows

COC aaa © aw

COBREST acccost BALANCE

(BILLIONS

or DOLLARS)

-0.9 ~i.1 -0.8 0.2 1.6 ~2.1 ~2.3 ~3.4

2.7 2.8 2.2 1.5 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9

APPENDIX TABLE 15

NOKBINAL EXPORTS OF EXPORTS OF

IBTEBREST GOODS AND GOODS AED PAYMENTS SERVICES SERVICES {BILLIONS (BILLIONS GROSTE or OF RATE DOLL ABS) DOLLARS) (PERCENT) 0.1 3.5 - 0.3 3.2 -10.1 0.2 3.8 6.9 0.2 4.2 22.9 0.6 8.8 16.4 1.0 6.2 27.8 1.2 7.9 27.8 1.5 8.4 6-2 1.6 8.2 -1.8 1.5 8.5 3.6 1.7 9.8 V4.1 1.8 10.7 13.6 1.9 12.2 13.6 1.9 33.9 13.6 1.9 158.7 13.6 1.9 17.9 13.6 1.9 20.3 13.6 ISPLICIT CUBDLATED TRADE CAPITAL CAPITAL BALANCE OOTFLOW OUTFLOW (BILLIONS (BILLIONS (BILLIONS or Or OF DOLLARS) DOLLARS) DOLLARS) -0.4 002 0.2 1.2 0.3 0.5 -tt, 0.5 1.0 123 0.7 2.7 -1.5 0.3 3.0 -1.9 -0.3 2-7 ~2.2 0.7 3.4 — -2.8 0.5 3.9 2.2 0.0 3-9 -2.1 0.0 3.9 -1.4 0.0 3.9 -0.6 0.0 3.9 0.0 0.0 3.9 0.0 0.0 3.9 0.0 0.0 3.9 0.0 0.0 3.9

1/ SISTORICAL DATA FOR 1974-82, PROJECTIONS FoR 1983-90 2/ TOTAL BOSINAL DEBT-BET DIVIDED BY U.S. G#P DEFLATOR

BASELIBE SCENARIO 1/ — PHILIPPINES

TOTAL TOTAL NOMINAL DEBT-NET DEBST-SET (BILLIONS GROWTH or RATE DOLLARS) (PEBCENT) 1.3 - 2.8 88.6 3.9 62.5 5.5 81.0 722 30.9 9.0 25.0 10.8 20.0 13.4 24.1 16.8 25.8 19.0 13.2 21.3 12.1 23.1 8.2 24.1 8.5 28.5 1.8 24.9 1.7 25.3 1.5 25.7 1.6 REAL WOSIWAL ISPORTS INTEREST GROWTH BATE RATE (PERCENT) (PERCENT) - 9.1 0.8 5.8 6.1 6.3 3.8 4.3 3.5 9.8 5.6 12.3 6.6 12.1 5.0 12.4 15.2 10.6 -3.6 8.5 4.6 8.5 1.3 8.3 1.7 8.2 4.5 7.9 9.9 7.7 9.8 7.5 9.7 7.5

NOAIBHAL TOTAL REAL

DEBT-NET 27

(1980= 100)

20.1 38.0 52.3 69.2 84.2 94.6 100.0 112.4 132.8

owe « eer ewe wee

145.8 157.2 163.5 168.2 160.7 157.1 153.8 189.9

REAL INTEREST

RATE (PERCENT)

71.9 -3.7 0.6 1.8 1.1 ~18 2.1 aa

5.8 8.5 4.3 §.2 3.9 3.7

les

APPENDIX TABLE 16 BASELINE SCENARIO 1f —- VENEZOSLA

REAL WOMIWAL EXPORTS OF EXPORTS OF TOTAL TOTAL REAL INTEREST INTEREST GOODS AND GOODS AED NOMTHAL BOMIHAL TOTAL REAL INTEREST PAYMENTS PAYSESTS SERVICES SERVICES DEBT-WET DEBT-NET DEBT~ NET ' OVER (BILLIONS (BILLIONS (BELLIOBES GROUTH (BILLIONS GROWTH 2/ RXPORTS OF or OF RATE oP RATE (1980= 100) (PERCENT) DOLLARS) BOLLAES) DOLLARS) (PERCENT) DOLLARS) (PERCENT) 1974 0.0 0.0: 0.2 12.0 - -t.t - 721.9 1975 2.0 0.2 0.0 10.1 ~16.2 -3.3 200.0 -60.1 1976 0.8 0.1 -0.1 10.4 2.8 ~3.2 3.0 ~55.2 1977 2.2 0.2 0.1 10.9 5.5 -1,2 -62.5 19.48 1978 3.3 0.4 0.5 10.9 -0.8 5.9 ~516.6 75.2 1979 3.1 0.5 1.3 16.3 50.2 9.0 80.0 121.6 1980 2.8 0.6 1.8 22.2 36.4 8.4 6.7 100.0 1981 4.0 1.0 2.0 24.5 10.3 11.2 33.3 120.8 1982 7.4 1.5 2.5 19.5 -20.5 22.9 104.5 232.8 1983 10.1 1.9 2.6 19.1 -2.2 20.8 9.1 205.2 3984 724 1.6 2.4 21.5 12.7 18.9 -9.1 179.3 1985 5.8 1.5 2.2 25.5 18.7 19.3 1.8 175.6 1986 5.7 1.5 2.4 27.2 6.7 2t.2 10.2 186.0 1987 5.7 1.7 2.6 29.1 6.9 28.8 16.9 209.2 1988 5.9 1.8 2.9 31.1 Tet 28.7 15.7 232.8 1989 5.9 2.0 302 33.4 7.8 33.90 14.7 256.8 1990 6.3 2.3 3.7 36.0 7.6 37.7 14.2 282.1 CURRENT XIsPLicit CUASCLATED TCvVAL REAL account TRADE CAPITAL CAPITAL REAL BOAIBAL REAL DR BT-NET BALANCE BALASCE OUTFLOR OUTFLOS IsPORTS ISTEREST ISTEREST GROWTH (BILLIOWS (BILLIONS (BILLIONS (BILLIONS GROWTH RATE RATE RATE OF OF or or RATE (PERCENT) (PERCENT) (PERCENT) DOLLARS) DOLLARS) DOLLARS) DOLLAES) (PERCEBT) 1974. = 6.1 702 -0.3 -0.1 - 14.1 0.1 1975 174.9 2.4 3.4 0.6 0.6 22.1 -0.0 ~9.1 1976 ~8.3 0.5 1.9 -0.3 0.3 30.2 3.1 -2.7 1977 -68.8 72.9 ~0.6 -0.9 -0.6 28.6 -4.5 11.0 1978 ~ 887.0 -5.3 “2.1 0.9 0.3 8.2 26.3 18.7 1979 61.8 0.8 8.2 4.8 5.4 —22.6 18.6 723 1980 ~17.8 5.2 8.2 6.6 9.8. -11.8 20.7 702 i988 20.8 5.4 728 7.4 17.2 18.1 20.4 ~10.1 $982 92.6 -3.5 3.4 8.3 25.5 9.8 18.7 8.5 1983 -11.8 2.0 5.7 0.0 25.5 -22.8 32.9 8.8 19848 ~12.6 1.8 5.3 0.0 25.5 15.3 12.0 8.9 1985 -2.1 -0.4 2.9 0.0 25.5 31.8 14.7 77 1986 6.0 ~2.1 1.4 0.0 25.5 9.1 311.6 726 1987 12.4 -3.7 0.0 0.0 25.5 729 11.2 702 1988 11.3 4.0 0.0 0.0 25.5 2.8 10.8 6.8 1989 10.3 ~48&.5 0.0 0.0 25.5 3.0 10.8 6.4 1990 9.8 4.8 0.0 0.0 25.5 3.3 10.8 6.4

en en wn ee ne ee ee eee re ew ee we.

U/ BISTORICAL LATA FOR 1978-82, PROJECTIONS FOR 1983-90 2/ TOTAL NOMISAL DEBT-S2T DIVIDED BY U.S. GHP DEFLATOR

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