How Biased Are U.S. Government Forecasts of the Federal Debt?
Abstract
Government debt and forecasts thereof attracted considerable attention during the recent financial crisis. The current paper analyzes potential biases in different U.S. government agencies' one-year-ahead forecasts of U.S. gross federal debt over 1984-2012. Standard tests typically fail to detect biases in these forecasts. However, impulse indicator saturation (IIS) detects economically large and highly significant time-varying biases, particularly at turning points in the business cycle. These biases do not appear to be politically related. IIS defines a generic procedure for examining forecast properties; it explains why standard tests fail to detect bias; and it provides a mechanism for potentially improving forecasts.
K.7 How Biased Are U.S. Government Forecasts of the Federal Debt? Ericsson, Neil R. Please cite paper as: Ericsson, Neil R. (2017). How Biased Are U.S. Government Forecasts of the Federal Debt? International Finance Discussion Papers 1189. https://doi.org/10.17016/IFDP.2017.1189 International Finance Discussion Papers Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Number 1189 January 2017
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System International Finance Discussion Papers Number 1189 January 2017 How Biased Are U.S. Government Forecasts of the Federal Debt? Neil R. Ericsson NOTE: International Finance Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. References to International Finance Discussion Papers (other than an acknowledgment that the writer has had access to unpublished material) should be cleared with the author or authors. Recent IFDPs are available on the Web at www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/. This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network electronic library at www.ssrn.com.
HOW BIASED ARE U.S. GOVERNMENT FORECASTS OF THE FEDERAL DEBT? Neil R. Ericsson ∗ January 6, 2017 Abstract: Government debt and forecasts thereof attracted considerable attention during the recent financial crisis. The current paper analyzes potential biases in different U.S. government agencies’ one-year-ahead forecasts of U.S. gross federal debt over 1984—2012. Standard tests typically fail to detect biases in these forecasts. However, impulse indicator saturation (IIS) detects economically large and highly significant time-varying biases, particularly at turning points in the business cycle. These biases do not appear to be politically related. IIS defines a generic procedure for examining forecast properties; it explains why standard tests fail to detect bias; and it provides a mechanism for potentially improving forecasts. Keywords: Autometrics, bias, debt, federal government, forecasts, impulse indicator saturation, heteroscedasticity, projections, United States. JEL classifications: H68, C53. Forthcoming in the International Journal of Forecasting as the articles “How Biased Are U.S. ∗ Government Forecasts of the Federal Debt?” (Sections 1—7 below) and “Interpreting Estimates of Forecast Bias” (Appendix A below). Appendix B below lists the data and forecasts analyzed. An earlier version of this paper was titled “Detecting and Quantifying Biases in Government Forecasts of the U.S. Gross Federal Debt”. The author is a staff economist in the Division of International Finance, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC 20551 USA, and a Research Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, The George Washington University, Washington, DC 20052 USA. He may be reached on the Internet at ericsson@frb.gov and ericsson@gwu.edu. The views in this paper are solely the responsibility of the author and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or of any other person associated with the Federal Reserve System. The author is grateful to Danny Bachman, Russell Davidson, Ed Gamber, David Hendry, Stedman Hood, Rob Hyndman, Søren Johansen, FredJoutz, AndrewKane, KajalLahiri, JeffreyLiebner, PrakashLoungani, Aaron Markiewitz, Jaime Marquez, Andrew Martinez, Toshihiko Mukoyama, Bent Nielsen, Felix Pretis, JohnRogers,TaraSinclair,HermanStekler,BenTaylor,ChristopherWilliams,andtwoanonymous referees for helpful discussions and comments; and, in addition, to Stedman Hood for invaluable research assistance, and to Andrew Martinez for providing the data and forecasts analyzed and for stimulatingmyinterestinthistopic. NumericalresultswereobtainedusingMicrosoft’s32-bitExcel 2013 and Doornik and Hendry’s (2013) PcGive Version 14.1, Autometrics Version 1.5g, and Ox Professional Version 7.10 in 64-bit OxMetrics Version 7.10.
1 Introduction Government debt attracted considerable attention during the recent financial crisis and Great Recession. In the United States, federal debt limits, sequestration, and the federal government shut-down have posed substantial economic, political, and policy challenges; see The Economist (November 20, 2010), Podkul (2011), Bernanke (2011, 2013),Chokshi(2013),andYellen(2014,pp.20—21)interalia. InEurope,government debt and fiscal policy are central to current discussions about the euro-area crisis. Because future outcomes of government debt are unknown, forecasts of that debt may matter in government policy, so it is of interest to ascertain how good those forecasts are, and howthey might be improved. A central focus in forecast evaluation is forecastbias, especiallybecauseforecastbiasesaresystematic, andbecauseignored forecast biases may have substantive adverse consequences for policy. Building on Martinez (2011, 2015), the current paper analyzes potential biases in different U.S. government agencies’ one-year-ahead forecasts of the U.S. gross federal debt over 1984—2012. Standard tests typically do not detect biases in these forecasts. However, a recently developed technique–impulse indicator saturation–detects economicallylargeandhighlystatisticallysignificanttime-varyingbiasesintheforecasts, particularly for 1990, 1991, 2001—2003, and 2008—2011. Biases differ according to the agency making the forecasts as well as over time. Biases are typically associated with turning points in the business cycle and (to a lesser degree) economic expansions, and thus are highly nonlinear and dynamic. That said, the forecast biases do not appear to be politically related. Impulse indicator saturation defines a generic procedure for examining forecast properties; it explains why standard tests fail to detect forecast bias; and it provides a mechanism for potentially improving the forecasts. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the forecasts being analyzed. Section 3 discusses different approaches to testing for potential forecast bias and proposes impulse indicator saturation as a generic test of forecast bias. Section 4 describes indicator saturation techniques, including impulse indicator saturation and several of its extensions. Section 5 presents evidence on forecast bias, using the methods detailed in Sections 3 and 4. Section 6 re-examines the forecast biases in light of business-cycle turning points. Section 7 concludes. 2 The Data and the Forecasts This section describes the data on the United States gross federal debt and the three differentone-year-aheadforecastsofthatdebtthatareanalyzedherein. Theforecasts are denoted by their sources: CBO (Congressional Budget Office) in its Budget and Economic Outlook, • OMB(OfficeofManagementandBudget)initsBudgetoftheU.S.Government, • and 1
APB (Analysis of the President’s Budget). • The Congressional Budget Office and the Office of Management and Budget are different agencies within the U.S. federal government. The Analysis of the President’s Budget is produced by the Congressional Budget Office, but the forecast in the Analysis of the President’s Budget is referred to as the “APB forecast” in order to distinguish it from the “CBO forecast”, which appears in the CBO’s Budget and Economic Outlook. The agencies’ publications detail how debt is forecast and the assumptions made in generating those forecasts. Significantly, the CBO forecast assumes that current law remains unchanged, whereas the OMB and APB forecasts assume that the president’s proposed budget is implemented. The assumptions underlying the forecasts, the complex process involved in generating the forecasts, and the goals and objectives of that process are of considerable interest in their own right and merit detailed examination. However, in the spirit of Stekler (1972), Chong and Hendry (1986), and Fildes and Stekler (2002) inter alia, the current paper focuses on the properties of the forecasts themselves. The data on the debt are published by the Financial Management Service at the U.S. Department of the Treasury in the Treasury Bulletin. The data on debt are annual (end of fiscal year) over 1984—2012 (29 observations) andarefortotalgrossfederaldebtoutstandingheldbythepublicandthegovernment. The CBO, OMB, and APB forecasts typically are published in late January, early February, and early March respectively, where those months directly precede the end of the fiscal year (September 30); see Martinez (2011, Table 2; 2015) for details. For convenience, these forecasts are called “one-year-ahead”, even though the actual horizon is somewhat less than one year, differs for the three forecasts, and varies somewhat from one year to the next. Debt and its forecasts are in billions of U.S. dollars (nominal), and the analysis below is of the logs of debt and of its forecasts. Figure 1 plots actual U.S. gross federal debt and its forecasts by the CBO, OMB, and APB (in logs, denoted by lowercase). Actual and forecast values appear close, reflecting in part the scale of the graph: debt increases by approximately an order of magnitude over the sample. Figure 2 plots the forecast errors for the log of U.S. gross federal debt. The forecast errors for all three forecasts are often small–under 2% in absolute value–but sometimes they are much larger, and with the magnitude and even the sign differing across agency as well as by forecast date. Forecast errors are often persistent, suggestive of systematic biases in the forecasts. For comparison, the growth rate of debt is 83% on average, and its standard deviation is 41%. The presence of forecast bias has both economic significance and statistical significance. That said, the particular sense in which forecast bias is significant depends in part on whether an agency’s forecasts are interpreted as “forecasts” or as “projections”, where “projections” are in the sense of being policy simulations conditional upon a certain set of assumptions. If the agency’s forecasts are interpreted qua forecasts, then forecast bias implies potential room for improvement in terms of standard 2
ddeebbtt ccbboo 9.5 oommbb aappbb 9.0 8.5 8.0 7.5 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Figure 1: Actual U.S. gross federal debt and its forecasts by the CBO, OMB, and APB (in logs). 0.06 ddeebbtt--ccbboo ↑ under-prediction ddeebbtt--oommbb 0.04 ddeebbtt--aappbb 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 ↓ over-prediction -0.06 -0.08 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Figure 2: Forecast errors for the log of U.S. gross federal debt. 3
performance measures such as the root mean squared error. If the forecasts are interpreted qua projections, then forecast bias implies a limited usefulness of the forecasts as representing interesting hypothetical paths for economic policy. With that in mind, the agencies’ forecasts are always referred to as “forecasts” below, while recognizing that some of these forecasts may be more usefully viewed as projections. This broader usageof the term“forecast” is alsoin line withClements andHendry(2002b, p. 2): “A forecast is any statement about the future”. For some previous analyses of these and other governmental and institutional forecasts, see Corder (2005), Engstrom and Kernell (1999), Frankel (2011), Joutz and Stekler (2000), Nunes (2013), Sinclair, Joutz, and Stekler (2010), Romer and Romer (2008), and Tsuchiya (2013). Finally, many prior studies have compared forecasts whose assumptions differ from each other. Hence, the differing assumptions of the CBO, OMB, and APB forecasts are not grounds per se for not comparing the forecasts. 3 Approaches to Detecting Forecast Bias This section considers different approaches for assessing potential forecast bias, starting with the standard test of forecast bias by Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969). This section then discusses how Chong and Hendry’s (1986) forecast-encompassing test is interpretable as a test of time-varying forecast bias. Finally, this section proposes using impulse indicator saturation as a generic test of arbitrarily time-varying forecast bias. This generic test generalizes the Mincer—Zarnowitz test, which is a test of a constant (i.e., time-invariant) forecast bias. MincerandZarnowitz(1969, pp. 8—11)suggesttestingforforecastbiasbyregressing the forecast error on an intercept and testing whether the intercept is statistically significant. That is, for a variable at time and its forecast ˆ, estimate the equa- tion: ( ˆ) = + = 1 (1) − where is the intercept, is the error term at time , and is the number of ob- servations. A test of = 0 is interpretable as a test that the forecast ˆ is unbiased for the variable . For one-step ahead forecasts, the error may be serially uncorre- lated, in which case a - or -statistic for = 0 may be appropriate. For multi-step ahead forecasts, generally will be serially correlated; hence, inference about the intercept may require some accounting for that autocorrelation. MincerandZarnowitz(1969, p. 11)alsoproposeavariantofequation(1)inwhich the coefficient on ˆ is estimated rather than imposed. That variant is: = + ˆ + = 1 (2) 0 1 where is the intercept, and is the coefficient on ˆ. Mincer and Zarnowitz 0 1 (1969) interpret a test that = 1 as a test of the efficiency of the forecast ˆ for 1 4
the outcome . The joint hypothesis = 0 = 1 is of interest to test as well. 0 1 { } Subtracting ˆ from both sides, equation (2) may be conveniently rewritten as: ( ˆ) = + ˆ + = 1 (3) − 0 ∗1 where = 1. Hence,thehypothesis = 0 = 0 inequation(3)isequivalent ∗1 1 − { 0 ∗1 } to = 0 = 1 in equation (2). 0 1 { } Below, “Mincer—Zarnowitz A” denotes the regression-based test of = 0 in equation (1), whereas “Mincer—Zarnowitz B” denotes the regression-based test of = 0 = 0 in equation (3). While equations (2) and (3) are equivalent, equa- { 0 ∗1 } tion(3)isreportedbelowbecauseitparallelsthestructureofequation(1), with ˆ − as the dependent variable. Mincer—Zarnowitz A (i.e., testing = 0 in equation (1)) is itself equivalent to testing = 0 in equation (3), subject to the restriction that 0 = 0. See Holden and Peel (1990) and Stekler (2002) for expositions on these tests ∗1 as tests of unbiasedness and efficiency, and Sinclair, Stekler, and Carnow (2012) for a recent discussion. Chong and Hendry (1986) propose another test about forecast errors, namely, a test of whether one model’s forecasts provide information about another model’s forecasterrors. Ifonemodel’sforecastsdoprovideinformationaboutanothermodel’s forecast errors, then those forecast errors are in part predictable. If not, then the latter model “forecast-encompasses” the first model. As Ericsson (1992) discusses, a necessary condition for forecast encompassing is having the smallest mean squared forecasterror(MSFE).Granger(1989)andDieboldandMariano(1995)proposetests of whether one model’s MSFE is less than another model’s MSFE. Chong and Hendry (1986) and subsequent authors implement many versions of the forecast-encompassing test. One appealing version is based on the regression: ( ˆ) = + (˜ ˆ) + 0 1 − · − = + = 1 (4) where ˆ is the forecast of by model 1 (say), ˜ is the forecast of by model 2, and and are regression coefficients. A test of = 0 is interpretable as a test 0 1 1 of whether discrepancies between the two models’ forecasts are helpful in explaining model 1’s forecast errors. The joint hypothesis = 0 = 0 is also of interest to 0 1 { } test. Equation (4) can be extended to compare several forecasts at once, in which case the right-hand side of equation (4) includes the differential of each alternative model’s forecast relative to model 1’s forecast; see Ericsson and Marquez (1993). Tests of forecast encompassing are interpretable as tests of time-varying forecast bias, as the second line in equation (4) indicates. The subscript on the intercept emphasizes the time dependence of the potential bias, which here is parameterized as + (˜ ˆ). The forecast-encompassing test thus focuses on a specific time- 0 1 · − varying form of potential forecast bias. 5
The time dependence of the forecast bias could be completely general, as follows: ( ˆ) = + − =1 = P + = 1 (5) where the impulse indicator is a dummy variable that is unity for = and zero otherwise, and is the corresponding coefficient for . Because the may have { } anyvalueswhatsoever, theintercept inequation(5)mayvaryarbitrarilyovertime. Inthiscontext,atestthatallcoefficients areequaltozeroisagenerictestofforecast unbiasedness. Because equation (5) includes coefficients, equation (5) cannot be estimatedunrestrictedly. However,thequestionbeingaskedcanbeansweredbyusing impulse indicator saturation, as is discussed in the following section. 4 Indicator Saturation Techniques Impulse indicator saturation (IIS) is a general procedure for model evaluation, and in particular for testing parameter constancy. As this section shows, IIS also can be used to test for time-varying forecast bias. Doing so provides a new application of impulse indicator saturation–as a generic test of forecast bias–noting that IIS has previously been employed for model evaluation, model design, and robust estimation. Section 4.1 discusses IIS and its extensions as a procedure for testing parameter constancy. Section 4.2 re-interprets existing tests of forecast bias as special cases of IIS and shows how IIS can be used to detect arbitrarily time-varying forecast bias. Sections5and6thenapplyIISanditsextensionstoanalyzepotentialbiasinforecasts of the U.S. gross federal debt. 4.1 Impulse Indicator Saturation and Extensions This subsection summarizes how impulse indicator saturation provides a general procedure for analyzing a model’s constancy. Specifically, IIS is a generic test for an unknown number of breaks, occurring at unknown times anywhere in the sample, with unknown duration, magnitude, and functional form. IIS is a powerful empirical tool for both evaluating and improving existing empirical models. Hendry (1999) proposed IIS as a procedure for testing parameter constancy. See Hendry, Johansen, and Santos (2008), Doornik (2009a), Johansen and Nielsen (2009, 2013), Hendry and Santos (2010), Ericsson (2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2016), Ericsson and Reisman (2012), Bergamelli and Urga (2014), Hendry and Pretis (2013), Hendry and Doornik (2014), Castle, Doornik, Hendry, and Pretis (2015), and Marczak and Proietti (2016) for further discussion and recent developments. Impulseindicatorsaturationusesthezero—oneimpulseindicatordummies to { } analyze properties of a model. For a sample of observations, there are such dummies, so the unrestricted inclusion of all dummies in an estimated model (thereby 6
“saturating” the sample) is infeasible. However, blocks of dummies can be included, and that insight provides the basis for IIS. To motivate how IIS is implemented in practice, this subsection employs a bare-bones version of IIS in two simple Monte Carlo examples. Example 1. This example illustrates the behavior of IIS when the model is correctly specified. Suppose that the data generation process (DGP) for the variable is: = + NID(02) = 1 (6) 0 ∼ where is normally and independently distributed with mean and variance 2. 0 Furthermore, suppose that the model estimated is a regression of on an intercept, i.e., the model is correctly specified. Figure 3a plots Monte Carlo data from the DGP in equation (6) with = 20, 2 = 1, and = 100. Figure 3b plots the estimated 0 model’s residuals, scaled by that model’s residual standard error. The bare-bones version of IIS is as follows. 1. Estimatethemodel,includingimpulseindicatordummiesforthefirsthalfofthe sample,asrepresentedbyFigure4a. Thatestimationisequivalenttoestimating the model over the second half of the sample, ignoring the first half. Drop all statistically insignificant impulse indicator dummies and retain the statistically significant ones (Figure 4b). 2. Repeat this process, but start by including impulse indicator dummies for the second halfofthesample(Figure4d),andretainthesignificantones(Figure4e). 3. Re-estimate the original model, including all dummies retained in the two block searches (Figure 4g), and select the statistically significant dummies from that combined set (Figure 4h). Hendry, Johansen, and Santos (2008) and Johansen and Nielsen (2009) have shown that, under the null hypothesis of correct specification, the expected number of impulse indicator dummies retained is roughly , where is the target size. In Figure 4h, five dummies are retained; = 5%; and = (5% 100) = 5, an exact · match. Example 2. This example illustrates the behavior of IIS when there is an unmodeled break. Suppose that the DGP for the variable is: = + + NID(02) = 1 (7) 0 1 64 ∼ where is a one-off step dummy that is equal to 0 ( = 163) or 1 ( = 64 64100), and is its coefficient in the DGP. The model estimated is a regression 1 of on an intercept alone, ignoring the break induced by the step dummy . As 64 in Example 1, is normally and independently distributed with a nonzero mean. However, that mean alters at = 64. The model ignores that change in mean (aka 7
(a) Actual and fitted values 22 AAccttuuaall FFiitttteedd 21 20 19 18 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 (b) Scaled residuals 2 1 0 -1 -2 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Figure 3: Actual and fitted values and the corresponding scaled residuals for the estimated model when the DGP does not have a break. Initial model: dummies included 1.0 0.5 0 50 100 1 kcolB Final model: Final model: (a) (b) dummies retained (c) actual and fitted 1.0 22 0.5 20 18 0 50 100 0 50 100 1.0 0.5 0 50 100 2 kcolB (d) (e) (f) 1.0 22 0.5 20 18 0 50 100 0 50 100 1.0 0.5 0 50 100 noitanibmoc kcolB (g) (h) (i) 1.0 22 0.5 20 18 0 50 100 0 50 100 Figure 4: A characterization of bare-bones impulse indicator saturation with a target size of 5% when the DGP does not have a break. 8
a “location shift”) and hence is mis-specified. Figure 5a plots Monte Carlo data from the DGP in equation (7) with = 20, = 10, 2 = 1, and = 100. 0 1 − Figure 5b plots the estimated model’s residuals. Interestingly, no residuals lie outside the estimated 95% confidence region, even though the break is 10. The model has − no “outliers”. Figure 6 plots the corresponding graphs for the bare-bones implementation of IIS described in Example 1, as applied to the Monte Carlo data in Example 2. As the penultimate graph (Figure 6h) shows, the procedure has high power to detect the break, even although the nature of the break is not utilized in the procedure itself. In practice, IIS as an algorithm may be more complicated than this bare-bones version, which employs two equally sized blocks, selects dummies by -tests, and is non-iterative. In Doornik and Hendry’s (2013) Autometrics econometrics software, IIS utilizes many possibly unequally sized blocks, rather than just two blocks; the partitioning of the sample into blocks may vary over iterations of searches; dummy selectionincludes-testsagainstageneral model; andresidual diagnosticshelpguide model selection. Notably, the specific algorithm for IIS can make or break IIS’s usefulness; cf. Doornik (2009a), Castle, Fawcett, and Hendry (2010), and Hendry and Doornik (2014). IIS is a statistically valid procedure for integrated, cointegrated data; see Johansen and Nielsen (2009). IIS can serve as a diagnostic statistic, and it can aid in model development, as discussed in Ericsson (2011a). Many existing procedures can be interpreted as special cases of IIS in that they represent particular algorithmic implementations of IIS. Such special cases include recursive estimation, rolling regression, the Chow (1960) predictive failure statistic (including the 1-step, breakpoint, and forecast versions implemented in OxMetrics), the Andrews (1993) unknown breakpoint test, the Bai and Perron (1998) multiple breakpointtest,testsofextendedconstancyinEricsson,Hendry,andPrestwich(1998, pp. 305ff), tests of nonlinearity, intercept correction (in forecasting), and robust estimation. IIS thus provides a general and generic procedure for analyzing a model’s constancy. Algorithmically, IIS also solves the problem of having more potential regressors than observations by testing and selecting over blocks of variables. Table 1 summarizes IIS and two extensions of IIS, drawing on expositions and developmentsinEricsson(2011b, 2012)andEricssonandReisman(2012). Throughout, is the sample size, is the index for time, and are the indexes for indicators, is the index for economic variables (denoted ), and is the total number of potential regressors considered. A few remarks may be helpful for interpreting the entries in Table 1. Impulse indicator saturation. This is the standard IIS procedure proposed by Hendry (1999), with selection among the zero—one impulse indicators { }. Super saturation. Super saturation searches across all possible one-off step functions { }, in addition to { }. Step functions are of economic interest because they 9
(a) Actual and fitted values 20 AAccttuuaall FFiitttteedd 15 10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 (b) Scaled residuals 2 1 0 -1 -2 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Figure 5: Actual and fitted values and the corresponding scaled residuals for the estimated model when the DGP has a break and the model ignores that break. Initial model: dummies included 1.0 0.5 0 50 100 1 kcolB Final model: Final model: (a) (b) dummies retained (c) actual and fitted 1.0 20 0.5 15 10 0 50 100 0 50 100 1.0 0.5 0 50 100 2 kcolB (d) (e) (f) 1.0 20 0.5 15 10 0 50 100 0 50 100 1.0 0.5 0 50 100 noitanibmoc kcolB (g) (h) (i) 1.0 20 0.5 15 10 0 50 100 0 50 100 Figure 6: A characterization of bare-bones impulse indicator saturation with a target size of 5% when the DGP has a break and the model ignores that break. 10
Table 1: Impulse indicator saturation and two extensions, as characterized by the variables involved. Name Description Variables Definition Impulse indicator Zero—one = 1 for = { } saturation dummies zero otherwise Super Step = 1 for { } ≥ saturation functions zero otherwise Ultra Broken linear = +1 for { } − ≥ saturation trends zero otherwise may capture permanent or long-lasting changes that are not otherwise incorporated into a specific empirical model. A step function is a partial sum of impulse indicators. Equivalently, a step function is a parsimonious representation of a sequential subset of impulse indicators that have equal coefficients. Castle, Doornik, Hendry, and Pretis (2015) investigate the statistical properties of a closely related saturation estimator–stepindicator saturation(SIS)–whichsearches among onlythestepindicator variables { }. Autometrics now includes IIS, SIS, super saturation (IIS+SIS), and zero-sum pairwise IIS (mentioned below); see Doornik and Hendry (2013). Ultra saturation. Ultra saturation (earlier, sometimes called “super duper” saturation) searches across { }, where the { } are broken linear trends. Broken linear trends may be of economic interest. Mathematically, the { } are partial sums of the partial sums of impulse indicators. Broken quadratic trends, broken cubic trends, and higher-order broken trends are also feasible. Table 1 is by no means an exhaustive list of extensions to IIS. Other extensions include sequential ( = 1) and non-sequential ( 1) pairwise impulse indicator saturation for an indicator , defined as + ; zero-sum pairwise IIS for an + indicator , defined as ∆ ; many many variables for a set of potential regressors { = 1} for ; factors; principal components; and multiplicative indicator saturation for the set of . See Ericsson (2011b, 2012) and Castle, Clements, and Hendry (2013) for details, discussion, and examples in the literature. Also, the saturation procedure chosen may itself be a combination of extensions; and that choice may affect the power of the procedure to detect specific alternatives. For instance, in Example 2 above, the 37 impulse indicators { = 64100} are not a particularly parsimonious way of expressing the step shift that occurs two thirds of the way through the sample, whereas the single one-off step dummy is. 64 11
4.2 Re-interpretation and Generalization This subsection discusses how IIS and its extensions provide a conceptual framework for re-interpreting existing tests of forecast bias. Equally, saturation procedures generalize those existing tests to allow for arbitrarily time-varying forecast bias. Forinstance, theMincer—ZarnowitzAtest(basedonequation(1))isaspecialcase of super saturation in which only the step dummy (equivalent to the intercept) 1 is included. The Mincer—Zarnowitz A test is also interpretable as the IIS test based on equation (5), but where = = = is imposed, and the hypothesis = 0 1 2 1 is tested. The Mincer—Zarnowitz B test (based on equation (3)) is a special case of multiplicative indicator saturation in which the dependent variable is the forecast error, the ’s are the intercept andthe forecast, andthe onlymultiplicative indicators considered are those multiplied by the step indicator . Multiplicative indicator 1 saturation also includes the forecast encompassing test and standard tests of strong efficiency as special cases; cf. Holden and Peel (1990) and Stekler (2002). As equation (5) entails, saturation-based tests generalize the Mincer—Zarnowitz tests to allow for time-varying forecast bias. This observation and the observations above highlight the strength of the Mincer—Zarnowitz tests (that they focus on detecting a constant nonzero forecast bias) and also their weakness (that they assume that the forecast bias is constant over time). These characteristics of the Mincer— Zarnowitz tests bear directly on the empirical results in the next two sections. Certain challenges arise when interpreting a saturation-based test as a test of forecast bias. Specifically, saturation-based tests can detect not only time-varying forecast bias but also other forms of mis-specification, as reflected by discrepancies between the actual data and their assumed distribution as implied by the model. Such mis-specifications include outliers due to heteroscedasticity (as from a change in the forecast error variance) and thick tails (thick, relative to the assumed distribution). IIS’s ability to detect many forms of mis-specification is thus a caveat for the interpretation of IIS results per se. Two items can help resolve this interpretational challenge: the retained dummies themselves, and outside information. First, the structure of the retained dummies may have implications for their interpretation. For instance, for mis-specification due to heteroscedasticity or thick tails, retained impulses typically would not be sequential or–even if they were–would not be of the same sign and of similar magnitude. Because (e.g.) step indicators characterize sequential, same-signed, same-magnitude features, any retained step indicators from super saturation would be unlikely to arise from heteroscedasticity or thick tails. Hence, the interpretational caveat may not be germane to extended forms of IIS such as super saturation. In that light, saturation procedures can serve as tools for characterizing time-varying forecast bias qua bias, rather than as some unknown form of mis-specification. Saturation procedures thus provide a generic approach to estimating time-varying forecast bias, albeit a generic approach that is atheoretical, 12
economically speaking. Second, outside information–such as from economic, institutional, and historical knowledge–may assist in interpreting saturation-based results. For instance, Section 6 integrates saturation procedures with an economically based interpretation of the estimated biases in light of the dates of business-cycle turning points. Features of the government’s budget may imply systematic forecast errors (i.e., biases) at business-cycle turning points. Such an economic interpretation holds, even although impulse (rather than step) dummies statistically characterize the time-varying forecast bias. Asamoregeneral observation, differenttypesof indicatorsareadeptatcharacterizing different sorts of bias: impulse dummies for date-specific anomalies, step { } dummies for level shifts, and broken trends for evolving developments. { } { } Transformations of the variable being forecast also may affect the interpretation of the retained indicators. For instance, an impulse dummy for a growth rate implies a level shift in the (log) level of the variable. Saturation-based tests of forecast bias can serve both as diagnostic tools to detect what is wrong with the forecasts, and as developmental tools to suggest how the forecasts can be improved. Clearly, “rejection of the null doesn’t imply the alternative”. However, for time series data, the date-specific nature of saturation procedures can aid in identifying important sources of forecast error. Use of these tests in forecast development is consistent with a progressive modeling approach; see White (1990) and Hendry and Doornik (2014). 5 Evidence on Biases in the Forecasts of Debt This section examines the CBO, OMB, and APB forecasts of U.S. gross federal debt for potential bias over 1984—2012. Standard (Mincer—Zarnowitz) tests of forecast bias typically fail to detect economically and statistically important biases. By contrast, saturation-based tests detect large time-varying biases in the CBO, OMB, and APB forecasts, particularly for 1990, 1991, 2001—2003, and 2008—2011. Forecast biases for a given year differ numerically across the CBO, OMB, and APB, albeit with some similarities. Table 2 reports the Mincer—Zarnowitz regressions in equations (1) and (3) for the CBO, OMB, and APB forecasts, with columns alternating between the “A” and “B” versions of the Mincer—Zarnowitz regression. Here and in subsequent tables, estimatedstandarderrorsappearinparentheses ( ) underregressioncoefficients, · -ratios appear in curly brackets , -values appear in square brackets [ ], and ˆ de- {·} · notes the residual standard error. For the Mincer—Zarnowitz test statistic in Table 2, and for other test statistics here and below, the entries within a given block of numbers are the -statistic for testing the null hypothesis against the designated main- 13
Table 2: Coefficients, estimated standard errors, -ratios, and summary statistics for Mincer—Zarnowitz A and B regressions of the CBO, OMB, and APB forecast errors. Regressor CBO CBO OMB OMB APB APB or statistic Intercept 027 607 079 1156 036 189 (033) −(460) −(040) (515) −(027) (382) 082 132 199 224 134 050 { } {− } {− } { } {− } { } Forecast ˆ _ 00074 _ 00144 _ 00026 (00054) −(00060) −(00044) 138 240 059 { } {− } {− } ˆ 1757% 1729% 2136% 1974% 1432% 1449% RMSE of the 1746% 1746% 2243% 2243% 1452% 1452% forecast Mincer— 067 130 396 521 180 105 ∗ Zarnowitz [0421] [0290] [0056] [0012] [0191] [0363] test statistic (128) (227) (128) (227) (128) (227) Normality 106 540 135 172 600 679 ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗ statistic [0005] [0067] [0001] [0000] [0050] [0034] 2(2) 2(2) 2(2) 2(2) 2(2) 2(2) Variance 038 048 043 039 037 030 ∗ instability statistic tained hypothesis, the tail probability associated with that value of the -statistic, the degrees of freedom for the -statistic (in parentheses), and (for saturation-based statistics) the retained dummy variables. Superscript asterisks and denote re- ∗ ∗∗ jections of the null hypothesis at the 5% and 1% levels respectively, and the null hypothesis typically includes setting the coefficient on the intercept to zero. Doornik and Hendry (2013) provide a description of the residual diagnostic statistics. For the saturation-based statistics reported below, is the number of potential regressors for selection, and the target size is chosen much smaller than 1 in order to help ensure that few if any indicators are retained fortuitously. The results in Table 2 provide little evidence of forecast bias for any of the forecasts. From the first column for the CBO, the estimate of the forecast bias in equation (1) is 027, which is statistically insignificantly different from zero, with an -statistic of 067. From the second column for the CBO, the estimates of and 0 14
in equation (3) are 607 and 00074, which are individually insignificant with ∗1 − -statistics of 132 and 138, and jointly insignificant with an -statistic of 130. − The Mincer—Zarnowitz statistics for OMB and APB are likewise insignificant, except that the Mincer—Zarnowitz B statistic for OMB is significant at around the 1% level. Thus, the Mincer—Zarnowitz A test fails to detect bias in all three forecasts, and the Mincer—Zarnowitz B test fails to detect bias in two of three forecasts. Standard tests thus provide little evidence of forecast bias. Table 3 reports forecast-encompassing statistics and saturation-based test statistics of forecast bias for the CBO, OMB, and APB forecasts. Table 3 also includes the Mincer—Zarnowitz statistics for comparison. The forecast-encompassing statistic detects bias for all three forecasts; cf. Martinez (2011, 2015). Likewise, IIS and its extensions always detect bias, and they do so for historically and economically consequential years. The dates of several retained impulse and step dummies are indicative of the following important events that potentially affected the actual federal debt after its forecasts were made. 1990: Iraq invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990; July 1990—March 1991 recession. 2001: March—November 2001 recession; September 11, 2001. 2008, 2009: December 2007—June 2009 recession. RecessionsaredatedpertheNationalBureauofEconomicResearch(2012). Businesscycle turning points are prominent among the events listed. The four years listed also highlight the difficulties in forecasting the debt, especially in light of unanticipated events that affect both government expenditures and government revenues; cf. Alexander and Stekler (1959) and Stekler (1967). The saturation-based tests in Table 3 focus on the statistical significance of the biases for each set of forecasts. The corresponding regressions permit assessing the extent and economic and numerical importance of the bias for each set of forecasts. Figure 2 plots the CBO, OMB, and APB forecast errors; and Figure 7 plots the estimates of forecast bias obtained from ultra saturation. (Figure 8 provides an alternative calculation of the forecast biases, as discussed in Section 6 below.) The forecast biases vary markedly over time, and they exhibit some similarities across agencies. For the CBO forecasts, the bias is approximately 2.5% for 1990 and 2001—2003, 5% for 2008, for the most part declining thereafter, and —0.5% (and statistically detectably so) for all other years. For the OMB forecasts, the bias is approximately —8% for 2009 and —0.5% for all other years. For the APB forecasts, the bias is approximately 4% for 2008 and —0.5% for all other years. As a reference, theresidualstandarderrorsfortheregressionswithultrasaturationare0.68%,1.65%, and 1.20% respectively. In several instances, forecast biases exceed 2% in absolute value. These biases are economically large, especially considering that debt is a stock (not a flow), and that the forecasts are made less than nine months prior to the end of the fiscal year. 15
Table 3: Statistics for testing for bias in the CBO, OMB, and APB forecasts. Statistic CBO OMB APB or regressor (target size) Mincer— 1 067 396 180 Zarnowitz A [0421] [0056] [0191] (128) (128) (128) Mincer— 2 130 521 105 ∗ Zarnowitz B [0290] [0012] [0363] (227) (227) (227) Forecast- 3 838 1944 312 ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ encompassing [0000] [0000] [0043] (326) (326) (326) Impulse 29 1850 2804 1440 ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ indicator [0000] [0000] [0000] saturation (821) (623) (524) (1%) 1990 1990 2001 1990 2001 2001 2002 2003 2008 2009 2011 2008 2009 2008 2009 2010 Super 56 1766 1544 763 ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ saturation [0000] [0000] [0002] (0.5%) (821) (425) (227) 2008 1990 1991 2008 2008 2001 2004 2008 2010 2008 2011 Ultra 84 2416 1333 763 ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ saturation [0000] [0000] [0002] (0.3%) (722) (227) (227) 1990 2011 2009 2008 2001 2004 2008 2009 Intercept 1 027 079 036 (OLS) (033) −(040) −(027) 082 199 134 { } {− } {− } [0421] [0056] [0191] Intercept 29 058 079 060 (IIS at 1%) −(015) −(018) −(016) 378 443 374 {− } {− } {− } [0001] [0000] [0001] 16
0.06 EEssttiimmaatteedd bbiiaass ffoorr CCBBOO ffoorreeccaassttss ((uullttrraa ssaattuurraattiioonn)) EEssttiimmaatteedd bbiiaass ffoorr OOMMBB ffoorreeccaassttss ((uullttrraa ssaattuurraattiioonn)) 0.04 EEssttiimmaatteedd bbiiaass ffoorr AAPPBB ffoorreeccaassttss ((uullttrraa ssaattuurraattiioonn)) 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Figure 7: Estimates of forecast bias for the log of U.S. gross federal debt using ultra saturation. 0.06 EEssttiimmaatteedd bbiiaass ffoorr CCBBOO ffoorreeccaassttss ((NNBBEERR--bbaasseedd)) EEssttiimmaatteedd bbiiaass ffoorr OOMMBB ffoorreeccaassttss ((NNBBEERR--bbaasseedd)) 0.04 EEssttiimmaatteedd bbiiaass ffoorr AAPPBB ffoorreeccaassttss ((NNBBEERR--bbaasseedd)) 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Figure 8: Estimates of forecast bias for the log of U.S. gross federal debt using a standardized set of NBER-dated and other impulse dummies. 17
AsFigure7shows, forecastbiasesaresometimespositiveandothertimesnegative. TheMincer—Zarnowitztestshaveparticulardifficultyindetectingsuchbiasesbecause the Mincer—Zarnowitz tests average all biases (both negative and positive) over time, and because the Mincer—Zarnowitz tests assign any time variation in bias to the residual rather than to the bias itself. As an extreme hypothetical example, the Mincer—Zarnowitz A test has no power whatsoever to detect a forecast bias that is +$10100 for the first half of the sample and $10100 for the second half of the sample, − even though this bias would be obvious from (e.g.) plotting the forecast errors. Mincer—Zarnowitztestsalsocanlackpowertodetectforecastbiasifforecasterrors have thick tails or are heteroscedastic. Indeed, for every Mincer—Zarnowitz regression in Table 2, residual diagnostic statistics reject either normality or homoscedasticity. As follows from Johansen and Nielsen (2009), IIS can provide robust inference about the intercept in such a situation. While heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors may provide consistent inference, they fail to improve efficiency of coefficient estimates, whereas robust estimation techniques such as IIS can. Those differences are highlighted in the bottom two rows of Table 3, which compare the estimated intercepts in the (OLS) Mincer—Zarnowitz A regressions with the estimated intercepts using IIS. The intercepts in the standard Mincer—Zarnowitz A regressions are statistically insignificant, whereas the intercepts estimated using IIS are highly significant. EvenwhenIISisviewedpurelyasarobustestimationprocedure, empirical inferences about bias alter dramatically for the CBO, OMB, and APB forecasts. Bias is present in all three forecasts, and the standard Mincer—Zarnowitz tests typically fail to detect that bias. Section 6 goes further by re-interpreting the selected indicators themselves as resulting from an economically based time-varying forecast bias. 6 An Economic Interpretation of the Forecast Biases This section examines the forecast biases in light of the business cycle. Section 6.1 re-interprets the estimated biases in light of the dates for the peaks and troughs of the business cycle, as determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).Thisre-interpretationleadstoastandardizedreformulationoftheestimated forecast biases in terms of business-cycle turning points, augmented by a few additional adjustments. Thus, this approach draws on Sinclair, Joutz, and Stekler (2010), who analyze the Fed’s Greenbook forecasts similarly; and on Hendry (1999), who reinterprets IIS-detected outliers in an economic and institutional framework. See also Dyckman and Stekler (1966) and Stekler (1972, 2003). Section 6.2 evaluates these new models of forecast bias, including with tests for biases associated with political factors. Section 6.3 discusses some implications of forecast bias for forecasting. 18
Table 4: NBER reference dates and announcement dates for 1984—2012. Event Reference date Announcement date Length of Impulse of the event of the reference date determination indicator (in months) Peak July 1990 April 25, 1991 9 1990 Trough March 1991 December 22, 1992 21 1991 Peak March 2001 November 26, 2001 8 2001 Trough November 2001 July 17, 2003 20 2002 Peak December 2007 December 1, 2008 11 2008 Trough June 2009 September 20, 2010 15 2009 Notes. Thelengthofdeterminationisthetimeelapsedfromtheendofthemonthofthereference datetotheannouncementdateofthereferencedate,roundedtothenearestendofmonth. The dateof theimpulseindicatoris thecalendaryearinwhichthefiscalyearendsforthefiscalyear that spans the reference date. A superscript or on an impulse indicator denotes peak or trough; and that superscript emphasizes the event associated with the superscripted indicator. Source for events and dates: National Bureau of Economic Research (2012). 6.1 Forecast Biases and Turning Points The previous section noted that several of the years associated with forecast bias are years in which major events–such as business-cycle turning points–occurred after the forecasts were made. As a way of capturing these phenomena in an economically interpretable manner, this subsection re-analyzes the forecast errors, specifically accounting for the effects of business-cycle turning points with impulse indicators. Additionally, IIS and its extensions are re-calculated, conditional on including the impulse indicators for these turning-point events. The analysis below allows the forecast bias to alter for years in which an NBERdated peak or trough occurs after the publication of the forecast but before the end of the fiscal year. In practice, impulse indicators are constructed for these turningpoint events, and these dummy variables are included in regressions such as those for calculating the Mincer—Zarnowitz tests. From an economic and budgetary perspective, turning-point events could generate systematic biases in forecasts of debt because the advent of a recession or an expansion is likely to affect both sides of the federal government’s balance sheet. For instance, the onset of a recession could lead to higher-than-anticipated outlays (as through higher unemployment compensation) and lower-than-anticipated revenues (as through lower individual and corporate income taxes). Table 4 reports the NBER’s turning-point events (“peak” or “trough”) within the sample, the date of the event (the “reference date” in the NBER’s terminology), the 19
Table 5: Statistics for testing for additional time-varying forecast bias in regressions of the CBO, OMB, and APB forecast errors on a standardized set of NBER-dated impulse indicators. Statistic CBO OMB APB (target size) IIS 23 1169 2099 No ∗∗ ∗∗ (1%) [0000] [0000] impulses (220) (121) selected 2003 2010 2011 date on which the NBER announced the determination of that event, and the length of time taken to determine that an event had occurred; see the National Bureau of Economic Research (2012) for details. The corresponding impulse dummies are denoted , , , , , and , where a superscript or denotes 1990 1991 2001 2002 2008 2009 that the event was a peak or trough, and the subscript indicates the year of the event (i.e., in the notation above for the subscript on an indicator dummy). The turning-point dummies appear necessary to capture the time variation in the forecast bias, but they do not appear sufficient. When the turning-point dummies are added to (e.g.) the Mincer—Zarnowitz A regression in equation (1), those dummies do capture economically and statistically important time dependence of the forecast bias. However, there is also evidence of time-varying bias, additional to what is associated with those turning points. Specifically, when IIS is applied to the version of equation (1) that is augmented by the turning-point dummies, IIS detects three additional years (2003, 2010, 2011) with bias for the CBO and OMB forecasts. Those three years immediately follow troughs, suggesting a potential explanation. Table 5 reports the additional impulse dummies detected and the corresponding test statistics. The additional dummies detected differ across agencies: and 2003 for the CBO, for the OMB, and none for the APB. For a given forecast, 2010 2011 the indicators selected are the same across saturation procedures, whether IIS at 1% ( = 23), super saturation at 05% ( = 50), or ultra saturation at 03% ( = 78). To provide a unified and encompassing approach, the agencies’ forecast errors are re-analyzed in regressions that include an intercept, all turning-point dummies, and all three of the additional dummies from Table 5. Table 6 reports these regressions, and Figure 8 (above) graphs the corresponding estimated forecast biases. This unified approach is also in line with the methodology in Hendry and Johansen (2015), who advocate (and provide the statistical underpinnings for) empirical analysis that embodies the available economic theory, while allowing model selection to detect additional phenomena that are also incorporated into the empirical model. 20
Table 6: Coefficients, estimated standard errors, and summary statistics for regressions of the CBO, OMB, and APB forecast errors on a standardized set of NBERdated and other impulse indicators. Regressor or statistic CBO OMB APB Intercept 054 088 069 −(015) −(018) −(015) 291 382 246 1990 (071) (082) (067) 034 036 021 1991 (071) (082) (067) 348 343 320 2001 (071) (082) (067) 307 187 201 2002 (071) (082) (067) 622 424 454 2008 (071) (082) (067) 348 716 286 2009 (071) −(082) −(067) 261 098 147 2003 (071) (082) (067) 253 102 047 2010 (071) −(082) −(067) 137 384 095 2011 −(071) −(082) −(067) ˆ 0690% 0798% 0654% RMSE of the forecast 1746% 2243% 1452% AR(2) LM statistic 047 145 010 [0634] [0261] [0910] (217) (217) (217) ARCH(1) LM statistic 018 036 000 [0674] [0554] [0951] (127) (127) (127) Normality statistic 108 463 609 ∗ [0582] [0099] [0048] 2(2) 2(2) 2(2) Ramsey (1969) 000 000 000 RESET statistic [0999] [0996] [0999] (217) (217) (217) 21
The estimated biases in Figure 8 are thus interpretable economically, and they arise primarily from turning points in the business cycle. The three business-cycle peaks are all associated with substantial under-prediction of the debt: approximately 2%—3% in 1990 and 2001, and 3%—6% in 2008. Debt tends to be slightly overpredicted (by roughly 05%—1%) during 1984—1989, 1992—2000, 2004—2007, and 2012, which correspond to expansionary periods: see the intercepts in Table 6. Numerically and economically, the estimated biases are very similar across forecasts through 2008, but differ markedly thereafter. Statistically, the estimated biases in Figure 8 are substantial, noting the large difference between the residual standard error (ˆ) of a given regression in Table 6 and the root mean squared error (RMSE) of the corresponding forecast. Interestingly, these economically based estimated forecast biases are generallysimilar to the “atheoretically based” estimated biases in Figure 7, which are derived from ultra saturation alone. The estimated biases in Figure 8 also can be assessed statistically through residual diagnostics of the corresponding estimated equations. The standard diagnostics reported in Table 6 do not detect any substantial evidence of mis-specification. In particular, the Ramsey (1969) RESET test does not detect any nonlinearity, additional to that found by IIS. Conversely, the saturation-based tests for time-varying bias in Section 5 are very much in the spirit of Ramsey’s RESET test for nonlinear mis-specification. 6.2 Assessment of the Economic Interpretation This subsection assesses the economic interpretation of the models of forecast bias in Table 6 by testing various hypotheses about these models. Table 7 examines hypotheses that restrict the parameters estimated in Table 6–hypotheses of unbiasedness, the degree of bias induced by turning points, and biases across different forecasts. Table 8 examines hypotheses that focus on the potential importance of information excluded from the regressions in Table 6: assumed efficiency (in Mincer and Zarnowitz’s sense), alternative forecasts, the phase of the NBER business cycle, the White House administration, the political party in the White House, and dates of presidential elections. Empirically, the magnitude of the forecast bias varies across business cycles; and the forecast bias does not appear politically related. The remainder of this subsection considers the results in Tables 7 and 8 in detail. Table 7 examines restrictions on the parameters estimated in Table 6. Hypothesis (i) in Table 7 restricts all coefficients (including the intercept) to equal zero. This is denoted the Mincer—Zarnowitz A test because it generalizes the Mincer— ∗ Zarnowitz A test by allowing for time-varying forecast bias. If all coefficients are zero, then the forecasts are unbiased. Unbiasedness is strongly rejected for all agencies’ forecasts, contrasting with non-rejection by the Mincer—Zarnowitz A tests in Table 3. 22
Table 7: Tests of coefficient restrictions in regressions of the CBO, OMB, and APB forecast errors on a standardized set of NBER-dated and other impulse indicators. Hypothesis or statistic CBO OMB APB (i) Mincer— 1670 2099 1238 ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ Zarnowitz A [0000] [0000] [0000] ∗ (1019) (1019) (1019) (ii) Mincer— 1208 2440 2215 ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ Zarnowitz A [0002] [0000] [0000] ∗∗ (119) (119) (119) (iii) Equal 636 1847 839 ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ coefficients [0002] [0000] [0000] (by event) (419) (419) (419) (iv) Equal magnitude, 2559 1651 1219 ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ opposite-signed [0000] [0000] [0000] coefficients (519) (519) (519) (v) Equality of biases 8623 6377 10031 ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ across forecasts [0000] [0000] [0000] 2(10) 2(10) 2(10) (CBO=OMB) (OMB=APB) (APB=CBO) Hypothesis (ii) restricts just the intercept in Table 6 to equal zero. This also is a variant of the hypothesis underlying the Mincer—Zarnowitz A test, so it is denoted Mincer—Zarnowitz A . This hypothesis is rejected for all forecasts. Rejection implies ∗∗ a bias for all years without an impulse indicator in the regression, i.e., for the years 1984—1989, 1992—2000, 2004—2007, and 2012, all of which are during expansions. The estimated biases for those years are —0.54%, —0.88%, and —0.69% for the CBO, OMB, and APB respectively. That is, during these expansionary years, forecasts tend to over-predict the debt by about two-thirds of a percent. Hypotheses (iii) and (iv) restrict the bias associated with turning points: either so that that bias is equal across dates for a specific event (peak or trough), or so that that bias is of equal magnitude across all events and opposite-signed for peaks and troughs. These hypotheses thus examine whether all peaks have the same bias (and likewise, all troughs), and additionally whether the nature of the event (peak or trough) affects only the sign of the bias. Hypotheses (iii) and (iv) are rejected for all agencies’ forecasts. Not all peaks–nor all troughs–are equal in their effect on bias. Hypothesis (v) imposes equality of the bias across different forecasts, e.g., testing 23
whether the CBO and OMB forecast biases are equal. Hypothesis (v) is strongly rejected, whether comparing CBO and OMB forecast biases, OMB and APB forecast biases, or APB and CBO forecast biases. Furthermore, the hypothesis of equality across CBO, OMB, and APB forecast biases is rejected, with the likelihood ratio statistic being 2(20) = 1499 [0000]. Thus, in Figure 8, the time-varying forecast ∗∗ biases for the CBO, OMB, and APB are all significantly different from each other: the CBO, OMB, and APB forecasts do not share the same bias. Table 8 focuses on the potential importance of information excluded from the regressions in Table 6. While IIS directly applied to Table 6’s regressions would implicitly test the hypotheses listed in Table 8, explicit tests of these hypotheses may have more power than IIS. Hypothesis #1 in Table 8 imposes efficiency in the sense of Mincer and Zarnowitz, generalizing on the hypothesis = 1 in equation (2) 1 and hence denoted Mincer—Zarnowitz B . This hypothesis is examined by testing ∗ for the significance of the forecast itself, if the forecast is added to a regression in Table 6. This test is not rejected for the CBO or the APB, but it is rejected for the OMB. That said, the implied estimate of for the OMB is 09922, which is very 1 close to unity numerically. Hypothesis #2 (forecast encompassing) considers whether alternative forecasts help explain a given forecast’s forecast error. Only for the OMB do the other agencies’ forecasts aid in explaining the forecast error, and then, only marginally so. Hypothesis #3 considers whether the phase of the NBER business cycle (expansion or contraction) matters for the forecast bias, above and beyond the presence of turning points. The phase does not matter for the CBO or APB but does matter (marginally) for the OMB. TheremaininghypothesesinTable8examinewhethervariouspoliticalfactorsbias the forecasts. These hypotheses are very much in the spirit of Faust and Irons (1999), who test for presidential-cycle effects in U.S. macro-economic data. These hypotheses about political factors are of interest for all of the forecasts, even though the CongressionalBudgetOfficeproduces“nonpartisananalysisfortheU.S.Congress”(CBO website). In particular, outcomes of debt might be influenced by political factors, in which case the forecast errors could be, too. That is, a forecast could be biased because it failed to account for political factors that affected the actual outcome. Hypotheses #4 and #5 consider the administration in the White House and the political party of the administration, where the “administration” is defined by the four-year presidential term. Neither the administration nor its political party appear to affect the forecast bias of any of the agencies. Hypotheses #6—#8 consider the presidential elections themselves, as measured by the year of the election, or by the political party of the president elected in that year. Furthermore, because the forecastsaremadeearlyinthecalendaryearandthepresidentialelectionsareheldshortly after the end of the fiscal year, these hypotheses are also tested for the year after the presidential election (Hypotheses #9—#11). As the statistics for Hypotheses #6—#11 indicate, presidential elections do not appear to affect the forecast bias of any of the 24
Table 8: Diagnostic statistics for regressions of the CBO, OMB, and APB forecast errors on a standardized set of NBER-dated and other impulse indicators. Hypothesis or statistic CBO OMB APB 1. Mincer— 025 935 041 ∗∗ Zarnowitz B [0620] [0007] [0532] ∗ (118) (118) (118) 2. Forecast 117 445 020 ∗ encompassing [0334] [0028] [0820] (217) (217) (217) 3. Phase of the NBER 069 483 055 ∗ business cycle [0574] [0014] [0656] (316) (316) (316) 4. White House 079 172 049 administration [0606] [0194] [0823] (712) (712) (712) 5. Political party of 000 022 007 the administration [0948] [0642] [0797] (118) (118) (118) 6. Presidential 088 158 063 election year [0550] [0233] [0725] (712) (712) (712) 7. Year that a Democratic 054 170 013 president was elected [0471] [0209] [0727] (118) (118) (118) 8. Year that a Republican 111 012 057 president was elected [0305] [0732] [0458] (118) (118) (118) 9. Year after a 081 044 061 presidential election [0565] [0811] [0696] (514) (514) (514) 10. Year after a Democratic 142 059 060 president was elected [0249] [0453] [0448] (118) (118) (118) 11. Year after a Republican 035 002 032 president was elected [0560] [0892] [0578] (118) (118) (118) 25
agencies, regardless of the particular measure used for the presidential election year. Notably, the results on Hypotheses #4—#11 pertain to forecast errors and are mute about whether politics affects the government debt and its forecasts. In summary, debt forecasts by the CBO, OMB, and APB exhibit time-varying biases that are primarily associated with turning points in the business cycle. The biasesarenotthesameacrosstheagenciesmakingtheforecasts,noraretheythesame for peaks (or troughs) across different business cycles. Biases appear little affected by other factors. In particular, the biases do not appear to be politically related. 6.3 Remarks and Implications Thissubsectiondiscussessomepotentialimplicationsofforecastbias. Asbackground, this subsection first discusses forecast bias as a conditional expectation and then examines the importance of the information set on which that expectation is taken. Forecast bias is defined as the expectation of the deviation between the actual outcome and the forecast itself. Either implicitly or explicitly, this expectation is conditional on an information set, such as past data; and the choice of that information set can affect the forecast bias. For instance, a forecast error may be unanticipated, unpredictable, and non-systematic conditional on one information set–but anticipated, predictable, and systematic conditional on another information set. To illustrate, consider a simple (albeit slightly modified) example from Granger’s (1983) paper “Forecasting White Noise”. Define the forecast error as ( ˆ), and − assume that is white noise and has an unconditional zero mean. Hence, from the properties of white noise, the expectation of the forecast error conditional on its own lag is zero: [( ˆ) ( ˆ )] = [ ] = 0 (8) 1 1 1 E − | − − − E | − where [ ] is the expectations operator. In fact, conditional on the lagged forecast E · error ,thecurrentforecasterror isunpredictable,andtheforecastˆ isunbiased 1 − for . That said, whether the forecast is really unbiased–and whether the forecast errorisreally unpredictable–dependsontheinformationsetbeingconditionedupon. To see the importance of the information set chosen, suppose that the white-noise forecast error is made up of two white-noise processes and : = + . (9) 1 − Conditional on , rather than on , the forecast error is both biased and pre- 1 1 − − dictable: [ ] = [( + ) ] = . (10) 1 1 1 1 E | − E − | − − If islargerelativeto , theforecasterrormayappeartobeanoutlierconditional 1 − on the lagged forecast error , whereas the forecast error simply may be biased 1 − 26
conditional on . As equations (8), (9), and (10) highlight, the choice of condition- 1 − ing set can matter; see Clements and Hendry (1999, Chapter 1.4.1) and Hendry and Mizon (2014) for discussion. Someadditionalobservationsaregermane. First,theforecastbiasinequation(10) is systematic in that it depends directly on . Second, that forecast bias is not 1 − persistent, noting that is white noise. Third, the conditioning information sets in both equations (8) and (10) include only lagged information. Several different information sets are relevant for analyzing the forecasts of debt, including: (a) knowledgeabouttheeconomy, asavailableatthetimethattheforecastismade; (b) knowledge about the economy, as available on September 30; and (c) the actual state of the economy on and before September 30. Information set (a) is relevant for formulating the forecasts themselves, whereas information sets (a), (b), and (c) are all valuable for casting light on the sources of forecast error. In particular, the NBER dates for business-cycle turning points can be viewed as information in (c) and hence as valid information for ex post analysis of the forecast errors. Those dates provide the basis for the statistical and economic interpretation of the estimated forecast biases in Section 6.2. Information about upcoming turning points may be present in (a), but not fully utilized in formulating the forecasts, thereby leading to forecast biases relative to (a). The presence of forecast bias implies the potential for improved forecasts. The feasibility of improvement may depend on the information in (a)—(c), as the large biases in 2001 and 1990 illustrate. For 2001, the NBER-dated peak of the business cycle is March. Because the 2001 forecasts were released on January 31 (CBO), February28 (OMB), andMay 1(APB), exploitable informationabout the 2001 recession may have been available when the forecasts were being prepared. For 1990, however, theNBER-datedpeakof the business cycle isJuly, whichis muchlaterintheforecast period than March. Hence, at the time of forecasting in 1990, evidence about the upcoming recession may have been more limited than in 2001. Additionally, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait begins on August 2, 1990; and that event and its timing would have been difficult to predict when the debt forecasts were being prepared in early 1990. Thesetwoexampleshighlighttheimportanceofdevelopingrobustandaccurate forecasts, and some of the difficulties in doing so. As Fildes and Stekler (2002) and others have documented, turning points have been difficult to forecast. The large forecast biases for debt appear to reflect that challenge. From an institutional perspective, it may be useful to isolate the causes of the forecast errors according to the various assumptions made about fiscal policy, outlays and revenues, and the path of the economy in terms of variables such as output,inflation,andinterestrates. Suchananalysiscouldleadtoimprovedforecasts, or at least provide a deeper understanding of the sources of forecast error. 27
7 Conclusions Governmentdebtanditsforecastsfeatureprominentlyincurrent economicandpolitical discussions. The properties of these forecasts are thus of interest, and it matters how these properties are assessed. Mincer—Zarnowitz tests typically fail to detect biases in the CBO, OMB, and APB one-year-ahead forecasts of U.S. gross federal debt over 1984—2012. By contrast, more general tests based on impulse indicator saturation detect economically large, systematic, and statistically highly significant time-varying biases in the CBO, OMB, and APB forecasts, particularly for 1990, 1991, 2001—2003, and 2008—2011. These biases differ according to the agency making theforecasts, andthesebiasesarecloselylinkedtoturningpointsinthebusinesscycle and (to a lesser degree) economic expansions. However, these biases do not appear to be politically related. The IIS approach also explains why Mincer—Zarnowitz tests may fail to detect bias. The Mincer—Zarnowitz tests average over the biases for all observations, but those biases may be positive for some observations and negative for others, thereby reducing the tests’ power. Impulse indicator saturation defines a generic procedure for examining forecast properties and, in particular, for detecting and quantifying forecast bias. Forecast bias can be systematic yet time-varying; it can be difficult to detect in a timely fashion; and it may have substantive implications for policy analysis. IIS and its extensions can help address these issues by characterizing systematic properties in the forecast errors. The IIS approach also links directly to existing techniques for robustifyingforecasts, notingthatinterceptcorrectionisavariantofsupersaturation; see Clements and Hendry (1996, 1999, 2002a), Hendry (2006), Castle, Fawcett, and Hendry (2010), and Castle, Clements, and Hendry (2015). TheIISapproachhasmanypotentialapplications,beyonditsinitialrolesinmodel evaluation and robust estimation. Ericsson (2012) considers its uses for detecting crises, jumps, and changes in regime. IIS also provides a framework for creating near real-time early-warning and rapid-detection devices, such as of financial market anomalies; cf. Vere-Jones (1995) on forecasting earthquakes and earthquake risk, and Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000) on early warning systems for emerging market economies. Relatedly, the model selection approach in IIS is applicable to nowcasting with a large set of potential explanatory variables, such as those generated from Google Trends; see Doornik (2009b), Choi and Varian (2012), and Castle, Hendry, and Kitov (2016). Finally, IIS generalizes to systems, and so is consonant with the approach proposed in Sinclair, Stekler, and Carnow (2012) for evaluating economic forecasts. 28
AppendixA. Interpreting Estimates of Forecast Bias This appendix resolves differences in results and interpretation between Ericsson’s (2017) and Gamber and Liebner’s (2017) assessments of forecasts of U.S. gross federal debt. As Gamber and Liebner (2017) discuss, heteroscedasticity could explain the empirical results in Ericsson (2017). However, thecombinedevidenceinEricsson(2017)andGamberandLiebner(2017)supportstheinterpretationthattheseforecastshavesignificant time-varyingbiases. BothEricsson(2017)andGamberandLiebner(2017) advocate using impulse indicator saturation in empirical modeling. A.1 Introduction Using impulse indicator saturation (IIS), Ericsson (2017) tests for and detects economically large and statistically highly significant time-varying biases in forecasts of U.S. gross federal debt over 1984—2012, particularly at turning points in the business cycle. Gamber and Liebner (2017) discuss Ericsson (2017), obtaining different empirical results and offering a different interpretation. This appendix resolves those differences through a re-examination of IIS. Gamber and Liebner (2017) examine Ericsson’s (2017) choice of IIS’s significance level and interpretation of the estimated bias, concluding that the empirical basis for time-varying bias per se is weaker than claimed, and that the outliers detected by IIS could easily arise from heteroscedasticity rather than from time-varying bias. Because IIS does have power to detect heteroscedasticity, heteroscedasticity could explain the IIS results in Ericsson (2017). However, as Sections A.2 and A.3 below show, time-varying bias is more consistent with the combined evidence in Ericsson (2017) and Gamber and Liebner (2017). Section A.4 comments further on modeling with IIS. A.2 Analysis of Alternative Model Specifications Ericsson (2017) and Gamber and Liebner (2017) assess forecasts of U.S. federal debt, focusingontheeconomicandstatisticalbasesfortheselectedimpulseindicatorsfrom IIS. Although Ericsson (2017) and Gamber and Liebner (2017) evaluate the same set of forecasts, they obtain different empirical results and offer different interpretations of those results. Section A.3 below resolves the differences in interpretation through a re-examination of IIS. The current section resolves the differences in the empirical results themselves–both qualitatively and quantitatively–through an encompassing approach by examining alternative model specifications. In particular, encompassing analysis of an analytical example demonstrates how certain model specifications reduce the power of tests to detect impulse indicators, 29
where that power depends directly on -ratios for the indicators. The encompassing analysisimpliesthatsomerelevantindicatorsmaynonethelessappearunimportantin certain models, simply because those models omit relevant variables, thereby increasing the residual standard error and hence reducing the -ratios. The current section first presents the analytical example and then applies it to the disparate empirical results with IIS. This type of assessment is sometimes called “mis-specification analysis” because some models analyzed omit certain relevant variables and hence are mis-specified, relative to the data generation process; see Sargan (1988, Chapter 8). Mizon and Richard(1986)proposeaconstructiveutilizationofmis-specificationanalysis–known as the encompassing approach–in which a given model (Model M0, below) is shown toexplainor“encompass”propertiesoftheothermodels(ModelsM1andM2,below). In the current section, model properties include -ratios, residual variances, and the selection of impulse dummies. See Davidson, Hendry, Srba, and Yeo (1978), Mizon and Richard (1986), and Bontemps and Mizon (2008) for further discussion. Analytical example. To put the encompassing analysis in context, suppose that both blocks of observations for bare-bones IIS include impulse dummies that have nonzero coefficients in the data generation process (DGP). In bare-bones IIS, estimation of coefficients for dummies that saturate a given block then implies omission of the other block’s relevant dummies in the corresponding model. These omitted dummies typically result in reduced power to detect the significance of included dummies. An analytical example illustrates.1 In a notation similar to that in Ericsson (2017, Example 2), let the DGP for the variable be as follows. DGP: = + + + NID(02) = 1 (A1) 0 1 1 2 2 ∼ That is, is normally and independently distributed with a constant mean and 0 constant variance 2 over observations, except that ’s mean is + in period 0 1 = (when the impulse indicator is nonzero) and + in period = (when 1 1 0 2 2 = 0). For expository purposes, assume that and are both strictly positive, 2 1 2 6 and that and are in the first and second blocks of observations respectively. 1 2 Consider three models, denoted M0, M1, and M2. Model M0 is specified as the DGP (A1) itself. Model M0: = + + + (A2) 0 1 1 2 2 Models M1 and M2 entail omitted variables. Model M1 includes but omits . 1 2 Model M1: = + + (A3) 0 1 1 1 1This analysis and its empirical application below ignore changes in the estimated coefficients thatarisefromtheomittedimpulseindicators. However,becauseimpulseindicatorsareorthogonal, those changes should not be an important consideration here. 30
Model M2 includes but omits . 2 1 Model M2: = + + (A4) 0 2 2 2 For Model M1, the error is ( + ), so Model M1’s mean squared error 2 is: 1 2 2 1 2 = (2 +2) (A5) 1 2 which is larger than 2, the error variance for Model M0. Likewise, for Model M2, the error is ( + ), and the mean squared error 2 is: 2 1 1 2 2 = (2 +2) (A6) 2 1 which also is larger than 2. One possible consequence of model specifications such as M1 and M2 is to shrink -ratios on included variables. As equations (A5) and (A6) imply, the estimated residual variance in a model with an omitted relevant variable is typically larger than the estimated residual variance in the DGP. Hence, the estimated standard error on the coefficient of a variable included in that model is larger than the corresponding coefficient’sestimatedstandarderrorintheDGP.Thatshrinksthecoefficient’s-ratio in the model with the omitted variable. For example, the -ratio for in Model M1 uses ˆ in the coefficient’s estimated 1 1 standard error, rather than ˆ, which would be used for its -ratio in Model M0. Thus, might be significant in Model M0 but appear insignificant in Model M1, 1 simply because Model M1 excludes and so ˆ ˆ. Likewise, the -ratio for 2 1 2 in Model M2 uses ˆ in the coefficient’s estimated standard error, rather than ˆ. 2 Hence, might be significant in Model M0 but appear insignificant in Model M2 2 because Model M2 excludes and so ˆ ˆ. As Hendryand Doornik(2014, p. 243) 1 2 summarize, “[w]hen there is more than a single break, a failure to detect one [break] increases the residual variance and so lowers the probability of detecting any others.” Empirical application. Gamber and Liebner (2017) discuss -ratios, significance levels, and empirical power for IIS, illustrating with the CBO forecasts. To interpret theseempiricalresultsinanencompassingframework,considerabaselinespecification that includes all seven impulse indicators selected in Ericsson (2017). The observed -ratios on retained impulses in Gamber and Liebner’s models are closely matched by -ratios as numerically solved from an encompassing analysis that starts with that baseline seven-indicator model. This comparison appears in Table A1. Moreover, the retention (or not) of individual impulse indicators in Gamber and Liebner (2017) is consistent with the losses in power implied by the encompassing analysis. Key empirical results can be summarized, as follows. Using the “bare-bones” implementation of IIS, Gamber and Liebner (2017, Section 3) detect the following impulse indicators in the second subsample (1998—2012): 31
Table A1: Actual and solved -ratios and residual standard errors for regressions of the CBO forecast errors on various impulse indicators. Regressor Block analyzed, significance level or target size, and result and column or statistic Bare-bones IIS Autometrics IIS 2nd block 2nd block 2nd block 1st block Multi-block Estimated ˆ (1%) (1%, 1%) (5%) (—) (1%) coefficient (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (e) col. #1 col. #2 col. #3 col. #4 col. #5a col. #5b 12 40 296 1990 ∗∗∗ 15 h i 24 35 48 352 2001 ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ 27 38 ∗ ∗∗ h i h i 31 42 312 2002 ∗∗ ∗∗∗ 34 ∗∗ h i 26 36 266 2003 ∗ ∗∗ 29 ∗∗ h i 46 38 64 85 627 2008 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 48 39 67 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ h i h i h i 25 36 48 353 2009 ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ 27 38 ∗ ∗∗ h i h i 26 35 257 2010 ∗ ∗∗ 28 ∗ h i ˆ 124 144 094 174 072 – 128 158 091 188 h i h i h i h i Calculated 057 046 080 038 – h i h i h i h i − rescaling factor Notes. Column headers indicate the version of IIS employed, the block(s) analyzed, the significance level (for bare-bones IIS) or target size (for Autometrics IIS), associated result (a)—(e), and the column number. Unbracketed numerical values are observed empirical -ratios, ˆ, and (for Column #5b) estimated coefficients from the designated regressions. Values in angled brackets are as solved from the encompassing analysis. Superscript asterisks , , and ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ h·i denoterejectionsofthenullhypothesisatthe5%,1%,and01%levelsrespectively;andthenull hypothesis is that the coefficient on the corresponding impulse indicator is zero. All actual and solved values are reported to just one or two decimals for readability, but solved quantities are calculated from unrounded actual values. All regressions include an intercept; ˆ is in percent; and the sample period is 1984—2012. In Column #2, selection at the 1% significance level is repeated. 32
(a) , , and (at a 1% significance level); 2001 2008 2009 (b) only (at a 1% significance level, but re-selected from (a)); and 2008 (c) , , , , , and (at a 5% significance level). 2001 2002 2003 2008 2009 2010 For the first subsample (1984—1997), Gamber and Liebner find that: (d) is not significant, nor is any other impulse indicator. 1990 Columns ##1—4 in Table A1 report the -ratios from (a)—(d). Using IIS in Autometrics, Ericsson (2017, Table 3) detects seven impulse indicators: (e) , , , , , , and (at a 1% target size). 1990 2001 2002 2003 2008 2009 2010 Column #5a in Table A1 reports the -ratios in that specification. The results in (a)—(e) present a puzzle. From (a)—(d) combined, Gamber and Liebner (2017) find that only is significant at the 1% level. By contrast, all 2008 seven impulses in (e) are significant at not only the 1% level but at the 05% level; and all but and are significant at the 01% level. 2003 2010 Theseapparentlycontradictoryresultscanbereconciledbyanencompassinganalysis that treats (e) as Model M0 (the DGP), (a)—(c) as versions of model M1, and (d) as model M2. In this context, specifications (e), (a)—(c), and (d) generalize equations (A2), (A3), and (A4) to (potentially) include multiple indicators in each subsample. The encompassing analysis begins with ˆ. Note that ˆ in Column #5a is 072, which is ˆ for the assumed DGP. In Columns ##1—4, the values of ˆ are much larger, as would be expected with omitted relevant indicators. Directly under those four values of ˆ, the values in angled brackets report the corresponding residual h·i standard errors, as solved numerically from the analytical example above. These solved values are calculated from formulas (A5) and (A6), generalized for multiple ˆ impulses, and using the values of ˆ and for the model in Column #5. The solved valuesforˆ areveryclosetotheactualvaluesforˆ, indicatinghowwelltheanalytical example helps explain (and encompass) Gamber and Liebner’s empirical results. Similarly, the values in angled brackets under actual -ratios report the h·i -ratios as solved from the encompassing analysis. To obtain a “solved” -ratio, the actual -ratio is rescaled by the ratio of Column #5’s ˆ to the solved value of the residual standard error. The values of the solved -ratios also are very close to their actual values. The last line in Table A1 reports the calculated rescaling factor, which highlights the considerable anticipated loss of information from the omitted impulse indicators in (a)—(d). To illustrate concretely how these encompassing calculations proceeded, consider the solved values for Column #3. From equation (A6), the solved value of ˆ is the square root of (0722 +(296229)), or 091. The solved -ratio on (e.g.) is 2001 48 (072091), or 38. These solved values for ˆ and the -ratio are very close to · the actual values of 094 and 35. 33
A.3 The Power of Impulse Indicator Saturation Gamber and Liebner (2017) observe that IIS has power to detect heteroscedasticity in the disturbances as well as nonconstancy in the forecast bias. Gamber and Liebner then conduct Monte Carlo simulations, which suggest that heteroscedasticity is a likely interpretation of the empirical results from IIS in Ericsson (2017). ParallelingGamberandLiebner’sMonteCarlosimulations, adirectanalyticalsolutionshows thatheteroscedasticitycangiverisetoIISdetectingmultipleimpulsedummies. However, the number of impulse dummies actually detected by IIS for the government debt forecast errors would likely require substantially more heteroscedasticity than assumed. This section summarizes the statistical framework for Gamber and Liebner’s Monte Carlo simulations, derives an alternative analytical solution, summarizes implications for the empirical results, and reconsiders the potential role of heteroscedasticity. To show that pure heteroscedasticity might explain the empirical results fromIIS, Gamber and Liebner (2017) adopt the following DGP for : NID(02) = 1 ; and (A7) ∼ NID(02) = ( +1) (A8) ∼ Based on the empirical setting for debt forecasts as analyzed with bare-bones IIS, Gamber and Liebner choose equations (A7)—(A8) with subsamples of length = 14 and = 15 where ( ), and subsample standard deviations of = 1007% ≡ − and = 2122%. Gamber and Liebner generate 104 replications of Monte Carlo data with these properties, apply bare-bones IIS to each replication, and count the number of dummies retained across replications. Table A2’s column labeled “Monte Carlo (5%)” reports Gamber and Liebner’s (2017, Table 1) estimated probabilities for retaining different numbers of impulse indicator dummies when selecting them at a 5% significance level on individual -ratios in bare-bones IIS. These estimated probabilities imply a nearly one-in-three chance of detecting six or more impulse indicators, six being the number of indicators detected in (c) above. The average number of indicators detected in the Monte Carlo simulation is 44. The statistical problem posed by Gamber and Liebner can also be solved analytically, noting the following features. First, the -ratios on the impulse indicators in bare-bones IIS have -distributions, once the -ratios are rescaled by or , as appropriate. Second, the probability of retaining a specific number of dummies can be derived from a generalization of the binomial distribution; see Stuart and Ord (1987, Chapter 5). Solving that probability obtains the values in Table A2’s column “Binomial solution (5%)”, which closely matches the previous column, “Monte Carlo (5%)”. As Section A.2 discusses, the empirically relevant target size is 1% (not 5%), and itis of interesttocalculatetheprobabilityof retainingatleastsevendummies(rather 34
TableA2: Calculatedprobabilitiesforretainingdifferentnumbersofimpulseindicator dummies under an assumption of heteroscedasticity, at 5% and 1% target sizes. Number of Monte Binomial Binomial Binomial retained Carlo solution solution solution dummies (5%) (5%) (1%) (1%) [ = 2842] 0 1.9 0.3 5.4 0.4 1 6.4 2.0 17.5 2.8 2 13.3 6.8 26.2 8.6 3 16.5 14.0 24.3 16.4 4 17.4 20.2 15.6 21.6 5 15.1 21.4 7.4 20.9 6 11.9 17.1 2.6 15.3 7 8.1 10.6 0.7 8.6 8 5.0 5.1 0.2 3.8 9 2.7 1.9 0.0 1.3 10 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.3 11 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 12 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 13 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Probability 29.4 35.3 3.5 29.4 of retaining 6+ dummies Probability 17.5 18.2 0.9 14.1 of retaining 7+ dummies Average 4.4 4.9 2.6 4.6 number of dummies retained Notes. All values for Monte Carlo and binomial calculations are in percent, except for the “average number of dummies retained”. Values in the column for “Monte Carlo (5%)” are from Gamber and Liebner (2017, Table 1), rounded to the first decimal in light of the implied uncertainty in their Monte Carlo simulation; see Hendry (1984). Probabilities in the antepenultimate and penultimate rowsarecalculatedfromunroundedvalues. Thefinalcolumniscalculatedforthe alternative value of equal to 2.842. 35
than at least six). The corresponding calculations appear in Table A2’s penultimate column, labeled “Binomial solution (1%)”. The average number of dummies retained is only 26, and the probability of retaining at least seven dummies is under 1%. Pure heteroscedasticity thus appears unlikely to explain the retention of the seven impulse indicators found in practice. That said, if the difference between the subsample standard deviations and were greater, the implied heteroscedasticity could have been a likely explanation for IIS’s empirical behavior. Specifically, if were 2842 rather than 2122 (and unchanged), then the probability of retaining at least six dummies would have been 294%, the same value as obtained by Gamber and Liebner. The corresponding calculations appear in Table A2’s final column, labeled “Binomial solution (1%) [ = 2842]”. A.4 Remarks Several issues merit additional remarks, including algorithmic implementation, the models considered, power, time-invariant bias, and directions for further research. First, algorithmic implementation of IIS requires important choices, as Hendry and Doornik (2014) discuss. Choices include the construction of the blocks, model selection criteria, use of diagnostic statistics, path search, block combination and reselection, iteration, and significance level. These choices may matter under the null hypothesis of correct specification, under the alternative hypothesis, or under both. For example, under the null hypothesis, too loose a significance level may inadvertently retain many irrelevant dummies, downwardly biasing the estimated residual standard error, and upwardly biasing -ratios; see Gamber and Liebner (2017). Hendry, Johansen, and Santos (2008) and Johansen and Nielsen (2009, 2013, 2016) consider this issue in detail. Hendry and Doornik (2014, Chapter 15) and Johansen and Nielsen (2016) propose implementable bias corrections. Even simpler, Hendry and Doornik (2014, Chapter 15) recommend a relatively tight significance level of 1 as a rule-of-thumb to help keep such estimation bias minimal. Ericsson (2017) employs an even tighter level of about 03 for IIS. So, the seven impulse indicators discussed in Section A.2 above are of substantive interest and do not appear to have been retained spuriously. Relatedly, bare-bones IIS can actually select more (and not only fewer) impulse indicators than Autometrics IIS, as Figures 6g and 6h in Ericsson (2017) imply. Second, the models considered–and those not considered–can affect the model selected. Thus, the results in Section A.2 may depend on differences between barebones and Autometrics implementations of IIS, indirectly through which models the two algorithms consider in their selection processes. For instance, if one of the blocks in bare-bones IIS had included 1990 in addition to 1998—2012, bare-bones IIS would have detected the impulse indicator for 1990 at the 1% significance level. When the 36
null hypothesisisfalse, thechoiceofblocksandtheimpliedsetofmodelscanstrongly influence IIS’s ability to detect the alternative. Hence, Autometrics searches over many blocks, including possibly overlapping and unequally sized blocks; see Doornik (2009a). Third, IIS has power to detect heteroscedasticity–and many other alternatives as well. Applications of IIS reflect that wide-ranging ability: see Hendry (1999) on nonconstancy, Johansen and Nielsen (2009) and Marczak and Proietti (2016) on outliers, Hendry and Doornik (2014, Chapter 15.6) on thick-tailed distributions, Hendry and Santos (2010) on heteroscedasticity and super exogeneity, Ericsson (2011b) on omitted variables and regime changes, Castle, Doornik, and Hendry (2012) on multiple breaks, Pretis, Schneider, Smerdon, and Hendry (2016) on “designer” breaks, and Ericsson (2016) on measurement errors. Gamber and Liebner (2017) underscore the benefits of IIS, stating that “... the IIS technique is useful as an ex-post diagnostic tool for detecting points in time when the model is biased” (Section 4), and that IIS is valuable “... as a general diagnostic tool for detecting model misspecification” (abstract). Fourth,inordertoachievegoodpoweragainstmanydifferentalternatives,Hendry and Doornik (2014) intentionally allow Autometrics to beneficially (and temporarily) relax the significance level in “... search[ing] for potentially significant, but as yet omitted, variables” (p. 235). Doing so has little effect under the null hypothesis but may be helpful under alternatives, as Section A.2 highlights. Fifth, time-invariant bias in the government debt forecasts is empirically detectable at the 02% significance level when using IIS, even if the retained impulse indicators are thought of as arising purely from “outliers”. By contrast, without IIS to robustify estimation and inference, the forecast bias appears insignificant at even the 10% level; cf. the Mincer—Zarnowitz A and A tests for the CBO in Ericsson ∗∗ (2017, Tables 3 and 7). Sixth, many directions for further research are highly promising. In particular, generalized saturation offers parsimonious representations of outliers and breaks; see Castle, Doornik, Hendry, and Pretis (2015) on step indicator saturation, and Ericsson (2011b) for a typology of saturation techniques. One saturation technique– multiplicative indicator saturation–embodies a structure similar to that of regimeswitching models, while allowing a given regime to differ quantitatively across its multiple occurrences. Highlighting this aspect, test (iii) in Ericsson (2017, Table 7) shows that forecast biases are not equal across different occurrences of the same “event” (or regime), where that event is a peak or a trough. A standard regimeswitching model would have difficulty accommodating such heterogeneity, and would have difficulty even detecting turning points as regimes because of their brief nature. 37
A.5 Conclusions Gamber and Liebner (2017) raise important issues concerning the interpretation of empirical results, particularly when employing impulse indicator saturation. In the discussion above, the analysis of alternative model specifications and the calculation of empirical power functions highlight consequences for IIS when the null hypothesis is incorrect. Specifically, IIS has power to detect many empirical features, including heteroscedasticity, structural breaks, outliers, and omitted variables. As a practical implication, theevidenceinEricsson(2017)andGamberandLiebner(2017)supports the interpretation that U.S. government agencies’ forecasts of U.S. gross federal debt have time-varying biases. 38
AppendixB. The Data and the Forecasts Sections 1—7 above, Gamber and Liebner (2017), and Ericsson (2017) (Appendix A above)analyzedataonU.S. governmentdebt(denoted“Debt”)andCBO, OMB, and APB forecasts of that debt, as compiled by Martinez (2015). The current appendix lists those data and forecasts in Table B1. See Martinez (2015) and Section 2 above for details, including sources and definitions. Table B1: U.S. government debt and CBO, OMB, and APB forecasts of that debt. Year Debt CBO OMB APB 1983 1381.886 — — — 1984 1576.748 1600. 1591.573 1599. 1985 1827.47 1853. 1841.077 1854. 1986 2129.964 2114. 2112. 2110.6 1987 2355.206 2364. 2372.4 2367.2 1988 2600.679 2598. 2581.6 2603. 1989 2865.664 2865. 2868.8 2869. 1990 3206.26 3131. 3113.3 3150. 1991 3598.919 3606. 3617.837 3616. 1992 4002.815 4039. 4080.3 4058. 1993 4351.149 4392. 4396.7 4391. 1994 4643.996 4690. 4676. 4692. 1995 4920.95 4942. 4961.5 4947. 1996 5181.923 5191. 5207.3 5193. 1997 5369.7 5436. 5453.7 5432. 1998 5478.717 5540. 5543.6 5524. 1999 5606.486 5579. 5614.9 5578. 2000 5629.009 5665. 5686. 5674. 2001 5770.249 5603. 5625. 5627. 2002 6198.129 6043. 6137.1 6117. 2003 6758.722 6620. 6752. 6706. 2004 7352.017 7459. 7486.4 7453. 2005 7902.8 7975. 8031.4 7991. 2006 8448.991 8515. 8611.5 8556. 2007 8948.534 8915. 9007.8 8968. 2008 9983.694 9432. 9654.4 9606. 2009 11873.812 11529. 12867.5 12303. 2010 13526.633 13260. 13786.6 13684. 2011 14762.223 15047. 15476.2 15006. 2012 16048.111 16002. 16350.9 16187. 2013 16716.791 17068. 17249.2 16897. 39
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Cite this document
Supplemental materials (.zip) : This file includes the data, code, & and output for the empirical and analytical results in this paper. (2017). How Biased Are U.S. Government Forecasts of the Federal Debt? (IFDP 2017-1189). Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion Papers. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/ifdp_2017-1189
@techreport{wtfs_ifdp_2017_1189,
author = {Supplemental materials (.zip) : This file includes the data and code and and output for the empirical and analytical results in this paper.},
title = {How Biased Are U.S. Government Forecasts of the Federal Debt?},
type = {International Finance Discussion Papers},
number = {2017-1189},
institution = {Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System},
year = {2017},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/ifdp_2017-1189},
abstract = {Government debt and forecasts thereof attracted considerable attention during the recent financial crisis. The current paper analyzes potential biases in different U.S. government agencies' one-year-ahead forecasts of U.S. gross federal debt over 1984-2012. Standard tests typically fail to detect biases in these forecasts. However, impulse indicator saturation (IIS) detects economically large and highly significant time-varying biases, particularly at turning points in the business cycle. These biases do not appear to be politically related. IIS defines a generic procedure for examining forecast properties; it explains why standard tests fail to detect bias; and it provides a mechanism for potentially improving forecasts.},
}